This book invites newcomers to analytical legal philosophy to
reconsider the terms in which they are accustomed to describing and
defending their jurisprudential allegiances. It argues that
familiar taxonomic labels such as legal positivism, natural law
theory and legal interpretivism are poor guides to the actual
diversity of views on the nature and normativity of law, mainly
because they fail to carve up the reality of jurisprudential
disagreement at its joints. These joints, the author suggests, are
elusive because the semantics of law systematically misplaces them.
Their true nature resides in the metaontological and metanormative
features that dictate or indicate the target of a theory's
jurisprudential commitments. The book advocates a new vocabulary
for articulating these commitments without eliminating the use of
familiar criteria of division among competing theories of law. The
resulting picture is a much broader platform of meaningful
disagreement about the nature and grounds of legal truth and legal
normativity. Albeit based on a factualist-cognitivist understanding
of the sources and grounds of law, the book reserves ample room for
the unconvinced. Those suspicious of the project of "ontologising"
theoretical disagreements in law can avail themselves of the
quietist or anti-metaphysical avenue that the book's alternative
taxonomy also makes available. The humblest path to law's reality
may not be metaphysically ambitious after all.
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