Trust is pervasive in our lives. Both our simplest actions - like buying a coffee, or crossing the street - as well as the functions of large collective institutions - like those of corporations and nation states - would not be possible without it. Yet only in the last several decades has trust started to receive focused attention from philosophers as a specific topic of investigation. The Routledge Handbook of Trust and Philosophy brings together 31 never-before published chapters, accessible for both students and researchers, created to cover the most salient topics in the various theories of trust. The Handbook is broken up into three sections: I. What is Trust? II. Whom to Trust? III. Trust in Knowledge, Science, and Technology The Handbook is preceded by a foreword by Maria Baghramian, an introduction by volume editor Judith Simon, and each chapter includes a bibliography and cross-references to other entries in the volume.

A theme of growing importance in both the law and philosophy and socio-legal literature is how regulatory dynamics can be identified (that is, conceptualised and operationalised) and normative expectations met in an age when transnational actors operate on a global plane and in increasingly fragmented and transformative contexts. A reconsideration of established theories and axiomatic findings on regulatory phenomena is an essential part of this discourse. There is indeed an urgent need for discontinuity regarding what we (think we) know about, among other things, law, legality, sovereignty and political legitimacy, power relations, institutional design and development, and pluralist dynamics of ordering under processes of globalisation and transnationalism. Making an important contribution to the scholarly debate on the subject, this volume features original and much-needed essays of theoretical and applied legal philosophy as well as socio-legal accounts that reflect on whether legal positivism has anything to offer to this intellectual enterprise. This is done by discussing whether global and transnational cultural, socio-political, economic, and juridical challenges as well as processes of diversification, fragmentation, and transformation (significantly, de-formalisation) reinforce or weaken legal positivists' assumptions, claims, and methods. The themes covered include, but are not limited to, absolute and limited state sovereignty; the 'new international legal positivism'; Hartian legal positivism and the 'normative positivist' account; the relationship between modern secularisation, social conventionalism, and meta-ontological issues of temporality in postnational jurisprudence; the social positivisation of human rights; the formation and content of jus cogens norms; feminist critique; the global and transnational migration of principles of justice and morality; the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties rule of interpretation; and the responsibility of transnational corporations.

This Handbook discusses representative philosophers in the history of the philosophy of law and social philosophy, giving clear concise expert definitions and explanations of key personalities and their ideas. It provides an essential reference for experts and newcomers alike.

This book provides a set of proposals for the new conceptual network required in order to establish civil law rules for a world permeated by Artificial Intelligence. These proposals are intended by their authors to push the debate on the new civil law forward. In spite of the natural conservatism of jurists, some innovative or even futuristic ideas are called for, also because the future, even this not-so-distant one, is difficult to foresee. Paradoxically, and unlike in the past, this lack of knowledge must not stop us from planning. If it does, humankind may, as some pessimists already claim, lose its chance to win the battle for control of the world. The rise and expansion of Artificial Intelligence and robotics in recent years has highlighted a pressing need to create a suitable legal framework for this new phenomenon. The debate on the subject, although wide-ranging and involving many new legal documents, is still quite general and preliminary in nature, although these preparatory works illustrate the very real need to develop appropriate new civil law arrangements. It is exactly the branch of private law where the necessity of these new rules appears to be the most imperative. Autonomous vehicles, medical robots, and expertise software raise fundamental questions on aspects of civil liability such as culpability; whereas the growth in popularity of automated, intelligent software systems for concluding contracts requires a new approach to many fundamental and deeply rooted elements of contract law, e.g. consciousness, intent, error, deception, interpretation of contracts and good faith. Ruling on these specific matters demands the identification and clarification of certain key points, which shall become the foundation for constructing AI/robot civil law.

Let us endeavor to see things as they are, and then enquire whether we ought to complain. Whether to see life as it is, will give us much consolation, I know not; but the consolation which is drawn from truth if any there be, is solid and durable: that which may be derived from errour, must be, like its original, fallacious and fugitive. Samuel Johnson, Letter to Bennet Langton (1758) Attorneys and clients make hundreds of decisions in every litigation case. From initially deciding which attorney to retain to deciding which witnesses to call at trial, from deciding whether to ?le a complaint to deciding whether to appeal a verdict, attorneys and clients make multiple, critical decisions about strategies, costs, arguments, valuations, evidence and negotiations. Once made, these de- sions are scrutinized by an opponent intent on exploiting the consequences of any mistake. In this intense and adversarial arena, decision-making errors often are transparent, irreversible and dispositive, wielding the power to bankrupt clients and dissolve law ?rms. Although attorneys and clients may regard sound decision making as incidental to effective lawyering, sound decision making actually is the essence of effective lawyering. An attorney's knowledge, intelligence and experience are inert re- urces until the attorney decides how to deploy those skills to serve the client's interests. Those decisions, in turn, largely determine a case's course and outcome.

The intertwinement of EC law and national law may create unforeseeability in situations where EC law invades the national cases. This study contributes to the contemporary discussion, which wrestles with questions such as: What have been the visions and objectives for European integration in the last decades? How to describe European Union as a political entity and a legal system? What is the relationship between legal certainty, rule of law, various general principles and human rights?

How does law possess the normative force it requires to direct our actions? This book argues that this seemingly innocuous question is of central importance to the philosophy of law and, by extension, of the very concept of law itself. It advances a position grounded in the secular natural law tradition, and in doing so addresses the two success criteria for this position head on: Firstly, that commitment to the existence of a supreme moral principle is required; Secondly, that any supreme moral principle must be identifiable through human reason. The book argues that these conditions are met by Alan Gewirth's Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), which - through a dialectically necessary argument - locates the existence of universally applicable moral norms in the concept of agency. Given the very purpose of law is to guide action, legal norms must be located in a unified hierarchy of practical reason. It follows that, if law is to succeed in claiming to be capable of guiding our action, moral permissibility with reference to the PGC is a necessary condition of a rule's legal validity. This strong theory of natural law is defended throughout, both against moral sceptics and positions within contemporary legal positivism.

A book on legal philosophy, necessarily, focuses attention on law. In addition to this focus, An Introduction to an African Legal Philosophy focuses attention on philosophy. The link between law and philosophy is brought into relief, which is done through an African context. An attempt is made to spell out what is African about legal philosophy without being cut off of African legal philosophy from non-African legal philosophy. The book draws attention to the view that a basic component of African legal philosophy consists of an investigation of what it is to be an African, and because an African is a human being among other human beings, the investigation is about what it is to be a human being. Ubuntuism is an African-derived word that captures this mode of being human. Moreover, because human beings are cultural beings, African cultural context guides the investigation. Inescapably, it is claimed that, every legal philosophy is embedded in a culture. African legal philosophy is not an exception. It is deeply rooted in African culture -a culture that is today shaped, in part, by a European colonialist culture. One feature that will strike one as one reads the book is that the book approaches African legal philosophy as a means of decolonization of African culture. African legal philosophy can accomplish this intelligently and effectively if it is itself decolonized. In doing this it contrasts sharply with mainstream Western legal philosophy.

Methodological and metaphilosophical disputes in the contemporary philosophy of law are very vivid. Basic issues remain controversial. The purpose of the book is to confront approaches of Anglo-Saxon and continental philosophy of law to the following topics: the purpose of legal philosophy, the role of disagreement in legal philosophy, methodology of legal philosophy (conceptual analysis) and normativity of law. We see those areas of legal metaphilosophy as drawing recently more and more attention in the literature. The authors of particular chapters are internationally recognised scholars rooted in various traditions: Anglo-Saxon (Gerald Postema, Dennis Patterson, Kenneth Ehrenberg, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco); Southern-European (Riccardo Guastini, Manuel Atienza); Nordic (Torben Spaak); German (Ralf Poscher); and Central-European (Jan Wolenski, Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki, Adam Dyrda). They represent different approaches and different backgrounds. The purpose of the volume is to contribute to the cross-cultural discussions of fundamental issues of philosophy of law.

This work is part of a series focusing on research into law and economics. It discusses a variety of topics in the field.

This anthology illustrates how law and economics is developing in Europe and what opportunities and problems - both in general and specific legal fields - are associated with this approach within the legal traditions of European countries. The first part illuminates the differences in the development and reception of the economic analysis of law in the American Common Law system and in the continental European Civil Law system. The second part focuses on the different ways of thinking of lawyers and economists, which clash in economic analysis of law. The third part is devoted to legal transplants, which often accompany the reception of law and economics from the United States. Finally, the fourth part focuses on the role economic analysis plays in the law of the European Union. This anthology with its 14 essays from young European legal scholars is an important milestone in establishing a European law and economics culture and tradition.

Global Perspectives on Subsidiarity is the first book of its kind exclusively devoted to the principle of subsidiarity. It sheds new light on the principle and explores and develops the many applications of the principle of subsidiarity. The book provides a comprehensive overview of the principle in all its facets, from its philosophical origins in the writings of Aristotle and Aquinas, to its development in Catholic social doctrine, and its emergence as a key principle in European Union Law. This book explores the relationship between subsidiarity and concepts such as sphere sovereignty and social pluralism. It analyses subsidiarity in light of globalisation, federalism, democracy, individual rights and welfare, and discusses subsidiarity and the Australian, Brazilian and German Constitutions.

This Handbook discusses representative philosophers in the history of the philosophy of law and social philosophy, giving clear concise expert definitions and explanations of key personalities and their ideas. It provides an essential reference for experts and newcomers alike.

To a certain extent, this book is a translation of Recht, verhaal en werke- lijkheid, published by Coutinho (Bussum, 1993). Chapters 1, 5 and 9, however, differ considerably from the original. At the basis of the Dutch book were arguments already submitted in 'Narrative coherence in legal contexts', in C. Faralli and E. Pattaro (eds.), Reason in Law, vol. III., Milano, A. Giuffre Editore, 1988, pp. 159-170; 'Justice, Rights, and Hu- man Dignity', in The Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice, 7, 1987, pp. 46-65; 'Narrative coherence and the guises of legalism', in P. Nerhot (ed.), Law, Interpretation and Reality, Dordrecht - Boston, Kluwer Aca- demic Publishers, 1990, pp. 310-345; 'The Instituting of Brute Facts', in The International Journal for the Semiotics of Law / Revue internationale de semiotique juridique, 4, 1991, pp. 279-308. For chapters 1 and 9 I used the following materials: 'Law is narrative, not literature', in W.l. Witte- veen (ed.), Law, Rhetoric and Literature (Special Issue of the Dutch Jour- nal for Legal Philosophy and Legal Theory), 23, No.3, 1994, Zwolle, Tjeenk Willink, 1994, pp. 221-227 (with a response by R. Weisberg, pp. 228-229); and 'Seeing Places: On Prepositions in Law', The International Journal for the Semiotics of Law / Revue internationale de semiotique juridique, 6, 1993, pp. 249-270. Chapter 5 was rewritten on the basis of 'The Instituting of Brute Facts'.

In law, gains, like losses, don't always lie where they fall. The circumstances in which the law requires defendants to give up their gains are well documented in the work of unjust enrichment lawyers. The same cannot be said, however, of the reasons for ordering restitution of such gains. It is often suggested that unjust enrichment's existence can be demonstrated without inquiry into these reasons, into the principles of justice it represents and invokes. Yet while we can indeed show that there exists a body of claims dealing with the recovery of mistaken payments and the like without going on to inquire into their rationale, this isn't true of unjust enrichment's existence as a distinct ground of such claims. If unjust enrichment exists as a body of like cases and claims, truly independent of contract and tort, it does so by virtue of the distinct reasons it identifies and to which these claims respond. Reason and Restitution examines the reasons which support and shape claims in unjust enrichment and how these reasons bear on the law's resolution of these claims. The identity of these reasons matters. For one thing, unjust enrichment's status as a distinct ground of liability depends on the distinctiveness of these reasons. But, more importantly, it matters to those charged with the practical tasks of deciding cases and making laws, for it is these reasons alone which can direct how judges and legislators ought to respond to these claims.

Instead of the usual apologetic treatment found in legal doctrine, linked to the determinacy, immutability or predictability of norms, this book treats legal certainty innovatively, holistically and in depth. Using a method at once analytical and functional, Professor Avila examines the structural elements of legal certainty, from its definition and foundations to its various dimensions, normative forces and efficacies, citing a wealth of examples from case law to support each of the theses defended. No subject is more important and topical than legal certainty. Problems relating to lack of understanding, instability and unpredictability of law intensify day by day everywhere, in civil law and common law countries alike. Normative sources are increasingly diverse in origin (national, international, community) and multiple in nature (legal, contractual, jurisprudential). They change constantly, and present increasingly frequent problems of ambiguity and vagueness that significantly hinder their comprehension. This state of affairs, which to a greater or lesser extent is true of any legal order, justifies a return to the subject of legal certainty. In this book, essential questions are answered such as: Legal certainty in what sense? Certainty of what, for whom, in whose vision and by whom? When, to what extent, and to what end? "(...) it is probably the most comprehensive and systematic study ever produced on this subject using the analytical method." (Riccardo Guastini, Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Genoa, Italy)

When should we follow the law? How can we know what law's words mean? What iisr law? biLaw's Evolution and Human Understandingrr presents fresh and surprising answers to these questions. In an account alive with the stories of our shared human history, Laurence Claus explains why we should discard the old idea that legal rules tell us what to do, and instead see law as a system of sayings that evolves among humans to help us better iunderstand each otherr. When driving on public roads, when buying and selling, and in countless other aspects of our work and play, we depend on law to let us know what other people are likely to do and to expect of us. Through fast-paced pages of anecdote and argument, biLaw's Evolution and Human Understandingrr explains the revolutionary consequences of seeing law as truly what Oliver Wendell Holmes called it: systematized prediction. The book reveals how this vision of law can transform our thinking about the way we make moral decisions, about the way we read law, and about many other ways that law affects our lives.

Mainstream historians in recent decades have often treated formal categories and rules as something to be 'used' by individuals, as one might use a stick or stone, and the gains of an earlier legal history are often needlessly set aside. Anthropologists, meanwhile, have treated rules as analytic errors and categories as an imposition by outside powers or by analysts, leaving a very thin notion of 'practice' as the stuff of social life. Philosophy of an older vintage, as well as the work of scholars such as Charles Taylor, provides fresh approaches when applied imaginatively to cases beyond the traditional ground of modern Europe and North America. Not only are different kinds of rules and categories open to examination, but the very notion of a rule can be explored more deeply. This volume approaches rules and categories as constitutive of action and hence of social life, but also as providing means of criticism and imagination. A general theoretical framework is derived from analytical philosophy, from Wittgenstein to his critics and beyond, and from recent legal thinkers such as Schauer and Waldron. Case-studies are presented from a broad range of periods and regions, from Amazonia via northern Chad, Tibet, and medieval Russia to the scholarly worlds of Roman law, Islam, and Classical India. As the third volume in the Legalism series, this collection draws on common themes that run throughout the first two volumes: Legalism: Anthropology and History and Legalism: Community and Justice, consolidating them in a framework that suggests a new approach to rule-bound systems.

Over 2 billion people (61% of the world's employed population) work in the informal economy. Due to its pervasiveness, informality plays a major role in understanding a wide swath of ideas, such as development, work, employment, governance, and growth. Its scope, nonetheless, goes far beyond economic definitions and political agendas. As the book argues, at the root of informality lies another comprehensive, yet generally unnoticed-or at best unduly treated-phenomenon: that of noncompliance with the law. Whilst it is true that much attention has been paid to the economic aspect over the past 5 decades, the same cannot be said about the legal aspect, which is one of its constitutive features. This book takes the first steps in this direction. The book provides an account of the phenomenon's legal nature through the lens of a case study on street vendors in Brazil, focusing on what can be conceived as noncompliance and by which forms noncompliant behaviour can be assessed. It goes on to set out the most striking impacts of noncompliance; specifically, what happens with the legal system when noncompliance becomes pervasive.

This book contributes conceptually, theoretically and morally to a deeper understanding of the distinctive Asian perceptions of punishment, justice and human rights. Researched and prepared by scholars who have not only been conducting studies on the death penalty in the region but have also been advocating for legal reforms, this edited book touches upon the different justifications for the use of capital punishment in the ASEAN region, exposing the secrecy, sensitivities and dilemmas that mask violations of international human rights laws. The chapters bring in numerous new perspectives which have been overlooked in the traditional discourse surrounding the use of the death penalty, such as that around crimes that do not meet the threshold of “most serious�; the dignity of death row inmates and their families; contradictions within religion and capital punishment; and the way in which growing authoritarianism and the media are adversely influencing the public’s perception and support for capital punishment in the region. In examining how public opinion shapes state policies towards the death penalty and how it varies according to different offences and different states, the authors critically analyse how the international human rights mechanisms have specifically called for ASEAN member states to refrain from extending the application of the death penalty and to limit it to the “most serious crimes.� Relevant to socio-legal scholars focused on crime and punishment in Southeast Asia, and in the Global South more broadly, this is a landmark collection in criminology and human rights scholarship.  Chapter "ASEAN and the Death Penalty: Theoretical and Legal Views and a Pathway to Abolition" is available open access under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License via link.springer.com.

This book provides a new approach to the study of the History of Roman Law. It collects the first results of the European Research Council Project, Scriptores iuris Romani - dedicated to a new collection of the texts of Roman jurisprudence, highlighting important methodological issues, together with innovative reconstructions of the profiles of some ancient jurists and works. Jurists were great protagonists of the history of Rome, both as producers and interpreters of law, since the Republican Age and as collaborators of the principes during the Empire. Nevertheless, their role has been underestimated by modern historians and legal experts for reasons connected to the developments of Modern Law in England and in Continental Europe. This book aims to address this imbalance. It presents an advanced paradigm in considering the most important aspects of Roman law: the Justinian Digesta, and other juridical late antique anthologies. The work offers an historiographic model which overturns current perspectives and makes way for a different path for legal and historical studies. Unlike existing literature, the focus is not on the Justinian Codification, but on the individualities of ancient Roman Jurists. As such, it presents the actual legal thought of its experts and authors: the ancient iuris prudentes. The book will be of interest to researchers and academics in Classics, Ancient History, History of Law, and contemporary legal studies.

This book features mathematical and formal philosophers' efforts to understand philosophical questions using mathematical techniques. It offers a collection of works from leading researchers in the area, who discuss some of the most fascinating ways formal methods are now being applied. It covers topics such as: the uses of probable and statistical reasoning, rational choice theory, reasoning in the environmental sciences, reasoning about laws and changes of rules, and reasoning about collective decision procedures as well as about action. Utilizing mathematical techniques has been very fruitful in the traditional domains of formal philosophy - logic, philosophy of mathematics and metaphysics - while formal philosophy is simultaneously branching out into other areas in philosophy and the social sciences. These areas particularly include ethics, political science, and the methodology of the natural and social sciences. Reasoning about legal rules, collective decision-making procedures, and rational choices are of interest to all those engaged in legal theory, political science and economics. Statistical reasoning is also of interest to political scientists and economists.

This book explores innovative and context-driven political and legal policy measures designed to expand the powers of the African Union (AU) in order to meaningfully drive the continental integration process. In this regard, the book addresses issues of context, political will, and innovative and inclusive approaches as essential elements that must be considered. Africa is currently experiencing one of the most critical phases of its integrative development. Since 2015, there have been increasing efforts to develop policies and practices that grant the AU broader powers to coordinate and create binding rules regarding the regional integration process. In other words, these processes seek to endow the AU with supranational powers like those exercised by the European Union, which, despite its internal problems, remains the most successful experiment in supranationalism in the world. This has included the decision to finance the AU through a 0.2% tax on eligible imports into member states; the decision to reduce the number of AU Commission portfolios from eight to six; the adoption and entry into force of the much touted Agreement establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area; the adoption of the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right to Residence and Right of Establishment; and the adoption of the AU Agenda 2063 policy framework in 2015. How these processes will change the direction of regional integration in Africa, the book argues, largely depends on the existence of quality-driven institutions.

The expression "transitional justice" emerged at the end of the Cold War, during the transition from dictatorships to democracies, and serves as a central concept in dealing with systemic injustice. This textbook examines the basic principles of transitional justice and explores its core mechanisms, including prosecutions, amnesties, truth commissions, reparations, and vetting the public service. It elaborates the substance and legal framework of these mechanisms and discusses current challenges. The book provides extensive material illustrating a wide variety of transitional justice situations. "This book summarizes the subjects of transitional justice and Vergangenheitsbewaltigung systematically and clearly" (Joachim Gauck, German Federal President, 2012-2017).

What sort of methods are best suited to understanding constitutional doctrines and practices? Should we look to lawyers and legal methods alone, or should we draw upon other disciplines such as history, sociology, political theory, and moral philosophy? Should we study constitutions in isolation or in a comparative context? To what extent must constitutional methods be sensitive to empirical data about the functioning of legal practice? Can ideal theory aid our understanding of real constitutions? This volume brings together constitutional experts from around the world to address these types of questions through topical events and challenges such as Brexit, administrative law reforms, and the increasing polarisations in law, politics, and constitutional scholarship. Importantly, it investigates the ways in which we can ensure that constitutional scholars do not talk past each other despite their persistent - and often fierce - disagreements. In so doing, it aims systematically to re-examine the methodology of constitutional theory.