This book bridges a scholarly divide between empirical and normative theorizing about procedural justice in the context of relations of power between citizens and the state. Empirical research establishes that people's understanding of procedural justice is shaped by relational factors. A central premise of this volume is that this research is significant but needs to be complemented by normative theorizing that draws on relational theories of ethics and justice to explain the moral significance of procedures and make normative sense of people's concerns about relational factors. The chapters in Part 1 provide comprehensive reviews of empirical studies of procedural justice in policing, courts and prisons. Part 2 explores empirical and normative perspectives on procedural justice and legitimacy. Part 3 examines philosophical approaches to procedural justice. Part 4 considers the implications of a relational perspective for the design of procedures in a range of legal contexts. This collection will be of interest to a wide academic readership in philosophy, law, psychology and criminology.

This first critical examination of informal dispute processing links the institutionalization of alternatives to the court process and the ideology of informalism with the evolution of the American court system. The author connects dispute processing reform to the broader social and political context in which it developed, including the rise of judicial management in the Progressive period and the reconstruction of court unification in the 1970s. Harrington defines legal resources and their distribution in alternative dispute resolution policy before focusing on the institutionalization of this reform in a case study of a federally sponsored Neighborhood Justice Center. In conclusion, Harrington finds that the symbols of informalism and its institutions are a mere shadow of conventional legal practices.

Sovereignty, Knowledge, Law investigates the notion of sovereignty from three different, but related perspectives: as a legal question in relation to the sovereign state, as a political question in relation to sovereign power, and as a metaphysical question in relation to sovereign self-knowledge. The varied and interchangeable uses of legal sovereignty, political sovereignty and metaphysical sovereignty in contemporary debates have resulted in a situation where the word sovereignty itself has become something of a non-concept. Panu Minkkinen shows here how these three perspectives have informed one another, by addressing their shared relationship to law, and to the autocephalous function of sovereignty; that is, the attempt to provide a single source and foundation for law, power, and self-knowledge. Through an effort to domesticate the intrinsically heterocephalous nature of power, the juridical and jurisprudential aim has been to confine power within the closed vertical hierarchy of traditional legal thinking. Sovereignty, Knowledge, Law thus elaborates this heterocephaly, proposing new understandings of sovereignty, as well as of law and of legal scholarship.

Kantianism, Postmodernism and Critical Legal Thought presents a challenging alternative theory of legal philosophy. The central thesis of the book suggests an accommodation between three of the most influential contemporary theories of law, Kantianism, postmodernism and critical legal thought. In doing so, it further suggests that the often perceived distance between these theories of law disguises a common intellectual foundation. This foundation lies in the work of Immanuel Kant. Kantianism, Postmodernism and Critical Legal Thought presents an intellectual history of critical legal thinking, beginning with Kant, and then proceeding through philosphers and legal theorists as diverse as Heidegger and Arendt, Foucault and Derrida, Rorty and Rawls, and Unger and Dworkin. Ultimately, it will be suggested that each of these philosophers is writing within a common intellectual tradition, and that by concentrating on the commonality of this tradition, contemporary legal theory can better appreciate the reconstructive potential of the critical legal project.

The philosophy of law - inquiry into the origins, nature and theory of laws and legal principles, and those concepts that structure the practice of law - is of great importance in moral and political philosophy, as well as being a major area of philosophical concern in its own right. Clear, concise and comprehensive, this is the ideal introduction to the philosophy of law for those studying it for the first time. Drawing upon both the analytic Anglo-American and Continental schools of philosophy, Law: Key Concepts in Philosophy summarises the work of key thinkers in the philosophy of law, including Rousseau, Hobbes, Austin, Hegel, Mill, Marx, Dworkin and Rawls. It provides lucid and thorough explication and analysis of central concerns in legal philosophy, covering criminal law, civil law and constitutional law. Finally, the text also addresses key issues in contemporary philosophy of law, including human rights, international law and questions of race and gender.

This book aims to explore the construction of Chinese law, with an evolution that has been strongly inspired by international law that has functioned as a "pioneer of legal civilization" in China. Chinese law is a fluid sedimentation of traditional elements of Chinese culture and the internalization of external elements. The internal dimension of Chinese legal evolution therefore coincides with a progressive incursion also at the international level, questioning the traditional rules of international relations. The most relevant and comprehensive concept that has been proposed by China in recent years is certainly the idea of building a "community of shared future for mankind." This aspiration demonstrates a global and integral vocation of international law capable of embracing relations of a new type, towards a multi-polar democratization of international relations, which mark the need for the beginning of a new era.  

Judgment is simple, right? This book begs to differ. Written for all students of the law-from undergraduate to supreme court justice-it opens the reader to a broad landscape of ideas surrounding common law judgment. Short and accessible, it touches upon the many pathways that lead out from the phenomenon of judgment in common law jurisdictions. This book is unique in its brevity and scope. It engages not only with the core operation of judgment as legal decision, but considers questions of authority and reason, and broader issues of interpretation, rhetoric, and judicial improvisation. The aim of this book is not to present a summary of research or a comprehensive 'theory' of judgment, nor is it bounded by the divisions of different legal subjects. Instead, it is a handbook or companion for students of the law to read and return to in their studious journeys across all common law topic areas, providing readers with a robust and open-ended set of tools, combined with selected further readings, to facilitate their own discovery, exploration, and critical analysis of the rich tapestry of common law judgment.

The book provides a comprehensive analysis of the advisory role of the International Court of Justice in light of its jurisprudence and overall contribution over a period of more than 55 years. The author highlights the "organic connection" between UN organs and the Court and the Court 's contribution as one of the UN 's principal organs to the Organisation. The basic argument of this study is that the advisory function should be understood as a two-sided process involving the interplay between UN organs and the ICJ. The request for and the giving of an advisory opinion is a collective coordinated process, involving more than one organ or part of the Organisation.

This Element aims to explore how the relation between societal organisation and legal orders - the question of materiality - has been investigated in philosophy of law. The starting point of the Element is that such relation has often been left invisible or thematised in poor and reductive terms. After having explained the main reasons behind this neglect, the Element provides an overview of the three main approaches to legal philosophy whose contributions, though not always effective, can still provide some insights for a contemporary analysis of legal orders' materiality: materialism, legal institutionalism, and the new materialism. The last section of the Element suggests looking for a footing for the study of materiality in two fields: the metaphysics of relations and the political economy of legal orders.

The scandal of this collection lies not just in its equating law and resistance but also in its consequent revision of those critical, realist, social, and even positivist theories that would constitute law in its dependence on sovereign or society, on some surpassing power, or on the state of the judge's digestion. There is as well a further provocation offered by the collection in that the most marginalized of resistances through law are found to be the most destabilizing of standard paradigms of legal authority. Instances of such seeming marginality explored here include the resistances of colonized and indigenous peoples and resistance pursued through international law. What this 'marginal' focus also reveals is the constituent connection between modernism, imperialism and that legalism produced by the ready reduction of law in terms of sovereign, society and such. In all, the collection makes a radical contribution to social, political and postcolonial theories of law.

What can we say about justice in a pluralist world? Is there some universal justice? Are there universal human rights? What is the function of the state in the modern world? Such are the problems dealt with by the 20th world congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (Amsterdam, June 2001) and published in this book, which is for legal and social philosophers, students of human rights, and political philosophers.

This book develops a sociological understanding of law making in the European Union. In particular, the book focuses on the social function of law in new governance structures promoting decentralized and flexible procedures that encourage deliberation, participation of stakeholders, and public dialogue. It pays attention to both the practical knowledge and the power relations underpinning law making, while seeking to bring to the foreground the importance of compromise in the process. The empirical substantiation of the argument discusses the regulation of technology in the European Union and is premised on case studies of governance of the Internet, patents of high technology, filters used on the Internet to block harmful material, trademark law and domain name dispute resolution by ICANN. To this effect, the book studies the dynamics of constructing a legal argument inside the European Commission, and its role in the process of coordinating the creation of networks, securing enforcement in self regulatory regimes, and steering activity on the part of autonomous groups of actors.

This is an outline of a coherence theory of law. Its basic ideas are: reasonable support and weighing of reasons. All the rest is commentary.

These words at the beginning of the preface of this book perfectly indicate what On Law and Reason is about. It is a theory about the nature of the law which emphasises the role of reason in the law and which refuses to limit the role of reason to the application of deductive logic.

In 1989, when the first edition of On Law and Reason appeared, this book was ground breaking for several reasons. It provided a rationalistic theory of the law in the language of analytic philosophy and based on a thorough understanding of the results, including technical ones, of analytic philosophy. That was not an obvious combination at the time of the book s first appearance and still is not. The result is an analytical rigor that is usually associated with positivist theories of the law, combined with a philosophical position that is not natural law in a strict sense, but which shares with it the emphasis on the role of reason in determining what the law is. If only for this rare combination, On Law and Reason still deserves careful study.

On Law and Reason also foreshadowed and influenced a development in the field of Legal Logic that would take place in the nineties of the 20th century, namely the development of non-monotonic ( defeasible ) logics for the analysis of legal reasoning. In the new Introduction to this second edition, this aspect is explored in some more detail."

Critically engages with theories of the recognition of states under international law. Departs from the restrictive economy of recognition that constantly recreates a paradoxical perception of sovereignty. Of interest to legal and political theorists, as well as scholars and students in international relations.

In a time of disenchantment with democracy, massive social protests and the 'erosion' of the system of checks and balances, this book proposes to reflect upon the main problems of our constitutional democracies from a particular regulative ideal: that of the conversation among equals. It examines the structural character of the current democratic crisis, and the way in which, from its origins, constitutions were built around a 'discomfort with democracy'. In this sense, the book critically explores the creation of different restraints upon majority rule and collective debate: constitutional rights that are presented as limits to (and not, fundamentally, as a product of) democratic debate; an elitist system of judicial review; a checks and balances scheme that discourages, rather than promotes, dialogue between the different branches of power; etc. Finally, the book proposes a dignified constitutional democracy aimed at enabling fraternal conversation within the framework of a community of equals.

This book examines the constitutional history of Transylvania, a region of Central Europe that has experienced a compelling series of historical events and been governed by a variety of ancient, medieval, and modern entities, as well as its own peoples, who from time to time have jointly or separately exercised their right to self-governance. The book’s main goal is to provide, for the first time in English, a comprehensive source for those interested in the variety of states, constitutional and public legal orders which have succeeded one another during Transylvania’s tumultuous history. It serves to underline the region’s uniqueness as a space where (for better or worse) several nationalities, multiple religions and varied cultures have had to find a way to get along, under the pressures of external state and constitutional orders. It seeks to show both the positive and the negative solutions found, which advanced or hindered this goal of organised coexistence.

Comparative constitutional change has recently emerged as a distinct field in the study of constitutional law. It is the study of the way constitutions change through formal and informal mechanisms, including amendment, replacement, total and partial revision, adaptation, interpretation, disuse and revolution. The shift of focus from constitution-making to constitutional change makes sense, since amendment power is the means used to refurbish constitutions in established democracies, enhance their adaptation capacity and boost their efficacy. Adversely, constitutional change is also the basic apparatus used to orchestrate constitutional backslide as the erosion of liberal democracies and democratic regression is increasingly affected through legal channels of constitutional change. Routledge Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Change provides a comprehensive reference tool for all those working in the field and a thorough landscape of all theoretical and practical aspects of the topic. Coherence from this aspect does not suggest a common view, as the chapters address different topics, but reinforces the establishment of comparative constitutional change as a distinct field. The book brings together the most respected scholars working in the field, and presents a genuine contribution to comparative constitutional studies, comparative public law, political science and constitutional history.

Analytical jurisprudence has been mostly silent on the role of precedent in legal adjudication. What is the content of a judge's precedent ideology,or the rule of precedent-recognition, by means of which the ratio of a case is to be distinguished from mere dicta? In this study, the author identifies six types of judicial precedent-ideology, among them judicial legislation, systemic construction of the underlying reasons of law in the Dworkinian sense, and a radical re-evaluation of the merits of a prior case in later adjudication, as envisioned by the American Realists. These competing models are tested against judicial experiences in the UK, US, France, Italy, Germany and Finland. By this means Lon Fuller's famous 'internal morality of law' is shown to function rather poorly in the context of precedents, and the author therefore suggests a redefinition of the rule which makes it work for precedent. This, in turn leads the author to confront fundamental questions about the normative nature of law. Is Kelsen's grundnorm or Hart's ultimate rule of recognition a valid rule, in the image of legal rules proper, or is it merely a social fact, observable only in the practices and behaviour of judges and other officials? The author claims that Hart is caught between Kelsen and J.L. Borges, the late Argentinian fabulist, in so far as the ontology and epistemology of the rule of recognition are concerned. This leads the author to the conclusion that the two predicaments affecting analytical positivism, namely the threat of endless self-referentiality, or infinite regress, can only be accounted for by means of recourse to the philosophy of deconstruction as posited by Jacques Derrida.

Judge Richard A. Posner's work on the economics of public law is a critical component of the interaction between the new law and economics movement and public choice theory. It exemplifies the parallel influence that these two important intellectual movements have had on the current understanding of legal institutions. Together with an insightful introduction by Francesco Parisi, this volume brings together his most important contributions on areas such as: the economics of constitutional law and legislation the economics of criminal law the economics of labour law and employment discrimination the economics of antitrust. The Economics of Public Law will be essential reading for economists, lawyers and judges alike.

This book discusses the relationship between law and memory and explores the ways in which memory can be thought of as contributing to legal socialization and legal meaning-making. Against a backdrop of critical legal pluralism which examines the distributedness of law(s), this book introduces the notion of mnemonic legality. It emphasises memory as a resource of law rather than an object of law, on the basis of how it substantiates senses of belonging and comes to frame inclusions and exclusions from a national community on the basis of linear-trajectory and growth narratives of nationhood. Overall, it explores the sensorial and affective foundations of law, implicating memory and perceptions of belonging within this process of creating legality and legitimacy. By identifying how memory comes to shape and inform notions of law, it contributes to legal consciousness research and to important questions informing much socio-legal research.

This book explores the constitutional, legally binding dimension to legisprudence in the light of the German Federal Constitutional Courts approach to rational lawmaking. Over the last decades this court has been remarkably active in applying legisprudential criteria and standards when reviewing parliamentary laws. It has thus supplied observers with a unique material to analyse the lawmakers' duty to legislate rationally, and to assess the virtues and drawbacks of this strand of judicial control in a constitutional democracy. By bringing together legislation experts and public law scholars to elaborate on 'legisprudence under review', this contributed volume aspires to shed light on the constitutionalisation of rational lawmaking as a controversial trend gaining ground in both national and international jurisdictions. The book is divided into five parts. Part I frames the two key issues pervading the whole collection: the intricate relationship between judicial review and democracy, on the one hand, and the possibility of improving and rationalizing the task of legislation under the current circumstances of politics, on the other. Part II provides an overview of the judicial review of rational lawmaking, laying special emphasis on the duty of legislative justification imposed on lawmakers by the German Constitutional Court. Part III is devoted to the review of the systemic rationality of legislation, in particular to the requirements of legislative consistence and coherence as developed by this court. Contributions in Part IV revolve around the judicial scrutiny of the socio-empirical elements of rational lawmaking, with the control of legislative facts and impacts and the problem of symbolic laws being the central topics. Finally, Part V draws on the German case law to discuss the links between rational lawmaking, balancing and proportionality, and the interdependence between process review and substantive review of legislation.

Liberal concepts of democracy envision courts as key institutions for the promotion and protection of democratic regimes. Yet social science scholarship suggests that courts are fundamentally constrained in ways that undermine their ability to do so. Recognizing these constraints, this book argues that courts can influence regime instability by affecting inter-elite conflict. They do so in three ways: by helping leaders credibly reveal their rationales for policy choices that may appear to violate legal rules; by encouraging leaders to less frequently make decisions that raise concerns about rule violations; and by encouraging the opposition to accept potential rule violations. Courts promote the prudent use of power in each of these approaches. This book evaluates the implications of this argument using a century of global data tracking judicial politics and democratic survival.

The legal essays by Michael Bayles in this collection display his commitment to utilitarianism both as a moral theory and an analytical device. A utilitarian must choose between the best of all possible alternatives and so must lay out the alternatives and thus their consequences carefully and completely. As it happens, there is no better way of understanding why something is as it is in the law, and no better way to lay the foundations for criticism and improvement, than to lay out what the alternatives are, carefully distinguishing them, their justifications, and their implications for changing other areas of the law and for changing our relation to the law. Bayles was a master at such work, and each essay thus repays careful study for anyone concerned about the law. The essays cover a wide variety of topics, from contract law to the criminal law, from torts to theory, and form a natural set. Laying out the alternatives in one area makes it much clearer how and why alternatives in other areas are acceptable or required. Interconnections within the legal system as a whole not readily visible when studying one area of the law become obvious when several are laid out side-by-side using the analytical skill required by a good utilitarian.

Countries undergoing or recovering from conflict and authoritarianism often face profound rule of law challenges. The law on the statute books may be repressive, judicial independence may be compromised, and criminal justice agencies may be captured by powerful interests. How do lawyers working within such settings imagine the law? How do they understand their ethical obligations towards their clients and the rule of law? What factors motivate them to use their legal practice and social capital to challenge repressive power? What challenges and risks can they face if they do so? And when do lawyers facilitate or acquiesce to illegality and injustice? Drawing on over 130 interviews from Cambodia, Chile, Israel, Palestine, South Africa, and Tunisia, this book explores the extent to which theoretical understandings within law and society research on the motivations, strategies, tactics, and experiences of lawyers within democratic states apply to these more challenging environments.

In 1788 John Adams created a sublime ambition for all nations - 'a government of laws and not of men'. In the intervening years we have come to learn that legislation itself works through the interpretations of the many men and women who work on the inside and the outside of the law. Effective regulation thus depends not only on scrupulous legal analysis, with its appeal to precedent, conceptual clarity and argumentation, but also on sound empirical research, which often reveals diversity in implementation, enforcement and observance of the law in practice. In this outstanding, worldly-wise book Leeuw and Schmeets demonstrate how to bridge the gap between the letter and the delivery of the law. It is packed with examples, cases and illustrations that will have international appeal. I recommend it to students and practitioners engaged across all domains of legislation and regulation.' - Ray Pawson, University of Leeds, UK Empirical Legal Research describes how to investigate the roles of legislation, regulation, legal policies and other legal arrangements at play in society. It is invaluable as a guide to legal scholars, practitioners and students on how to do empirical legal research, covering history, methods, evidence, growth of knowledge and links with normativity. This multidisciplinary approach combines insights and approaches from different social sciences, evaluation studies, Big Data analytics and empirically informed ethics. The authors present an overview of the roots of this blossoming interdisciplinary domain, going back to legal realism, the fields of law, economics and the social sciences, and also to civilology and evaluation studies. The book addresses not only data analysis and statistics, but also how to formulate adequate research problems, to use (and test) different types of theories (explanatory and intervention theories) and to apply new forms of literature research to the field of law such as the systematic, rapid and realist reviews and synthesis studies. The choice and architecture of research designs, the collection of data, including Big Data, and how to analyze and visualize data are also covered. The book discusses the tensions between the normative character of law and legal issues and the descriptive and causal character of empirical legal research, and suggests ways to help handle this seeming disconnect. This comprehensive guide is vital reading for law practitioners as well as for students and researchers dealing with regulation, legislation and other legal arrangements.