How often our actions go awry because our perceptions are at odds with reality! This book examines the legal issues that arise when we seek to avoid the untoward consequences of an action by claiming that our perception was flawed. We all make mistakes. Some have unfortunate consequences: we might overpay a debt or make an unfavourable contract, or we might be sued or accused of a crime as a result of our mistake.
Claims to alleviation on the grounds of mistake are likely to arise wherever the law prescribes a state of mind (some kind of intent) as a prerequisite for the application of a legal rule. This book asks when the fact that a person made a mistake should entitle them to alleviation. This may involve the intention to enter into a contract or a payment, in which case a person could seek its reversal, or it might involve the intent to commit a tort or crime, in which case they could seek forgiveness for the offence. Farnsworth defines 'alleviating' mistakes as those which entitle a person to relief from untoward consequences of their mistake.
There is no general 'law of mistake', and despite their similarities, few discussions of mistake in one setting pause to consider mistakes in other contexts. The goals of fields as disparate as contracts and criminal law are very different: how do these differences affect the treatment of mistakes? Farnsworth sets out a new taxonomy of mistakes. His analysis reveals that over the past century, there has been a remarkable increase in the receptivity of courts and scholars to claims for both reversal and forgiveness--a waxing of alleviating mistakes.

Democratic Government and Constitutional Jurisdiction brings together a series of articles produced in recent years and contains elements that can provide a panoramic view of the most prominent discussions in constitutional law in our time. The book is divided in five main parts, each of them is an article and addresses issues related to constitutional law, democracy and institutions. It brings about the challenges that Brazil must confront as part of the process of constructing a free, just and compassionate society, this book is intended to be an additional tool for improving the country's institutions. In the inevitable presence of doubts and dreams, we seek to offer alternatives in order to ensure that this project continues.

The book presents a comprehensive reconceptualization of Geert Hofstede's well-known concept of power distance, applying the theory to the specific case of judge-witness courtroom interactions in Polish regional courts. In the light of the detailed critique of Hofstede's original approach to power distance, the book first carefully develops a three-level concept of power distance, including personal preferences concerning the realization of power relations (subjective level); rules, practices and spatio-architectural arrangements underlying power relations (organizational level); and individual demeanors that can, in practice, increase or decrease the asymmetry between parties to a power relation (interactional level). This reconceptualization provides a universal conceptual apparatus that is applicable to various social settings, but the authors have used it in extensive qualitative and quantitative research focused on courtroom interactions. After laying the theoretical foundations, the book details the elements of judge-witness courtroom interactions (both verbal and non-verbal) that contribute to establishing power distance between judge and witness. These were identified over 6 months of observational research conducted in 2018 in the Krakow regional courts. Lastly, the book addresses the issue of the relationship between the subjective level of power distance and opinions that laypeople can have concerning a judge's demeanor in the courtroom environment. To do so, it describes specific quantitative research that involved the creation of original film clips depicting witness questioning by the judge in a courtroom in three power distance situations. Offering a coherent framework for examining various interpersonal relations in legal contexts and illustrating how the framework can be applied on the courtroom interactions example, the book will appeal to a wide range of legal practitioners and academics. It also allows scientists outside the legal field to gain a new and broad understanding of power distance that they can easily apply in their respective fields. Furthermore, it provides non-academics with insights into courtroom interactional dynamics, as exemplified by the discussion of Polish judicial practice.

Democratic states must protect the liberty of citizens and must accommodate both religious liberty and cultural diversity. This democratic imperative is one reason for the increasing secularity of most modern democracies. Religious citizens, however, commonly see a secular state as unfriendly toward religion. This book articulates principles that enable secular governments to protect liberty in a way that judiciously separates church and state and fully respects religious citizens.
After presenting a brief account of the relation between religion and ethics, the book shows how ethics can be independent of religion-evidentially autonomous in a way that makes moral knowledge possible for secular citizens--without denying religious sources a moral authority of their own. With this account in view, it portrays a church-state separation that requires governments not only to avoid religious establishment but also to maintain religious neutrality. The book shows how religious neutrality is related to such issues as teaching evolutionary biology in public schools, the legitimacy of vouchers to fund private schooling, and governmental support of "faith-based initiatives." The final chapter shows how the proposed theory of religion and politics incorporates toleration and forgiveness as elements in flourishing democracies. Tolerance and forgiveness are described; their role in democratic citizenship is clarified; and in this light a conception of civic virtue is proposed.
Overall, the book advances the theory of liberal democracy, clarifies the relation between religion and ethics, provides distinctive principles governing religion in politics, and provides a theory of toleration for pluralistic societies. It frames institutional principles to guide governmental policy toward religion; it articulates citizenship standards for political conduct by individuals; it examines the case for affirming these two kinds of standards on the basis of what, historically, has been called natural reason; and it defends an account of toleration that enhances the practical application of the ethical framework both in individual nations and in the international realm.

Reading Ricoeur through Law, edited by Marc de Leeuw, George H. Taylor, and Eileen Brennan, is the first collection of essays solely focused on Ricoeur's thinking about law, bringing together both established and emerging scholars to offer a systematic and critical examination of Ricoeur's legal thinking. The chapters not only explore the specific contribution Ricoeur makes to the field of jurisprudence but also examine how Ricoeur's work on law fits, complements, or changes his overall anthropology, phenomenology, and hermeneutics. The book provides a complex insight into how law, ethics, and politics intertwine both from within law as normative rule setting, as well as through the wider social-political and historical context in which law and legal institutions affect our inter-subjective and communal life as lived "with and for others in just institutions." The collection also makes available in English "The Just between the Legal and the Good," a key text in Ricoeur's reflections about law and justice. The core topics of this collection are rights, justice, responsibility, judging, interpretation, argumentation, punishment, and authority, but contributors but also offer original insights in how Ricoeur's philosophical reconceptualization of symbolism, action, ideology, narrative, selfhood, testimony, history, trauma, reconciliation, justice, and forgiveness can be made productive for our understanding of law and legal institutions.

For over forty years John Finnis has pioneered the development of a new classical theory of natural law, a systematic philosophical explanation of human life that offers an integrated account of personal identity, practical reason, morality, political community, and law. The core of Finnis' theory, articulated in his seminal work Natural Law and Natural Rights, has profoundly influenced later work in the philosophy of law and practical reason, while his contributions to the ethical debates surrounding nuclear deterrence, abortion, and sexual morality have been a powerful, and controversial exposition of the practical implications of his theory of natural law. The Collected Essays of John Finnis brings together 122 papers. Thematically arranged, the five volumes provide ready access to his contributions across central areas of modern practical philosophy - the philosophy of practical reason; the philosophy of personal identity and intention; political philosophy; the philosophy of law; and the philosophy of revelation and the role of religion in public life. Fully cross-referenced, cross-indexed, and introduced by the author, the Collected Essays reveal the connections and coherence of the different branches of Finnis' work, showing the full picture of his philosophical contribution for the first time. Covering topics from the nature of divine revelation, the morality of abortion, to the adoption of Bills of Rights, the work in these volumes offer a unique insight into the intellectual currents and political debates that have transformed major areas of public morality and law over the last half century. Together with the new edition of Natural Law and Natural Rights, they will be an essential resource for all those engaged with the philosophy of law and broader questions in practical philosophy.

This Handbook discusses representative philosophers in the history of the philosophy of law and social philosophy, giving clear concise expert definitions and explanations of key personalities and their ideas. It provides an essential reference for experts and newcomers alike.

What should we call law when it is not the law of one or several states? Does it actually matter what we call law? How can we take into account the consequences of calling something law when we shape the concept of law in the first place? How does international arbitration help to illustrate the problem?
This book is an investigation into stateless law, illustrated by international arbitration regimes. It addresses key philosophical questions posed by international arbitration as a potential path to law beyond the state. It ascertains which dimensions of transnational legality arbitral regimes conform to, and what consequences follow from it.
The argument of this book is firmly rooted in contemporary legal positivism and is attentive to current debates regarding the rule of law to ponder legality without territory. A theory is suggested regarding the minimal conditions that transnational regimes must fulfil in order to legitimately and appropriately count as law. The theory is tested on various arbitral regimes. The book thus offers reflections on the extent to which legality and the rule of law can serve as a moral and political benchmark for transnational regimes, to assess the political morality of arbitration's current autonomy from states and what arbitration's claim for an increase in that autonomy implies.

This book analyses the features and functionality of the relationship between the law, individual or collective values and medical-scientific evidence when they have to be interpreted by judges, courts and para-jurisdictional bodies. The various degrees to which scientific data and moral values have been integrated into the legal discourse reveal the need for a systematic review of the options and solutions that judges have elaborated on. In turn, the book presents a systematic approach, based on a proposed pattern for classifying these various degrees, together with an in-depth analysis of the multi-layered role of jurisdictions and the means available to them for properly handling new legal demands arising in plural societies. The book outlines a model that makes it possible to focus on and address these issues in a sustainable manner, that is, to respond to individual requests and technological advances in the field of biolaw by consistently and effectively applying suitable legal instruments and jurisdictional interpretation.

Thomas Hobbes wrote extensively about law and was strongly influenced by developments and debates among lawyers of his day. And Hobbes is considered by many commentators to be one of the first legal positivists. Yet there is no book in English that focuses on Hobbes's legal philosophy. Indeed, Hobbes's own book length treatment of law, A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England, has also not received much commentary over the centuries. Larry May seeks to fill the gap in the literature by addressing Hobbes's legal philosophy directly, and comparing Leviathan to the Dialogue, as he offers a new interpretation of Hobbes's views about the connections among law, politics, and morality. May argues that Hobbes is much more amenable to moral, and even legal, limits on the law-indeed closer to Lon Fuller than to today's legal positivists-than he is often portrayed. He shows that Hobbes's views can provide a solid grounding for the rules of war and international relations generally, contrary to the near universal belief that Hobbes is the bete noir of international law. To support these views, May holds that Hobbes places greater weight on equity than on justice, and that understanding the role of equity is the key to his legal philosophy. Equity also is the moral concept that provides restrictions on what a sovereign can legitimately do, and if violated is the kind of limitation on sovereignty that could open the door for possible international institutions.

Reason in Action collects John Finnis's work on the theory of practical reason and moral philosophy. The essays in the volume range from foundational issues of meta-ethics to the practical application of natural law theory to ethical problems such as nuclear deterrence, obscenity and free speech, and abortion and cloning. Defending the objectivity of some evaluative and moral judgments, the volume's meta-ethical papers debate with figures as diverse as Jurgen Habermas, Bernard Williams, David Hume, Max Weber, and Christine Korsgaard, and offer a new understanding of Wittgenstein's On Certainty. Further papers engage with Philippa Foot, Geoffrey Warnock, Leo Strauss, Terence Irwin, Matthew Kramer, neo-scholastic interpreters of Aquinas, utilitarians, game theorists, and Immanuel Kant on the shape of moral thought. John Rawls's conception of public reason, J.S. Mill's understanding of free speech, and Jacques Maritain's appeal to "connatural" knowledge are critically contested. Foundational questions addressed in the volume include: how legal reasoning differs from general practical reasoning; how aesthetic appreciation differs from erotic attraction; how subrational elements enter into the rational standard of fairness; how virtues depend upon principles and norms; and how incommensurabilities count in moral thought. These essays mark the development of Finnis's new classical theory of natural law, engaged with contemporary thinkers and problems. Several essays, including two previously unpublished, show the theory's emergence before Natural Law and Natural Rights. Other unpublished essays include a discussion of pornography, an analysis of freedom of speech, and a substantive introduction reflecting on the theory, its reception, and the convergence on it of capabilities theorists such as Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.

This central volume in the Collected Essays brings together John Finnis's wide-ranging contribution to central issues in political philosophy. The volume begins by examining the general theory of political community and social justice. It includes the powerful and well-known Maccabaean Lecture on Bills of Rights - a searching critique of Ronald Dworkin's moral-political arguments and conclusions, of the European Court of Human Rights' approach to fundamental rights, and of judicial review as a constitutional institution. It is followed by an equally searching analysis of Kant's thought on the intersection of law, right, and ethics. Other papers in the book's opening section include an early assessment of Rawls's A Theory of Justice, a radical re-interpretation of Aquinas on limited government and the significance of the private/public distinction, and a challenging paper on virtue and the constitution. The volume then focuses on central problems in modern political communities, including the achievement of justice in work and distribution; the practice of punishment; war and justice; the public control of euthanasia and abortion; and the nature of marriage and the common good. There are careful and vigorous critiques of Nietzsche on morality, Hart on punishment, Dworkin on the enforcement of morality and on euthanasia, Rawls on justice and law, Thomson on the woman's right to choose, Habermas on abortion, Nussbaum and Koppelman on same-sex relations, and Dummett and Weithman on open borders. The volume's previously unpublished papers include a foundational consideration of labour unions, a fresh statement of a new grounding for the morality of sex, a surprising reading of C.S. Lewis's Abolition of Man on contraception, and an introduction reviewing some of the remarkable changes in private and public morality over the past half-century.

Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility is a series of volumes presenting outstanding new work on a set of connected themes, investigating such questions as: * What does it mean to be an agent? * What is the nature of moral responsibility? Of criminal responsibility? What is the relation between moral and criminal responsibility (if any)? * What is the relation between responsibility and the metaphysical issues of determinism and free will? * What do various psychological disorders tell us about agency and responsibility? * How do moral agents develop? How does this developmental story bear on questions about the nature of moral judgment and responsibility? * What do the results from neuroscience imply (if anything) for our questions about agency and responsibility? OSAR thus straddles the areas of moral philosophy and philosophy of action, but also draws from a diverse range of cross-disciplinary sources, including moral psychology, psychology proper (including experimental and developmental), philosophy of psychology, philosophy of law, legal theory, metaphysics, neuroscience, neuroethics, political philosophy, and more. It is unified by its focus on who we are as deliberators and (inter)actors, embodied practical agents negotiating (sometimes unsuccessfully) a world of moral and legal norms.

The book offers contributions to a philosophical and realistic approach to the place of adjudication in contemporary constitutional democracies. Bringing together scholars from different legal and philosophical backgrounds, the book purports to cast light on the role(s) of judges and the function of judicial interpretation inside of constitutional states, from the standpoint of legal realism as a revisited and sophisticated jurisprudential outlook. In so doing, the book also copes with a few major jurisprudential issues, like, e.g., determining the ideas that make up the core of legal realism, exploring the relation between legal realism and legal positivism, identifying the boundaries of judicial interpretation as they appear from a realist standpoint, as well as considering some skeptical outlooks on the very claims of contemporary legal realism.

What sort of methods are best suited to understanding constitutional doctrines and practices? Should we look to lawyers and legal methods alone, or should we draw upon other disciplines such as history, sociology, political theory, and moral philosophy? Should we study constitutions in isolation or in a comparative context? To what extent must constitutional methods be sensitive to empirical data about the functioning of legal practice? Can ideal theory aid our understanding of real constitutions? This volume brings together constitutional experts from around the world to address these types of questions through topical events and challenges such as Brexit, administrative law reforms, and the increasing polarisations in law, politics, and constitutional scholarship. Importantly, it investigates the ways in which we can ensure that constitutional scholars do not talk past each other despite their persistent - and often fierce - disagreements. In so doing, it aims systematically to re-examine the methodology of constitutional theory.

"Eusebism" is a new moral philosophy based on respect, whose purpose is to change paradigms and perspectives that prevent human beings from being free and aware. Eusebism's unifying element is absolute and unconditional respect for everything that exists. From a material and transcendental perspective, it represents the only security on which to base relationships between all people and animals, to search for the best improvement possible and maximize overall well-being. Eusebism is not based on faith, but on observation and interpretation without subjectivism, even based upon species, sex, age, origin, propensity, habit, social status, technological level, and historical epoch. Humanism, animal rights, and environmentalism represent philosophical currents that, even if useful and innovative, remain confined within objective limitations since all consider just one element and automatically prevent referentiality to the other doctrines. The theory incorporates all those perspectives, assimilating inside a comprehensive general theory that rejects discrimination based on them. Eusebism's perspective inversion is explained by the question: "Why should I deny respect?"

Every modern democratic state imprisons thousands of offenders every year, depriving them of their liberty, causing them a great deal of psychological and sometimes physical harm. Relationships are destroyed, jobs are lost, the risk of the offender being harmed by other offenders is increased and all at great expense to the state. How can this brutal and costly enterprise be justified? Traditionally, philosophers answering this question have argued either that the punishment of wrongdoers is a good in itself (retributivism), or that it is a regrettable means to a valuable end, such as the deterrence of future wrongdoing, and thus justifiable on consequentialist grounds. This book offers a critical examination of those theories and advances a new argument for punishment's justification, calling it the 'duty view'. On this view, the permission to punish offenders is grounded in the duties that they incur in virtue of their wrongdoing. The most important duties that ground the justification of punishment are the duty to recognize that the offender has done wrong and the duty to protect others against wrongdoing. In the light of these duties the state has a permission to punish offenders to ensure that they recognize that what they have done is wrong, but also to protect others from crime. In contrast to other justifications of punishment grounded in deterrence, the duty view is developed in the light of a non-consequentialist moral theory: a theory which endorses constraints on the pursuit of the good. It is shown that it is normally wrong to harm a person as a means to pursue a greater good. However, there are exceptions to this principle in cases where the person harmed has an enforceable duty to pursue the good. The implications of this idea are explored both in the context of self-defence, and then in the context of punishment. Through the systematic exploration of the relationship between self-defence and punishment, the book makes significant progress in defending a plausible set of non-consequentialist moral principles that justify the punishment of wrongdoers, and marks a significant contribution to the philosophical literature on punishment.

No social life is possible without order. Order being the most constituent element of society, it is not surprising that so many theories have been developed to explain what social order is and how it is possible, as well as to explore the features that social order acquires in its different dimensions. The book leads these many theories of social order back to a few main matrices for the use of theoretical and practical reason, which are defined as 'paradigms of order'. The plurality of conceptual constructs regarding social order is therefore reduced to a manageable number of theoretical patterns and an intellectual map is produced in which the most significant differences between paradigms are clearly outlined. Furthermore, the 'paradigmatic revolutions' are addressed that marked the most relevant turning points in the way in which a 'well-ordered society' should be understood. Against this background, the question is discussed on the theoretical and practical perspectives for a cosmopolitan society as the only suitable possibility to meet the global challenges with which we are all presently confronted.

The following pages attempt to develop the main outlines of an existential phenomenology of law within the context of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phe nomenology of the social world. In so doing, the essay addresses the rather narrow scholarly question, If Merleau-Ponty had written a phenomenology of law, what would it have looked like? But this scholarly enterprise, although impeccable in itself, is also transcended by a more complicated concern for a very different sort of question. Namely, if Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological descriptions of the social world are correct-as I believe they largely are-then what are the philosophical consequences for an adequate understanding of law? Such a project may well occasion a certain surprise amongst observers of the contemporary philosophical landscape, at least in what concerns the terrain of continental thought, and for two different reasons. The first is that, although interest in Merleau-Ponty's work remains strong in the. United States and Can ada, his philosophical standing in his own country has been largely eclipsed by that of, first, his friend/estranged acquaintance, Jean-Paul Sartre; by various Marxist philosophies and critical social theories; and finally by those doing her meneutics of language. In my view, current neglect of Merleau-Ponty's thought in France is most regrettable."

This book examines the extent to which Brexit has impacted upon the operation of the British constitution, prompting in turn consideration of how some of the factors which contributed towards the outcome of the 2016 referendum, as well as the event of Brexit itself, might inform debates surrounding constitutional reform moving forward. The work seeks to make sense of the constitutional implications of Brexit and to revisit some of the key debates to have taken place in respect of particular constitutional reform proposals in order to assess the extent to which recent Brexit related developments inform the perspectives which are taken upon their merits and prospects. The book is divided into two parts. The first provides some context for the substantive treatment of the potential impact of Brexit on constitutional reform debates which is to be found in part two. Part two centres on various specific constitutional reform themes or issues, which are explored further within the context of Brexit. For each such issue, the main parameters of the debates which have taken place are sketched out before moving on to consider how it has informed, or may come to be informed, by the phenomenon of Brexit. By so doing, it looks to some future directions for constitutional reform which take account of the factors driving the discourses which gave rise to the referendum outcome and subsequent developments, as well as offering meaningful responses to these. The book will be of interest to academics, researchers and policy-makers working in the areas of constitutional law, constitutional politics, philosophy and history.

For courses covering multicultural issues in law enforcement. A classic text in peacekeeping, cultural awareness, and diversity in law enforcement Multicultural Law Enforcement: Strategies for Peacekeeping in a Diverse Society provides practical information and insight to prepare officers for culturally sensitive policing. The content explores the pervasive influences of culture, race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation in the workplace and in multicultural communities. It also delves into topics such as gangs, victims of human trafficking, homelessness, mental illness, and international events and their impact on law enforcement in the U.S. The 7th edition reflects new and expanded information on issues facing law enforcement professionals and the communities they serve, such as implicit biases and police-community mutual stereotypes.

This book examines the way in which undercover police investigation has come to be regulated in Australia. Drawing on documentary and doctrinal legal analysis, this book investigates how, in the space of a single decade, Australian law makers set out to regulate one of the most difficult aspects of police: undercover investigation. In so doing, the Australian experience represents a paradigm model. And yet despite its success, it is a system of law and practice that has a dark side - a model of investigation to relies heavily on activities that are unlawful in the absence of authorisation. It is a model that is as much concerned with the surveillance and control of police as it is with suspected criminal conduct. The book aims to locate the Australian experience in comparative perspective with other major common law jurisdictions (the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand), with a view to contrast strengths, similarities and weaknesses of these models. It is argued that the Australian model, at the pragmatic level, offers a highly successful model for regulatory structure and practice, providing a significant model for successful regulation. At the same time, the model that has been introduced raises important questions about how and why the Australian experience evolved in the way that it did, and the implications this has for the relationship between citizen and state, the judiciary and the executive, and broader questions about the protections offered by rights discourse and jurisprudence. This book aims to document the law, policy and practices that shape undercover investigations. In so doing, it aims to not only articulate the way in which the law regulates these activities, but also to move on to consider some of the fundamental questions linked to undercover investigations: how did regulation happen? By what means of regulation? What are the driving policy issues that give this field of law its particular complexion? What are the implications? Who gains, and who loses, by which means of power? The book offers unique insights into a largely unknown aspect of modern covert policing, identifying a range of practices, the legal framework, controversies and powers. By locating these practices in a rich theoretical context, informed by risk and governmentality scholarship, this book offers a legal and theoretical explanation of one of the most controversial forms of policing.

In the Shade of an African Baobab: Tom Bennett's Legacy is a collection of essays published to honour and thank Tom Bennett for his generous contribution to scholarly work over the years in the field of legal pluralism and African jurisprudence, as well as for his mentorship and friendship. The book brings together a collection of work by esteemed scholars from multidisciplinary fields, though the work is focused on aspects of law, culture and religion. The common thread through all the contributions is Tom. His scholarly influence, visible in each of the contributions, can be compared to the mighty Baobab tree: a large iconic, culturally important and majestic tree indigenous to Africa.

This book provides a set of proposals for the new conceptual network required in order to establish civil law rules for a world permeated by Artificial Intelligence. These proposals are intended by their authors to push the debate on the new civil law forward. In spite of the natural conservatism of jurists, some innovative or even futuristic ideas are called for, also because the future, even this not-so-distant one, is difficult to foresee. Paradoxically, and unlike in the past, this lack of knowledge must not stop us from planning. If it does, humankind may, as some pessimists already claim, lose its chance to win the battle for control of the world. The rise and expansion of Artificial Intelligence and robotics in recent years has highlighted a pressing need to create a suitable legal framework for this new phenomenon. The debate on the subject, although wide-ranging and involving many new legal documents, is still quite general and preliminary in nature, although these preparatory works illustrate the very real need to develop appropriate new civil law arrangements. It is exactly the branch of private law where the necessity of these new rules appears to be the most imperative. Autonomous vehicles, medical robots, and expertise software raise fundamental questions on aspects of civil liability such as culpability; whereas the growth in popularity of automated, intelligent software systems for concluding contracts requires a new approach to many fundamental and deeply rooted elements of contract law, e.g. consciousness, intent, error, deception, interpretation of contracts and good faith. Ruling on these specific matters demands the identification and clarification of certain key points, which shall become the foundation for constructing AI/robot civil law.

This book uses the philosophy of Thomas Kuhn to provide a new vision of the development of European comparative law that will challenge and inspire scholars in the field. With the 'empathic' use of some ideas from Kuhn's theories on the history of science - paradigm, paradigm-shift, puzzle-solving research and incommensurability - the book rethinks the modern history of European comparative law from the late 19th century to the modern day. It argues that three major paradigms determine modern comparative law: - historical and comparative jurisprudence, - droit compare, and - post-World War II comparative law. It concludes that contemporary methodological trends are not signs of a paradigm-shift toward a postmodern and culturalist understanding of comparative law, but that the new approach spreads the idea of methodological plurality.