"Nothing is more curiously enquired after . . . than the causes of every phenomenon. . . . We] push on our enquiries, till we arrive at the original and ultimate principle. . . . This is our aim in all our studies and reflections."
These words sum up David Hume's plan: To discover the fundamental principles at work in the nature and extent of human knowledge, and in so doing to gain a clearer understanding of our perception, ideas (e.g. of cause and effect), impressions, beliefs, passions, virtues, and vices. Hume's piercing critique and relentless analysis make this truly one of the most influential works of the Early Modern period.

Once the stuff of science fiction, recent progress in artificial intelligence, robotics, and machine learning means that these rapidly advancing technologies are finally coming into widespread use within everyday life. Such rapid development in these areas also brings with it a host of social, political and legal issues, as well as a rise in public concern and academic interest in the ethical challenges these new technologies pose. This volume is a collection of scholarly work from leading figures in the development of both robot ethics and machine ethics; it includes essays of historical significance which have become foundational for research in these two new areas of study, as well as important recent articles. The research articles selected focus on the control and governance of computational systems; the exploration of ethical and moral theories using software and robots as laboratories or simulations; inquiry into the necessary requirements for moral agency and the basis and boundaries of rights; and questions of how best to design systems that are both useful and morally sound. Collectively the articles ask what the practical ethical and legal issues, arising from the development of robots, will be over the next twenty years and how best to address these future considerations.

In recent years, there has been a substantial increase in concern for the rule of law. Not only have there been a multitude of articles and books on the essence, nature, scope and limitation of the law, but citizens, elected officials, law enforcement officers and the judiciary have all been actively engaged in this debate. Thus, the concept of the rule of law is as multifaceted and contested as it's ever been, and this book explores the essence of that concept, including its core principles, its rules, and the necessity of defining, or even redefining, the basic concept.

"Law, Liberty, and the Rule of Law" offers timely and unique insights on numerous themes relevant to the rule of law. It discusses in detail the proper scope and limitations of adjudication and legislation, including the challenges not only of limiting legislative and executive power via judicial review but also of restraining active judicial lawmaking while simultaneously guaranteeing an independent judiciary interested in maintaining a balance of power. It also addresses the relationship not only between the rule of law, human rights and separation of powers but also the rule of law, constitutionalism and democracy.

This volume provides a critical roadmap through the major historical sources of legal semiotics as we know them today. The history of legal semiotics, now at least a century old, has never been written (a non-event itself pregnant with semiotic possibility). As a consequence, its sources are seldom clearly exposed and, as word, object and meaning change, are sometimes lost. They reach from an English translation of the 1916 inaugural lecture of the first Chair in Legal Significs at the Amsterdam University, via mid 20th century studies on "property" or "contract," to equally fascinating essays on contemporary semiotic problems produced by former students of the Roberta Kevelson Semiotics Roundtable Seminar at Penn State University 2012 and 2013. Together, the materials in this book weave the fabric of semiotics and significs, two names for the unfolding of semiotics in law and legal discourse at least until the second half of the 20th century, and both of which covered a lawyer's focus on sign and meaning in law. The latter is embedded within the cultural imperatives of the civilization that gave these terms meaning and made them an effective tool for the dissection of law, its reconstitution as an instrument to be used by the lawyer to advance the interests of her clients, and for judges as a means to restructure language as a narrative of law whose power could bend behavior to its strictures. Legal semiotics has become an indispensible part of the elite lawyer's toolkit and a fundamental approach to analysis of legal texts. Two previous volumes published in 2011 and 2012 explored the conceptual, methodological and epistemological progress in the field of legal semiotics, the modern forms of semiotics study, and the mechanics of meaning making processes by lawyers. Yet the great lessons of semiotics requires a focus on the origins of the concepts and frameworks that would become contemporary legal semiotics, its origins as an object of the consciousness of meaning making-one whose roots, as lessons for the oracular conversations of law, are expanded in this volume.

This book is an updated and revised edition of Fundamentals of Legal Argumentation published in 1999. It discusses new developments that have taken place in the past 15 years in research of legal argumentation, legal justification and legal interpretation, as well as the implications of these new developments for the theory of legal argumentation. Almost every chapter has been revised and updated, and the chapters include discussions of recent studies, major additions on topical issues, new perspectives, and new developments in several theoretical areas. Examples of these additions are discussions of recent developments in such areas as Habermas' theory, MacCormick's theory, Alexy's theory, Artificial Intelligence and law, and the pragma-dialectical theory of legal argumentation. Furthermore it provides an extensive and systematic overview of approaches and studies of legal argumentation in the context of legal justification in various legal systems and countries that have been important for the development of research of legal argumentation. The book contains a discussion of influential theories that conceive the law and legal justification as argumentative activity. From different disciplinary and theoretical angles it addresses such topics as the institutional characteristics of the law and the relation between general standards for moral discussions and legal standards such as the Rule of Law. It discusses patterns of legal justification in the context of different types of problems in the application of the law and it describes rules for rational legal discussions. The combination of the sound basis of the first edition and the discussions of new developments make this new edition an up-to-date and comprehensive survey of the various theoretical influences which have informed the study of legal argumentation. It discusses salient backgrounds to this field as well as major approaches and trends in the contemporary research. It surveys the relevant theoretical factors both from various continental law traditions and common law countries.

PATRICKNERHOT Since the two operations overlap each other so much, speaking about fact and interpretation in legal science separately would undoubtedly be highly artificial. To speak about fact in law already brings in the operation we call interpretation. EquaHy, to speak about interpretation is to deal with the method of identifying reality and therefore, in large part, to enter the area of the question of fact. By way of example, Bemard Jackson's text, which we have placed in section 11 of the first part of this volume, could no doubt just as weH have found a horne in section I. This work is aimed at analyzing this interpretation of the operation of identifying fact on the one hand and identifying the meaning of a text on the other. All philosophies of law recognize themselves in the analysis they propose for this interpretation, and we too shall seek in this volume to fumish a few elements of use for this analysis. We wish however to make it clear that our endeavour is addressed not only to legal philosophers: the nature of the interpretive act in legal science is a matter of interest to the legal practitioner too. He will find in these pages, we believe, elements that will serve hirn in rcflcction on his daily work.

This book explores critical questions pertaining to the character and content of the "American People" as posited in the US Supreme Court's interpretation of the fundamental law. What exactly is an American? Who or what comprise the People? What are the constitutive sociocultural, political, and economic ordering principles of the American People and society? How does the Court impact the nationalist character and content of law and policy? From a sociocultural, economic, political, and ideological perspective, the Court's singular proclamations as to what the US Constitution means, what is its purpose, and how it is to be perceived and implemented have profound consequences for representational politics and notions of what exactly constitutes the American polity. This book employs a critical, conceptual, and structural approach, critically examining the notion of the People in constitutional discourse, and its impact on government, politics, law, and society in the present.

THE CONSCIENCE OF JUDGES AND APPLICA nON OF LEGAL RULES The book is devoted to the problem of the influence of moral judgements on the result of judicial decision-making in the process of application of the established (positive) law. It is the conscience of judges that takes the central place in the research. Conscience is understood in the meaning developed in the theory of Thomas Aquinas as the complex capacity of the human being to make moral judgements which represent acts of reason on the question of what is right or wrong in a particular situation. The reason why we need a theory of conscience in making judicial decisions lies in the nature of the positive law itself. On the one hand, there is an intrinsic conflict between the law as the body of rigid rules and the law as an living experience of those who are involved in social relationships. This conflict particularly finds its expression in the collision of strict justice and equity. The idea of equity does not reject the importance of rules in legal life. What is rejected is an idolatrous attitude to the rules when the uniqueness of a human being, his well being and happiness are disregarded and sacrificed in order to fulfil the observance of the rules. The rules themselves are neither good or bad. What makes them good or bad is their application."

Jeffrie G. Murphy's third collection of essays further pursues the topics of punishment and retribution that were explored in his two previous collections: Retribution, Justice and Therapy and Retribution Reconsidered. Murphy now explores these topics in the light of reflections on issues that are normally associated with religion: forgiveness, mercy, and repentance. He also explores the general issue of theory and practice and discusses a variety of topics in applied ethics - e.g., freedom of artistic expression, the morality of gambling, and the value of forgiveness in psychological counseling. As always, his perspective may be described as Kantian; and, indeed, this collection contains the first extended piece of Kant scholarship that he has done in years: a long essay on Kant on theory and practice.

With contributions from world-class specialists this first book-length work looks at translation issues in forensic linguistics, where accuracy and cultural understandings play a prominent part in the legal process.

This book is a revised and extended version of my PhD Thesis 'Logical Tools for Modelling Legal Argument', which I defended on 14 January 1993 at the Free University Amsterdam. The first five chapters of the thesis have remained almost completely unchanged but the other chapters have undergone considerable revision and expansion. Most importantly, I have replaced the formal argument-based system of the old Chapters 6, 7 and 8 with a revised and extended system, whieh I have developed during the last three years in collaboration with Giovanni Sartor. Apart from some technical improvements, the main additions to the old system are the enriehment of its language with a nonprovability operator, and the ability to formalise reasoning about preference criteria. Moreover, the new system has a very intuitive dialectieal form, as opposed to the rather unintuitive fixed-point appearance of the old system. Another important revision is the split of the old Chapter 9 into two new chapters. The old Section 9. 1 on related research has been updated and expanded into a whole chapter, while the rest of the old chapter is now in revised form in Chapter 10. This chapter also contains two new contributions, a detailed discussion of Gordon's Pleadings Game, and a general description of a multi-Iayered overall view on the structure of argu mentation, comprising a logieal, dialectical, procedural and strategie layer. Finally, in the revised conclusion I have paid more attention to the relevance of my investigations for legal philosophy and argumentation theory."

This volume examines the property transformations in post-communist Central Eastern Europe (CEE) and focuses on the role of restitution and privatisation in such transformations. It argues that the theorisation of 'restitution' in post-communist CEE is incomplete in the transitional justice scholarship and in the literature on correction of historical wrongs. The book also argues that, for a more complete theorisation of (post-communist) restitution, the transformations of property in post-communist societies ought to be studied in a more holistic way. The main legal vehicles used for such transformations, privatisation and restitution, should not be studied separately and in abstract, but in their reciprocal relationship, and in connection to the dimension of justice which each could achieve. Finally, the book integrates 'privatisation' in a theory of post-communist transformation of property.

Spontaneous Order, Organization and the Law contains contributions by renowned lawyers from all over the World, to honor one of our time's most significant private law scholars, Ernst-Joachim Mestmacker, Director (emeritus) of the Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and International Private Law in Hamburg, on the occasion of his 75th Anniversary. The papers presented at an academic symposium to celebrate the occasion are included in the Annex. The contributions cover a wide spectrum of subjects, ranging from theoretical questions of hybrid governance across national jurisdictions, the changing role of the state, competition as a basic element of the social market economy, and international economic relations in the twenty-first century, to regulatory reform of European telecommunications, the public spirit of the corporation, venture capital funding for biotech pharmaceutical companies, and other questions of corporate law, competition law, civil law and constitutional law, arising in Europe, the US, Japan and Israel.

This book describes the origins of the concept of liberty in the legal and political thought of Rome, Italy, England, France and the United States of America. Professor Sellers traces the development of liberty and republican government over two centuries of European history, in association with liberal ideas. This study reveals republicanism as the parent of liberalism in modern law and politics, and demonstrates the continuing value of republican ideas in securing the liberty of contemporary states and their citizens.

"English Version: Anspruch und Rechtfertigung (Appeal and Justification)" develops a phenomenological theory of judgments on legitimacy. It undertakes a first systematic investigation of the structures in consciousness which enable the process of justification to unfold. The overall question is how the claim for legitimacy, inherent in both epistemological and ethical judgments, can be understood as a fundamental character of experience. The thesis that this book offers follows along the lines of a genetic answer to this question. It traces the characteristic of legitimation back to an originary appeal to which consciousness is exposed by experience. Legitimizing structures are thus to be understood as a predicative answer to this prepredicative appeal.This book investigates both the epistemological and the ethical fields, working mainly with Husserl's genetic theory in "Experience and Judgement". It offers a new and comprehensive reading of Husserl's ethics and a critical dialogue with Levinas' ethics of alterity and Apels' discourse ethics."German Version: Anspruch und Rechtfertigung" entwickelt eine phanomenologische Theorie des 'rechtlichen Denkens'.Dabei handelt es sich um eine erste systematische Untersuchung derjenigen Bewusstseinsstrukturen, die ein Begrunden, Ausweisen und Rechtfertigen uberhaupt erst ermoglichen. Die grundlegende Frage ist, wie Rechtsanspruche, die sowohl erkenntnistheoretischen als auch ethischen Urteilen inharent sind, als ein Grundmerkmal des Erfahrens verstanden werden konnen. Die vorliegende These gibt eine genetische Antwort auf diese Frage. Sie fuhrt den Rechtscharakter im Denken auf einen ursprunglichen Anspruch zuruck, dem Bewusstsein im Erfahren immer schon ausgesetzt ist.Rechtliche Strukturen mussen daher als eine pradikative Antwort auf ein vorpradikatives Angesprochen-Sein begriffen werden. Das vorliegende Buch untersucht sowohl den ethischen als auch den erkenntnistheoretischen Bereich, wobei Husserls genetische Phanomenologie in Erfahrung und Urteil den methodischen Hintergrund bildet. Es bietet ausserdem eine neue und umfassende Lekture von Husserls Schriften zur Ethik, sowie einen kritischen Dialog mit der Alteritatsethik von Levinas und der Diskursethik Apels.

The essays in this book treat important aspects of most of the major themes in contemporary philosophy of law and legal theory. All reveal the distinctive authenticity of the author's work, for he is not only a reputable legal theorist but an internationally known scholar of private law, and for many years chair of the Bielefelder Kreis, an international group of legal theorists who have jointly authored major works comparing methodologies of statutory interpretation and precedent.

This book offers the first theoretical approach to rules of evidence and the practice of judicial proof in China written in English by a Chinese professor. As Prof. He's first representative work, based on over three decades of studying and researching evidence law, it clarifies concepts relevant to evidence law, highlights the value of studying evidence law, re-examines the domain of presumption, reviews central problems in obtaining evidence, and discusses the reasons for misjudged cases. In brief, the book not only presents all major aspects of Chinese rules of evidence in criminal justice, but also introduces readers to the latest developments from a global perspective.

During the last half of the twentieth century, legal philosophy (or legal theory or jurisprudence) has grown significantly. It is no longer the domain of a few isolated scholars in law and philosophy. Hundreds of scholars from diverse fields attend international meetings on the subject. In some universities, large lecture courses of five hundred students or more study it. The primary aim of the Law and Philosophy Library is to present some of the best original work on legal philosophy from both the Anglo-American and European traditions. Not only does it help make some of the best work available to an international audience, but it also encourages increased aware ness of, and interaction between, the two major traditions. The primary focus is on full-length scholarly monographs, although some edited volumes of original papers are also included. The Library editors are assisted by an Editorial Advisory Board of internationally renowned scholars. Legal philosophy should not be considered a narrowly circumscribed field. Insights into law and legal institutions can come from diverse disciplines on a wide range of topics. Among the relevant disciplines or perspectives contributing to legal philosophy, besides law and philosophy, are anthropol ogy, economics, political science, and sociology. Among the topics included in legal philosophy are theories of law; the concepts of law and legal institu tions; legal reasoning and adjudication; epistemological issues of evidence and procedure; law and justice, economics, politics, or morality; legal ethics; and theories of legal fields such as criminal law, contracts, and property."

The claim once made by philosophers of unique knowledge of the essence of humanity and society has fallen into disrepute. Neither Platonic forms, divine revelation nor metaphysical truth can serve as the ground for legitimating social and political norms. On the political level many seem to agree that democracy doesn't need foundations. Nor are its citizens expected to discuss the worth of their comprehensive conceptions of the good life. According to Rawls, for example, we have to accept that "politics in a democratic society can never be guided by what we see as the whole truth (...)." (1993: 243) And yet we still call upon truth when we participate in defining the basic structure our society and argue why our opinions, beliefs and preferences need to be taken seriously. We do not think that our views need to be taken into account by others because they are our views, but because we think they are true. If in a democratic society citizens have to deal with the challenge of affirming their claims as true, we need to analyse the precise relationship between truth and democracy. Does truth matter to democracy and if so, what is the place of truth in democratic politics? How can citizens affirm the truth of their claims and accept - at the same time - that their truth is just one amongst many? Our book centers on the role of the public sphere in these pressing questions. It tries to give a comprehensive answer to these questions from the perspective of the main approaches of contemporary democratic theory: deliberative democracy, political pragmatism and liberalism. A confrontation of these approaches, will result in a more encompassing philosophical understanding of our plural democracy, which - in this era of globalization - is more complex than ever before.

Because a good understanding of the function, meaning and shortcomings of the public sphere is essential to answering these questions, a good deal of the book addresses these issues. Historically, after all, the idea that citizens have to engage each other in discussion in order to determine the structure and goals of society, is connected to the rational ideal of a public sphere where conflicting views can be expressed, formed, and transformed. But hasn't the collective decision making in which everyone participates on an equal footing turned out to be a deceptive ideal or a simple illusion? Not every individual in society has equal access to the podium. Furthermore, power, being an inevitable feature of the public sphere, seems to permanently endanger its democratic value. Moreover, the existence of this sphere depends on a specific ethos and particular public spaces where citizens are called upon to present themselves as citizens, as people taking responsibility for their society. It is not clear whether this ethos and these spaces exist at all, and if so, if they preserved their ascribed capacity for constituting 'democratic' truth? By answering these questions we expect to deepen our understanding of the relation between truth and democracy.

This book provides a theoretical framework for explaining the choices made by international decision-makers in terms of what constitutes law. It comprehensively analyzes the practice of human rights courts in applying legal instruments outside their competence and proposes that this practice recognizes that different normative instruments coexist in an un-ordered space, and that meaning can be produced by the free interaction of those instruments around a problem. Based on this, the book advances its normative plurality hypothesis, which states that decision-makers must survey the acquis of international law in order to identify all the instruments containing relevant normative information for a particular situation. The set of rules of law applicable to the situation must then be complemented with other instruments containing specific normative information relevant to the situation, resulting in a complete system of norms advancing a common purpose.

How should judges and legislators address challenges arising at the frontiers of biomedicine? What if it became possible to edit the DNA of embryos for enhanced traits, gestate a fetus in an artificial womb, self-modify brain implants to provide new skills or bring a frozen human back to life? This book presents an innovative legal theory and applies it to future developments in biomedicine. This legal theory reconceptualises the role of legal officials in terms of moral principle and contextual constraints: 'contextual legal idealism'. It is applied by asking how a political leader or appeal court judge could address technological developments for which the current law of England and Wales would be ill-equipped to respond. The book's central thesis is that the regulation of human conduct requires moral reasoning directed to the context in which it operates. The link between abstract theory and practical application is articulated using future developments within four areas of biomedicine. Developments in heritable genome editing and cybernetic biohacking are addressed using Explanatory Notes to hypothetical UK Parliamentary Bills. Developments in ectogestation and cryonic reanimation are addressed using hypothetical appeal court judgments. The book will be of great interest to scholars and students of medical/health law, criminal law, bioethics, biolaw, legal theory and moral philosophy.

This multi-disciplinary, multi-jurisdictional collection offers the first ever full-scale analysis of legal fictions. Its focus is on fictions in legal practice, examining and evaluating their roles in a variety of different areas of practice (e.g. in Tort Law, Criminal Law and Intellectual Property Law) and in different times and places (e.g. in Roman Law, Rabbinic Law and the Common Law). The collection approaches the topic in part through the discussion of certain key classical statements by theorists including Jeremy Bentham, Alf Ross, Hans Vaihinger, Hans Kelsen and Lon Fuller. The collection opens with the first-ever translation into English of Kelsen's review of Vaihinger's As If. The 17 chapters are divided into four parts: 1) a discussion of the principal theories of fictions, as above, with a focus on Kelsen, Bentham, Fuller and classical pragmatism; 2) a discussion of the relationship between fictions and language; 3) a theoretical and historical examination and evaluation of fictions in the common law; and 4) an account of fictions in different practice areas and in different legal cultures. The collection will be of interest to theorists and historians of legal reasoning, as well as scholars and practitioners of the law more generally, in both common and civil law traditions.

"Law and Transcendence" examines and develops the philosophy of British Philosopher Gillian Rose. By putting Roses thought into critical dialogue with contemporary philosophers and religious thinkers, the author demonstrates the continuing importance of her work and the importance of critical engagement between philosophy and religious thought.""

'A leading figure in critical legal studies and renowned scholar of comparative constitutionalism, Frankenberg urges us forward, offering a new taxonomy for critical work. He illustrates its potential in terrific chapters on recent transnational legal movements: to regulate the veil, provide access to justice and reinvigorate human rights as a language of justification. A methodological tour de force.' - David Kennedy, Harvard University 'One of the most courageous and intellectually earnest legal scholars of our time, Gunter Frankenberg, has devoted his efforts to reconstructing comparative law's internal strength and potential for critical analysis. This book is a masterpiece that should be read by every serious thinker concerned with the need for legal reforms and the politics of globalization.' - Pier Giuseppe Monateri, University of Turin, Italy Presenting a critique of conventional methods in comparative law, this book argues that, for comparative law to qualify as a discipline, comparatists must reflect on how and why they make comparisons. Gunter Frankenberg discusses not only methods and theories but also the ethical implications and the politics of comparative law in order to bring out the different dimensions of the discipline. Comparative Law as Critique offers various approaches that turn on the academic discourse of comparative law, including analysis of a widespread spirit of innocence in terms of method, and critique of human rights narratives. It also analyses how courts negotiate differences between cases regarding Muslim veiling. Gunter Frankenberg presents varied critical projects that discuss methods and theories, ethics and the politics of comparative law to bring out the different dimensions of the discipline. The incisive critiques and comparisons in this book will make essential reading for comparatists working in legal education and research as well as students of comparative law and scholars in comparative anthropology and social sciences.