The term anarchism derives from the Greek word meaning 'without ruler or leader, and without law'. Although the roots of the word can be traced back to Ancient Greece, anarchism as a political ideology is relatively new. Anarchism developed as a political ideology at the end of the eighteenth century at the time of the emergence of the modern State. And, as is well known, anarchism developed both a politics and a way of life that did not include the State as its compass, support and structure. In contrast to the extensive contemporary literature about anarchist politics and ideas, this book focuses on the practices and attitudes that constitute what the author refers to as an anarchist 'art of life'. The book draws on archival material that records the life and actions of the anarchist Emma Goldman and her associates, legal documents and writings by classical (Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Peter Krotopkin) and contemporary anarchists (David Graeber, Saul Newman, Ciarra Bottici), as well as contemporary groups such as the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army and Occupy Wall Street. By studying the idiosyncrasies of this art of life, it argues, we are better able to appreciate how anarchism is not some future utopian oriented project, waiting to come into existence after a revolution, but rather exists in parallel to the life and politics offered by the State. Anarchism: An Art of Living Without Law will be of interest to graduate students and academics working on critical legal theory, political theory, sociology and cultural studies.

This book features new perspectives on the ethics and politics of free speech. Contributors draw on insights from philosophy, psychology, political theory, journalism, literature, and history to respond to pressing problems involving free speech in liberal societies.

Obligations: New Trajectories in Law provides a critical analysis of the role of obligations in contemporary legal and social practices. As rights have become the preeminent feature of modern political and legal discourse, the work of obligations has been overshadowed. Questioning and correcting this dominant image of our time, this book brings obligations back into view in a way that fits better with the realities of contemporary social life. Following a historical account of the changing place and priorities of obligations in modernity, the book analyses how obligations and practices of obedience are core to understanding how law sustains conditions of inequality. But it also explores the enduring role obligations play in furthering individual and collective well-being, highlighting their significance in practices that prioritize human and environmental needs, common goods, and solidarity. In doing so, it also offers an alternative and cogent assessment of the force, and the potential, of obligations in contemporary societies. This original jurisprudential contribution will appeal to an academic and student readership in law, politics, and the social sciences.

This is the first book to comprehensively analyze the work of Hans Micklitz, one of the leading scholars in the field of EU economic law. It brings together analysts, academic friends and critics of Hans Micklitz and results in a unique collection of essays that evaluate his work on European Economic Law and Regulation. The contributions discuss a wide range of Micklitz' work: from his theoretical work on private law beyond party autonomy, with a special focus on its regulatory function, to the illustration of how his work has built the basis for current solutions such as used in solving the financial crisis. The book is divided into sections covering foundations of private law, regulatory law, competition and intellectual property law, product safety law, consumer contract law and the enforcement of law. This book clearly shows the enormous impact of Hans Micklitz' work on the EU legal system in both scholarship and practice.

This book descibes in detail the development of substantive criminal law during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The author examines the forces which shaped criminal jurisprudence throughout the course of this period, paying particular attention to the activities of legislators and reformers, to parallel developments in the study of punishment and human psychology, to general social and political changes and to the growth of an organised police force and its reliance upon formal rules of proceedure and evidence.

PRAISE FOR THE BOOK "Despite the existing scholarly literature on criminal defences, many issues remain contested or unresolved. Dr Dsouza offers a thorough and scholarly treatment of a complex topic which can be expected to become a point of reference for future work in the field." Professor James Chalmers, University of Glasgow "Mark Dsouza has produced an engaging, incisive and cogently argued monograph, that makes an original contribution to criminal law theory. Required reading for scholars and graduate students working on criminal law defences." Professor Paul Roberts, University of Nottingham Although it is often accepted that rationale-based defences to criminal liability can be justificatory or excusatory, disagreements about how best to conceptualise the categories of justification and excuse have appeared so interminable that some theorists argue that they should be abandoned altogether. This book offers a novel, principled, and intuitively appealing conceptual account of the natures of justifications and excuses, showing how they differ, and why the distinction between them matters. The monograph breaks new ground by defending a model of rationale-based defences that turns solely on the quality of the defendant's reasoning. This model is shown to generate appealing liability outcomes, advance convincing solutions to questions that have puzzled criminal lawyers for years, and offer suggestions for doctrinal reform that are both normatively sound, and practical. By proposing new ways to think about defences, this book makes an original contribution to criminal law theory that will be of benefit to academics, practitioners, and persons interested in law reform.

Using an innovative history of the constitutional right to privacy, and inspired by Emersonian Justices like Brandeis and Douglas, this book rescues the meaning of privacy from prevalent liberal thinking by proposing a general theory of rights based on a spiritual-ecological jurisprudence tradition at the heart of American law. The right to privacy is a powerful, yet often overlooked tradition, whose main representatives are Justice Brandeis and Justice Douglas, both of whom translated into concretely legal and political ideas the philosophy of American thinkers like Emerson and Thoreau. In light of this historical understanding, the major constitutional cases relating to privacy, such as Griswold or Roe v. Wade, are given new interpretations. Through a radical reinterpretation of Mill's philosophy of liberty, and a comparison of that reinterpretation with the one of Brandeis, this book proposes a new general theory of rights, based on the valuation of privacy as a transformative context in which self-knowledge can emerge, giving birth to ethical and communal responsibility.

A new edition of F. A. Hayek’s three-part opus Law, Legislation, and Liberty, collated in a single volume In this critical entry in the Collected Works of F. A. Hayek series, political philosopher Jeremy Shearmur collates Hayek’s three-part study of law and liberty and places Hayek’s writings in careful historical context. Incisive and unrestrained, Law, Legislation, and Liberty is Hayek at his late-life best, making it essential reading for understanding the philosopher’s politics and worldview. These three volumes constitute a scaling up of the framework offered in Hayek’s famed The Road to Serfdom. Volume 1, Rules and Order, espouses the virtues of classical liberalism; Volume 2, The Mirage of Social Justice, examines the societal forces that undermine liberalism and, with it, liberalism’s capacity to induce "spontaneous order"; and Volume 3, The Political Order of a Free People, proposes alternatives and interventions against emerging anti-liberal movements, including a rule of law that resides in stasis with personal freedom. Shearmur’s treatment of this challenging work—including an immersive new introduction, a conversion of Hayek’s copious endnotes to footnotes, corrections to Hayek’s references and quotations, and the provision of translations to material that Hayek cited only in languages other than English—lends it new importance and accessibility. Rendered anew for the next generations of scholars, this revision of Hayek’s Law, Legislation, and Liberty is sure to become the standard.

This book examines ethics at the intersection of law and justice. If law and justice are concerned with collectively establishing the general terms on which the plurality called "we" share the earth as social beings, then ethics concerns the individual Self's particular moral relationship with the Other. Law, the acknowledged offspring of politics, represents the kind of might that most people accept as legitimate, at least most of the time. Justice, on the other hand, is supposed to vigilantly stand guard over law: to protect us against its biases and excesses, or, at the very least, to rise up and reproach the law whenever it permits or encourages injustice. But what if the belief that a particular legally-authorized state of affairs is "just" - a common enough feeling, especially amongst the privileged - or even "unjust" and in need of correction, were itself in need of a vigilant guardian? This book argues that ethics can and should stand guard over whatever image of justice and/or just law one happens to believe in. The book thus attempts to steer a perilous course between two looming moral hazards: ethics interpreted as the rational production of ethically correct behavior (as in Kant) and ethics interpreted as the spontaneous eruption of pre-rational compassion for the suffering of the Other, come what may (as in Levinas). In the end, the book characterizes ethical life in the law as the more-or-less constant experience of the paradoxical nature of this choice - a feeling of inescapable personal responsibility for the fate of the Other. Based on the author's well-established expertise in the area, this book will appeal to students, scholars and others with interests in legal theory and moral and political philosophy.

Focusing on John Milton's Paradise Lost , this book investigates the metaphorical identification of nature with a court of law - an old and persistent trope, haunted by ancient aporias, at the intersection of jurisprudence, philosophy and literature. In an enormous variety of texts, from the Greek beginnings of Western literature onward, nature has been described as a courtroom in which an all- encompassing trial takes place and a universal verdict is executed. The first, introductory part of this study sketches an overview of the metaphor's development in European history, from antiquity to the seventeenth century. In its second, more extensive part, the book concentrates on Milton's epic Paradise Lost in which the problem of the natural law court finds one of its most fascinating and detailed articulations. Using conceptual tools provided by Hannah Arendt, Walter Benjamin, Hans Blumenberg, Gilles Deleuze, William Empson and Alfred North Whitehead, the study demonstrates that the conflicts in Milton's epic revolve around the tension between a universal legal procedure inherent in nature and the positive legal decrees of the deity. The divine rule is found to consolidate itself by Nature's supplementary shadow government; their inconsistencies are not flaws, but rather fundamental rhetorical assets, supporting a law that is inherently "double- formed". In Milton's world, human beings are thus confronted with a twofold law that entraps them in its endlessly proliferating double binds, whether they obey or not. The analysis of this strange juridical structure can open up new perspectives on Milton's epic, as well as on the way legal discourse tends to entangle norms with facts and thus to embed itself in human life. This original and intriguing book will appeal not only to those engaged in the study of Milton, but also to anyone interested in the relationship between law, history, literature and philosophy.

Why does a hospital need an ethics consultation? And what about this counselling is ethical? The book explains the background of the development of clinical ethics counselling. It provides new insights into serious decision-making conflicts in everyday clinical life and uncovers the disputes that followed in public. In the search for the ethical understanding of clinical ethics counselling, the book comes across previously unexplored evidence. Step by step, a system is reconstructed that reveals the shape of a significant philosophical school of thought.

This book analyses the phenomenon of digitally mediated property and considers how it problematises the boundary between human and nonhuman actors. The book addresses the increasingly porous border between personhood and property in digitized settings and considers how the increased commodification of knowledge makes visible a rupture in the liberal concept of the property owning, free, person. Engaging with the latest work in posthumanist and new materialist theory, it shows, how property as a concept as well as a means for control, changes fundamentally under advanced capitalism. Such change is exemplified by the way in which data, as an object of commodification, is extracted from human activities yet is also directly used to affectively control - or nudge - humans. Taking up a range of human engagements with digital platforms and coded architectures, as well as the circulation of affects through practices of artificial intelligence that are employed to shape behaviour, the book argues that property now needs to be understood according to an ecology of human as well as nonhuman actors. The idea of posthuman property, then, offers both a means to critique property control through digital technologies, as well as to move beyond the notion of the self-owning, object-owning, human. Engaging the most challenging contemporary technological developments, this book will appeal to researchers in the areas of Law and Technology, Legal Theory, Intellectual Property Law, Legal Philosophy, Sociology of Law, Sociology, and Media Studies.

Addressing the influential analysis of law and literature, this book offers a new perspective on their relationship. The law and literature movement that has gained global prominence in the course of last decades of the twentieth and the first decades of the twenty-first centuries has provided the research and teaching of law with a considerable body of new and valuable knowledge and understanding. Most of the knowledge and insights generated by the movement concern either a thematic overlap between legal and literary discourses - suggesting they deal with the same moral concerns - or a rhetorical, semiotic or general linguistic comparability or 'sameness' between them - imputing to both the same or very similar narrative structures. The Literary Exception and the Rule of Law recognises the wealth of knowledge generated by this approach to the relationship between law and literature, and acknowledges its debt to this genre of scholarship. It nevertheless also proposes, on the basis of a number of revealing phenomenological inquiries, a different approach to law and literary studies: one that emphasises the irreducible difference between law and literature. It does so with the firm believe that a regard for the very different and indeed opposite discursive trajectories of legal and literary language allows for a more profound understanding of the unique and indeed separate roles that the discourses of law and literature generally play in the sustenance of relatively stable legal cultures. This important rethinking of the relationship between law and literature will appeal to scholars and students of legal theory, jurisprudence, philosophy, politics and literary theory.

This book argues that justice often governs apologies. Drawing on examples from literature, politics, and current events, Cohen presents a theory of apology as corrective offers. Many leading accounts of apology say much about what apologies do and why they are important. They stop short of exploring whether and how justice governs apologies. Cohen argues that corrective justice may require apologies as offers of reparation. Individuals, corporations, and states may then have rights or duties regarding apology. Exercising rights to apology or fulfilling duties to provide them are ways of holding one another mutually accountable. By casting rights and duties of apology as justifiable to free and equal persons, the book advances conversations about how liberalism may respond to historic injustice. Apologies and Moral Repair will be of interest to scholars and advanced students in ethics, political philosophy, and social philosophy.

How might the social sciences best be employed in the study of law, especially in light of today's legal climate of anti-foundationalism? Realistic Socio-Legal Theory addresses this question thoroughly and precisely. Drawing upon philosophical pragmatism to construct an epistemological and methodological foundation, this book formulates a framework for a realistic approach to socio-legal theory.
Brian Z. Tamanaha contrasts the strengths of his realistic approach with those of the major schools of socio-legal theory through application to many key issues in the field. He explores the problematic state of socio-legal studies, the relationship between behavior and meaning, the notion of legal ideology, the nature of the concept of law, the problem of indeterminacy in rule following and application, and the structure of judicial decision making.
Tamanaha's discussion is always clear and concise as he articulates a social theory of law that draws equally from legal theory and socio-legal studies. His book has much to offer those interested in the gathering and organization of knowledge about law and legal phenomena.

Lon L Fuller's account of what he termed 'the internal morality of law' is widely accepted as the classic twentieth century statement of the principles of the rule of law. Much less accepted is his claim that a necessary connection between law and morality manifests in these principles, with the result that his jurisprudence largely continues to occupy a marginal place in the field of legal philosophy. In 'Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L Fuller', Kristen Rundle offers a close textual analysis of Fuller's published writings and working papers to explain how his claims about the internal morality of law belong to a wider exploration of the ways in which the distinctive form of law introduces meaningful limits to lawgiving power through its connection to human agency. By reading Fuller on his own terms, 'Forms Liberate' demonstrates why his challenge to a purely instrumental conception of law remains salient for twenty-first century legal scholarship.

A collection of essays discussing Herbert Hart's writings on responsibility. The essays focus upon Hart's work on causation in the law and on the justification of punishment. Specific topics discussed include senses of 'responsibility', voluntariness, Mill's harm principle, mens rea, excuses, the Hart-Wootton debate, and negligence.

Based on the Judicial Transparency Index Assessment (2019 and 2020) conducted in China by the Institute of Law of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, this book summarizes and analyzes the current situation of judicial openness in China, using a sample of 218 courts across the country for the study. The book analyzes the ideological and institutional origins of judicial openness and examines the operation of judicial openness through the practical experience of role replacement. By analyzing evaluation data in the fields of audit information disclosure, trial information disclosure, judicial enforcement data disclosure, and judicial reform data disclosure, the book points out that the current judicial disclosure has made significant progress, but there are still problems such as unclear disclosure standards, insufficient rigidity in disclosure requirements, and the scope of disclosure still needs to be expanded. The book recommends accelerating the disclosure of judicial legislation, public standards, and strengthening assessment and accountability.

This book explores the application of concepts of fiduciary duty or public trust in responding to the policy and governance challenges posed by policy problems that extend over multiple terms of government or even, as in the case of climate change, human generations. The volume brings together a range of perspectives including leading international thinkers on questions of fiduciary duty and public trust, Australia's most prominent judicial advocate for the application of fiduciary duty, top law scholars from several major universities, expert commentary from an influential climate policy think-tank and the views of long-serving highly respected past and present parliamentarians. The book presents a detailed examination of the nature and extent of fiduciary duty, looking at the example of Australia and having regard to developments in comparable jurisdictions. It identifies principles that could improve the accountability of political actors for their responses to major problems that may extend over multiple electoral cycles.

This book examines selected high-profile U.S. First Amendment cases occurring during the Trump era as a vehicle for exploring a possible fundamental commonality in understanding the democratic rule of law globally. In each of these cases, the adjudicating body's analytical legal strategy is discussed in terms of how it reinforces or detracts from the democratic rule of law. It was and continues to be highly internationally anticipated as to what legal examples are being set by this established democracy when confronted by legal contests between the former Trump administration and those alleging their rights were somehow violated by the executive of that time. Thus, the book is instructive for an international audience on the essential role of the courts in protecting democracy through providing, where supported by the law and the facts, a remedy for the aggrieved comparatively powerless. The book will be essential reading for academics and researchers working in the areas of constitutional law, politics and human rights.

The monograph discusses the problem of aerial terrorism, one of the biggest challenges humanity faces in the 21st century. Its main goal is to answer the question of whether international legal regulations serve as an effective tool in the fight against terrorists who target civil aviation. The book itself is divided into three chapters: the first one focuses on the theoretical aspect by describing the term “aerial terrorism” itself from a legal perspective. The second one is an in-depth overview of key legal instruments drafted under the auspices of ICAO, the United Nations, and the European Union, that together form a juridical core for the fight against air terrorists. Finally, the third is a case study that depicts how the mechanisms described in the previous parts function in practice.

This volume showcases emerging interdisciplinary scholarship that captures the complex ways in which biological knowledge is testing the nature and structure of legal personhood. Key questions include: What do the new biosciences do to our social, cultural, and legal conceptions of personhood? How does our legal apparatus incorporate new legitimations from the emerging biosciences into its knowledge system? And what kind of ethical, socio-political, and scientific consequences are attached to the establishment of such new legalities? The book examines these problems by looking at materialities, the posthuman, and the relational in the (un)making of legalities. Themes and topics include postgenomic research, gene editing, neuroscience, epigenetics, precision medicine, regenerative medicine, reproductive technologies, border technologies, and theoretical debates in legal theory on the relationship between persons, property, and rights.

1. This book has a market across criminology and criminal justice, sociology and law. 2. While there is a healthy market for books on the death penalty, there is a gap for a book that offers a rigorous theoretical approach to making sense of the data. 3. While many studies have focused specifically on racial bias, this book considers a range of social characteristics and their impact on sentencing, including class, moral reputation and organizational status.

This book takes up Paul Ricoeur's relational idea of the self in order to rethink the basis of human rights. Many schools of critical theory argue that the idea of human rights is based on a problematic conception of the human subject and the legal person. For liberals, the human is a possessive and self-interested individual, such that others are either tools or hurdles in their projects. This book offers a novel reading of subjectivity and rights based on Paul Ricoeur's re-interpretation of human subjectivity as a relational concept. Taking up Ricoeur's idea of recognition as a 'reciprocal gift', it argues that gift exchange is the relation upon which authentic, non-abstract, human subjectivity is based. Seen in this context, human rights can be understood as tokens of mutual recognition, securing a genuinely human life for all. The conception of human rights as gift effectively counters their moral individualism and possessiveness, as the philosophical anthropology of an isolated ego is replaced by that of a related, dependent and embedded self. This original reinterpretation of human rights will appeal to scholars of legal theory, jurisprudence, politics and philosophy.

Necessity is a notoriously dangerous and slippery concept-dangerous because it contemplates virtually unrestrained killing in warfare and slippery when used in conflicting ways in different areas of international law. Jens David Ohlin and Larry May untangle these confusing strands and perform a descriptive mapping of the ways that necessity operates in legal and philosophical arguments in jus ad bellum, jus in bello, human rights, and criminal law. Although the term "necessity" is ever-present in discussions regarding the law and ethics of killing, its meaning changes subtly depending on the context. It is sometimes an exception, at other times a constraint on government action, and most frequently a broad license in war that countenances the wholesale killing of enemy soldiers in battle. Is this legal status quo in war morally acceptable? Ohlin and May offer a normative and philosophical critique of international law's prevailing notion of jus in bello necessity and suggest ways that killing in warfare could be made more humane-not just against civilians but soldiers as well. Along the way, the authors apply their analysis to modern asymmetric conflicts with non-state actors and the military techniques most likely to be used against them. Presenting a rich tapestry of arguments from both contemporary and historical Just War theory, Necessity in International Law is the first full-length study of necessity as a legal and philosophical concept in international affairs.