This book explores the legal dimension of the Islamic State, an aspect which has hitherto been neglected in the literature. ISIS' dystopian experience, intended as a short-lived territorial and political governance, has been analyzed from multiple points of view, including the geopolitical, social and religious ones. However, its legal dimension has never been properly dealt with in a comprehensive way, assuming as a point of reference both the Islamic and the Western legal tradition. This book analyzes ISIS as the expression of a potential though never fully realized legal order. The book does not describe ISIS' possible classifications according to the standards and the criteria of international law, such as its possible statehood or proto-statehood, issues that are however touched upon. Rather, it analyzes ISIS' own legal awareness, based on the group's literary materials, which show a considerable amount of juridical work. Such material, mainly propagandistic in its nature, is essential in understanding which kind of legal order ISIS aimed at establishing. The book will be of interest to students and academics in the fields of Law, International Relations, Political Sciences, Terrorism Studies, Religion and Middle Eastern Studies.

In 1918 a young Carl Schmitt published a short satirical fiction entitled The Buribunks. He imagined a future society of beings who consistently wrote and disseminated their personal diaries. Schmitt would go on to become the infamous philosopher of the exception and for a while the 'Crown Jurist of the Third Reich'. The Buribunks - ironically for beings that lived only for self-memorialisation - has been mostly lost to history. However, the digital realm, with its emphasis on the informatic traces generated by human doing, and the continual interest in Schmitt's work to explain and criticise contemporary constellations of power, suggests that The Buribunks is a text whose epoch has come. This volume includes the first full translation into English of The Buribunks and a selection of critical essays on the text, its meanings in the digital present, its playing with and criticism of the literary form, and its place within Schmitt's life and work. The Buribunks and the essays provide a complex, critical and provocative invitation to reimagine the relations between the human and their imprint and legacy within archives and repositories. There is a fundamental exploration of what it means to be a being intensely aware of 'writing itself'. This is not just a volume for critical lawyers, literary scholars and the Schmitt literati. It is a volume that challenges a broad range of disciplines, from philosophy to critical data studies, to reflect on the digital present and its assembled and curated beings. It is a volume that provides a set of fantastically located concepts, images and histories that traverse ideas and practices, play and politics, power and possibility.

Written by experts from within their communities, this book compares the legal regimes of Christian churches as systems of religious law. The ecumenical movement, with its historical theological focus, has failed to date to address the role of church law in shaping relations between churches and fostering greater mutual understanding between them. In turn, theologians and jurists from the different traditions have not hitherto worked together on a fully ecumenical appreciation of the potential value of church laws to help, and sometimes to hinder, the achievement of greater Christian unity. This book seeks to correct this ecumenical church law deficit. It takes account of the recent formulation by an ecumenical panel of a Statement of Principles of Christian Law, which has been welcomed by Pope Francis and the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, leader of the Orthodox Church worldwide, as recognizing the importance of canon law for ecumenical dialogue. This book, therefore, not only provides the fruits of an understanding of church laws within ten Christian traditions, but also critically evaluates the Statement against the laws of these individual ecclesial communities. The book will be an essential resource for scholars of law and religion, theology, and sociology. It will also be of interest to those working in religious institutions and policy-makers.

Norm and Nature deals with the traditional conflict in legal philosophy between positivistic and anti-positivistic theories of law. It examines the conflict with respect to seven central issues in legal philosophy - law as a reason for action, law and authority, the internal point of view to law, the acceptance of law, discretion and principle, interpretation and semantics, and law and the common good. It has three theses. First, that the opposition to positivism is based on acceptance of, rather than rejection of, claims made by positivism. Secondly, that the conflict between positivism and anti-positivism is irresolvable and finally, that the understanding of why this is so is the key to the understanding of the nature of law. Tension between formal and substantive considerations comprises the essence of law. The central theses presuppose that anti-positivism or natural law theory is defensible as an account of the nature of law. More than half the book, therefore, is a criticism of the prevailing orthodoxy of legal positivism and a defence of an anti-positivist view, making Norm and Nature important not only for the originality of its central theses, but also for its critique of positivism and for the thoroughness of its examination of contemporary legal thought.

Judgment is simple, right? This book begs to differ. Written for all students of the law-from undergraduate to supreme court justice-it opens the reader to a broad landscape of ideas surrounding common law judgment. Short and accessible, it touches upon the many pathways that lead out from the phenomenon of judgment in common law jurisdictions. This book is unique in its brevity and scope. It engages not only with the core operation of judgment as legal decision, but considers questions of authority and reason, and broader issues of interpretation, rhetoric, and judicial improvisation. The aim of this book is not to present a summary of research or a comprehensive 'theory' of judgment, nor is it bounded by the divisions of different legal subjects. Instead, it is a handbook or companion for students of the law to read and return to in their studious journeys across all common law topic areas, providing readers with a robust and open-ended set of tools, combined with selected further readings, to facilitate their own discovery, exploration, and critical analysis of the rich tapestry of common law judgment.

This book differs from books for the US Criminal Justice market, by offering an upper level, and philosophical introduction to Criminal Justice Ethics. Its focus on Anglo-American models of justice, means this has a market across western jurisdictions. This book has a market across criminology and criminal justice, philosophy and political science.

In an era of almost boundless individual opportunities, vulnerability, paradoxically, has gained significant attention. Undoubtedly this book significantly contributes to the debates on this very complex phenomenon, dealing with both the specific aspects of vulnerable individuals and groups' legal positions, as well as presenting the concept of vulnerability in international law. This book brings together scholars engaging with legal and actual positions of women, children and other vulnerable persons. Authors in detail discuss - among others - such issues as: political violence, motherhood in prison, age assessing of foreigners, infanticide or exclusion of the elderly. It will be of interest for academics in the fields of law and sociology, as well as vulnerability-oriented practitioners.

What role does reason play in determining what, if anything, is morally right? What role does morality play in law? Perhaps the most controversial answer to these fundamental questions is that reason supports a supreme principle of both morality and legality. The contributors to this book cast a fresh critical eye over the coherence of modern approaches to ethical rationalism within law, and reflect on the intellectual history on which it builds. The contributors then take the debate beyond the traditional concerns of legal theory into areas such as the relationship between morality and international law, and the impact of ethically controversial medical innovations on legal understanding.

This book explores storytelling as an innovative means of improving understanding of Indigenous people and their histories and struggles including with the law. It uses the Critical Race Theory ('CRT') tool of 'outsider' or 'counter' storytelling to illuminate the practices that have been used by generations of Aboriginal women to create an outlaw culture and to resist their invisibility to law. Legal scholars are yet to use storytelling to bring the experiential knowledge of Aboriginal women to the centre of legal scholarship and yet this book demonstrates how this can be done by way of a new methodology that combines elements of CRT with speculative biography. In one chapter, the author tells the imagined story of Eliza Woree who featured prominently in the backdrop to the decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland in Dempsey v Rigg (1914) but whose voice was erased from the judgements. This accessible book adds a new and innovative dimension to the use of CRT to examine the nexus between race and settler colonialism. It speaks to those interested in Indigenous peoples and the law, Indigenous studies, Indigenous policy, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander history, feminist studies, race and the law, and cultural studies.

While an abundance of literature covers the right of states to defend themselves against external aggression, this is the first book dedicated to the right to personal self-defense in international law. Drawing on his extensive experience as a human rights practitioner and scholar, Dr. Hessbruegge sets out in careful detail the strict requirements that human rights impose on defensive force by law enforcement authorities, especially police killings in self-defense. The book also discusses the exceptional application of the right to personal self-defense in military-led operations, notably to contain violent civilians who do not directly participate in hostilities. Human rights also establish parameters on how broad or narrow the laws can be drawn on self-defense between private persons. Setting out the prevailing international standards, the book critically examines the ongoing trend to excessively broaden self-defense laws. It also refutes the claim that there is a human right to possess firearms for self-defense purposes. In extraordinary circumstances, the right to personal self-defence sharpens human rights and allows people to defend themselves against the state. Here the author establishes that international law gives individuals the right to forcibly resist human rights violations that pose a serious risk of significant and irreparable harm. At the same time, he calls into question prevailing state practice, which fails to recognize any collective right to organized armed resistance even when it constitutes the last resort to defend against genocide or other mass atrocities.

Some say that private law ought to correct wrongs or to protect rights. Others say that private law ought to maximise social welfare or to minimise social cost. In this book, Emmanuel Voyiakis claims that private law ought to make our responsibilities to others depend on the opportunities we have to affect how things will go for us. Drawing on the work of HLA Hart and TM Scanlon, he argues that private law principles that require us to bear certain practical burdens in our relations with others are justified as long as those principles provide us with certain opportunities to choose what will happen to us, and having those opportunities is something we have reason to value. The book contrasts this 'value-of-choice' account with its wrong- and social cost-based rivals, and applies it to familiar problems of contract and tort law, including whether liability should be negligence-based or stricter; whether insurance should matter in the allocation of the burden of repair; how far private law should make allowance for persons of limited capacities; when a contract term counts as 'unconscionable' or 'unfair'; and when tort law should hold a person vicariously liable for another's mistakes.

This book challenges the correspondence theory of judicial fact construction - that legal rules resemble and subsume facts 'out there' - and instead provides an account of judicial fact construction through legally produced times- or adjudicative temporalities- that structure legal subject and event formation in legal judgement. Drawing on Bergsonian and Gadamerian theories of time, this book details how certain adjudicative temporalities can produce fully willed and autonomous subjects through 'time framed' legal events - in effect, the paradigmatic liberal legal subject - or how alternative adjudicative temporalities may structure legal subjects that are situated and constituted by social structures. The consequences of this novel account of legal judgement are fourfold. The first is that judicial fact construction is not exclusively determined by the legal rule (s) but by adjudication's production of temporalities. The second is that the selection between different adjudicative temporalities is generally indeterminate, though influenced by wider social structures. As will be argued, social structures, framed as a particular type of past produced by certain adjudicative temporalities, may either be incorporated in the rendering of the legal event or elided. The third is that, with the book's focus on criminal law, different deployments of adjudicative temporalities effect responsibility ascription. Finally, it is argued that the demystification of time as that which structures event and subject formation reveals another way in which to uncover the politics of legal judgement and the potential for its transformative potential, through either its inclusion or its elision of social structures in adjudication's determination of facts. This book will be of interest to students and scholars in the field of legal judgement, legal theory and jurisprudence.

This book addresses the relevance of the state of exception for the analysis of law, while reflecting on the deeper symbolic and jurisprudential significance of the coalescence between law and force. The concept of the state of exception has become a central topos in political and legal philosophy as well as in critical theory. The theoretical apparatus of the state of exception sharply captures the uneasy relationship between law, life and politics in the contemporary global setting, while also challenging the comforting narratives that uncritically connect democracy with the tradition of the rule of law. Drawing on critical legal theory, continental jurisprudence, political philosophy and history, this book explores the genealogy of the concept of the state of exception and reflects on its legal embodiment in past and present contexts - including Weimar and Nazi Germany, contemporary Europe and Turkey. In doing so, it explores the disruptive force of the exception for legal and political thought, as it recuperates its contemporary critical potential. The book will be of interest to students and scholars in the field of jurisprudence, philosophy and critical legal theory.

This book radically rethinks the philosophical basis of copyright in the arts. The author reflects on the ontology of art to argue that current copyright laws cannot be justified. The book begins by identifying two problems that result from current copyright laws: (1) creativity is restricted and (2) they primarily serve the interests of large corporations over those of the artists and general public. Against this background, the author presents an account of the ontology of artworks and explains what metaphysics can tell us about ownership in the arts. Next, he makes a moral argument that copyright terms should be shorter and that corporations should not own copyrights. The remaining chapters tackle questions regarding the appropriation of tokens of artworks, pattern types, and artistic elements. The result is a sweeping reinterpretation of copyright in the arts that rests on sound ontological and moral foundations. Radically Rethinking Copyright in the Arts will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in aesthetics and philosophy of art, metaphysics, philosophy of law, and intellectual property law.

This book differs from books for the US Criminal Justice market, by offering an upper level, and philosophical introduction to Criminal Justice Ethics. Its focus on Anglo-American models of justice, means this has a market across western jurisdictions. This book has a market across criminology and criminal justice, philosophy and political science.

This collection, by leading legal scholars, judges and practitioners, together with theologians and church historians, presents historical, theological, philosophical and legal perspectives on Christianity and criminal law. Following a Preface by Lord Judge, formerly Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, and an introductory chapter, the book is divided into four thematic sections. Part I addresses the historical contributions of Christianity to criminal law drawing on biblical sources, early church fathers and canonists, as far as the Enlightenment. Part II, titled Christianity and the principles of criminal law, compares crime and sin, examines concepts of mens rea and intention, and considers the virtue of due process within criminal justice. Part III looks at Christianity and criminal offences, considering their Christian origins and continuing relevance for several basic crimes that every legal system prohibits. Finally, in Part IV, the authors consider Christianity and the enforcement of criminal law, looking at defences, punishment and forgiveness. The book will be an invaluable resource for students and academics working in the areas of Law and Religion, Legal Philosophy and Theology.

This collection of essays presents opposing sides of the debate over the foundations of judicial review. In this work,however, the discussion of whether the 'ultra vires' doctrine is best characterised as a central principle of administrative law or as a harmless, justificatory fiction is located in the highly topical and political context of constitutional change. The thorough jurisprudential analysis of the relative merits of models of 'legislative intention' and 'judicial creativity' provides a sound base for consideration of the constitutional problems arising out of legislative devolution and the Human Rights Act 1998. As the historical orthodoxy is challenged by growing institutional independence, leading figures in the field offer competing perspectives on the future of judicial review. "Confucius was wrong to say that it is a curse to live in interesting times. We are witnessing the development of a constitutional philosophy which recognises fundamental values and gives them effect in the mediation of law to the people". (Sir John Laws) Contributors Nick Bamforth, Paul Craig, David Dyzenhaus, Mark Elliott, David Feldman, Christopher Forsyth, Brigid Hadfield, Jeffrey Jowell QC, Sir John Laws, Dawn Oliver, Sir Stephen Sedley, Mark Walters. With short responses by: TRS Allan, Stephen Bailey, Robert Carnworth, Martin Loughlin, Michael Taggart, Sir William Wade.

This book assembles leading legal, political, and moral philosophers to examine the legacy of the work of Ronald Dworkin. They provide the most comprehensive critical treatment of Dworkin's accomplishments focusing on his work in all branches of philosophy, including his theory of value, political philosophy, philosophy of international law, and legal philosophy. The book's organizing principle and theme reflect Dworkin's self-conception as a builder of a unified theory of value, and the broad outlines of his system can be found throughout the book. The first section addresses the most abstract and general aspect of Dworkin's work-the unity of value thesis. The second section explores Dworkin's contributions to political philosophy, and discusses a number of political concepts including authority, civil disobedience, the legitimacy of states and the international legal system, distributive justice, collective responsibility, and Dworkin's master value of dignity and the associated values of equal concern and respect. The third section addresses various aspects of Dworkin's general theory of law. The fourth and final section comprises accounts of the structure and defining values of discrete areas of law.

This book offers an outline of the foundations of a theory of constitutional semiotics. It provides a systematic account of the concept of constitutional semiotics and its role in the representation and signification of meaning in constitution, constitutional law, and constitutionalism. The book explores the constitutional signification of meaning that is stretched between rational entrenchment and constitutional imagination. It provides a critical assessment of the rationalist entrapment of constitutional modernity and justifies the need to turn to 'shadow constitutionalisms': textual, symbolic-imaginary and visual constitutionalism. The book puts forward innovative incentives for constitutional analysis based on constitutional semiotics as a paradigm for representation of meaning in rational, textual, symbolic-imaginary and visual constitutionalism. The book focuses on the textual, imaginative, and visual discourse of constitutionalism, which is built upon collective constitutional imaginaries and on the peculiar normativity of constitutional geometry and constitutional mythology as borderline phenomena entrenched in rational, textual, symbolic-imaginary and visual constitutionalism. The book analyses concepts such as: constitutional text and texture, authoritative constitutional narratives and authoritative constitutional narrators, constitutional semiotic community, constitutional utopia, constitutional taboo, normative ideology and normative ideas, constitutional myth and mythology, constitutional symbolism, constitutional code and constitutional geometric form. It explores the textual entrenchment of constitutionalism and its repercussions for representation and signification of meaning.

This book proposes the study of norms as a method of explaining human choice and behaviour by introducing a new scientific perspective. The science of norms may here be broadly understood as a social science which includes elements from both the behavioural and legal sciences. It is given that a science of norms is not normative in the sense of prescribing what is right or wrong in various situations. Compared with legal science, sociology of law has an interest in the operational side of legal rules and regulation. This book develops a synthesizing social science approach to better understand societal development in the wake of the increasingly significant digital technology. The underlying idea is that norms as expectations today are not primarily related to social expectations emanating from human interactions but come from systems that mankind has created for fulfilling its needs. Today the economy, via the market, and technology via digitization, generate stronger and more frequent expectations than the social system. By expanding the sociological understanding of norms, the book makes comparisons between different parts of society possible and creates a more holistic understanding of contemporary society. The book will be of interest to academics and researchers in the areas of sociology of law, legal theory, philosophy of law, sociology and social psychology.

The chapters in this book analyze the relationship between core concepts of the common good and the work of American political philosopher John Rawls. One of the main criticisms that has been made of Rawls is his supposed neglect of central aspects of collective life. The contributors to this book explore the possibility of a substantive and community-oriented interpretation of Rawls's thought. The chapters investigate Rawls's views on values such as community, faith, fraternity, friendship, gender equality, love, political liberty, reciprocity, respect, sense of justice, and virtue. They demonstrate that Rawls finds a balance between certain individualistic aspects of his theory of justice and the value of community. In doing so, the book offers insightful new readings of Rawls. John Rawls and the Common Good will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in political, moral, and legal philosophy.

This book considers the manner in which the making and implementation of law and governance is changing in the global context. It explores this through a study of the deployment of the global anti-doping apparatus including the World Anti-Doping Code and its institutions with specific reference to professional cycling, a sport that has been at the forefront of some of the most famous doping cases and controversies in recent years. Critically, it argues that the changes to law and governance are not restricted to sport and anti-doping, but are actually inherent in broader processes associated with neoliberalism and social and behavioural surveillance and affect all aspects of society and its political institutions. The author engages with concepts and arguments in contemporary social theory, including: Dardot and Laval on neoliberalism; Agamben on sovereignty; Hardt and Negri on globalisation; and others including Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, and Louis Dumont. The work seeks to answer a question posed by both Foucault and Agamben; that is, given the growing primacy of the arts of government, what is the juridical form and theory of sovereignty that is able to sustain and found this primacy? It is argued that this question can be understood by reference to the shift from a social or public contract that was understood to be the foundation of society, to a society that is constituted by consent, private agreement and contract. In addition, the book examines the juridical concepts of the rule of law and sovereignty. Commencing with the Festina scandal of 1998, the Spanish case of Operacion Puerto and concluding with the fall from grace of the American cyclist Lance Armstrong in 2012, the principal processes examined include: - The increasing crossing of the borders between different legal regimes (whether supranational or simply particularised) and with it the erosion of what we knew as state sovereignty and constitutionalism; - The increasing use of judgment achieved through the media and how this arrives at new configurations of moral panic and scapegoating; - The creation of a need for rapid outcomes at the expense of the modernist value or version of the rule of law; - The increasing use of new and alternative methods of guilt, proof and ultra-legal detection.

This book provides a critique of current international law-making and draws on a set of principles from Persian philosophers to present an alternative to influence the development of international law-making procedure. The work conceptualizes a substantive notion of democracy in order to regulate international law-making mechanisms under a set of principles developed between the twelfth and seventeenth centuries in Persia. What the author here names 'democratic egalitarian multilateralism' is founded on: the idea of 'egalitarian law' by Suhrawardi, the account of 'substantial motion' by Mulla Sadra, and the ideal of 'intercultural dialectical democracy' developed by Rumi. Following a discussion of the conceptual flaws of the chartered and customary sources of international law, it is argued that 'democratic egalitarian multilateralism' could be a source for a set of principles to regulate the procedures through which international treaties are made as well as a criterion for customary international law-ascertainment. Presenting an alternative, drawn from a less dominant culture, to the established ideas of international law-making the book will be essential reading for researchers and academics working in public international law, history of law, legal theory, comparative legal theory, Islamic law, and history.

Illuminating the idea of legality by a consideration of its moral nature, this book explores the emergence and development of two rival traditions of legal thought (those of 'positivism' and 'idealism') which together define the structure of modern juridical thought. In doing so, it consciously departs from many of the tendencies and working assumptions that define modern legal philosophy. The book examines the shifts in thinking about the rule of law and the wider significance of law, brought about by changing conceptions of the nature of law: from an understanding of law in which the primary focus is on rights, to an articulation of the legal order as a body of deliberately posited rules, and finally to the present understanding of law as a systematic body of rules and principles underpinned by an abiding concern with individual rights. By exposing the historical and metaphysical underpinnings of these theoretical traditions, the book imparts an idea of their limitations and moves beyond the understandings offered within them of the nature of legality.

Presenting a unique blend of historical and contemporary research from a range of interdisciplinary and theoretical analysis, this book examines the intersection of 'race', gender and national identity. Focusing on New Zealand, the book highlights the ways in which shifts in national identity shape and limit legal claims for redress for historical racial injustices internationally. Key features: * Analyzes the identity configurations produced by New Zealand's process of 'settling' colonial injustices and highlights the wider relevance for other groups such as Australian aborigines and Native Americans. * Traces the connections and discontinuities between the free trade imperialism of the mid-19th Century and the Free Trade Globalization of the late 20th Century. * Rich, rigorous interdisciplinarity and use of a range of theoretical perspectives provides insights relevant to legal theorists, feminists and legal scholars internationally.