Analysing the most important concepts and problems of the philosophy of polar law, this book focuses on the legal regimes relating to both the Arctic and Antarctic. The book addresses the most fundamental concepts and problems of polar law, looking beyond the apparent biophysical similarities and differences of the two polar regions, to tackle the distinctive legal problems relating to each polar region. It examines key legal-philosophical areas of the philosophy of law around legal interpretation; the role of nation states, reflected in concepts of territorial sovereignty - whether recognised or merely asserted, the exercise of jurisdiction, and the philosophical justifications for such claims; as well as indigenous rights, land rights, civil commons and issues of justice. The book will be of interest to students and scholars of polar law, land law, heritage law, international relations in the polar regions and the wider polar social sciences and humanities.

This book challenges the correspondence theory of judicial fact construction - that legal rules resemble and subsume facts 'out there' - and instead provides an account of judicial fact construction through legally produced times- or adjudicative temporalities- that structure legal subject and event formation in legal judgement. Drawing on Bergsonian and Gadamerian theories of time, this book details how certain adjudicative temporalities can produce fully willed and autonomous subjects through 'time framed' legal events - in effect, the paradigmatic liberal legal subject - or how alternative adjudicative temporalities may structure legal subjects that are situated and constituted by social structures. The consequences of this novel account of legal judgement are fourfold. The first is that judicial fact construction is not exclusively determined by the legal rule (s) but by adjudication's production of temporalities. The second is that the selection between different adjudicative temporalities is generally indeterminate, though influenced by wider social structures. As will be argued, social structures, framed as a particular type of past produced by certain adjudicative temporalities, may either be incorporated in the rendering of the legal event or elided. The third is that, with the book's focus on criminal law, different deployments of adjudicative temporalities effect responsibility ascription. Finally, it is argued that the demystification of time as that which structures event and subject formation reveals another way in which to uncover the politics of legal judgement and the potential for its transformative potential, through either its inclusion or its elision of social structures in adjudication's determination of facts. This book will be of interest to students and scholars in the field of legal judgement, legal theory and jurisprudence.

This book presents a distinctive version of a contractarian approach to law and justice. The work argues that law and justice are social norms that arise from a process of social evolution, and are binding only if and to the extent that they are mutually beneficial. It explicitly rejects accounts of law and justice that are based on morality, on the basis that morality itself is only legitimately founded on mutual advantage. But it also rejects most existing versions of contractarianism, which are based on ideas of hypothetical agreements by rational contractors, in favour of an approach that is based on actually existing social norms, but advocates critically examining these norms and discarding those that are not truly mutually beneficial. The first half of the book develops the approach, while the second half explores some of its implications for law. It argues for a left-libertarian approach to property, an approach largely based on the common law of tort, contract and criminal law, and a rejection of most statutory law, which is based not on mutual advantage but rather on benefiting some at the expense of others. However, it ultimately recognises that there are those who want a more extensive state than this approach allows, and advocates a strong form of federalism to allow this, provided robust exit rights are provided. The book combines political philosophy, economics and law into an approach that is broadly libertarian but distinctive in many respects. It will be of interest to scholars in all three of those disciplines.

This book argues that justice often governs apologies. Drawing on examples from literature, politics, and current events, Cohen presents a theory of apology as corrective offers. Many leading accounts of apology say much about what apologies do and why they are important. They stop short of exploring whether and how justice governs apologies. Cohen argues that corrective justice may require apologies as offers of reparation. Individuals, corporations, and states may then have rights or duties regarding apology. Exercising rights to apology or fulfilling duties to provide them are ways of holding one another mutually accountable. By casting rights and duties of apology as justifiable to free and equal persons, the book advances conversations about how liberalism may respond to historic injustice. Apologies and Moral Repair will be of interest to scholars and advanced students in ethics, political philosophy, and social philosophy.

During a recent visit to China to give an invited lecture on legal argumentation I was asked a question about conventional opinion in western countries. If legal r- soning is thought to be important by those both inside and outside the legal prof- sion, why does there appear to be so little attention given to the study of legal logic? This was a hard question to answer. I had to admit there were no large or well-established centers of legal logic in North America that I could recommend as places to study. Going through customs in Vancouver, the customs officer asked what I had been doing in China. I told him I had been a speaker at a conf- ence. He asked what the conference was on. I told him legal logic. He asked 1 whether there was such a thing. He was trying to be funny, but I thought he had a good point. People will question whether there is such a thing as legal logic, and some recent very prominent trials give the question some backing in the common opinion. But having thought over the question of why so little attention appears to be given to legal logic as a mainstream subject in western countries, I think I now have an answer. The answer is that we have been looking in the wrong place."

Firmly rooted on Roman and canon law, Italian legal culture has had an impressive influence on the civil law tradition from the Middle Ages to present day, and it is rightly regarded as "the cradle of the European legal culture." Along with Justinian's compilation, the US Constitution, and the French Civil Code, the Decretum of Master Gratian or the so-called Glossa ordinaria of Accursius are one of the few legal sources that have influenced the entire world for centuries. This volume explores a millennium-long story of law and religion in Italy through a series of twenty-six biographical chapters written by distinguished legal scholars and historians from Italy and around the world. The chapters range from the first Italian civilians and canonists, Irnerius and Gratian in the early twelfth century, to the leading architect of the Second Vatican Council, Pope Paul VI. Between these two bookends, this volume offers notable case studies of familiar civilians like Bartolo, Baldo, and Gentili and familiar canonists like Hostiensis, Panormitanus, and Gasparri but also a number of other jurists in the broadest sense who deserve much more attention especially outside of Italy. This diversity of international and methodological perspectives gives the volume its unique character. The book will be essential reading for academics working in the areas of Legal History, Law and Religion, and Constitutional Law and will appeal to scholars, lawyers, and students interested in the interplay between religion and law in the era of globalization.

Is the legal protection that is given to the expression of Abrahamic religious belief adequate or appropriate in the context of English medical law? This is the central question that is explored in this book, which develops a framework to support judges in the resolution of contentious cases that involve dissension between religious belief and medical law, developed from Alan Gewirth's Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC). This framework is applied to a number of medical law case studies: the principle of double effect, ritual male circumcision, female genital mutilation, Jehovah's Witnesses (adults and children) who refuse blood transfusions, and conscientious objection of healthcare professionals to abortion. The book also examines the legal and religious contexts in which these contentious cases are arbitrated. It demonstrates how human rights law and the proposed framework can provide a gauge to measure competing rights and apply legitimate limits to the expression of religious belief, where appropriate. The book concludes with a stance of principled pragmatism, which finds that some aspects of current legal protections in English medical law require amendment.

Healthcare Ethics, Law and Professionalism: Essays on the Works of Alastair V. Campbell features 15 original essays on bioethics, and healthcare ethics specifically. The volume is in honour of Professor Alastair V. Campbell, who was the founding editor of the internationally renowned Journal of Medical Ethics, and the founding director of three internationally leading centres in bioethics, in Otago, New Zealand, Bristol, UK, and Singapore. Campbell was trained in theology and philosophy and throughout his career worked with colleagues from various disciplines, including law and various branches of healthcare. The diversity of topics and depth of contributors' insights reflect the breadth and impact of Campbell's philosophical work and policy contributions to healthcare ethics. Throughout his long academic career, Campbell's emphasis on healthcare ethics being practice-oriented, yet driven by critical reflection, has shaped the field in vital ways. The chapters are authored by leading scholars in healthcare ethics and law. Directly engaging with Campbell's work and influence, the essays discuss essential questions in healthcare ethics relating to its methodology and teaching, its intersection with law and policy, medical professionalism, religion, and its translation in different cultural settings. Chapters also grapple with specific enduring topics, such as the doctor-patient relationship, justice in health and biomedical research, and treatment of the human body and the dead.

Philosophical interest in disability is rapidly expanding. Philosophers are beginning to grasp the complexity of disability-as a category, with respect to well-being and as a marker of identity. However, the philosophical literature on justice and human rights has often been limited in scope and somewhat abstract. Not enough sustained attention has been paid to the concrete claims made by people with disabilities, concerning their human rights, their legal entitlements and their access to important goods, services and resources. This book discusses how effectively philosophical approaches to distributive justice and human rights can support these concrete claims. It argues that these approaches often fail to lend clear support to common disability demands, revealing both the limitations of existing philosophical theories and the inflated nature of some of these demands. Moving beyond entitlements, the author also develops a unique conception of dignity, which she argues illuminates the specific indignities experienced by people with disabilities in the allocation of goods, in the common experience of discrimination and in a wide range of interpersonal interactions. Disability with Dignity offers an accessible and extended philosophical discussion of disability, justice and human rights. It provides a comprehensive assessment of the benefits and pitfalls of theories of human rights and justice for advancing justice for the disabled. It brings the moral importance of dignity to the centre, arguing that justice must be pursued in a way that preserves and promotes the dignity of people with disabilities.

This book analyses the abuse of idealism with particular reference to China's Cultural Revolution. The work examines abuse at two levels: the state leaders' metaphysical vision as the interpretation of idealism at the top with state power; and the psychological state of the masses at the bottom of society. The concept of abuse itself is discussed with the author arguing that idealism is often used to justify abuse while many are all too willing to accept this as idealism itself. On the other hand, many dismiss the idealist vision because of the horrible consequences of the abuse. For these reasons, the book holds that abuse of idealism should not be confused with the original intent of idealism. It is further argued that the masses often complement dictatorship due to a basic weakness of human nature. Finally, the book proposes that the concepts of human dignity and equal access to truth are prerequisites for the effective rule of law within China.

The Constitution of Japan has served the country for more than half a century, creating and maintaining a stable and functional democratic system. This book innovatively interprets Japanese politics as a 'benign elite democracy' whilst demonstrating the Supreme Court's vital contribution to the political structure. In The Supreme Court and Benign Elite Democracy in Japan, Hiroshi Itoh presents the first empirical study of judicial decision making under Japan's Constitution. He examines the Supreme Court's records regarding the protection of civil rights and liberties, the preservation of the conformity of lower levels of laws and regulations to the Constitution, and the maintenance of the Court's relationships to the political branches. The analysis of these three aspects of constitutional litigation reveal how the Supreme Court contributes to the efficacy of constitutional democracy by keeping the system adaptable to the ever-changing environment in and around Japan.

This book compares the civil and common law approach to analyze the question - 'What sorts of conduct may the state legitimately make criminal?'. Through a comparative focus on an Australian and German context, this book utilizes interviews with Australian criminal law experts and contrasts them with the German model based on 'Rechtsgutstheorie'. By comparing the largely descriptive, criminology-based Australian approach with the more sophisticated German legal theory model the author finds the Australian approach to be suffering from a 'normative flaw', illustrated by the distinction of different approaches to the offences of incest, bestiality and possession of illicit drugs. Carl Constantin Lauterwein discovers that while there is strength in the common law approach of describing the possible reasons for criminalizing certain conduct, the approach could be significantly improved by scrutinizing the legitimacy of those reasons.

This collection of essays brings together Zygmunt Bauman and a number of internationally distinguished legal scholars who examine the influence of Bauman's recent works on social theory of law and socio-legal studies. Contributors focus on the concept of 'liquid society' and its adoption by legal scholars. The volume opens with Bauman's analysis of fears and policing in 'liquid society' and continues by examining the social and legal theoretical context and implications of Bauman's theory.

Globalization has become a common phenomenon, yet one that many people experience as a threat not only to their economic existence, but also to their cultural and moral self-image. This volume takes an interdisciplinary approach to provide a theoretical overview of how business ethics deals with the phenomenon of globalization. The authors first examine the origins and development of globalization and its interaction with business ethics, before discussing the impact on and role of national and multinational corporations. The book goes on to examine the relationship between industrialized and developing countries, and explores the place of ethics in globalized markets.

The Research Handbook on Feminist Jurisprudence surveys feminist theoretical understandings of law, including liberal and radical feminism, as well as socialist, relational, intersectional, post-modern, and pro-sex and queer feminist legal theories. Featuring contributions from a diverse team of prominent scholars, this Research Handbook illuminates the ways in which feminist scholarship has enriched understandings of law's sometimes subordinating structures and the ways in which law can be interpreted or changed so as to promote the equality, liberty, wellbeing, and interests of women. The expert contributors offer a vast range of feminist perspectives on law, including liberal, radical, and post-modern feminism, and explore the implications of these theoretical stances for understandings of the nature of law, legal change, and the relationship between law and politics. Chapters analyse the influence of feminist legal theories on doctrinal areas of law including US constitutional and civil rights law, international law, and various areas of private law. This insightful book will be of interest to law students, legal scholars, and scholars of political and moral philosophy seeking to understand the entire body of feminist legal scholarship from the early 1970s to the present, as well as its variants, and relationships among different theoretical perspectives. Contributors include: S.F. Appleton, K.K. Baker, I. Caglar, M. Chamallas, C.-j. Chen, M.A. Fineman, M.A. Franks, C. Grant Bowman, B.A. Gur, N.D. Hunter, L.C. Ikemoto, O. Kamir, H. Keren, S.A. Law, N. Menon, N. Naffine, J.A. Nice, V.F. Nourse, N. Rimalt, D.E. Roberts, L.A. Rosenbury, J.C. Suk, D. Tuerkheimer, R. West, A.K. Wing, K.A. Yuracko

Trust is pervasive in our lives. Both our simplest actions - like buying a coffee, or crossing the street - as well as the functions of large collective institutions - like those of corporations and nation states - would not be possible without it. Yet only in the last several decades has trust started to receive focused attention from philosophers as a specific topic of investigation. The Routledge Handbook of Trust and Philosophy brings together 31 never-before published chapters, accessible for both students and researchers, created to cover the most salient topics in the various theories of trust. The Handbook is broken up into three sections: I. What is Trust? II. Whom to Trust? III. Trust in Knowledge, Science, and Technology The Handbook is preceded by a foreword by Maria Baghramian, an introduction by volume editor Judith Simon, and each chapter includes a bibliography and cross-references to other entries in the volume.

What does it mean when civil lawyers and common lawyers think differently? In Charting the Divide between Common and Civil Law, Thomas Lundmark provides a comprehensive introduction to the uses, purposes, and approaches to studying civil and common law in a comparative legal framework. Superbly organized and exhaustively written, this volume covers the jurisdictions of Germany, Sweden, England and Wales, and the United States, and includes a discussion of each country's legal issues, structure, and their general rules. Professor Lundmark also explores the discipline of comparative legal studies, rectifying many of the misconceptions and prejudices that cloud our understanding of the divide between the common law and civil law traditions.
Students of international law, comparative law, social philosophy, and legal theory will find this volume a valuable introduction to common and civil law. Lawyers, judges, political scientists, historians, and philosophers will also find this book valuable as a source of reference. Charting theDivide between Common and Civil Law equips readers with the background and tools to think critically about different legal systems and evaluate their future direction.

If we are kind people, we care about others, including others who tend to hurt themselves. We all have friends or family members who have potential but squander or even ruin their lives from things like drug abuse, unwise spending decisions, or poor dietary habits. Concern for others often motivates us to endorse laws or private interventions meant to keep people from harming themselves even if that's what they want to do in the moment. However, it is far from clear that such paternalistic measures are, on net, benign, and they tend to violate an understanding that we should let adults make their own decisions. In this little book, William Glod argues that it's OK to allow people to make bad choices. It's OK even if those choices risk causing a lot of harm. Most defenders of paternalism agree that some bad choices are not harmful enough to require laws to stop them. However, Glod goes further. He argues that some people might want - and deserve - the freedom to make truly bad choices because such freedom is the only way they can act responsibly. He also argues that some "bad" choices may not even be bad, even if we can't know with confidence a person's true desires. In addition, the book explores choices that are bad because they might impose high monetary costs on others, arguing that mandatory insurance may be a better solution than eliminating the choice. Finally, it explores the potential pitfalls of paternalistic laws and policies - and how unintended, costly consequences can sabotage the most well-intended plans. Key Features Introduces key concepts for understanding paternalism and freedom of choice for undergraduates and general readers Discusses how many of our preferences are not easily understood by others, and shows how assumptions of what our true preferences can often backfire Explores ways in which people may want the freedom to make mistakes Examines the unintended consequences and associated problems of many paternalistic laws and regulations

This volume addresses the pluralistic identity of the legal order. It argues that the mutual reflexivity of the different ways society perceives law and law perceives society eclipses the unique formal identity of written law. It advances a distinctive approach to the plural ways in which legal cultures work in a modern society, through the metaphor of the mirror. As a mirror of society, it distinguishes between the structure and function of legal culture within the legal system, and the external representation of law in society. This duality is further problematized in relation to the increasing transnationalisation of law. Based on a multi-level interpretation of the concept of legal culture, the work is divided into three parts: the first addresses the mutual reflections of social and legal norms that support a pluralist representation of internal legal cultures, the second concentrates on the external legal cultures that constantly enable pragmatic adjustments of the legal order to its social environment, and the third concludes the book with a theoretical discussion of the issues presented.

Philosophies of Difference engages with the concept of difference in relation to a number of fundamental philosophical and political problems. Insisting on the inseparability of ontology, ethics and politics, the essays and interview in this volume offer original and timely approaches to thinking nature, sexuate difference, racism, and decoloniality. The collection draws on a range of sources, including Latin American Indigenous ontologies and philosophers such as Henri Bergson, Jacques Derrida, Luce Irigaray, Immanuel Kant, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Charles Mills, and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro. The contributors think embodiment and life by bringing continental philosophy into generative dialogue with fields including plant studies, animal studies, decoloniality, feminist theory, philosophy of race, and law. Affirming the importance of interdisciplinarity, Philosophies of Difference contributes to a creative and critical intervention into established norms, limits, and categories. Invoking a conception of difference as both constitutive and generative, this collection offers new and important insights into how a rethinking of difference may ground new and more ethical modes of being and being-with. Philosophies of Difference unearths the constructive possibilities of difference for an ethics of relationality, and for elaborating non-anthropocentric sociality. The chapters in this book were originally published in a special issue in Australian Feminist Law Journal.

This collection brings together lawyers and theologians in the U.S. and Europe to reflect on Lutheran understandings of the political use of the law by secular governments. The book furthers the intellectual conversation about how Lutheran insights can be used to develop jurisprudence and specific solutions to legal issues in which there is strong conflict. It presents the basic theological and interpretive assumptions of the Lutheran tradition as they may inform the creation of legislation and judicial interpretation at local, national and international levels. The authors explore Luther's conception of the foundations of modern secular law and understanding of vocation. The work discusses the application of Lutheran theological principles to contemporary issues such as the war on terror, native land rights, property law, family law, church and state, medical experimentation, and the criminal law of rape, providing ethical insights for lawyers and lawmakers.

This study draws on critical historical analysis and contemporary language theory to illuminate John Marshall's jurisprudence and political philosophy in new ways. It challenges both liberal and conservative views and it defines Marshall's constitutional interpretations, political ideology, and pragmatic interests anew. It shows how his pragmatism and "republican revisionism" impacted decisions about matters of property, contract, and debt. Legal scholars, political scientists, and historians interested in law and language, 19th-century history, and republicanism will find this study especially interesting.

This book offers an in-depth analysis of the differences between common law and civil law systems from various theoretical perspectives. Written by a global network of experts, it explores the topic against the background of a variety of legal traditions.Common law and civil law are typically presented as antagonistic players on a field claimed by diverse legal systems: the former being based on precedent set by judges in deciding cases before them; the latter being founded on a set of rules intended to govern the decisions of those applying them. Perceived in this manner, common law and civil law differ in terms of the (main) source(s) of law; who is to create them; who is (merely) to draw from them; and whether the law itself is pure each step of the way, or whether the law's purity may be tarnished when confronted with a set of contingent facts. These differences have deep roots in (legal) history - roots that allow us to trace them back to distinct traditions. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the divide thus depicted is as great as it may seem: international and supranational legal systems unconcerned by national peculiarities appear to level the playing field. A normative understanding of constitutions seems to grant ever-greater authority to High Court decisions based on thinly worded maxims in countries that adhere to the civil law tradition. The challenges contemporary regulation faces call for ever-more detailed statutes governing the decisions of judges in the common law tradition. These and similar observations demand a structural reassessment of the role of judges, the power of precedent, the limits of legislation and other features often thought to be so different in common and civil law systems. The book addresses this reassessment.

This title was first published in 2003. This book critically examines the moral and political status of the child by a consideration of three interrelated questions: What rights if any does the child have? What rights over and duties in respect of a child do parents have? What rights over and duties in respect of a child does the state have? David Archard adopts three areas for particular discussion on the practical implications of the general theoretical issues: education, child protection policy, and the medical treatment of children. Providing a clear legal context and a sharper, contemporary discussion of the question of rights, this book presents a clear introduction to the key issues in the moral and political status of children.