This book re-considers property law for a future of environmental disruption. As slogans such as "build the wall" or "stop the boats" affect public policy, there are counter-questions as to whether positivist or statist notions of property are fit for purpose in a time of human mobility and environmental disruption. State-centric property laws construct legal fictions of sovereign control over land, notwithstanding the persistent reality of informal settlements in many parts of the Global South. In a world affected by catastrophic disasters, this book develops a vision of adaptive governance for property in land based on a critical re-assessment of state-centric property law. This book will appeal to a broad readership with interests in legal theory, property law, adaptive governance, international development, refugee studies, postcolonial studies, and natural disasters.

This book re-considers property law for a future of environmental disruption. As slogans such as "build the wall" or "stop the boats" affect public policy, there are counter-questions as to whether positivist or statist notions of property are fit for purpose in a time of human mobility and environmental disruption. State-centric property laws construct legal fictions of sovereign control over land, notwithstanding the persistent reality of informal settlements in many parts of the Global South. In a world affected by catastrophic disasters, this book develops a vision of adaptive governance for property in land based on a critical re-assessment of state-centric property law. This book will appeal to a broad readership with interests in legal theory, property law, adaptive governance, international development, refugee studies, postcolonial studies, and natural disasters.

This book gathers together leading voices in virtue theory-an increasingly influential aspect of legal theory in the 21st century-to take stock of virtue jurisprudence's evolution and suggest ways in which this approach can be further developed. The contributions address the three main axes along which virtue jurisprudence has unfolded in the past decades: the quest to provide a suitable virtue-based foundation for the law (in general) or for some aspects of it (in particular, but not exclusively, criminal law); the investigation of the role played by character traits in legal decision-making; and the investigation of how the law can be part of a virtuous life. As will become apparent for readers of this volume, those lines are converging and, as they do so, a general virtue-based approach to the study of law is starting to emerge. Crucial in addressing problems with legal experience for which the resources of traditional legal theory are insufficient, this book's investigation of virtue theory and virtue jurisprudence will be of interest to all of those studying legal decision-making and the philosophy of law, as well as those studying virtue ethics more widely. It was originally published as a special issue of Jurisprudence.

Returning to the map of the island of utopia, this book provides a contemporary, inventive, addition to the long history of legal fictions and juristic phantasms. Progressive legal and political thinking has for long lacked a positive, let alone a bold imaginary project, an account of what improved institutions and an ameliorated environment would look like. And where better to start than with the non-laws or imaginary legislations of a realm yet to come. The Cabinet of Imaginary Laws is a collection of fictive contributions to the theme of conceiving imaginary laws in the vivid vein of jurisliterary invention. Disparate in style and diverse in genres of writing and performative expression, the celebrated and unknown, venerable and youthful authors write new laws. Thirty-five dissolute scholars, impecunious authors and dyspeptic artists from a variety of fields including law, film, science, history, philosophy, political science, aesthetics, architecture and the classics become, for a brief and inspiring instance, legislators of impossible norms. The collection provides an extra-ordinary range of inspired imaginings of other laws. This momentary community of radial thought conceives of a wild variety of novel critical perspectives. The contributions aim to inspire reflection on the role of imagination in the study and writing of law. Verse, collage, artworks, short stories, harangues, lists, and other pleas, reports and pronouncements revivify the sense of law as the vehicle of poetic justice and as an art that instructs and constructs life. Aimed at an intellectual audience disgruntled with the negativity of critique and the narrowness of the disciplines, this book will appeal especially to theorists, lawyers, scholars and a general public concerned with the future of decaying laws and an increasingly derelict legal system.

Anthropocene Antarctica offers new ways of thinking about the 'Continent for Science and Peace' in a time of planetary environmental change. In the Anthropocene, Antarctica has become central to the Earth's future. Ice cores taken from its interior reveal the deep environmental history of the planet and warming ocean currents are ominously destabilising the glaciers around its edges, presaging sea-level rise in decades and centuries to come. At the same time, proliferating research stations and tourist numbers challenge stereotypes of the continent as the 'last wilderness.' The Anthropocene brings Antarctica nearer in thought, entangled with our everyday actions. If the Anthropocene signals the end of the idea of Nature as separate from humans, then the Antarctic, long considered the material embodiment of this idea, faces a radical reframing. Understanding the southern polar region in the twenty-first century requires contributions across the disciplinary spectrum. This collection paves the way for researchers in the Environmental Humanities, Law and Social Sciences to engage critically with the Antarctic, fostering a community of scholars who can act with natural scientists to address the globally significant environmental issues that face this vitally important part of the planet.

The status of economic liberties remains a serious lacuna in the theory and practice of human rights. Should a minimally just society protect the freedoms to sell, save, profit and invest? Is being prohibited to run a business a human rights violation? While these liberties enjoy virtually no support from the existing philosophical theories of human rights and little protection by the international human rights law, they are of tremendous importance in the lives of individuals, and particularly the poor. Like most individual liberties, economic liberties increase our ability to lead our own life. When we enjoy them, we can choose the occupational paths that best fit us and, in so doing, define who they are in relation to others. Furthermore, in the absence of good jobs, economic liberties allow us to create an alternative path to subsistence. This is critical for the millions of working poor in developing countries who earn their livelihoods by engaging in independent economic activities. Insecure economic liberties leave them vulnerable to harassment, bribery and other forms of abuse from middlemen and public officials. This book opens a debate about the moral and legal status of economic liberties as human rights. It brings together political and legal theorists working in the domain of human rights and global justice, as well as people engaged in the practice of human rights, to engage in both foundational and applied issues concerning these questions.

In the context of increasing division and segregation in cities across the world, along with pressing concerns around austerity, environmental degradation, homelessness, violence, and refugees, this book pursues a multidisciplinary approach to spatial justice in the city. Spatial justice has been central to urban theorists in various ways. Intimately connected to social justice, it is a term implicated in relations of power which concern the spatial distribution of resources, rights and materials. Arguably there can be no notion of social justice that is not spatial. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos has argued that spatial justice is the struggle of various bodies - human, natural, non-organic, technological - to occupy a certain space at a certain time. As such, urban planning and policy interventions are always, to some extent at least, about spatial justice. And, as cities become ever more unequal, it is crucial that urbanists address questions of spatial justice in the city. To this end, this book considers these questions from a range of disciplinary perspectives. Crossing law, sociology, history, cultural studies, and geography, the book's overarching concern with how to think spatial justice in the city brings a fresh perspective to issues that have concerned urbanists for several decades. The inclusion of empirical work in London brings the political, social, and cultural aspects of spatial justice to life. The book will be of interest to academics and students in the field of urban studies, sociology, geography, planning, space law, and cultural studies.

This book offers a multi-discursive analysis of the constitutional foundations for peaceful coexistence, the constitutional background for discontent and the impact of discontent, and the consequences of conflict and revolution on the constitutional order of a democratic society which may lead to its implosion. It explores the capacity of the constitutional order to serve as a reliable framework for peaceful co-existence while allowing for reasonable and legitimate discontent. It outlines the main factors contributing to rising pressure on constitutional order which may produce an implosion of constitutionalism and constitutional democracy as we have come to know it. The collection presents a wide range of views on the ongoing implosion of the liberal-democratic constitutional consensus which predetermined the constitutional axiology, the institutional design, the constitutional mythology and the functioning of the constitutional orders since the last decades of the 20th century. The constitutional perspective is supplemented with perspectives from financial, EU, labour and social security law, administrative law, migration and religious law. Liberal viewpoints encounter radical democratic and critical legal viewpoints. The work thus allows for a plurality of viewpoints, theoretical preferences and thematic discourses offering a pluralist scientific account of the key challenges to peaceful coexistence within the current constitutional framework. The book provides a valuable resource for academics, researchers and policymakers working in the areas of constitutional law and politics.

Xiang explains the nature and depth of the legitimacy crisis facing the government of China, and why it is so frequently misunderstood in the West. Arguing that it is more helpful to understand the quest for legitimacy in China as an eternally dynamic process, rather than to seek resolutions in constitutionalism, Xiang examines the understanding of legitimacy in Chinese political philosophy. He posits that the current crisis is a consequence of the incompatibility of Confucian Republicanism and Soviet-inspired Bolshevism. The discourse on Chinese political reform tends to polarize, between total westernization on the one hand, or the rejection of western influence in all forms on the other. Xiang points to a third solution - meeting western democratic theories halfway, avoiding another round of violent revolution. This book provides valuable insights for scholars and students of China's politics and political history.

In 2010, Martin Loughlin, Professor of Public Law at the LSE, published Foundations of Public Law, 'an account of the foundation of the discipline of public law with a view to identifying its essential character'. The book has become a landmark in the field, and it has been said, notably by one of its major critics, that it now provides the 'starting point' for any deeper inquiry into the subject. The purpose of this volume is to engage critically with Foundations - conceptually, comparatively and historically - from the viewpoints of public law, private law, political, social and legal theory, as well as jurisdictional perspectives including the UK, US, India, and Continental Europe. Scholars also consider the legacy and continuing relevance of Foundations in the light of developments in transnational law, global law and regional integration in the European Union.

The meaning and function of law in Hannah Arendt's work has never been the subject of a systematic reconstruction. This book examines Arendt's work and reconstructs her ideas through political, legal and constitutional theory, and shows that her engagement with law is continuous as well as crucial to an adequate understanding of her political thought. The author argues that Arendt was very much concerned with the question of an adequate arrangement of law, politics and order - the so-called triad of constitutionalism. By adopting this approach, the author suggests an alternative interpretation of Arendt's thought, which sees her as thinker of political order who considers as crucial a stable and free political order in which political struggle and dissent can occur. Endorsements 'Christian Volk is one of the most original and penetrating Arendt interpreters of his generation. This book addresses some of the most misunderstood aspects of Arendtian thought - namely, her views of law and constitutionalism. Volk does away with a lot of misconceptions and guides us to a novel view of Arendt on these questions and beyond'. Seyla Benhabib, Yale University 'One could not imagine something new on Arendt these days. Too much has been written in the last decades. But this volume discloses new land and gives a fresh look at Arendt's theory of the political. A great book, and a must for every reading list'. Hauke Brunkhorst, University of Flensburg 'Hannah Arendt is famous for her unusual conception of politics, but as Christian Volk's rich and seminal study shows, Arendt's political theory goes hand in hand with a distinctive understanding of law. Volk persuasively charts the emergence of Arendt's complementary approaches to law and politics out of her analysis of the crisis of the European nation-state, and tests the power of her thought by bringing it into a fresh dialogue with an unusually wide spectrum of contemporary theorists. An impressive work that deserves the new audience it will find in this welcome translation'. Patchen Markell, University of Chicago 'Christian Volk splendidly discovers Hannah Arendt as a legal theorist. Lawyers interested in her seminal work should just read this book'. Christoph Moellers, Humboldt University Berlin 'As Christian Volk persuasively demonstrates, reading Arendt as a constitutional theorist is more than just adding another dimension to the interpretation of her work. Based on comprehensive textual evidence, he can instead show that this has important conceptual implications which shed a completely new light on the basic aspects of her overall theoretical outlook. Emphasising the procedural grounding of her understanding of democracy, it thus presents a major challenge to many widely held beliefs about Arendts work and an irresistible invitation to reinvestigate the foundations, promises and prospects of radical politics.' Rainer Schmalz-Bruns, Leibniz University of Hanover

This title was first published in 2003. This book examines the interrelationship between the unravelling of the post-war welfare state and legal change. By reference to theorists of postmodernity such as Zygmunt Bauman, Scott Lash and John Urry, and David Harvey, the principal argument is that contemporary law and legal institutions can be best understood as having changed in ways that mirror the recent transformation of the interventionist welfare state and its Fordist, Keynesian economic infrastructure. The key changes identified in the legal field include:- the shift toward marketized regulatory structures as reflected in privatization and deregulation, the attenuation of welfare rights, the privatization of justice, legal polycentricity, the reconfiguration of the welfare state's social citizenship and the globalization of law. Empirical evidence from a number of jurisdictions is adduced to indicate the general direction of change. The cumulative extent of recent social and legal change also forms the basis of a re-evaluation of some influential neo-evolutionist analyses of the nature of law in the welfare state, such as those of Unger, Teubner, Friedmann, Selznick and Habermas, as well as a critical re-assessment of some contemporary postmodern legal theory.

This book tracks the development of the emerging international legal principle of a responsibility to protect over the past two decades. It contrasts the influential version of the principle introduced by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001 with subsequent interpretations of the responsibility to protect advocated by the United Nations through its human protection agenda, and reviews the dangers and inconsistencies inherent in both perspectives. The author demonstrates that the evolving responsibility to protect principle can be recruited to support a wide range of irreconcilable projects, from those of cosmopolitan constitutionalism to those of hegemonic international law. However, despite the dangers posed by this susceptibility to conceptual hijacking, Oman argues that the responsibility to protect, like human rights, is an essential a modern emancipatory formation. To remedy this dangerous malleability, the author advocates a third, distinctive interpretation of the responsibility to protect designed to limit its cooptation by liberal anti-pluralist and hegemonic international law agendas. Oman outlines the key features of such a minimalist conception, and explores its fit with the "RtoP" version of the responsibility to protect promoted in recent years by the UN. The author argues that two crucial features missing from the UN reading of the principle should be developed in future: an acknowledgement of the role of non-state actors as bearers of the responsibility to protect, and a recognition of the principle's legal character. Both of these aspects of the principle offer means to democratize the international law-making enterprise.

Legal scholars and authorities generally agree that the law should be obeyed and should apply equally to all those subject to it, without favour or discrimination. Yet it is possible to see that in any legal system there will be situations when strict application of the law will produce undesirable results, such as injustice or other consequences not intended by the law as framed. In such circumstances the law may be changed but there may be broad policy reasons not to do so. The allied concepts of dispensation and economy grew up in the western and eastern traditions of the Christian church as mechanisms whereby an individual or a class of people could, by authority, be excused from obligations under a particular law in particular circumstances without that law being changed. This book uncovers and explores this neglected area of church life and law. Will Adam argues that dispensing power and authority exist in various guises in the systems of different churches. Codified and understood in Roman Catholic and Orthodox canon law, this arouses suspicion in the Church of England and in English law in general. The book demonstrates that legal flexibility can be found in English law and is integral to the law of the Church, to enable the Church today better to fulfil its mission in the world.

Ethnicity and International Law presents an historical account of the impact of ethnicity on the making of international law. The development of international law since the nineteenth century is characterised by the inherent tension between the liberal and conservative traditions of dealing with what might be termed the 'problem' of ethnicity. The present-day hesitancy of liberal international law to engage with ethnicity in ethnic conflicts and ethnic minorities has its roots in these conflicting philosophical traditions. In international legal studies, both the relevance of ethnicity, and the traditions of understanding it, lie in this fact.

Substate nationalism, especially in the past fifteen years, has noticeably affected the political and territorial stability of many countries, both democratic and democratizing. Norms exist to limit the behavior of collective agents in relation to individuals; the set of universally accepted human rights provides a basic framework. There is a lacuna in international law, however, in the regulation of the behavior of groups toward other groups, with the exception of relations among states. The book offers a normative approach to moderate minority nationalism that treats minorities and majorities in multinational states justly and argues for the differentiation of group rights based on how group agents are constituted. It argues that group agency requires a shared set of beliefs concerning membership and the social ontology it offers ensures that group rights can be aligned with individual rights. It formulates a set of principles that, if adopted, would aid conflict resolution in multinational states. The book pays special attention to national self-determination in transitional societies. The book is intended for everyone in political philosophy and political science interested in global justice and international law and legal practitioners interested in normative issues and group rights

Long-regarded as a classic in philosophical circles for launching the theory of fictionalism, Vaihinger's reputation has grown steadily over the years - now is the perfect time to enter the Routledge Classics pantheon The Philosophy of As If influenced various schools of philosophy, especially pragmatism, North America's most important philosophical movement The Routledge Classics edition includes a new foreword by Michael Rosenthal

The legal system affects behavior not just directly, by imposing sanctions, but also indirectly, by producing information on how people behave. For example, internal company documents exposed during litigation will help third parties assess whether they trust a company and want to keep doing business with it. The law therefore affects behavior by shaping reputations. Drawing on economics, communications, and a nascent multidisciplinary literature on reputation, Roy Shapira highlights how reputation works, and how information from the courtroom affects the court of public opinion, with a particular emphasis on the role of the media. By fleshing out interactions between law and reputation, Shapira corrects common misperceptions about the ability of market forces to discipline corporate behavior and adds to timely, ongoing debates such as the desirability of heightened pleading standards or mandatory arbitration clauses. Law and Reputation should interest any scholar who invokes notions of market discipline in their work.

In the long-standing debate between positivism and non-positivism, legal validity has always been a subject of controversy. While positivists deny that moral values play any role in the determination of legal validity, non-positivists affirm the opposite thesis. In departing from this narrow point of view, the book focuses on the notion of legal knowledge. Apart from what one takes to constitute the grounds of legal validity, there is a more fundamental issue about cognitive validity: how do we acquire knowledge of whatever is assumed to constitute the elements of legal validity? When the question is posed in this form a fundamental shift takes place. Given that knowledge is a philosophical concept, for anything to constitute an adequate ground for legal validity it must satisfy the standards set by knowledge. In exploring those standards the author argues that knowledge is the outcome of an activity of judging, which is constrained by reasons (reflexive). While these reasons may vary with the domain of judging, the reflexive structure of the practice of judging imposes certain constraints on what can constitute a reason for judging. Amongst these constraints are found not only general metaphysical limitations but also the fundamental principle that one with the capacity to judge is autonomous or, in other words, capable of determining the reasons that form the basis of action. One sees, as soon as autonomy has been introduced into the parameters of knowledge, that law is necessarily connected with every other practical domain. The author shows, in the end, that the issue of knowledge is orthogonal to questions about the inclusion or exclusion of morality, for what really matters is whether the putative grounds of legal validity are appropriate to the generation of knowledge. The outcome is far more integral than much work in current theory: neither an absolute deference to either universal moral standards or practice-independent values nor a complete adherence to conventionality and institutional arrangements will do. In suggesting that the current positivism versus non-positivism debate, when it comes to determining law's nature, misses the crux of the matter, the book aims to provoke a fertile new debate in legal theory. "George Pavlakos' engaging book tackles the fundamental question of what makes legal knowledge possible. Since all articulate thought has to conform to implicit rules of grammar, it is necessarily normatively structured. Thus normativity cannot be something external to human thinking that we study from the outside, but is intrinsic to all human practices (including the natural sciences). This insight opens up fascinating new lines of inquiry into the character of law and its relations to other normative domains." Professor Sir Neil MacCormick, Edinburgh University "With admirable analytical acumen, George Pavlakos underscores the practical character of legal knowledge as well as the importance of argumentation in legal theory. He rejects those approaches to the nature of law that rest on conventional criteria as well as those that turn on factors altogether independent of practice, developing instead the thesis that objectivity and knowledge emerge from practical activity reflecting the spontaneity of human reason. In light of this notion of legal cognition as a practical activity directed and constrained by reason, the law is seen as an enduring institution, jurisprudence as a humanistic discipline. A truly important work." Professor Dr. Robert Alexy, Christian-Albrechts-Universitat zu Kiel

The Passions of Law is the first anthology to treat the role that emotions play, don't play, and ought to play in the practice and conception of law and justice. Lying at the intersection of law, psychology, and philosophy, this emergent field of law scholarship raises some of the most profound and interesting questions at the heart of jurisprudence. For example, what role do emotions ranging from disgust to compassion play in the decision-making processes of judges, lawyers, juries, and clients? What emotions belong in which legal contexts? Is there a hierarchy of emotions, and, if so, through what sources do we identify it? To what extent are emotions subject to change or tutelage? How can we evaluate the role of emotion in such disparate contexts as death sentencing, laws about same sex marriage, hate crime legislation, punitive damages or shaming penalties?

Consisting of original essays by leading scholars of law, theology, political science, and philosophy, The Passions of Law contributes to ongoing efforts to humanize law and reveals how this previously unacknowledged aspect of decision-making exerts a much greater impact on justice and the practice of law than most tend, or like, to think.

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This book offers a critical analysis of the European colonial heritage in the Arab countries and highlights the way this legacy is still with us today, informing the current state of relations between Europe and the formerly colonized states. The work analyses the fraught relationship between the Western powers and the Arab countries that have been subject to their colonial rule. It does so by looking at this relationship from two vantage points. On the one hand is that of humanitarian intervention-a paradigm under which colonial rule coexisted alongside "humanitarian" policies pursued on the dual assumption that the colonized were "barbarous" peoples who wanted to be civilized and that the West could lay a claim of superiority over an inferior humanity. On the other hand is the Arab view, from which the humanitarian paradigm does not hold up, and which accordingly offers its own insights into the processes through which the Arab countries have sought to wrest themselves from colonial rule. In unpacking this analysis the book traces a history of international and colonial law, to this end also using the tools offered by the history of political thought. The book will be of interest to students, academics, and researchers working in legal history, international law, international relations, the history of political thought, and colonial studies.

This book argues for a mixed theory of legal punishment that treats both crime reduction and retribution as important aims of the state. A central question in the philosophy of law is why the state's punishment of its own citizens is justified. Traditionally, two theories of punishment have dominated the field: consequentialism and retributivism. According to consequentialism, punishment is justified when it maximizes positive outcomes. According to retributivism, criminals should be punished because they deserve it. This book recognizes the strength of both positions. According to the two-tiered model, the institution of punishment and statutory penalties, as set by the legislature, are justified based on their costs and benefits, in terms of deterrence and rehabilitation. The law exists to preserve the public order. Criminal courts, by contrast, determine who is punished and how much based on what offenders deserve. The courts express the community's collective sense of resentment at being wronged. This book supports the two-tiered model by showing that it accords with our moral intuitions, commonly held (compatibilist) theories of freedom, and assumptions about how the extent of our knowledge affects our obligations. It engages classic and contemporary work in the philosophy of law and explains the theory's advantages over competing approaches from retributivists and other mixed theorists. The book also defends consequentialism against a longstanding objection that the social sciences give us little guidance regarding which policies to adopt. Drawing on recent criminological research, the two-tiered model can help us to address some of our most pressing social issues, including the death penalty, drug policy, and mass incarceration. This book will be of interest to philosophers, legal scholars, policymakers, and social scientists, especially criminologists, economists, and political scientists.

This book explores the relationship between populism or populist regimes and constitutional interpretation used in those regimes. The volume discusses the question of whether contemporary populist governments and movements have developed, or encouraged new and specific constitutional theories, doctrines and methods of interpretation, or whether their constitutional and other high courts continue to use the old, traditional interpretative tools in constitutional adjudication. The book is divided into four parts. Part I contains three chapters elaborating the theoretical basis for the discussion. Part II examines the topic from a comparative perspective, representing those European countries where populism is most prevalent, including Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Part III extends the focus to the United States, reflecting how American jurisprudence and academia have produced the most important contributions to the theory of constitutional interpretation, and how recent political developments in that country might challenge the traditional understanding of judicial review. This section also includes a general overview on Latin America, where there are also some populist governments and strong populist movements. Finally, the editors' closing study analyses the outcomes of the comparative research, summarizing the conclusions of the book. Written by renowned national constitutional scholars, the book will be essential reading for students, academics and researchers working in Constitutional Law and Politics.

A FINANCIAL TIMES BOOK TO READ _______________ ‘One of the foremost thinkers on the transformative impact of the technology revolution’ - TONY BLAIR ‘Original and hopeful . . . a unique guide to the great challenges of the digital age’ - ANNE APPLEBAUM ‘Lucid and persuasive’ - NIALL FERGUSON _______________ The Digital Republic is the definitive guide to the great political question of our time: how can freedom and democracy survive in a world of powerful digital technologies? Not long ago, the tech industry was widely admired and the internet was regarded as a tonic for freedom and democracy. Not anymore. Every day, the headlines blaze with reports of racist algorithms, data leaks, and social media platforms festering with falsehood and hate. In The Digital Republic, acclaimed author Jamie Susskind argues that these problems are not the fault of a few bad apples at the top of the industry. They are the result of our failure to govern technology properly, a failure derived from decades of muddled ideas and wishful thinking. The Digital Republic charts a new course, with new legal standards, new public bodies and institutions, new duties on platforms, new rights and regulators, and new codes of conduct for people in the tech industry. Inspired by the great political essays of the past, and steeped in the traditions of republican thought, it offers a vision of a different type of society: a digital republic in which human and technological flourishing go hand in hand.

This book reconsiders the use of food metaphors and the relationship between law and food in an interdisciplinary perspective to examine how food related topics can be used to describe or identify rules, norms, or prescriptions of all kinds. The links between law and food are as old as the concept of law. Many authors have been using such links in creative ways to express specific features of law. This is because the language of food and cooking offers legal thinkers and teachers mouth-watering metaphors, comparing rules to recipes, and their combination to culinary processes. This collection focuses on this relationship between law and food and takes us far beyond their mere interaction, to explore different ways of using these two apparently so diverse elements to describe different phenomena of the legal reality. The authors use the link between food and law to describe different aspects of the legal landscape in different areas and jurisdictions. Bringing together metaphors and indirect correlations between law and food, the book explores different models of approaching legal issues and considering different legal challenges from a completely new perspective, in line with the multidisciplinary approach that leads comparative legal studies today and, to a certain extent, revisiting and enriching it. With contributions in English and French, the book will be of interest to academics and researchers working in the areas of law and food, law and language, and comparative legal studies.