This title was first published in 2000: While there are many philosophical studies of free speech, treating censorship historically, politically, or by the medium restricted (films, press etc.), little has been written on censorship and free speech dealing with issues philosophically and approaching them from the perspective of restrictions. This book treats censorship and free speech as a problem of ideas, examining the issues as an aspect of our wider social and political lives and critically examining mainstream arguments against censorship. This unique approach takes issue with the concept of censorship as something aberrant, to examine where the limits of free speech lie in ensuring individual development and collective harmony. Examining the possibility of accepting censorship positively to serve legitimate purposes, it will be a thought-provoking challenge to prescriptive arguments for free speech.

This book offers a detailed account of the legal issues concerning the British Indian Ocean Territory (Chagos Islands) by leading experts in the field. It examines the broader significance of the ongoing Bancoult litigation in the UK Courts, the Chagos Islanders' petition to the European Court of Human Rights and Mauritius' successful challenge, under the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, to the UK government's creation of a Marine Protected Area around the Chagos Archipelago. This book, produced in response to the 50th anniversary of the BIOT's founding, also assesses the impact of the decisions taken in respect of the Territory against a wider background of decolonization while addressing important questions about the lawfulness of maintaining Overseas Territories in the post-colonial era.The chapter 'Anachronistic As Colonial Remnants May Be...' - Locating the Rights of the Chagos Islanders As A Case Study of the Operation of Human Rights Law in Colonial Territories is open access under a CC BY 4.0 license via link.springer.com.

This is the first book in recent years to reconsider the shape and details of the English law of homicide, a topic avoided by governments in their plans for law reform. It discusses how the law should define murder, how it should respond to provoked killings, how it should deal with mentally abnormal killers, etc.

My dissertation for LLD (or JSD) Att beskriva ratten (To Describe Law), which was written under my bachelor surname of Andreasson, was presented for public exa- nation on Nov 4, 2004. Since then the text has been developed in two separate directions. On the one hand, three of the chapters have been made more accessible to students of jurisprudence and have been included in the second edition of the te- book Rattsfilosofi, samhalle och moral genom tiderna edited by Joakim Nergelius. On the other hand, the whole dissertation has been revised, translated and published as the present book. In the time that has passed since my dissertation, many things have changed. On the personal level, my friend and tutor, Aleksander Peczenick, was sadly taken away from my circle of colleagues. In contrast to that sad event, I have spent two nine-month periods on paternity leave, raising my two children, Selma and Bernhard. This past year, I have decided to move from theory to practice and have started working in a court of law. During my work on the dissertation, I had the opportunity to spend a rewarding term at Rutgers University in Camden, NJ visiting Professor Dennis Patterson. Since this book is a continuation of that project, it feels appropriate to repeat my thanks to Professor Patterson and STINT (The Swedish Foundation for International Cooperation in Research and Higher Education) for making that visit possible."

Promises and agreements are everywhere; we make, receive, keep, and break them on a daily basis. The quest to understand these social practices is integral to understanding ourselves as social creatures. The study of promises and agreements is enjoying a renaissance in many areas of social philosophy, including philosophy of language, action theory, normative ethics, value theory, and legal philosophy. This volume is the first collection of philosophical papers on promises and agreements, bringing together sixteen original self-standing contributions to the philosophical literature. The contributors highlight some of the more interesting aspects of the ubiquitous social phenomena of promises and agreements from different philosophical perspectives.

This book outlines a theory of communication and justice for the digital age, updating classic positions in political philosophy and ethics, and engaging thinkers from Aristotle through Immanuel Kant and the American pragmatists to John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, and Amartya Sen. In communication seeking to define justice and call out injustice, there is such a thing as the last word. The chapters in this book trace the historical emergence of communication as a human right; specify the technological resources and institutional frameworks necessary for exercising that right; and address some of the challenges following from digitalization that currently confront citizens, national regulators, and international agencies. Among the issues covered are public access to information archives past and present; local and global networks of communication as sources of personal identities and imagined communities; the ongoing reconfiguration of the press as a fourth branch of governance; and privacy as a precondition for individuals and collectives to live their lives according to plans, and to make their own histories. The book will be of interest to students and researchers in media and communication studies, cultural studies, political philosophy and ethics, and interdisciplinary fields examining the ethical and political implications of new information and communication infrastructures.

Caring for Liberalism brings together chapters that explore how liberal political theory, in its many guises, might be modified or transformed to take the fact of dependency on board. In addressing the place of care in liberalism, this collection advances the idea that care ethics can help respond to legitimate criticisms from feminists who argue that liberalism ignores issues of race, class, and ethnicity. The chapters do not simply add care to existing liberal political frameworks; rather, they explore how integrating dependency might leave core components of the traditional liberal philosophical apparatus intact, while transforming other aspects of it. Additionally, the contributors address the design of social and political institutions through which care is given and received, with special attention paid to non-Western care practices. This book will appeal to scholars working on liberalism in philosophy, political science, law, and public policy, and it is a must-read for feminist political philosophers.

This book examines ethics at the intersection of law and justice. If law and justice are concerned with collectively establishing the general terms on which the plurality called "we" share the earth as social beings, then ethics concerns the individual Self's particular moral relationship with the Other. Law, the acknowledged offspring of politics, represents the kind of might that most people accept as legitimate, at least most of the time. Justice, on the other hand, is supposed to vigilantly stand guard over law: to protect us against its biases and excesses, or, at the very least, to rise up and reproach the law whenever it permits or encourages injustice. But what if the belief that a particular legally-authorized state of affairs is "just" - a common enough feeling, especially amongst the privileged - or even "unjust" and in need of correction, were itself in need of a vigilant guardian? This book argues that ethics can and should stand guard over whatever image of justice and/or just law one happens to believe in. The book thus attempts to steer a perilous course between two looming moral hazards: ethics interpreted as the rational production of ethically correct behavior (as in Kant) and ethics interpreted as the spontaneous eruption of pre-rational compassion for the suffering of the Other, come what may (as in Levinas). In the end, the book characterizes ethical life in the law as the more-or-less constant experience of the paradoxical nature of this choice - a feeling of inescapable personal responsibility for the fate of the Other. Based on the author's well-established expertise in the area, this book will appeal to students, scholars and others with interests in legal theory and moral and political philosophy.

This book discusses the designs and applications of the social systems theory (built by Niklas Luhmann, 1927-1998) in relation to empirical socio-legal studies. This is a sociological and legal theory known for its highly complex and abstract conceptual apparatus. But how to change its scale in order to study more localised phenomena, and to deal with empirical data, such as case law, statutes, constitutions and regulation? This is the concern of a wide variety of scholars from many regions engaged in this volume. It focuses on methodological discussions and empirical examples concerning the innovations and potentials that functional and systemic approaches can bring to the study of legal phenomena (institutions building, argumentation and dispute-settlement), in the interface with economy and regulation, and with politics and public policies. It also discusses connections and contrasts with other jurisprudential approaches - for instance, with critical theory, law and economics, and traditional empirical research in law. Two decades after Luhmann's death, the 21st century has brought countless transformations in technologies and institutions. These changes, resulting in a hyper-connected, ultra-interactive world society bring operational and reflective challenges to the functional systems of law, politics and economy, to social movements and protests, and to major organisational systems, such as courts and enterprises, parliaments and public administration. Pursuing an empirical approach, this book details the variable forms by which systems construct their own structures and semantics and 'irritate' each other. Engaging Luhmann's theoretical apparatus with empirical research in law, this book will be of interest to students and researchers in the field of socio-legal studies, the sociology of law, legal history and jurisprudence.

Focusing on John Milton's Paradise Lost , this book investigates the metaphorical identification of nature with a court of law - an old and persistent trope, haunted by ancient aporias, at the intersection of jurisprudence, philosophy and literature. In an enormous variety of texts, from the Greek beginnings of Western literature onward, nature has been described as a courtroom in which an all- encompassing trial takes place and a universal verdict is executed. The first, introductory part of this study sketches an overview of the metaphor's development in European history, from antiquity to the seventeenth century. In its second, more extensive part, the book concentrates on Milton's epic Paradise Lost in which the problem of the natural law court finds one of its most fascinating and detailed articulations. Using conceptual tools provided by Hannah Arendt, Walter Benjamin, Hans Blumenberg, Gilles Deleuze, William Empson and Alfred North Whitehead, the study demonstrates that the conflicts in Milton's epic revolve around the tension between a universal legal procedure inherent in nature and the positive legal decrees of the deity. The divine rule is found to consolidate itself by Nature's supplementary shadow government; their inconsistencies are not flaws, but rather fundamental rhetorical assets, supporting a law that is inherently "double- formed". In Milton's world, human beings are thus confronted with a twofold law that entraps them in its endlessly proliferating double binds, whether they obey or not. The analysis of this strange juridical structure can open up new perspectives on Milton's epic, as well as on the way legal discourse tends to entangle norms with facts and thus to embed itself in human life. This original and intriguing book will appeal not only to those engaged in the study of Milton, but also to anyone interested in the relationship between law, history, literature and philosophy.

Presenting legal and philosophical essays on money, this book explores the conditions according to which an object like a piece of paper, or an electronic signal, has come to be seen as having a value. Money plays a crucial role in the regulation of social relationships and their normative determination. It is thus integral to the very nature of the "social", and the question of how society is kept together by a network of agreements, conventions, exchanges, and codes. All of which must be traced down. The technologies of money discussed here by Searle, Ferraris, and Condello show how we conceive the category of the social at the intersection of individual and collective intentionality, documentality, and materiality. All of these dimensions, as the introduction to this volume demonstrates, are of vital importance for legal theory and for a whole set of legal concepts that are crucial in reflections on the relationship between law, philosophy, and society.

This book examines the law and its practice in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The objective is to understand the logic of the legal system in the UAE through a rounded analysis of its laws in context. It thus presents an understanding of the system on its own terms beyond the accepted Western model. The book shows how the Emirati law differs from the conventional rule of law. The first section of the book deals with the imperial, international, and cultural background of the Emirati legal system and its influences on some of the elements of the legal system today. It maps the state's international legal obligations according to core human rights treaties showing how universal interpretations of rights may differ from Emirati interpretations of rights. This logic is further illustrated through an overview of the legal system, in federal, local, and free zones and how the UAE's diversity of legal sources from Islamic and colonial law provides legal adaptability. The second section of the book deals mainly with the contemporary system of the rule of law in the UAE but at times makes a detour to the British administration to show how imperial execution of power during the British administration created forerunners visible today. Finally, the debut of the UAE on the international scene contributed to an interest in human rights investigations, having manifestations in UAE law. The work will be a valuable resource for researchers and academics working in the areas of Comparative Constitutional Law, Legal Anthropology, Legal Pluralism, and Middle Eastern Studies.

Constitutionalism is the permanent quest to control state power, of which the judicial review of legislation is a prime example. Although the judicial review of legislation is increasingly common in modern societies, it is not a finished project. This device still raises questions as to whether judicial review is justified, and how it may be structured. Yet, judicial review's justification and its scope are seldom addressed in the same study, thereby making for an inconvenient divorce of these two related avenues of study. To narrow the divide, the object of this work is quite straightforward. Namely, is the idea of judicial review defensible, and what influences its design and scope? This book addresses these matters by comparing the judicial review of legislation in the United Kingdom (the Human Rights Act of 1998), the Netherlands (the Halsema Proposal of 2002) and the Constitution of South Africa of 1996. These systems present valuable material to study the issues raised by judicial review. The Netherlands is of particular interest as its Constitution still prohibits the constitutional review of acts of parliament, while allowing treaty review of such acts. The Halsema Proposal wants to even out this difference by allowing the courts also to apply constitutional norms to legislation and not only to international norms. The Human Rights Act and the South African Constitution also present interesting questions that will make their study worthwhile. One can think of the issue of dialogue between the legislature and the judiciary. This topic enjoys increased attention in the United Kingdom but is somewhat underexplored in South African thought on judicial review. These and similar issues are studied in each of the three systems, to not only gain a better understanding of the systems as such, but also of judicial review in general.

This book provides a thorough critical overview of the current debate on the ethics of war, as well as a modern just war theory that can give practical action-guidance by recognizing and explaining the moral force of widely accepted law. Traditionalist, Walzerian, and "revisionist" approaches have dominated contemporary debates about the classical jus ad bellum and jus in bello requirements in just war theory. In this book, Uwe Steinhoff corrects widely spread misinterpretations of these competing views and spells out the implications for the ethics of war. His approach is unique in that it complements the usual analysis in terms of self-defense with an emphasis on the importance of other justifications that are often lumped together under the heading of "lesser evil." It also draws on criminal law and legal scholarship, which has been largely ignored by just war theorists. Ultimately, Steinhoff rejects arguments in favor of "moral fundamentalism"- the view that the laws and customs of war must simply follow an immutable morality. In contrast, he argues that widely accepted laws and conventions of war are partly constitutive of the moral rules that apply in a conflict. The Ethics of War and the Force of Law will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in just war theory, applied ethics, political philosophy, political theory, philosophy of law, and criminal and military law.

This volume examines the relationship between Christian legal theory and the fields of private law. Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in private law theory, and this book contributes to that discussion by drawing on the historical, theological, and philosophical resources of the Christian tradition. The book begins with an introduction from the editors that lays out the understanding of "private law" and what distinguishes private law topics from other fields of law. This section includes two survey chapters on natural law and biblical sources. The remaining sections of the book move sequentially through the fields of property, contracts, and torts. Several chapters focus on historical sources and show the ways in which the evolution of legal doctrine in areas of private law has been heavily influenced by Christian thinkers. Other chapters draw out more contemporary and public policy-related implications for private law. While this book is focused on the relationship of Christianity to private law, it will be of broad interest to those who might not share that faith perspective. In particular, legal historians and philosophers of law will find much of interest in the original scholarship in this volume. The book will be attractive to teachers of law, political science, and theology. It will be of special interest to the many law faculty in property, contracts, and torts, as it provides a set of often overlooked historical and theoretical perspectives on these fields.

If we are kind people, we care about others, including others who tend to hurt themselves. We all have friends or family members who have potential but squander or even ruin their lives from things like drug abuse, unwise spending decisions, or poor dietary habits. Concern for others often motivates us to endorse laws or private interventions meant to keep people from harming themselves even if that's what they want to do in the moment. However, it is far from clear that such paternalistic measures are, on net, benign, and they tend to violate an understanding that we should let adults make their own decisions. In this little book, William Glod argues that it's OK to allow people to make bad choices. It's OK even if those choices risk causing a lot of harm. Most defenders of paternalism agree that some bad choices are not harmful enough to require laws to stop them. However, Glod goes further. He argues that some people might want - and deserve - the freedom to make truly bad choices because such freedom is the only way they can act responsibly. He also argues that some "bad" choices may not even be bad, even if we can't know with confidence a person's true desires. In addition, the book explores choices that are bad because they might impose high monetary costs on others, arguing that mandatory insurance may be a better solution than eliminating the choice. Finally, it explores the potential pitfalls of paternalistic laws and policies - and how unintended, costly consequences can sabotage the most well-intended plans. Key Features Introduces key concepts for understanding paternalism and freedom of choice for undergraduates and general readers Discusses how many of our preferences are not easily understood by others, and shows how assumptions of what our true preferences can often backfire Explores ways in which people may want the freedom to make mistakes Examines the unintended consequences and associated problems of many paternalistic laws and regulations

This book explores the relation between redistribution and recognition, two key paradigms in the contemporary discourse on justice. Combining insights from the traditions of critical social theory and analytical political philosophy, the volume offers a multifaceted exploration of this incredibly inspiring conceptual couple from a plurality of perspectives. The chapters engage with concepts such as universal basic income, property-owning democracy, poverty, equality, self-respect, pluralism, care, and work, all of which have an impact on individuals' recognition as well as on distributive policies. An important contribution to the field of political and social philosophy, the volume will be useful to scholars and researchers of politics, law, human rights, economics, social justice, as well as policymakers.

Philosophers, legal scholars, criminologists, psychiatrists, and psychologists have long asked important questions about punishment: What is its purpose? What theories help us better understand its nature? Is punishment just? Are there effective alternatives to punishment? How can empirical data from the sciences help us better understand punishment? What are the relationships between punishment and our biology, psychology, and social environment? How is punishment understood and administered differently in different societies? The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Science of Punishment is the first major reference work to address these and other important questions in detail, offering 31 chapters from an international and interdisciplinary team of experts in a single, comprehensive volume. It covers the major theoretical approaches to punishment and its alternatives; emerging research from biology, psychology, and social neuroscience; and important special issues like the side-effects of punishment and solitary confinement, racism and stigmatization, the risk and protective factors for antisocial behavior, and victims' rights and needs. The Handbook is conveniently organized into four sections: I. Theories of Punishment and Contemporary Perspectives II. Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment III. Sciences, Prevention, and Punishment IV. Alternatives to Current Punishment Practices A volume introduction and a comprehensive index help make The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Science of Punishment essential reading for upper-undergraduate and postgraduate students in disciplines such as philosophy, law, criminology, psychology, and forensic psychiatry, and highly relevant to a variety of other disciplines such as political and social sciences, behavioral and neurosciences, and global ethics. It is also an ideal resource for anyone interested in current theories, research, and programs dealing with the problem of punishment.

This volume addresses the pluralistic identity of the legal order. It argues that the mutual reflexivity of the different ways society perceives law and law perceives society eclipses the unique formal identity of written law. It advances a distinctive approach to the plural ways in which legal cultures work in a modern society, through the metaphor of the mirror. As a mirror of society, it distinguishes between the structure and function of legal culture within the legal system, and the external representation of law in society. This duality is further problematized in relation to the increasing transnationalisation of law. Based on a multi-level interpretation of the concept of legal culture, the work is divided into three parts: the first addresses the mutual reflections of social and legal norms that support a pluralist representation of internal legal cultures, the second concentrates on the external legal cultures that constantly enable pragmatic adjustments of the legal order to its social environment, and the third concludes the book with a theoretical discussion of the issues presented.

This book presents a comprehensive history of law and religion in the Nordic context. The entwinement of law and religion in Scandinavia encompasses an unusual history, not widely known yet important for its impact on contemporary political and international relations in the region. The volume provides a holistic picture from the first written legal sources of the twelfth century to the law of the present secular welfare states. It recounts this history through biographical case studies. Taking the point of view of major influential figures in church, politics, university, and law, it thus presents the principal actors who served as catalysts in ecclesiastical and secular law through the centuries. This refreshing approach to legal history contributes to a new trend in historiography, particularly articulated by a younger generation of experienced Nordic scholars whose work is featured prominently in this volume. The collection will be a valuable resource for academics and researchers working in the areas of Legal History and Law and Religion.

This book comprehensively discusses the main features of the Chinese patent law system, which not only legally 'transplants' international treaties into the Chinese context, but also maintains China's legal culture and promotes domestic economic growth. This is the basis for encouraging creativity and improving patent law protection in China. The book approaches the evolution of the Chinese patent system through the ancient Chinese philosopher Confucius's classic principle, offering readers a fresh new way to understand and analyze Chinese patent law reforms, while also outlining how Confucian insights could be used to improve the enforcement of patent law and overall intellectual property protection awareness in China. It examines ancient Chinese innovation history, explores intellectual property from a Confucian perspective, and discusses the roots of Chinese patent law, as well as the past three amendments and the trends in the ongoing fourth amendment. In addition to helping readers grasp the mentality behind the Chinese approach to patent law and patent protection, the book provides an alternative research methodology and philosophical approach by demonstrating Confucian analysis, which provides a more dynamic way to justify intellectual property in the academic world. Lastly, it suggests future strategies for local industries in the legal, cultural and sociological sectors in China, which provide benefits for domestic and overseas patent holders alike. The book offers a valuable asset for graduate students and researchers on China and intellectual property law, as well as general readers interested in Asian culture and the philosophy of law.

This volume brings together many of the world's leading theorists of free will and philosophers of law to critically discuss the ground-breaking contribution of David Hodgson's libertarianism and its application to philosophy of law. The book begins with a comprehensive introduction, providing an overview of the intersection of theories of free will and philosophy of law over the last fifty years. The eleven chapters collected together divide into two groups: the first five address libertarianism within the free will debate, with particular attention to Hodgson's theory, and in Part II, six contributors discuss Hodgson's libertarianism in relation to issues not often pursued by free will scholars, such as mitigation of punishment, the responsibility of judges, the nature of judicial reasoning and the criminal law process more generally. Thus the volume's importance lies not only in examining Hodgson's distinctive libertarian theory from within the free will literature, but also in considering new directions for research in applying that theory to enduring questions about legal responsibility and punishment.

Leading Works in Law and Religion brings together leading and emerging scholars in the field from the United Kingdom and Ireland. Each contributor has been invited to select and analyse a 'leading work', which has for them shed light on the way that Law and Religion are intertwined. The chapters are both autobiographical, reflecting upon the works that have proved significant to contributors, and also critical analyses of the current state of the field, exploring in particular the interdisciplinary potential of the study of Law and Religion. The book also includes a specially written introduction and conclusion, which critically comment upon the development of Law and Religion over the last 25 years and likely future developments in light of the reflections by contributors on their chosen leading works.

Research on law's relationship with time has flourished over the past decade. This edited collection aims to put law and time scholarship into wider context, advancing conversations on time and temporalities between socio-legal scholars, anthropologists, sociologists, geographers and historians. Through a diverse range of contributions, the collection explores how legal modalities of time emerge and have effects within wider clusters of social and political action. Themes include: law's diverse roles in maintaining linear historicist models of time; law's participation in the materialisation of times; and the unsteady effects of temporal pluralism and polytemporalities in law. De-naturalising the 'time' in law and time scholarship, this collection positions time as something that can be enacted and materialised as well as experienced, with distinct implications for questions of social justice. Chapter 6 of this book is freely available as a downloadable Open Access PDF under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 3.0 license. https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/tandfbis/rt-files/docs/Open+Access+Chapters/9780415792219_oachapter6.pdf The Introduction of this book is freely available as a downloadable Open Access PDF under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 3.0 license. https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/tandfbis/rt-files/docs/Open+Access+Chapters/9780415792219_oaintroduction.pdf

States across the globe spend billions of dollars fighting terrorism annually. As well as strategic questions about the way in which the money should be spent, we are also confronted with a host of moral issues here, many of which are poorly understood. The Ethics of Counterterrorism offers the first systematic normative theory for guiding, assessing, and criticising counterterrorist policy. Many commentators claim that state actors combating terrorism should set aside ordinary moral and legal frameworks, and instead bind themselves by a different (and, generally, more permissive) set of ethical rules than is appropriate in other areas. The book assesses arguments for this view, and more specifically investigates whether widely-endorsed restrictions on state action in the areas of surveillance, policing, armed conflict, criminal justice, diplomacy, and cultural integration need to be weakened when we are confronted with terrorist threats. With its novel overall framework for assessing counterterrorist strategies, its comprehensive analysis of existing practices, and its bringing the tools of analytic philosophy to bear on new questions regarding how states can fight terrorism both effectively and morally, The Ethics of Counterterrorism promises to be an important point of reference for future debates in this area.