This is the second volume of a new series entitled `Current Legal Issues' that are to be published each Spring as a sister volume to `Current Legal Problems'. The second volume shows that although law is literature, it also features in literature such as Shakespeare, Dickens, and Hardy. It is a particular form of literature and is not always recognized as such. The law is also used to control literature through defamation, blasphemy, obscenity, etc. These are just some of the many themes that are covered in this stimulating collection by leading writers on both sides of the Atlantic.

The term anarchism derives from the Greek word meaning 'without ruler or leader, and without law'. Although the roots of the word can be traced back to Ancient Greece, anarchism as a political ideology is relatively new. Anarchism developed as a political ideology at the end of the eighteenth century at the time of the emergence of the modern State. And, as is well known, anarchism developed both a politics and a way of life that did not include the State as its compass, support and structure. In contrast to the extensive contemporary literature about anarchist politics and ideas, this book focuses on the practices and attitudes that constitute what the author refers to as an anarchist 'art of life'. The book draws on archival material that records the life and actions of the anarchist Emma Goldman and her associates, legal documents and writings by classical (Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Peter Krotopkin) and contemporary anarchists (David Graeber, Saul Newman, Ciarra Bottici), as well as contemporary groups such as the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army and Occupy Wall Street. By studying the idiosyncrasies of this art of life, it argues, we are better able to appreciate how anarchism is not some future utopian oriented project, waiting to come into existence after a revolution, but rather exists in parallel to the life and politics offered by the State. Anarchism: An Art of Living Without Law will be of interest to graduate students and academics working on critical legal theory, political theory, sociology and cultural studies.

In Defense of Legal Positivism is an uncompromising defence of legal positivism that insists on the separability of law and morality. After distinguishing among three facets of morality, Matthew Kramer explores a variety of ways in which law has been perceived as integrally connected to each of those facets.

This peer-reviewed book features essays on the Armenian massacres of 1915-1916. It aims to cast light upon the various questions of international law raised by the matter. The answers may help improve international relations in the region. In 1915-1916, roughly a million and a half Armenians were murdered in the territory of the Ottoman Empire, which had been home to them for centuries. Ever since, a dispute between Armenians and Turkey has been ongoing over the qualification of the massacres. The contributors to this volume examine the legal nature and consequences of this event. Their investigation strives to be completely neutral and technical. The essays also look at the broader issue of denial. For instance, in Turkey, public speech on the matter can still trigger criminal prosecution whereas in other European States denial of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity is criminalized. However, the European Court of Human Rights views criminal prosecution of denial of the Armenian massacres as unlawful. In addition, one essay considers a state's obligation to remember by looking at lessons learnt from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Another contributor looks at a collective right to remember and some ideas to move forward towards a solution. Moreover, the book explores the way the Armenian massacres have affected the relationship between Turkey and the European Union.

Obligations: New Trajectories in Law provides a critical analysis of the role of obligations in contemporary legal and social practices. As rights have become the preeminent feature of modern political and legal discourse, the work of obligations has been overshadowed. Questioning and correcting this dominant image of our time, this book brings obligations back into view in a way that fits better with the realities of contemporary social life. Following a historical account of the changing place and priorities of obligations in modernity, the book analyses how obligations and practices of obedience are core to understanding how law sustains conditions of inequality. But it also explores the enduring role obligations play in furthering individual and collective well-being, highlighting their significance in practices that prioritize human and environmental needs, common goods, and solidarity. In doing so, it also offers an alternative and cogent assessment of the force, and the potential, of obligations in contemporary societies. This original jurisprudential contribution will appeal to an academic and student readership in law, politics, and the social sciences.

Using an innovative history of the constitutional right to privacy, and inspired by Emersonian Justices like Brandeis and Douglas, this book rescues the meaning of privacy from prevalent liberal thinking by proposing a general theory of rights based on a spiritual-ecological jurisprudence tradition at the heart of American law. The right to privacy is a powerful, yet often overlooked tradition, whose main representatives are Justice Brandeis and Justice Douglas, both of whom translated into concretely legal and political ideas the philosophy of American thinkers like Emerson and Thoreau. In light of this historical understanding, the major constitutional cases relating to privacy, such as Griswold or Roe v. Wade, are given new interpretations. Through a radical reinterpretation of Mill's philosophy of liberty, and a comparison of that reinterpretation with the one of Brandeis, this book proposes a new general theory of rights, based on the valuation of privacy as a transformative context in which self-knowledge can emerge, giving birth to ethical and communal responsibility.

It contributes to the field of posthumanism through its application of posthuman feminism to international law Interdisciplinary approach. Will appeal to students and scholars with interests in legal, feminist, and posthuman theory, as well as those concerned with the contemporary challenges faced by international law.

Regulation has become a key form of state activity and an area of burgeoning academic concern, both in Public Law and Economics. This collection makes available to the reader a number of indispensable readings. The text considers the central topics of regulation and looks to theory as well as practice, enforcement as well as rule-making, and supra-national as well as domestic concerns. Particular attention is paid to the ways that regulatory developments can be explained, the choices of technique that confront regulators and the varieties of regulatory style that are encountered within and between different regimes. The introductory essay considers the maturation of regulation both as a practice and as a discipline. it examines regulation as a topic for study, reviews major developments in regulation and outlines central themes. This book is intended as a resource for upper-level undergraduate students and teachers of regulation as part of degree courses in law, economics, business, public policy and politics, but also for those involved in or subject to regulation on a daily basis.

This book descibes in detail the development of substantive criminal law during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The author examines the forces which shaped criminal jurisprudence throughout the course of this period, paying particular attention to the activities of legislators and reformers, to parallel developments in the study of punishment and human psychology, to general social and political changes and to the growth of an organised police force and its reliance upon formal rules of proceedure and evidence.

This book argues for a mixed theory of legal punishment that treats both crime reduction and retribution as important aims of the state. A central question in the philosophy of law is why the state's punishment of its own citizens is justified. Traditionally, two theories of punishment have dominated the field: consequentialism and retributivism. According to consequentialism, punishment is justified when it maximizes positive outcomes. According to retributivism, criminals should be punished because they deserve it. This book recognizes the strength of both positions. According to the two-tiered model, the institution of punishment and statutory penalties, as set by the legislature, are justified based on their costs and benefits, in terms of deterrence and rehabilitation. The law exists to preserve the public order. Criminal courts, by contrast, determine who is punished and how much based on what offenders deserve. The courts express the community's collective sense of resentment at being wronged. This book supports the two-tiered model by showing that it accords with our moral intuitions, commonly held (compatibilist) theories of freedom, and assumptions about how the extent of our knowledge affects our obligations. It engages classic and contemporary work in the philosophy of law and explains the theory's advantages over competing approaches from retributivists and other mixed theorists. The book also defends consequentialism against a longstanding objection that the social sciences give us little guidance regarding which policies to adopt. Drawing on recent criminological research, the two-tiered model can help us to address some of our most pressing social issues, including the death penalty, drug policy, and mass incarceration. This book will be of interest to philosophers, legal scholars, policymakers, and social scientists, especially criminologists, economists, and political scientists.

What is a right? What, if anything, makes rights different from other features of the normative world, such as duties, standards, rules, or principles? Do all rights serve some ultimate purpose? In addition to raising these questions, philosophers and jurists have long been aware that different senses of 'a right' abound. To help make sense of this diversity, and to address the above questions, they developed two types of accounts of rights: models and theories. This book explicates rights modelling and theorising and scrutinises their methodological underpinnings. It then challenges this framework by showing why the theories ought to be abandoned. In addition to exploring structural concerns, the book also addresses the various ways that rights can be used. It clarifies important differences between rights exercise, enforcement, remedying, and vindication, and identifies forms of legal rights-claiming and rights-invoking outside of institutional contexts.

The subject of this book is human rights law, focusing on historic achievement of a common standard viewed from a perspective of Pengchun Chang's contributions to the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). This is an original research, integrating different research methods: inter-disciplinary approaches, historical and comparative methods, and documentary research and so on. The research findings can be described briefly as follows: Chinese wisdom has played an important role in achieving a common standard for the establishment of the international human rights system, which can be seen by exploring P. C. Chang's contributions to the drafting of the UDHR. The target readers are global scholars and students in law, politics, philosophy, international relations, human rights law, legal history, religion and culture. This book will enable these potential readers to have a vivid picture of the Chinese contributions to the international human rights regime and to have a better understanding of the significance of the traditional Chinese culture and P. C. Chang's human rights philosophy of pluralism.

Focusing on John Milton's Paradise Lost , this book investigates the metaphorical identification of nature with a court of law - an old and persistent trope, haunted by ancient aporias, at the intersection of jurisprudence, philosophy and literature. In an enormous variety of texts, from the Greek beginnings of Western literature onward, nature has been described as a courtroom in which an all- encompassing trial takes place and a universal verdict is executed. The first, introductory part of this study sketches an overview of the metaphor's development in European history, from antiquity to the seventeenth century. In its second, more extensive part, the book concentrates on Milton's epic Paradise Lost in which the problem of the natural law court finds one of its most fascinating and detailed articulations. Using conceptual tools provided by Hannah Arendt, Walter Benjamin, Hans Blumenberg, Gilles Deleuze, William Empson and Alfred North Whitehead, the study demonstrates that the conflicts in Milton's epic revolve around the tension between a universal legal procedure inherent in nature and the positive legal decrees of the deity. The divine rule is found to consolidate itself by Nature's supplementary shadow government; their inconsistencies are not flaws, but rather fundamental rhetorical assets, supporting a law that is inherently "double- formed". In Milton's world, human beings are thus confronted with a twofold law that entraps them in its endlessly proliferating double binds, whether they obey or not. The analysis of this strange juridical structure can open up new perspectives on Milton's epic, as well as on the way legal discourse tends to entangle norms with facts and thus to embed itself in human life. This original and intriguing book will appeal not only to those engaged in the study of Milton, but also to anyone interested in the relationship between law, history, literature and philosophy.

This book examines ethics at the intersection of law and justice. If law and justice are concerned with collectively establishing the general terms on which the plurality called "we" share the earth as social beings, then ethics concerns the individual Self's particular moral relationship with the Other. Law, the acknowledged offspring of politics, represents the kind of might that most people accept as legitimate, at least most of the time. Justice, on the other hand, is supposed to vigilantly stand guard over law: to protect us against its biases and excesses, or, at the very least, to rise up and reproach the law whenever it permits or encourages injustice. But what if the belief that a particular legally-authorized state of affairs is "just" - a common enough feeling, especially amongst the privileged - or even "unjust" and in need of correction, were itself in need of a vigilant guardian? This book argues that ethics can and should stand guard over whatever image of justice and/or just law one happens to believe in. The book thus attempts to steer a perilous course between two looming moral hazards: ethics interpreted as the rational production of ethically correct behavior (as in Kant) and ethics interpreted as the spontaneous eruption of pre-rational compassion for the suffering of the Other, come what may (as in Levinas). In the end, the book characterizes ethical life in the law as the more-or-less constant experience of the paradoxical nature of this choice - a feeling of inescapable personal responsibility for the fate of the Other. Based on the author's well-established expertise in the area, this book will appeal to students, scholars and others with interests in legal theory and moral and political philosophy.

This book features new perspectives on the ethics and politics of free speech. Contributors draw on insights from philosophy, psychology, political theory, journalism, literature, and history to respond to pressing problems involving free speech in liberal societies.

This book analyses the institution and concept of dictatorship from a legal, historical and theoretical perspective, examining the different types of dictatorship, their relationship to the law, as well as the analytical value of the concept in contemporary world. In particular, it seeks to codify the main theories and conceptions of 'dictatorship', with the goal of unearthing their contradictions. The book's main premise is that the concept of dictatorship and the different types of the dictatorial form have to be assessed and can only be understood in their historical context. On this basis, the elaborations on dictatorship of such diverse thinkers as Carl Schmitt, Donoso Cortes, Karl Marx, Ernst Fraenkel, Franz Neumann, Nicos Poulantzas, and V. I. Lenin, are discussed in their historical context: 'classical and Caesaristic dictatorship' in ancient Rome, 'dictatorship' in revolutionary France of 1789 and counterrevolutionary France of 1848, 'fascist dictatorship' in Nazi Germany, and 'dictatorship of the proletariat' in Russia of 1917. The book contributes to the theory of dictatorship as it outlines the contradictions of the different typologies of the dictatorial form and seeks to explain them on the basis of the concept of 'class dictatorship'. The book's original claim is that the dictatorial form, as a modality of class rule that relies predominantly on violence and repression, has been essential to the reproduction of bourgeois rule and, consequently, of capitalist social relations. This function has given rise to different types and conceptualisations of dictatorship depending on the level of capitalist development. This book is addressed to anyone with an interest in law, political theory, political history and sociology. It can serve as core text for courses that seek to introduce students to the institution or theory of dictatorship. It may also serve as a reference text for post-graduate programs in law and politics, because of its interdisciplinary and critical approach.

This is the first book to comprehensively analyze the work of Hans Micklitz, one of the leading scholars in the field of EU economic law. It brings together analysts, academic friends and critics of Hans Micklitz and results in a unique collection of essays that evaluate his work on European Economic Law and Regulation. The contributions discuss a wide range of Micklitz' work: from his theoretical work on private law beyond party autonomy, with a special focus on its regulatory function, to the illustration of how his work has built the basis for current solutions such as used in solving the financial crisis. The book is divided into sections covering foundations of private law, regulatory law, competition and intellectual property law, product safety law, consumer contract law and the enforcement of law. This book clearly shows the enormous impact of Hans Micklitz' work on the EU legal system in both scholarship and practice.

Addressing the influential analysis of law and literature, this book offers a new perspective on their relationship. The law and literature movement that has gained global prominence in the course of last decades of the twentieth and the first decades of the twenty-first centuries has provided the research and teaching of law with a considerable body of new and valuable knowledge and understanding. Most of the knowledge and insights generated by the movement concern either a thematic overlap between legal and literary discourses - suggesting they deal with the same moral concerns - or a rhetorical, semiotic or general linguistic comparability or 'sameness' between them - imputing to both the same or very similar narrative structures. The Literary Exception and the Rule of Law recognises the wealth of knowledge generated by this approach to the relationship between law and literature, and acknowledges its debt to this genre of scholarship. It nevertheless also proposes, on the basis of a number of revealing phenomenological inquiries, a different approach to law and literary studies: one that emphasises the irreducible difference between law and literature. It does so with the firm believe that a regard for the very different and indeed opposite discursive trajectories of legal and literary language allows for a more profound understanding of the unique and indeed separate roles that the discourses of law and literature generally play in the sustenance of relatively stable legal cultures. This important rethinking of the relationship between law and literature will appeal to scholars and students of legal theory, jurisprudence, philosophy, politics and literary theory.

This book offers a multi-discursive analysis of the constitutional foundations for peaceful coexistence, the constitutional background for discontent and the impact of discontent, and the consequences of conflict and revolution on the constitutional order of a democratic society which may lead to its implosion. The volume provides the reader with a multi-discursive analysis of the constitutional foundations of peace, discontent and revolution. It explores the capacity of the constitutional order to serve as a reliable framework for peaceful co-existence while allowing for reasonable and legitimate discontent. It outlines the main factors contributing to rising pressure on constitutional order which may produce an implosion of constitutionalism and constitutional democracy as we have come to know it. The collection presents a wide range of views on the ongoing implosion of the liberal-democratic constitutional consensus which predetermined the constitutional axiology, the institutional design, the constitutional mythology and the functioning of the constitutional orders since the last decades of the 20th century. The constitutional perspective is supplemented with perspectives from financial, EU, labour and social security law, administrative law, migration and religious law. Liberal viewpoints encounter radical democratic and critical legal viewpoints. The work thus allows for a plurality of viewpoints, theoretical preferences and thematic discourses offering a pluralist scientific account of the key challenges to peaceful coexistence within the current constitutional framework. The book provides a valuable resource for academics, researchers and policy-makers working in the areas of constitutional law and politics.

Academic legal production, when it focuses on the study of law, generally grasps this concept on the basis of a reference to positive law and its practice. This book differs clearly from these analyses and integrates the legal approach into the philosophy of normative language, philosophical realism and pragmatism. The aim is not only to place the examination of law in the immanence of its practice, but also to take note of the fact that legal enunciation must be taken seriously. In order to arrive at this analysis, it is necessary to go beyond traditional perspectives and to base reflection on an investigation of the conditions for enunciating law in our democracies. This analysis thus offers a renewal of the ethics inherent in the action of jurists and an original reflection on the role of certain legal tools such as concepts, categories, or "provisions". In this sense, the work nourishes its originality not only by the transversality of its approach, but also by the will to situate legal thought in concrete forms of its implementation. The book will be essential reading for academics working in the areas of legal theory, legal philosophy and constitutional theory.

Analysing the most important concepts and problems of the philosophy of polar law, this book focuses on the legal regimes relating to both the Arctic and Antarctic. The book addresses the most fundamental concepts and problems of polar law, looking beyond the apparent biophysical similarities and differences of the two polar regions, to tackle the distinctive legal problems relating to each polar region. It examines key legal-philosophical areas of the philosophy of law around legal interpretation; the role of nation states, reflected in concepts of territorial sovereignty - whether recognised or merely asserted, the exercise of jurisdiction, and the philosophical justifications for such claims; as well as indigenous rights, land rights, civil commons and issues of justice. The book will be of interest to students and scholars of polar law, land law, heritage law, international relations in the polar regions and the wider polar social sciences and humanities.

The proportionality test, as proposed in Robert Alexy's principles theory, is becoming commonplace in comparative constitutional studies. And yet, the question "are courts justified in borrowing proportionality?" has not been expressly put in many countries where judicial borrowings are a reality. This book sheds light on this question and examines the circumstances under which courts are authorized to borrow from alien legal sources to rule on constitutional cases. Taking the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil - and its enthusiastic recourse to proportionality when interpreting the Federal Constitution - as a case study, the book investigates the normative reasons that could justify the court's attitude and offers a comprehensive overview of its case law on controversial constitutional matters like abortion, same-sex union, racial quotas, and the right to public healthcare. Providing a valuable resource for those interested in comparative constitutional law and legal theory, or curious about Brazilian constitutional law, this book questions the alleged universality of the proportionality test, challenges the premises of Alexy's principles theory, and discloses more than 68 Brazilian Supreme Court decisions delivered from 2003 to 2018 that would otherwise have remained unknown to an English-speaking audience.

While much literature exists on the work of Stanley Cavell, this is the first monograph on his contribution to politics and practical philosophy. As Andrew Norris demonstrates, though skepticism is Cavell's central topic, Cavell understands it not as an epistemological problem or position, but as an existential one. The central question is not what we know or fail to know, but to what extent we have made our lives our own, or failed to do so. Accordingly, Cavell's reception of Austin and Wittgenstein highlights, as other readings of these figures do not, the uncanny nature of the ordinary, the extent to which we ordinarily fail to mean what we say and be who we are. Becoming Who We Are charts Cavell's debts to Heidegger and Thompson Clarke, even as it allows for a deeper appreciation of the extent to which Cavell's Emersonian Perfectionism is a rewriting of Rousseau's and Kant's theories of autonomy. This in turn opens up a way of understanding citizenship and political discourse that develops points made more elliptically in the work of Hannah Arendt, and that contrasts in important ways with the positions of liberal thinkers like John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas on the one hand, and radical democrats like Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe on the other.

International Relations and International Law continue to be accented by epistemic violence by naturalizing a separation between law and morality. What does such positivist juridical ethos make possible when considering that both disciplines reify a secular (immanent) ontology? International Law, Necropolitics, and Arab Lives emphasizes that positivist jurisprudence (re)conquered Arabia by subjugating Arab life to the power of death using extrajudicial techniques of violence seeking the implementation of a "New Middle East" that is no longer "resistant to Latin-European modernity", but amenable to such exclusionary telos. The monograph goes beyond the limited remonstration asserting that the problematique with both disciplines is that they are primarily "Eurocentric". Rather, the epistemic inquiry uncovers that legalizing necropower is necessary for the temporal coherence of secular-modernity since a humanitarian logic masks sovereignty inherently being necropolitical by categorizing Arab-Islamic epistemology as an internal-external enemy from which national(ist) citizenship must be defended. This creates a sense of danger around which to unite "modern" epistemology whilst reinforcing the purity of a particular ontology at the expense of banning and de-humanizing a supposed impure Arab refugee. This book will be of interest to graduate students, scholars, and finally, practitioners of international relations, political theory, philosophical theology, and legal-theory.