This new English translation of Solov'ev's principal ethical treatise, written in his later years, presents Solov'ev's mature views on a host of topics ranging from a critique of individualistic ethical systems to the death penalty, the meaning of war, animal rights, and environmentalism. Written for the educated public rather than for a narrow circle of specialists, Solov'ev's work largely avoids technical vocabulary while illustrating his points with references to classical literature from the ancient Greeks to Goethe. Although written from a deeply held Christian viewpoint, Solov'ev emphasizes the turn from his earlier position, now allegedly developing the independence of moral philosophy from metaphysics and revealed religion. Solov'ev sees the formal universality of the idea of the moral good in all human beings, albeit that this idea is bereft of material content. This first new English-language translation in a century makes a unique contribution to the study of Solov'ev's thought. It uses the text of the second edition published in 1899 as its main text, but provides the variations and additions from the earlier versions of each chapter in running notes. Other unique features of this translation are that the pagination of the widely available 1914 edition is provided in the text, and the sources of Solov'ev's numerous Biblical quotations and references as well as literary and historical allusions.

This book challenges the idea that the Rule of Law is still a universal European value given its relatively rapid deterioration in Hungary and Poland, and the apparent inability of the European institutions to adequately address the illiberalization of these Member States. The book begins from the general presumption that the Rule of Law, since its emergence, has been a universal European value, a political ideal and legal conception. It also acknowledges that the EU has been struggling in the area of value enforcement, even if the necessary mechanisms are available and, given an innovative outlook and more political commitment, could be successfully used. The authors appreciate the different approaches toward the Rule of Law, both as a concept and as a measurable indicator, and while addressing the core question of the volume, widely rely on them. Ultimately, the book provides a snapshot of how the Rule of Law ideal has been dismantled and offers a theory of the Rule of Law in illiberal constitutionalism. It discusses why voters keep illiberal populist leaders in power when they are undeniably acting contrary to the Rule of Law ideal. The book will be of interest to academics and researchers engaged with the foundational questions of constitutionalism. The structure and nature of the subject matter covered ensure that the book will be a useful addition for comparative and national constitutional law classes. It will also appeal to legal practitioners wondering about the boundaries of the Rule of Law.

This book bridges a scholarly divide between empirical and normative theorizing about procedural justice in the context of relations of power between citizens and the state. Empirical research establishes that people's understanding of procedural justice is shaped by relational factors. A central premise of this volume is that this research is significant but needs to be complemented by normative theorizing that draws on relational theories of ethics and justice to explain the moral significance of procedures and make normative sense of people's concerns about relational factors. The chapters in Part 1 provide comprehensive reviews of empirical studies of procedural justice in policing, courts and prisons. Part 2 explores empirical and normative perspectives on procedural justice and legitimacy. Part 3 examines philosophical approaches to procedural justice. Part 4 considers the implications of a relational perspective for the design of procedures in a range of legal contexts. This collection will be of interest to a wide academic readership in philosophy, law, psychology and criminology.

This unique book presents various ways in which evolutionary theory can contribute to the analysis of key legal-philosophical problems. Wojciech Zaluski explores three central questions; the ontological question - what is the nature of law?; the teleological-axiological question - what are the main values to be realized by law?; the normativity question, which has two aspects; normative: what explains the fact that legal norms provide reasons for action?, and motivational: what explains the fact that humans can be motivated by legal norms? It is argued that evolutionary theory suggests non-trivial answers to these questions, and that these answers can become the building blocks of a new - evolutionary - paradigm in legal philosophy. Being the first study entirely devoted to the analysis of fundamental legal-philosophical problems from the standpoint of evolutionary theory, this book is a must-read for graduate and postgraduate students, practitioners and philosophers in the field of legal philosophy.

The chapters in this book analyze the relationship between core concepts of the common good and the work of American political philosopher John Rawls. One of the main criticisms that has been made of Rawls is his supposed neglect of central aspects of collective life. The contributors to this book explore the possibility of a substantive and community-oriented interpretation of Rawls's thought. The chapters investigate Rawls's views on values such as community, faith, fraternity, friendship, gender equality, love, political liberty, reciprocity, respect, sense of justice, and virtue. They demonstrate that Rawls finds a balance between certain individualistic aspects of his theory of justice and the value of community. In doing so, the book offers insightful new readings of Rawls. John Rawls and the Common Good will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in political, moral, and legal philosophy.

This book argues that citizens have a moral right to decide by which criteria they grant migrants citizenship, as well as to control access to their territory in the first place. In developing and defending this argument, it critically engages numerous objections, thus providing the reader with a thorough overview of the current debate on the ethics of immigration and exclusion. The author's argument is based on a straightforwardly individualist and liberal starting point. One of the rights granted by liberalism is freedom of association, which also comprises the right not to associate with people with whom one does not want to associate. While this is an individual right, it can be exercised collectively like many other individual rights. Thus, people can decide to collectively organize into an association pursuing certain goals; and subject to certain provisos, this gives rise to legitimate claims to space and territory in which they pursue these goals. The author shows that this right is far-reaching and robust, which entails an equally far-reaching and robust right to exclude. Moreover, he demonstrates that large-scale immigration from illiberal cultures tends to severely compromise the way of life, the values, and the institutions of liberal democracies in ways routinely ignored by apologists for multiculturalism. Freedom, Culture, and the Right to Exclude will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in applied ethics, political philosophy, political theory, and law.

Why is there so much attention on Kant's global politics in present day law and philosophy? This book highlights the potential fruitfulness of Kant's cosmopolitan thought for understanding the complexities of the contemporary political world. It adopts a double methodological strategy by reconstructing a genealogical conceptual journey showing the development of international law, as well as introducing an interpretation of cosmopolitanism centred on Kant's theory of a metaphysics of freedom. The result is a novel focus on Kant's notion of the world republic. The hypothesis here defended is that the world republic stands as a way of thinking about international politics where the possibility of progression towards peace results from its use as a regulative idea.

Law schools are failing both their staff and students by requiring them to prize reason and rationality and to suppress or ignore emotions. Despite innovations in terms of both content and teaching techniques, there is little evidence that emotions are effectively acknowledged or utilised within legal education. Instead law schools are clinging to an out-dated and erroneous perception of emotions as at best, irrational, and at worst dangerous. In contrast to this, educational and scientific developments have demonstrated that emotions are a fundamental, inescapable part of learning, teaching and skills development. Harnessing these emotions will therefore have a transformative effect on legal education and enable it to adapt to the needs and demands of the twenty-first century. This book provides a theoretical overview of the role played by emotions in all aspects of the life of the law school. It explores the relationship emotions have with key traditional and contemporary approaches to legal education, the ways in which emotions can be conceptualised, their interaction with the politics and policies of legal education and their role within teaching and learning. The book also considers the importance of emotional wellbeing for both law students and legal academics Overall, this book argues for a more holistic form of legal education in which emotions play a valuable (and valued) role. This requires a new vision for law schools, in which emotions are acknowledged and embedded at all levels, institutional and personal.

This book provides a comprehensive introduction to global legal thought. It argues that economic globalization and digitalization have induced significant insecurity about the future of human social organization. While traditional international law as a system based on the consent of national states is in the process of rapid adaptation to its new social preconditions, a variety of transnational regulatory levels compete for legal authority. In this process of change, there is more need than ever to guide the theoretical understanding because academic concepts have a crucial influence on the emerging practice of global law. This book highlights which choices are available and argues that global law requires taking a stand in mutually irreconcilable choices.

This collection discusses the concept of fraternity and examines the issue of its role in law. Since the end of World War II, fraternity has been cited in several national constitutional charters, in addition to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But is there space for fraternity in law? The contributions to this book form an ideal "bridge" between the past and present to trace the different pathways taken to address the meaning of fraternity, and to identify its possible legal relevance. The book lays out paths that have placed fraternity in varied and challenging legal contexts in an age of globalization and conflict, where the multiplicity of national and supranational sources of law seems to show its inadequacy to govern complexity, and coexistence between diversities that appear irreconcilable. The purpose is not to recover fraternity as a forgotten principle, but to reimagine it today to address the aim and force of law within a plurality of cultures. The analysis considers a possible universal dimension that models unity within diversity, and aspires to serve as a prologue to a transition from research to dialogue between different legal systems and traditions. The book will be of interest to academics and researchers working in the areas of Comparative Law, Legal History and Legal Philosophy.

This book analyses the specificity of the law-making activity of European constitutional courts. The main hypothesis is that currently constitutional courts are positive legislators whose position in the system of State organs needs to be redefined. The book covers the analysis of the law-making activity of four constitutional courts in Western countries: Germany, Italy, Spain, and France; and six constitutional courts in Central-East European countries: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Latvia, and Bulgaria; as well as two international courts: the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The work thus identifies the mutual interactions between national constitutional courts and international tribunals in terms of their law-making activity. The chosen countries include constitutional courts which have been recently captured by populist governments and subordinated to political powers. Therefore, one of the purposes of the book is to identify the change in the law-making activity of those courts and to compare it with the activity of constitutional courts from countries in which democracy is not viewed as being under threat. Written by national experts, each chapter addresses a series of set questions allowing accessible and meaningful comparison. The book will be a valuable resource for students, academics, and policy-makers working in the areas of constitutional law and politics.

This book analyses collective punishment in the context of human rights law. Collective punishment is a concept deriving from the law of armed conflict. It describes the punishment of a group for an act allegedly committed by one of its members and is prohibited in times of armed conflict. Although the imposition of collective punishment has been witnessed in situations outside armed conflict as well, human rights instruments do not explicitly address collective punishment. Consequently, there is a genuine gap in the protection of affected groups in situations outside of or short of armed conflict. Supported by two case studies on collective punishment in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and in Chechnya, the book examines potential options to close this gap in human rights law in a way contributing to the empowerment of affected groups. This analysis centres on the European Convention on Human Rights due to its relevance to the situation in Chechnya. By questioning whether human rights instruments can encompass a prohibition of collective punishment, the book contributes to the broader academic debate on rights held by collectivities in general and on collective human rights in particular. The book will be of interest to students, academics and policy makers in the areas of International Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law.

This book assembles leading legal, political, and moral philosophers to examine the legacy of the work of Ronald Dworkin. They provide the most comprehensive critical treatment of Dworkin's accomplishments focusing on his work in all branches of philosophy, including his theory of value, political philosophy, philosophy of international law, and legal philosophy. The book's organizing principle and theme reflect Dworkin's self-conception as a builder of a unified theory of value, and the broad outlines of his system can be found throughout the book. The first section addresses the most abstract and general aspect of Dworkin's work-the unity of value thesis. The second section explores Dworkin's contributions to political philosophy, and discusses a number of political concepts including authority, civil disobedience, the legitimacy of states and the international legal system, distributive justice, collective responsibility, and Dworkin's master value of dignity and the associated values of equal concern and respect. The third section addresses various aspects of Dworkin's general theory of law. The fourth and final section comprises accounts of the structure and defining values of discrete areas of law.

This edited work collates novel contributions on contemporary topics that are related to human rights. The essays address analytic-descriptive questions, such as what legal personality actually means, and normative questions, such as who or what should be recognised as a legal person. As is well-known among jurists, the law has a special conception of personhood: corporations are persons, whereas slaves have traditionally been considered property rather than persons. This odd state of affairs has not garnered the interest of legal theorists for a while and the theory of legal personhood has been a relatively peripheral topic in jurisprudence for at least 50 years. As readers will see, there have recently been many developments and debates that justify a theoretical investigation of this topic. Animal rights activists have been demanding that some animals be recognized as legal persons. The field of robotics has prompted questions about driverless cars: should they be granted a limited legal personality, so that the car itself would be responsible for damages? This book explores such concepts and touches on matters of bioethics, animal law and medical law. It includes matters of legal history and appeals to both legal scholars and philosophers, especially those with an interest in theories of law and the philosophy of law.

This book differs from books for the US Criminal Justice market, by offering an upper level, and philosophical introduction to Criminal Justice Ethics. Its focus on Anglo-American models of justice, means this has a market across western jurisdictions. This book has a market across criminology and criminal justice, philosophy and political science.

This book differs from books for the US Criminal Justice market, by offering an upper level, and philosophical introduction to Criminal Justice Ethics. Its focus on Anglo-American models of justice, means this has a market across western jurisdictions. This book has a market across criminology and criminal justice, philosophy and political science.

Autonomy, viewed as a subject's autonomous designing of her own distinctive 'individuality', is not a constitutive problem for liberal theory. Since its earliest formulations, liberalism has taken it for granted that protecting rights is a sufficient guarantee for the primacy of individual subjectivity. The most dangerous legacy of the 'hierarchical-dualist' representation of the subject is the primacy given to reason in defining an individual's identity. For Santoro freedom is not a fixed measure. It is not the container of powers and rights defining an individual's role and identity. It is rather the outcome of a process whereby individuals continuously re-define the shape of their individuality. Freedom is everything that each of us manages to be in his or her active and uncertain opposition to external 'pressures'.

There have been extraordinary developments in the field of neuroscience in recent years, sparking a number of discussions within the legal field. This book studies the various interactions between neuroscience and the world of law, and explores how neuroscientific findings could affect some fundamental legal categories and how the law should be implemented in such cases. The book is divided into three main parts. Starting with a general overview of the convergence of neuroscience and law, the first part outlines the importance of their continuous interaction, the challenges that neuroscience poses for the concepts of free will and responsibility, and the peculiar characteristics of a "new" cognitive liberty. In turn, the second part addresses the phenomenon of cognitive and moral enhancement, as well as the uses of neurotechnology and their impacts on health, self-determination and the concept of being human. The third and last part investigates the use of neuroscientific findings in both criminal and civil cases, and seeks to determine whether they can provide valuable evidence and facilitate the assessment of personal responsibility, helping to resolve cases. The book is the result of an interdisciplinary dialogue involving jurists, philosophers, neuroscientists, forensic medicine specialists, and scholars in the humanities; further, it is intended for a broad readership interested in understanding the impacts of scientific and technological developments on people's lives and on our social systems.

This volume explores the opportunities and challenges facing the accounting profession in an increasingly globalized business and financial reporting environment. It looks back at past experiences of the profession in attempting to meet its public interest obligation. It examines the role and responsibilities of accounting to society including regulatory requirements, increased emphasis on corporate social responsibility, accounting fraud and whistle-blowing implications, internationalization of public interest obligations, and providing the education needed to be successful. The book incorporates an ethical dimension in making these assessments. Its focus is a conceptual, theoretical one drawing on classical philosophy, the sociology of professions, economic theory, and the public interest dimension of accountants as professionals. The authors of papers are long-time contributors to the annual symposium on Research in Accounting Ethics sponsored by the Public Interest Section of the AAA.

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Based on the Judicial Transparency Index Assessment (2019 and 2020) conducted in China by the Institute of Law of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, this book summarizes and analyzes the current situation of judicial openness in China, using a sample of 218 courts across the country for the study. The book analyzes the ideological and institutional origins of judicial openness and examines the operation of judicial openness through the practical experience of role replacement. By analyzing evaluation data in the fields of audit information disclosure, trial information disclosure, judicial enforcement data disclosure, and judicial reform data disclosure, the book points out that the current judicial disclosure has made significant progress, but there are still problems such as unclear disclosure standards, insufficient rigidity in disclosure requirements, and the scope of disclosure still needs to be expanded. The book recommends accelerating the disclosure of judicial legislation, public standards, and strengthening assessment and accountability.

This book critically explores the development of radical criminology through a range of written Ancient Greek works including epic and lyrical poetry, drama and philosophy, across different chapters. It traces the development of political power and the concepts of law, legitimacy, crime, justice and deviance in the Ancient Greek world and the political struggles that propelled that development, using the conflict perspective as a conceptual tool of the sociological analysis of reality. Theoretical discussions of crime and justice typically stem from the better known works of Plato or Aristotle although this book explores the works preceding these. This book will appeal to those interested in the (pre)history of criminology and the historical production of criminological knowledge.

This book argues that contractarianism is well suited as a political morality and explores the implications of deploying it in this way. It promises to revive contractarianism as a viable political theory, breaking it free from its Rawlsian moorings while taking seriously the long-standing objections to it. It's natural to think that the state owes things to its people: physical security, public health and sanitation services, and a functioning judiciary, for example. But is there a theory-a political morality-that can explain why this is so and who the state's people are? This new contractarianism deploys a reversed state of nature thought experiment as the starting point of political theorizing. From this starting point it develops a political morality: a theory of the common ground of the role moralities attached to the various roles within the state. Contractarianism, so understood, can provide a basis for already popular ideas in political theory-such as political and legal liberalism-and overturn conventional wisdom, for example that the state is obligated to secure justice and that animals should have no legal standing. Contractarianism, Role Obligations, and Political Morality will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in moral and political philosophy.

This book addresses the relevance of the state of exception for the analysis of law, while reflecting on the deeper symbolic and jurisprudential significance of the coalescence between law and force. The concept of the state of exception has become a central topos in political and legal philosophy as well as in critical theory. The theoretical apparatus of the state of exception sharply captures the uneasy relationship between law, life and politics in the contemporary global setting, while also challenging the comforting narratives that uncritically connect democracy with the tradition of the rule of law. Drawing on critical legal theory, continental jurisprudence, political philosophy and history, this book explores the genealogy of the concept of the state of exception and reflects on its legal embodiment in past and present contexts - including Weimar and Nazi Germany, contemporary Europe and Turkey. In doing so, it explores the disruptive force of the exception for legal and political thought, as it recuperates its contemporary critical potential. The book will be of interest to students and scholars in the field of jurisprudence, philosophy and critical legal theory.

This work deals with the applications of Semantic Publishing technologies in the legal domain, i.e., the use of Semantic Web technologies to address issues related to the Legal Scholarly Publishing. Research in the field of Law has a long tradition in the application of semantic technologies, such as Semantic Web and Linked Data, to real-world scenarios. This book investigates and proposes solutions for three main issues that Semantic Publishing needs to address within the context of the Legal Scholarly Publishing: the need of tools for linking document text to a formal representation of its meaning; the lack of complete metadata schemas for describing documents according to the publishing vocabulary and the absence of effective tools and user interfaces for easily acting on semantic publishing models and theories.

In particular, this work introduces EARMARK, a markup meta language that allows one to create markup documents without the structural and semantic limits imposed by markup languages such as XML. EARMARK is a platform to link the content layer of a document with its intended formal semantics and it can be used with the Semantic Publishing and Referencing (SPAR) Ontologies, another topic in this book. SPAR Ontologies are a collection of formal models providing an upper semantic layer for describing the publishing domain. Using EARMARK as a foundation for SPAR descriptions opens up to a semantic characterisation of all the aspects of a document and of its parts. Finally, four user-friendly tools are introduced: LODE, KC-Viz, Graffoo and Gaffe. They were expressly developed to facilitate the interaction of publishers and domain experts with Semantic Publishing technologies by shielding such users from the underlying formalisms and semantic models of such technologies.

This book challenges the correspondence theory of judicial fact construction - that legal rules resemble and subsume facts 'out there' - and instead provides an account of judicial fact construction through legally produced times- or adjudicative temporalities- that structure legal subject and event formation in legal judgement. Drawing on Bergsonian and Gadamerian theories of time, this book details how certain adjudicative temporalities can produce fully willed and autonomous subjects through 'time framed' legal events - in effect, the paradigmatic liberal legal subject - or how alternative adjudicative temporalities may structure legal subjects that are situated and constituted by social structures. The consequences of this novel account of legal judgement are fourfold. The first is that judicial fact construction is not exclusively determined by the legal rule (s) but by adjudication's production of temporalities. The second is that the selection between different adjudicative temporalities is generally indeterminate, though influenced by wider social structures. As will be argued, social structures, framed as a particular type of past produced by certain adjudicative temporalities, may either be incorporated in the rendering of the legal event or elided. The third is that, with the book's focus on criminal law, different deployments of adjudicative temporalities effect responsibility ascription. Finally, it is argued that the demystification of time as that which structures event and subject formation reveals another way in which to uncover the politics of legal judgement and the potential for its transformative potential, through either its inclusion or its elision of social structures in adjudication's determination of facts. This book will be of interest to students and scholars in the field of legal judgement, legal theory and jurisprudence.