The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility comprehensively addresses questions about who is responsible and how blame or praise should be attributed when human agents act together. Such questions include: Do individuals share responsibility for the outcome or are individuals responsible only for their contribution to the act? Are individuals responsible for actions done by their group even when they don't contribute to the outcome? Can a corporation or institution be held morally responsible apart from the responsibility of its members? The Handbook's 35 chapters-all appearing here for the first time and written by an international team of experts-are organized into four parts: Part I: Foundations of Collective Responsibility Part II: Theoretical Issues in Collective Responsibility Part III: Domains of Collective Responsibility Part IV: Applied Issues in Collective Responsibility Each part begins with a short introduction that provides an overview of issues and debates within that area and a brief summary of its chapters. In addition, a comprehensive index allows readers to better navigate the entirety of the volume's contents. The result is the first major work in the field that serves as an instructional aid for those in advanced undergraduate courses and graduate seminars, as well as a reference for scholars interested in learning more about collective responsibility.

Why is there so much attention on Kant's global politics in present day law and philosophy? This book highlights the potential fruitfulness of Kant's cosmopolitan thought for understanding the complexities of the contemporary political world. It adopts a double methodological strategy by reconstructing a genealogical conceptual journey showing the development of international law, as well as introducing an interpretation of cosmopolitanism centred on Kant's theory of a metaphysics of freedom. The result is a novel focus on Kant's notion of the world republic. The hypothesis here defended is that the world republic stands as a way of thinking about international politics where the possibility of progression towards peace results from its use as a regulative idea.

Law schools are failing both their staff and students by requiring them to prize reason and rationality and to suppress or ignore emotions. Despite innovations in terms of both content and teaching techniques, there is little evidence that emotions are effectively acknowledged or utilised within legal education. Instead law schools are clinging to an out-dated and erroneous perception of emotions as at best, irrational, and at worst dangerous. In contrast to this, educational and scientific developments have demonstrated that emotions are a fundamental, inescapable part of learning, teaching and skills development. Harnessing these emotions will therefore have a transformative effect on legal education and enable it to adapt to the needs and demands of the twenty-first century. This book provides a theoretical overview of the role played by emotions in all aspects of the life of the law school. It explores the relationship emotions have with key traditional and contemporary approaches to legal education, the ways in which emotions can be conceptualised, their interaction with the politics and policies of legal education and their role within teaching and learning. The book also considers the importance of emotional wellbeing for both law students and legal academics Overall, this book argues for a more holistic form of legal education in which emotions play a valuable (and valued) role. This requires a new vision for law schools, in which emotions are acknowledged and embedded at all levels, institutional and personal.

Bringing together the current international body of knowledge on key issues for educating for well-being in law, this book offers comparative perspectives across jurisdictions, and utilises a range of theoretical lenses (including socio-legal, psychological and ethical theories) in analysing well-being and legal education in law. The chapters include innovative and tested research methodologies and strategies for educating for well-being. Asking and answering the question as to whether law is special in terms of producing psychological distress in law students, law teachers and the profession, and bringing together common and opposing perspectives, this book also seeks to highlight excellent practice in promoting a positive professional identity at law school and beyond resulting in an original contribution to knowledge, and new discourses of analysis.

This collection discusses the concept of fraternity and examines the issue of its role in law. Since the end of World War II, fraternity has been cited in several national constitutional charters, in addition to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But is there space for fraternity in law? The contributions to this book form an ideal "bridge" between the past and present to trace the different pathways taken to address the meaning of fraternity, and to identify its possible legal relevance. The book lays out paths that have placed fraternity in varied and challenging legal contexts in an age of globalization and conflict, where the multiplicity of national and supranational sources of law seems to show its inadequacy to govern complexity, and coexistence between diversities that appear irreconcilable. The purpose is not to recover fraternity as a forgotten principle, but to reimagine it today to address the aim and force of law within a plurality of cultures. The analysis considers a possible universal dimension that models unity within diversity, and aspires to serve as a prologue to a transition from research to dialogue between different legal systems and traditions. The book will be of interest to academics and researchers working in the areas of Comparative Law, Legal History and Legal Philosophy.

This book analyses collective punishment in the context of human rights law. Collective punishment is a concept deriving from the law of armed conflict. It describes the punishment of a group for an act allegedly committed by one of its members and is prohibited in times of armed conflict. Although the imposition of collective punishment has been witnessed in situations outside armed conflict as well, human rights instruments do not explicitly address collective punishment. Consequently, there is a genuine gap in the protection of affected groups in situations outside of or short of armed conflict. Supported by two case studies on collective punishment in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and in Chechnya, the book examines potential options to close this gap in human rights law in a way contributing to the empowerment of affected groups. This analysis centres on the European Convention on Human Rights due to its relevance to the situation in Chechnya. By questioning whether human rights instruments can encompass a prohibition of collective punishment, the book contributes to the broader academic debate on rights held by collectivities in general and on collective human rights in particular. The book will be of interest to students, academics and policy makers in the areas of International Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law.

Following the basic presumptions of the early law-as-literature movement, past approaches have mainly focused on textuality and narrativity as the common denominators of law and literature, and have largely ignored the topic of fictionality. This volume provides a much needed analysis of this gap.

This book analyses the specificity of the law-making activity of European constitutional courts. The main hypothesis is that currently constitutional courts are positive legislators whose position in the system of State organs needs to be redefined. The book covers the analysis of the law-making activity of four constitutional courts in Western countries: Germany, Italy, Spain, and France; and six constitutional courts in Central-East European countries: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Latvia, and Bulgaria; as well as two international courts: the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The work thus identifies the mutual interactions between national constitutional courts and international tribunals in terms of their law-making activity. The chosen countries include constitutional courts which have been recently captured by populist governments and subordinated to political powers. Therefore, one of the purposes of the book is to identify the change in the law-making activity of those courts and to compare it with the activity of constitutional courts from countries in which democracy is not viewed as being under threat. Written by national experts, each chapter addresses a series of set questions allowing accessible and meaningful comparison. The book will be a valuable resource for students, academics, and policy-makers working in the areas of constitutional law and politics.

The first book to examine collective action and the law from a philosophical standpoint Outstanding line up of international contributors Examines hot topics such as the tension between individual and group accountability, human rights, punishment and the fundamental question of whether groups can be held accountable

* Editors and authors are leading experts in the field; * Multi-disciplinary approach; * Raises a large number of compelling theoretical, philosophical and normative questions, and has relevance across disciplinary and geographic boundaries.

Thinking About Clinical Legal Education provides a range of philosophical and theoretical frameworks that can serve to enrich the teaching and practice of Clinical Legal Education (CLE). CLE has become an increasingly common feature of the curriculum in law schools across the globe. However, there has been relatively little attention paid to the theoretical and philosophical dimensions of this approach. This edited collection seeks to address this gap by bringing together contributions from the clinical community, to analyse their CLE practice using the framework of a clearly articulated philosophical or theoretical approach. Contributions include insights from a range of jurisdictions including: Brazil, Canada, Croatia, Ethiopia, Israel, Spain, UK and the US. This book will be of interest to CLE academics and clinic supervisors, practitioners, and students.

This book explores the relevance of David Bowie's life and music for contemporary legal and cultural theory. Focusing on the artist and artworks of David Bowie, this book brings to life, in essay form, particular theoretical ideas, creative methodologies and ethical debates that have contemporary relevance within the fields of law, social theory, ethics and art. What unites the essays presented here is that they all point to a beyond law: to the fact that law is not enough, or to be more precise, too much, too much to bear. For those who, like Bowie, see art, creativity and love as what ought to be the central organising principles of life, law will not do. In the face of its certainties, its rigidities, and its conceits, these essays, through Bowie, call forth the monster who laughs at the law, celebrate inauthenticity as a deeper truth, explore the ethical limits of art, cut up the laws of writing and embrace that which is most antithetical to law, love. This original engagement with the limits of law will appeal to those working in legal theory, ethics and law and popular culture, as well as in art and cultural studies.

Autonomy, viewed as a subject's autonomous designing of her own distinctive 'individuality', is not a constitutive problem for liberal theory. Since its earliest formulations, liberalism has taken it for granted that protecting rights is a sufficient guarantee for the primacy of individual subjectivity. The most dangerous legacy of the 'hierarchical-dualist' representation of the subject is the primacy given to reason in defining an individual's identity. For Santoro freedom is not a fixed measure. It is not the container of powers and rights defining an individual's role and identity. It is rather the outcome of a process whereby individuals continuously re-define the shape of their individuality. Freedom is everything that each of us manages to be in his or her active and uncertain opposition to external 'pressures'.

This book argues that contractarianism is well suited as a political morality and explores the implications of deploying it in this way. It promises to revive contractarianism as a viable political theory, breaking it free from its Rawlsian moorings while taking seriously the long-standing objections to it. It's natural to think that the state owes things to its people: physical security, public health and sanitation services, and a functioning judiciary, for example. But is there a theory-a political morality-that can explain why this is so and who the state's people are? This new contractarianism deploys a reversed state of nature thought experiment as the starting point of political theorizing. From this starting point it develops a political morality: a theory of the common ground of the role moralities attached to the various roles within the state. Contractarianism, so understood, can provide a basis for already popular ideas in political theory-such as political and legal liberalism-and overturn conventional wisdom, for example that the state is obligated to secure justice and that animals should have no legal standing. Contractarianism, Role Obligations, and Political Morality will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in moral and political philosophy.

The book discusses discrimination based on sexual orientation in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Constitutional Court of Korea. The work provides insights into how prohibition on discrimination based on sexual orientation can be realized in South Korea with the reference of the case law of other jurisdictions including mainly from the ECtHR. The book reviews related principles and methodological tools applied in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Considering that the rights of sexual minorities are evolving in many jurisdictions including Europe, and this problem is currently of great importance in the constitutional and political discussion, the topic is important to the readers in Europe as well as in Korea.

The Punta del Este Declaration, and this book dedicated to elaborating upon it, is devoted to exploring the ways that human dignity for everyone everywhere can be a useful tool in helping to address the challenges and strains facing human rights in the world today. In 2018, an initiative was instigated to revitalize the human rights project by way of engaging the notion of human dignity. This resulted in the Punta Del Este Declaration on Human Dignity for Everyone Everywhere (Punta Del Este Declaration), a declaration co-authored by over 30 human rights experts from all over the world. The Punta Del Este Declaration simplifies and brings coherence to the concept of human dignity in 10 brief statements that capture the many dimensions and aspects of human dignity and the practical ways that human dignity is useful in the promotion of human rights. This book provides an overview of how the notion of human dignity has been used to strengthen human rights. It discusses how human dignity playsmany different roles in human rights discourse and has the force to revitalize the human rights project; it is the foundational principle upon which the human rights project is built. But it is also the telos, or end goal, of human rights. At the same time, it is an important evaluative mechanism for assessing how well a country is doing in the implementation of human rights. The book will be a valuable resource for all those working in the areas of International Human Rights Law, Legal Philosophy, and Law and Religion.

This is a collection of essays written by Moore which form a thorough examination of the theory of criminal responsibility. The author covers a wide range of topics, giving the book a coherence and unity which is rare in assembled essays. Perhaps the most significant feature of this book is Moore's espousal of a retributivist theory of punishment. This anti-utilitarian standpoint is a common thread throughout the book. It is also a trend which is currently manifesting itself in all areas of moral, political and legal philosophy, but Moore is one of the first to apply such attitudes so sytematically to criminal law theory. As such, this innovative, new book will be of great interest to all scholars in this field.

Modern jurisprudence embodies two distinct traditions of thought about the nature of law. The first adopts a scientific approach which assumes that all legal phenomena possess universal characteristics that may be used in the analysis of any type of legal system. The main task of the legal philosopher is to disclose and understand such characteristics,which are thought to be capable of establishment independently of any moral or political values which the law might promote, and of any other context-dependent features of legal systems. Another form of jurisprudential reflection views the law as a complex form of moral arrangement which can only be analysed from within a system of reflective moral and political practices. Rather than conducting a search for neutral standpoints or criteria, this second form of theorising suggests that we uncover the nature and purpose of the law by reflecting on the dynamic properties of legal practice. Can legal philosophy aspire to scientific values of reasoning and truth? Is the idea of neutral standpoints an illusion? Should legal theorising be limited to the analysis of particular practices? Are the scientific and juristic approaches in the end as rigidly distinct from one another as some have claimed? In a series of important new essays the authors of Jurisprudence or Legal Science? attempt to answer these and other questions about the nature of jurisprudential thinking, whilst emphasising the connection of such 'methodological' concerns to the substantive legal issues which have traditionally defined the core of jurisprudential speculation. The list of contributors includes R. Alexy, S. Coyle, J. Gorman, C. Heidemann, P. Leith, J. Morison, G. Pavlakos and V. Rodriguez-Blanco.

Behind the scenes of the many artists and innovators flourishing beyond the bounds of intellectual property laws Intellectual property law, or IP law, is based on certain assumptions about creative behavior. The case for regulation assumes that creators have a fundamental legal right to prevent copying, and without this right they will under-invest in new work. But this premise fails to fully capture the reality of creative production. It ignores the range of powerful non-economic motivations that compel creativity, and it overlooks the capacity of creative industries for self-governance and innovative social and market responses to appropriation. This book reveals the on-the-ground practices of a range of creators and innovators. In doing so, it challenges intellectual property orthodoxy by showing that incentives for creative production often exist in the absence of, or in disregard for, formal legal protections. Instead, these communities rely on evolving social norms and market responses-sensitive to their particular cultural, competitive, and technological circumstances-to ensure creative incentives. From tattoo artists to medical researchers, Nigerian filmmakers to roller derby players, the communities illustrated in this book demonstrate that creativity can thrive without legal incentives, and perhaps more strikingly, that some creative communities prefer, and thrive, in environments defined by self-regulation rather than legal rules. Beyond their value as descriptions of specific industries and communities, the accounts collected here help to ground debates over IP policy in the empirical realities of the creative process. Their parallels and divergences also highlight the value of rules that are sensitive to the unique mix of conditions and motivations of particular industries and communities, rather than the monoculture of uniform regulation of the current IP system.

This book invites newcomers to analytical legal philosophy to reconsider the terms in which they are accustomed to describing and defending their jurisprudential allegiances. It argues that familiar taxonomic labels such as legal positivism, natural law theory and legal interpretivism are poor guides to the actual diversity of views on the nature and normativity of law, mainly because they fail to carve up the reality of jurisprudential disagreement at its joints. These joints, the author suggests, are elusive because the semantics of law systematically misplaces them. Their true nature resides in the metaontological and metanormative features that dictate or indicate the target of a theory's jurisprudential commitments. The book advocates a new vocabulary for articulating these commitments without eliminating the use of familiar criteria of division among competing theories of law. The resulting picture is a much broader platform of meaningful disagreement about the nature and grounds of legal truth and legal normativity. Albeit based on a factualist-cognitivist understanding of the sources and grounds of law, the book reserves ample room for the unconvinced. Those suspicious of the project of "ontologising" theoretical disagreements in law can avail themselves of the quietist or anti-metaphysical avenue that the book's alternative taxonomy also makes available. The humblest path to law's reality may not be metaphysically ambitious after all.

This volume summarizes the achievements on rule of law in China for the ten years from 2002 to 2012, particularly focusing on areas such as judicial review, anti-monopoly, reform of government agencies, the circulation of rural Land contracted management rights, and the protection of children's rights. It also considers the prospects for rule of law in China in the future. With numerous tables and screenshots to illustrate the text and provide a comprehensive overview and insights into China's rule of law establishment, it appeals to readers interested in judicial reform, rural medical service, children's rights protection and anti-monopoly.

The 'law-language-law' theme is deeply engraved in Occidental culture, more so than contemporary studies on the subject currently illustrate. This insightful book creates awareness of these cultural roots and shows how language and themes in law can be richer than studying a simple mutuality of motives. Focusing on the multilevel phenomenon of 'speech', Jan M. Broekman explores the history of this theme, from the West-European Middle Ages, through to today s globalization. Existing philosophical concepts are studied for their views on 'alter', other and otherness in speech, alongside scientific approaches including 'semiotics', 'structuralism' and, in particular, 'legal consciousness'. This state-of-the-art book unveils today s problems with the two faces of language: the analog and the digital, on the basis of which our smart phones and Artificial Intelligence create modern life. Innovative and explorative, Rethinking Law and Language will be of value to law scholars, social scientists and psychologists alike. The investigation of professional language and the impact of digital communication on social relations will also appeal to judges and other officials as well as politicians

This collection brings together legal scholars and Christian theologians for an interdisciplinary conversation responding to the challenges of global migration. Gathering 14 leading scholars from both law and Christian theology, the book covers legal perspectives, theological perspectives, and key concepts in migration studies. In Part 1, scholars of migration law and policy discuss the legal landscape of migration at both the domestic and international level. In Part 2, Christian theologians, ethicists, and biblical scholars draw on the resources of the Christian tradition to think about migration. In Part 3, each chapter is co-authored by a scholar of law and a scholar of Christian theology, who bring their respective resources and perspectives into conversation on key themes within migration studies. The work provides a truly interdisciplinary introduction to the topic of migration for those who are new to the subject; an opportunity for immigration lawyers and legal scholars to engage Christian theology; an opportunity for pastors and Christian theologians to engage law; and new insights on key frameworks for scholars who are already committed to the study of migration.

Although our moral lives would be unrecognisable without them, roles have received little attention from analytic moral philosophers. Roles are central to our lives and to our engagement with one another, and should be analysed in connection with our core notions of ethics such as virtue, reason, and obligation. This volume aims to redress the neglect of role ethics by confronting the tensions between conceptions of impartial morality and role obligations in the history of analytic philosophy and the Confucian tradition. Different perspectives on the ethical significance of roles can be found by looking to debates within professional and applied ethics, by challenging existing accounts of how roles generate reasons, by questioning the hegemony of ethical reasons, and by exploring the relation between expertise and virtue. The essays tackle several core questions related to these debates: What are roles and what is their normative import? To what extent are roles and the ethics of roles central to ethics as opposed to virtue in general, and obligation in general? Are role obligations characteristically incompatible with ordinary morality in professions such as business, law, and medicine? How does practical reason function in relation to roles? Perspectives in Role Ethics is an examination of a largely neglected topic in ethics. It will appeal to a broad range of scholars in normative ethics, virtue ethics, non-Western ethics, and applied ethics interested in the importance of roles in our moral life.

First published in 1909 and then again in 1997. John Chipman Gray (1839-1915) spent the greater part of his professional life as a professor at Harvard Law School where he taught property, trusts and future interests. The Nature and Sources of the Law was first published in 1909. The book is divided into two parts which respectively look at 'Nature' and 'Sources'. In Part I, Gray warns that the study of jurisprudence, in isolation, could lead to dogmatism. Rather he advocates the structure offered by common law with its reliance on flexible interpretations of statutes, the use of all relevant cultural inputs and a highly adaptable approach to the resolution of disputes. Gray, in Part II, turns his attention to sources of the law and begins with statutes. Here he asserts that judges are the ones who actually turn into law, going against the conventional scholarship that judges merely interprets statutes. He also extensively examines the influence of tradition and the common law.