Justifying Taxes offers readers some of the elements of a democratic tax law, considered within its political and philosophical context in order to determine the extent of legitimate tax obligations. The objective is to revisit some of the issues in the dogmatics of tax law from the viewpoint of a critical citizen, always ready to ask questions about the justification underlying her obligations, and especially about her paramount burden, viz., the payment of certain amounts of money. Within this purview, special attention is paid to the general principles of taxation. The argument is complemented by a detailed reconstruction of constitutional reasoning in tax matters, close attention being paid to the jurisprudence of the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional. Readership: Legal scholars, political scientists and philosophers. Especially recommended to graduate and undergraduate students of Tax Law, Constitutional Law, Jurisprudence, Philosophy of Law and Political Theory.

Using St. Thomas Aquinas's natural law philosophy and Divine Exemplar argument to prompt new discussion of ethical questions that lawyers and judges should confront, the author delivers a complete occupational profile for the professional conduct of judges and lawyers. St. Thomas's discourse on such topics as procedural law, judicial and advocate conduct and character, criminal and civil practice standards, and sentencing guidelines provides a blueprint for the Christian lawyer and judge by laying out the professional and ethical parameters that make the actor operate in accordance with reason and morality. This text on Thomistic jurisprudence challenges the current beliefs of law and the justice system, the functions of lawyers, advocates, and judges, and traditional views on evidence and punishment, and suggests a return to the "roots" of the system, in which reason, virtue, and justice guide the law and its practice. Lawyers, judges, students, and scholars should find in these pages a unique approach to renewing our beleaguered justice system. Relying on extensive quotations from the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, the author begins the text with an explication of St. Thomas's influences, legal philosophy, and thoughts on virtue and the law. He then devotes several chapters to specific concepts in Thomistic jurisprudence, including prudence, the common good, judicial process, judgment, and punishment. The final chapters analyze the role of lawyers and judges, and argues for the need for the application of the Thomistic model of jurisprudence to our criminal justice system.

I begin by introducing the main issues of the work, and inviting their consideration; as enticement, I offer a sketch of their practical importance, and of the philosophical challenge they present. And I provide a preview of the work's organization and central argument. There is something so obvious that it is easily-and often-overlooked: the enforcing of criminal statutes is the most intrusive and coercive exercise of domestic power by a state. Forcibly preventing people from doing that which they wish to do, forcibly compelling people to do that which they do not wish to do-and wielding force merely attempting to compel or prevent-these state activities have extraordinarily serious ramifications. Indeed, no state institutions are likely to have more profound an impact on the lives of individual citizens than those of the criminal justice system. I endorse Herbert Packer's assessment: The criminal sanction is the law's ultimate threat. Being punished for a crime is different from being regulated in the public interest, or being forced to compensate another who has been injured by one's conduct, or being treated for a disease. The sanction is at once l uniquely coercive and, in the broadest sense, uniquely expensive. As a consequence, these state activities are in special need of moral warrant. Given the great potential for doing grave injustice, the power of the state embodied in the criminal justice system ought not be exercised in the absence of a complete and compelling moral justification.

The main purpose of this book is to offer a logical analysis of legal propositions, especially of constitutional propositions. This analysis shows the relationship between truth-conditions of legal propositions and the problem of indeterminacy. Where the law is indeterminate, legal propositions lack truth-values. The background of this approach is the philosophical debate between realism and antirealism. The book deals with the notions of legal norms and legal systems and provides an analysis of the notion of legal indeterminacy and its relation to gaps, contradictions and the vagueness of legal concepts. It shows also that the simple model of a legal system is not sufficient to account for the complexity of legal propositions referring to legal systems of some degree of maturity. Several notions from legal dynamics are presented in order to bring to light the importance of concepts like applicability or hierarchy for the determination of the truth-value of a legal proposition. Thus the primacy of constitution becomes a central idea in the theoretical reconstruction of most contemporary legal systems; a conceptual explanation of this idea is presented and some conclusions from that explanation are drawn. Finally, a particular conception of constitutional interpretation is proposed. Special attention is paid to the relationship between interpretation and legal indeterminacy and, more specifically, to the problem of the discretion enjoyed by the organs entrusted with applying the constitution and also to the several theses that have been discussed controversially in the context of constitutional interpretation, such as the relevance of the intentions for the interpretation of theconstitution and for the justification of judicial review.

This book brings recent insights about sovereignty and citizen participation in the Belgian Constitution to scholars in the fields of law, philosophy, history, and politics. Throughout the Western world, there are increasing calls for greater citizen participation. Referendums, citizen councils, and other forms of direct democracy are considered necessary antidotes to a growing hostility towards traditional party politics. This book focuses on the Belgian debate, where the introduction of participatory politics has stalled because of an ambiguity in the Constitution. Scholars and judges generally claim that the Belgian Constitution gives ultimate power to the nation, which can only speak through representation in parliament. In light of this, direct democracy would be an unconstitutional power grab by the current generation of citizens. This book critically investigates this received interpretation of the Constitution and, by reaching back to the debates among Belgium's 1831 founding fathers, concludes that it is untenable. The spirit, if not the text, of the Belgian Constitution allows for more popular participation than present-day jurisprudence admits. This book is the first to make recent debates in this field accessible to international scholars. It provides a rare source of information on Belgium's 1831 Constitution, which was in its time seen as modern constitutionalism's greatest triumph and which became a model for countless other constitutions. Yet the questions it asks reverberate far beyond Belgium. Combining new insights from law, philosophy, history, and politics, this book is a showcase for continental constitutional theory. It will be a valuable resource for academics and researchers in constitutional law, political and legal philosophy, and legal history. Chapters 3, 4, 11, and 15 of this book are freely available as a downloadable Open Access PDF under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license available at https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/sovereignty-civic-participation-constitutional-law-brecht-deseure-raf-geenens-stefan-sottiaux/e/10.4324/9781003039525

The book presents a new focus on the legal philosophical texts of Aristotle, which offers a much richerframe for the understanding of practical thought, legal reasoning and political experience. It allows understanding how human beings interact in a complex world, and how extensive the complexity is which results from humans' own power of self-construction and autonomy. The Aristotelian approach recognizes the limits of rationality and the inevitable and constitutive contingency in Law. All this offers a helpful instrument to understand the changes globalisation imposes to legal experience today. The contributions in this collection do not merely pay attention to private virtues, but focus primarily on public virtues. They deal with the fact that law is dependent on political power and that a person can never be sure about the facts of a case or about the right way to act. They explore the assumption that a detailed knowledge of Aristotle's epistemology is necessary, because of the direct connection between Enlightened reasoning and legal positivism. They pay attention to the concept of proportionality, which can be seen as a precondition to discuss liberalism.

According to platonists, entities such as numbers, sets, propositions and properties are abstract objects. But abstract objects lack causal powers and a location in space and time, so how could we ever come to know of the existence of such impotent and remote objects? In Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects, Colin Cheyne presents the first systematic and detailed account of this epistemological objection to the platonist doctrine that abstract objects exist and can be known. Since mathematics has such a central role in the acquisition of scientific knowledge, he concentrates on mathematical platonism. He also concentrates on our knowledge of what exists, and argues for a causal constraint on such existential knowledge. Finally, he exposes the weaknesses of recent attempts by platonists to account for our supposed platonic knowledge. This book will be of particular interest to researchers and advanced students of epistemology and of the philosophy of mathematics and science. It will also be of interest to all philosophers with a general interest in metaphysics and ontology.

Understanding the Nature of Law explores methodological questions about how best to explain law. Among these questions, one is central: is there something about law which determines how it should be theorized? Michael Giudice presents the problem: several methods suggest themselves as suitable to understanding law; however, each method claims unique importance with no need of others. A solution is offered in two key claims. First, many conceptual theories of law are best understood not as the result of conceptual analysis, but as constructive conceptual explanations, emphasizing a crucial role for revision and expansion of ordinary concepts, in ways responsive to new problems and new phenomena. Second, conceptual theories of law can and ought to identify necessary as well as contingent features in the construction of conceptual explanations of law. This novel book explains the importance of conceptual explanation by situating its methods and goals in relation to, rather than in competition with, social scientific and moral theories of law. The book will be of primary interest to both students and academics in legal, political, and moral philosophy. It will also be of interest to students and academics working in the social sciences who are interested in questions about the distinctive character of law.

The core of this book is a novel theory of distributive justice premised on the fundamental moral equality of persons. In the light of this theory, Eric Rakowski considers three types of problem which urgently require solutions - the distribution of resources, property rights, and the saving of life - and provides challenging and unconventional answers. Further, he criticizes the economic analysis of law as a normative theory, and develops an alternative account of tort and property law. Among the topics discussed are the principles by which earnings, wealth, and gifts should be taxed; whether the compulsory removal of organs for transplantation can be justified; how doctors and public officials should make life-or-death decisions when all those endangered cannot be helped in equal measure; and the morality of killing human beings and non-human animals.

This book examines how the functioning of the International Criminal Court has become a forum of convergence between the common law and civil law criminal justice systems. Four countries were selected as primary examples of these two legal traditions: the United States, England and Wales, Germany and Poland. The first layer of analysis focuses on selected elements of the model of accusation that are crucial to the model adopted by the ICC. These are: development of the notion of the prosecutor's independence in view of their ties to the countries and the Security Council; the nature and limits of the prosecutor's discretional powers to initiate proceedings before the ICC; the reasons behind the prosecutor's choice of both defendants and charges; the role the prosecutor plays in the procedure of disclosure of evidence and consensual termination of proceedings; and the determinants of the model of accusation used during trial and appeal proceedings. The second layer of the book consists in an analysis of the motives behind applying particular solutions to create the model of accusation before the ICC. It also shows how the model of accusation gradually evolved in proceedings before the military and ad hoc tribunals: ICTY and ICTR. Moreover, the question of compatibility of procedural institutions is addressed: In what ways does adopting a certain element of criminal procedure, e.g. discretional powers of the prosecutor to initiate criminal proceedings, influence the remaining procedural elements, e.g. the existence of the dossier of a case or the powers of a judge to change the legal classification of the criminal behavior appearing in the indictment?

This collection of nine essays selected from the nonjudical writings of Judge J. Skelly Wright deals with many of the important legal-policy questions of his career. Emphasizing his long-held belief that the disadvantaged should receive special protection, he details some of the ways in which the courts have failed to meet the needs of the underprivileged. He expands his views on judical activism, the uses and abuses of money in America's political process, and other of his abiding concerns. Each essay is preceded by an introductory statement discussing the content of the article.

This book is concerned with a central question in contemporary legal theory: how to describe global law? In addressing this question, the book brings together two features that are different and yet connected to one another: the conceptual description of contemporary law on the one hand, and methods of taking concrete perspectives on law on the other hand.

The book provides a useful concept for describing global law: thinking of law spatially. It illustrates that space is a concept with the capacity to capture the relationality, dynamics, and hybridity of law. Moreover, this book investigates the role of topological thinking in finding concrete perspectives on law.

Legal Spaces offers an innovative and interdisciplinary approach to law.

"

At the heart of this book, a question: what to make of the creeping competences of the EU and of the role the European Court of Justice plays in this respect? Taking the implied powers doctrine as its starting point, the hypothesis is that it shows what is ultimately at stake in the concept of legal competence: the problem of creation in law, or the relationship between constituent and constituted power. By rethinking this relationship, a new conceptual framework to make sense of creeping competences is designed. For this, the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty is used. Tracing back the philosophical roots of creation, legal constitution is understood as constitution in passivity. This leads to a whole new interpretation of the relationship between law and politics, rule following, authority, competences and European integration. From this perspective specific chapters in the case law of the European Court of Justice are reread and the logic behind the competence creep is unmasked. new back cover copy: Europe's constitutional journey has not been a smooth one, and a better division and definition of competence in the European Union is a key issue that needs to be addressed. How can the division of competence be made more transparent? Does there need to be a reorganization of competence? How can it be ensured that the redefined division of competence will not lead to a creeping expansion of the competence of the Union or to encroachment upon the exclusive areas of competence of the Member States and, where there is provision, regions? And how can it be ensured that the European dynamic does not come to a halt? Indeed, has the creeping expansion of the competence of the Union already come to a halt? These are the questions this book explores. The Passivity of Law: Competence and Constitution in the European Court of Justice opens with a legal account of competence creep, including the role that the European Court of Justice plays in it and a sketch of the present division of competences and the main principles regulating it. It then discusses the relationship between constituent power and constituted or constitutional power from the viewpoint of the history of constitutional history before offering an alternative theory of their relationship, known as "chiastic theory," which is based on the philosophical investigations of Merleau-Ponty. It details how chiastic theory can be used to make sense of the Court's role in the competence creep in general and the doctrine of implied powers in particular, and it utilizes several case studies concerning competences to sustain this claim. Aimed at researchers and practitioners in Philosophy, Phenomenology, Political Science, the Social Sciences and numerous fields of law, this monograph is a seminal work in the evolving theory and practice of EU law.

During the last half of the twentieth century, legal philosophy (or legal theory or jurisprudence) has grown significantly. It is no longer the domain of a few isolated scholars in law and philosophy. Hundreds of scholars from diverse fields attend international meetings on the subject. In some universities, large lecture courses of five hundred students or more study it. The primary aim of the Law and Philosophy Library is to present some of the best original work on legal philosophy from both the Anglo-American and European traditions. Not only does it help make some of the best work available to an international audience, but it also encourages increased awareness of, and interaction between, the two major traditions. The primary focus is on fu- length scholary monographs, although some edited volumes of original papers are also included. The Library editors are assisted by an Editorial Advisory Board of internationally renowned scholars. Legal philosophy should not be considered a narrowly circumscribed field. Insights into law and legal institutions can come from diverse disciplines on a wide range of topics. Among the relevant disciplines or perspectives contribut ing to legal philosophy, besides law and philosophy, are anthropology, economics, political science, and sociology. Among the topics included in legal philosophy are theories of law; the concepts of law and legal institutions; legal reasoning and adjudication; epistemological issues of evidence and pro cedure; law and justice, economics, politics, or morality; legal ethics; and theories oflegal fields such as criminal law, contracts, and property."

This timely book offers revealing insights into the changing role of China in world governance as exemplified by the Silk Road Initiative, the People's Republic's first published major initiative for external affairs. Focusing on various aspects of the Silk Road Initiative, particularly those that are largely neglected in current discussions, including culture and philosophy, finance and investment, environmental protection and social responsibility, judiciary and lawyers, the authors explore a wide range of contexts in which China's role as an emerging power in international relations and international law is examined. In the current era of ever-increasing populism, protectionism and challenges to globalization, the authors explore the Chinese philosophy underpinning Chinese norms of regional and international development. Bearing in mind the political and economic uncertainties hampering the establishment of such norms, the authors offer crucial insights into how the Silk Road Initiative could or should be developed and regulated.Given its depth of coverage, the book is an indispensable read for anyone interested in the Initiative and its social-legal implications.

Sixty-three proceedings papers from researchers in Europe, North America, and Australasia, assess the psychological implications of legal systems and prisons. The presentations review factors involving eyewitness testimony credibility and misinformation, techniques in suspect and victim interviewing

Islamic jurisprudence is a much misunderstood system. The misunderstanding is due to lack of information and to centuries of prejudice. This book seeks to present information, not at present available in a single work, on the pioneering efforts of Islamic jurists to develop a comprehensive body of human rights, principles and practice, as well as a corpus of international law principles. The attempt to develop such international law principles long anticipated any similar work in other legal or cultural systems. Human rights doctrine based upon the Qu'ran and the Sunna of the Prophet was expressed in terms which will strike the reader as surprisingly modern. In international law, Islamic treatises anticipated the work of Grotius by eight centuries. It is hoped that this systematic exposition, not attempted before in such detail, will help considerably in reducing misunderstanding and the resulting tensions, as well as being of considerable value to the Islamic world. The work will be of interest not only to lawyers, but also to philosophers, historians, sociologists, political scientists and students of international affairs.

Law is the great concealer; and law is everywhere. Or so claimed Marxists once upon a time. [Law] was imbricated within the mode of production and productive relations themselves . . . it intruded brusquely within alien categories, re-appearing bewigged and gowned in the form of ideology; . . . it was an arm of politics and politics was one of its arms; it was an academic discipline, subjected to the rigour of its own autonomous logic, it contributed to the definition of the self-identity of both the rulers 1 and the ruled. Does the old critique of domination still hold any sway? Apparently not. Or so even scholars of the far Left keep reminding us in their eagerness to embrace law and proclaim their allegiance to the new constitutional politics of civil society. Old Marxists now describe popular sovereignty as 'co-original' with, and democracy 'internally linked' to 2 constitutional rights and find it hard to remember what it was they once disagreed with liberals about. No tension left between emancipatory politics and oppressive law; instead we have reciprocal constitution, simultaneous realisation. In the Left's embracing of the new constitutionalisms its old critique of law - the critique of the law's concealment of class inequality, class conflict and class action - is left behind.

Clear, concise, and written by experts currently lecturing in the field, Financial Accounting focuses exclusively on what you need to know for success in your course and career. Students looking for a focused introduction to financial accounting will appreciate this book. This innovative textbook includes features which will particularly appeal to international students, including: a clear introduction to accounting from its initial concepts, through recording transactions to the accurate interpretation of accounts relevant case studies that illustrate key accounting principles up-to-date terminology to prepare you for current business practice worldwide summaries, activities and review questions to help reinforce your understanding Part of the 360 Degree Business, which provides accessible yet stimulating introductions to core business studies modules, the text comes with additional support materials including interactive multiple choice questions available at www.routledge.com/cw/vickerstaff.

The Dialectical Forge identifies dialectical disputation (jadal) as a primary formative dynamic in the evolution of pre-modern Islamic legal systems, promoting dialectic from relative obscurity to a more appropriate position at the forefront of Islamic legal studies. The author introduces and develops a dialectics-based analytical method for the study of pre-modern Islamic legal argumentation, examines parallels and divergences between Aristotelian dialectic and early juridical jadal-theory, and proposes a multi-component paradigm-the Dialectical Forge Model-to account for the power of jadal in shaping Islamic law and legal theory.In addition to overviews of current evolutionary narratives for Islamic legal theory and dialectic, and expositions on key texts, this work shines an analytical light upon the considerably sophisticated "proto-system" of juridical dialectical teaching and practice evident in Islam's second century, several generations before the first "full-system" treatises of legal and dialectical theory were composed. This proto-system is revealed from analyses of dialectical sequences in the 2nd/8th century Kitab Ikhtilaf al-'Iraqiyyin / 'Iraqiyyayn (the "subject-text") through a lens molded from 5th/11th century jadal-theory treatises (the "lens-texts"). Specific features thus uncovered inform the elaboration of a Dialectical Forge Model, whose more general components and functions are explored in closing chapters.

This textbook uses cases in family law to illustrate both traditional philosophical problems in the law as well as problems that are unique to family law. In the beginning chapters family law cases are employed to introduce the reader to philosophical debates about the relationship between law and morals, about how one ought to interpret the U.S. Constitution and its amendments, about the conditions under which individual liberty is justifiably limited by law, about the justification of punishment, and about the justification of remedies and standards of care in determining negligence in tort cases. Later chapters are devoted to contemporary issues unique to family law, including justifiable limits of access to marriage, alternatives to marriage, the rights of children, child custody disputes involving surrogate births, quasi-property disputes involving custody of frozen embryos, and the justifiable limits of the right not to procreate. The book reflects current movements, contemporary debates, and recent research on the philosophical problems in family law.

"In this well-written and carefully documented book Professor Gottlieb contends that the conservative direction of this court is so strong that it is impossible for the poor and less fortunate to receive proper consideration and, ultimately, redress."
"--New York Law Journal"

We like to think of judges and justices as making decisions based on the facts and the law. But to what extent do jurists decide cases in accordance with their own preexisting philosophy of law, and what specific ideological assumptions account for their decisions?

Stephen E. Gottlieb adopts a unique perspective on the decision-making of Supreme Court justices, blending and re-characterizing traditional accounts of political philosophy in a way that plausibly explains many of the justices' voting patterns.

A seminal study of the Rehnquist Court, Morality Imposed illustrates how, in contrast to previous courts which took their mandate to be a move toward a freer and/or happier society, the current court evidences little concern for this goal, focusing instead on thinly veiled moral judgments. Delineating a fault line between liberal and conservative justices on the Rehnquist Court, Gottlieb suggests that conservative justices have rejected the basic principles that informed post-New Deal individual rights jurisprudence and have substituted their own conceptions of moral character for these fundamental principles.

Morality Imposed adds substantially to our understanding of the Supreme Court, its most recent cases, and the evolution of judicial philosophy in the U.S.

Acclaimed as the "the most objective prosecutors in the world," the German prosecution service has long attracted the attention in the past of comparative law scholars. At first glance, the institutional position and statutory mandate of German prosecutors indicate that that reputation is well-deserved. Unfortunately, the introduction of charge-bargaining has opened the door to criticism that German prosecutors have abandoned their role of objective decision-makers. Using interview data collected from interviews with German prosecutors themselves as well as quantitative data, the book uses the actual voices of German prosecutors to show how real-world constraints, rather than changes in the law, undermine the ability of German prosecutors to objectively seek the truth. The book will take readers behind closed doors where prosecutors discuss case decisions and unveil the realities of practice. As a result, it will critically revise previous studies of German prosecution practices and offer readers a well-researched ethnographic analysis of actual German decision-making practices and the culture of the prosecution service. Unlike prosecutors in America's adversarial system, whom critics claim are driven by a "conviction-mentality" and gamesmanship, German prosecutors are institutionally positioned to function as (at least semi-)judicial officials dedicated to finding a case's objective truth. The book argues that, organizational incentives and norms, rather than the boundaries of the law determinately shapes how prosecutors investigate and prosecute crime in Germany.

lt is a commonplace that law and morality intersect and interpenetrate in all the areas of legal decision-making; that in order to make sense of constitutional, statutory or common-law questions, judges and other legal decision-makers must first resolve certain philosophical issues which include moral judgments of right and wrang_ This is particularly evident with regard to constitutional interpretation, especially when constitutions give a mandate for the protection of the substantive norms and values entrenched as constitutional rights. In these Situations, as a leading contemporary legal philosopher observed, the "Constitution fuses legal and moral issues, by making the validity of a law depend on an answer to complex moral 1 problems." But the need for substantive value elucidation is not confined, of course, only to constitutional interpretation under Bills of Rights. This, however, immediately raises a dilemma stemming from the moral diversity and pluralism of modern liberal societies. How can law remain sensitive to this pluralism and yet provide clear answers to the problems which call for a legal resolution? Sharply conflicting values in modern societies clash in the debates over the death penalty, abortion, homosexuality, separation of state and religion, the scope of the freedom of the press, or affirmative action. lt would often be difficult to discern a broader consensus within which these clashes of values operate, unless this consensus were described in such vague terms as to render it practically meaningless.