This volume brings together papers that offer conceptual analyses, highlight issues, propose solutions, and discuss practices regarding privacy and data protection. The first section of the book provides an overview of developments in data protection in different parts of the world. The second section focuses on one of the most captivating innovations of the data protection package: how to forget, and the right to be forgotten in a digital world. The third section presents studies on a recurring, and still important and much disputed, theme of the Computers, Privacy and Data Protection (CPDP) conferences : the surveillance, control and steering of individuals and groups of people and the increasing number of performing tools (data mining, profiling, convergence) to achieve those objectives. This part is illustrated by examples from the domain of law enforcement and smart surveillance. The book concludes with five chapters that advance our understanding of the changing nature of privacy (concerns) and data protection.

What is fair? How and when can punishment be legitimate? Is there recompense for human suffering? How can we understand ideas about immortality or an afterlife in the context of critical thinking on the human condition? In this book L. E. Goodman presents the first general theory of justice in this century to make systematic use of the Jewish sources and to bring them into a philosophical dialogue with the leading ethical and political texts of the Western tradition. Goodman takes an ontological approach to questions of natural and human justice, developing a theory of community and of nonvindictive yet retributive punishment that is grounded in careful analysis of various Jewish sources-biblical, rabbinic, and philosophical, His exegesis of these sources allow Plato, Kant, and Rawls to join in a discourse with Spinoza and medieval rationalists, such as Saasidah and Maimonides, who speak in a very different idiom but address many of the same themes. Drawing on sources old and new, Jewish and non-Jewish, Goodman offers fresh perspectives on important moral and theological issues that will be of interest to both Jewish and secular philosophers.

This book deals with a central problem throughout the legal profession -a solution to the problem is sought and reached in some basic form. At the centre of this prob lematic is the question indicated by the title: "What is the nature of "discovery" in legal decision-making?" In the final chapter that problem and the solution reached will be seen to have ramifications throughout the entire field of legal practice and theory. However, the focus of the argument is maintained first to specify adequately the particular manifestation of the problem in a variety of legal fields and secondly to arrive at a precise basic solution to this range of problems. The presentation of the solution is not dictated by the norms of clarity and coherence, but by the dynam ics of the struggle to reach the solution and by aspects of the problem available to various sub-groups within the legal profession -theorists, judges, arbitrators. So, I begin from a relatively familiar zone, discussions of discovery in legal theory before moving to more unfamiliar territory. This book is not a thorough survey of problems and writings on discovery. Rather, the strategic selection of problems and assessment of solutions across the first four chapters represents four aspects of the problem. Those chapters invite the reader to rise to the sense of occurrence of a single problem in a variety of contexts."

The concept of learning to 'think like a lawyer' is one of the cornerstones of legal education in the United States and beyond. In this book, Jeffrey Lipshaw provides a critique of the traditional views of 'thinking like a lawyer' or 'pure lawyering' aimed at lawyers, law professors, and students who want to understand lawyering beyond the traditional warrior metaphor. Drawing on his extensive experience at the intersection of real world law and business issues, Professor Lipshaw presents a sophisticated philosophical argument that the "pure lawyering" of traditional legal education is agnostic to either truth or moral value of outcomes. He demonstrates pure lawyering's potential both for illusions of certainty and cynical instrumentalism, and the consequences of both when lawyers are called on as dealmakers, policymakers, and counsellors. This book offers an avenue for getting beyond (or unlearning) merely how to think like a lawyer. It combines legal theory, philosophy of knowledge, and doctrine with an appreciation of real-life judgment calls that multi-disciplinary lawyers are called upon to make. The book will be of great interest to scholars of legal education, legal language and reasoning as well as professors who teach both doctrine and thinking and writing skills in the first year law school curriculum; and for anyone who is interested in seeking a perspective on 'thinking like a lawyer' beyond the litigation arena.

Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest, among both philosophers, legal scholars, and military experts, on the ethics of war. Due in part due to post 9/11 events, this resurgence is also due to a growing theoretical sophistication among scholars in this area. Recently there has been very influential work published on the justificaton of killing in self-defense and war, and the topic of the ethics of war is now more important than ever as a discrete field. The 28 commissioned chapters in this Handbook will present a comprehensive overview of the field as well as make significant and novel contributions, and collectively they will set the terms of the debate for the next decade. Lazar and Frowe will invite the leading scholars in the field to write on topics that are new to them, making the volume a compilation of fresh ideas rather than a rehash of earlier work. The volume will be dicided into five sections: Method, History, Resort, Conduct, and Aftermath. The contributors will be a mix of junior and senior figures, and will include well known scholars like Michael Walzer, Jeff McMahan, and David Rodin.

THE CONSCIENCE OF JUDGES AND APPLICA nON OF LEGAL RULES The book is devoted to the problem of the influence of moral judgements on the result of judicial decision-making in the process of application of the established (positive) law. It is the conscience of judges that takes the central place in the research. Conscience is understood in the meaning developed in the theory of Thomas Aquinas as the complex capacity of the human being to make moral judgements which represent acts of reason on the question of what is right or wrong in a particular situation. The reason why we need a theory of conscience in making judicial decisions lies in the nature of the positive law itself. On the one hand, there is an intrinsic conflict between the law as the body of rigid rules and the law as an living experience of those who are involved in social relationships. This conflict particularly finds its expression in the collision of strict justice and equity. The idea of equity does not reject the importance of rules in legal life. What is rejected is an idolatrous attitude to the rules when the uniqueness of a human being, his well being and happiness are disregarded and sacrificed in order to fulfil the observance of the rules. The rules themselves are neither good or bad. What makes them good or bad is their application."

This volume provides a critical roadmap through the major historical sources of legal semiotics as we know them today. The history of legal semiotics, now at least a century old, has never been written (a non-event itself pregnant with semiotic possibility). As a consequence, its sources are seldom clearly exposed and, as word, object and meaning change, are sometimes lost. They reach from an English translation of the 1916 inaugural lecture of the first Chair in Legal Significs at the Amsterdam University, via mid 20th century studies on "property" or "contract," to equally fascinating essays on contemporary semiotic problems produced by former students of the Roberta Kevelson Semiotics Roundtable Seminar at Penn State University 2012 and 2013. Together, the materials in this book weave the fabric of semiotics and significs, two names for the unfolding of semiotics in law and legal discourse at least until the second half of the 20th century, and both of which covered a lawyer's focus on sign and meaning in law. The latter is embedded within the cultural imperatives of the civilization that gave these terms meaning and made them an effective tool for the dissection of law, its reconstitution as an instrument to be used by the lawyer to advance the interests of her clients, and for judges as a means to restructure language as a narrative of law whose power could bend behavior to its strictures. Legal semiotics has become an indispensible part of the elite lawyer's toolkit and a fundamental approach to analysis of legal texts. Two previous volumes published in 2011 and 2012 explored the conceptual, methodological and epistemological progress in the field of legal semiotics, the modern forms of semiotics study, and the mechanics of meaning making processes by lawyers. Yet the great lessons of semiotics requires a focus on the origins of the concepts and frameworks that would become contemporary legal semiotics, its origins as an object of the consciousness of meaning making-one whose roots, as lessons for the oracular conversations of law, are expanded in this volume.

With contributions from world-class specialists this first book-length work looks at translation issues in forensic linguistics, where accuracy and cultural understandings play a prominent part in the legal process.

PATRICKNERHOT Since the two operations overlap each other so much, speaking about fact and interpretation in legal science separately would undoubtedly be highly artificial. To speak about fact in law already brings in the operation we call interpretation. EquaHy, to speak about interpretation is to deal with the method of identifying reality and therefore, in large part, to enter the area of the question of fact. By way of example, Bemard Jackson's text, which we have placed in section 11 of the first part of this volume, could no doubt just as weH have found a horne in section I. This work is aimed at analyzing this interpretation of the operation of identifying fact on the one hand and identifying the meaning of a text on the other. All philosophies of law recognize themselves in the analysis they propose for this interpretation, and we too shall seek in this volume to fumish a few elements of use for this analysis. We wish however to make it clear that our endeavour is addressed not only to legal philosophers: the nature of the interpretive act in legal science is a matter of interest to the legal practitioner too. He will find in these pages, we believe, elements that will serve hirn in rcflcction on his daily work.

Jeffrie G. Murphy's third collection of essays further pursues the topics of punishment and retribution that were explored in his two previous collections: Retribution, Justice and Therapy and Retribution Reconsidered. Murphy now explores these topics in the light of reflections on issues that are normally associated with religion: forgiveness, mercy, and repentance. He also explores the general issue of theory and practice and discusses a variety of topics in applied ethics - e.g., freedom of artistic expression, the morality of gambling, and the value of forgiveness in psychological counseling. As always, his perspective may be described as Kantian; and, indeed, this collection contains the first extended piece of Kant scholarship that he has done in years: a long essay on Kant on theory and practice.

In his introduction to these closely linked essays Professor Hart offers both an exposition and a critical assessment of some central issues in jurisprudence and political theory. Some of the essays touch on themes to which little attention has been paid, such as Bentham's identification of the forms of mysitification protecting the law from criticism; his relation to Beccaria; and his conversion to democratic radicalism and a passionate admiration for the United States.

This volume examines the property transformations in post-communist Central Eastern Europe (CEE) and focuses on the role of restitution and privatisation in such transformations. It argues that the theorisation of 'restitution' in post-communist CEE is incomplete in the transitional justice scholarship and in the literature on correction of historical wrongs. The book also argues that, for a more complete theorisation of (post-communist) restitution, the transformations of property in post-communist societies ought to be studied in a more holistic way. The main legal vehicles used for such transformations, privatisation and restitution, should not be studied separately and in abstract, but in their reciprocal relationship, and in connection to the dimension of justice which each could achieve. Finally, the book integrates 'privatisation' in a theory of post-communist transformation of property.

In recent years, there has been a substantial increase in concern for the rule of law. Not only have there been a multitude of articles and books on the essence, nature, scope and limitation of the law, but citizens, elected officials, law enforcement officers and the judiciary have all been actively engaged in this debate. Thus, the concept of the rule of law is as multifaceted and contested as it's ever been, and this book explores the essence of that concept, including its core principles, its rules, and the necessity of defining, or even redefining, the basic concept.

"Law, Liberty, and the Rule of Law" offers timely and unique insights on numerous themes relevant to the rule of law. It discusses in detail the proper scope and limitations of adjudication and legislation, including the challenges not only of limiting legislative and executive power via judicial review but also of restraining active judicial lawmaking while simultaneously guaranteeing an independent judiciary interested in maintaining a balance of power. It also addresses the relationship not only between the rule of law, human rights and separation of powers but also the rule of law, constitutionalism and democracy.

This book is a revised and extended version of my PhD Thesis 'Logical Tools for Modelling Legal Argument', which I defended on 14 January 1993 at the Free University Amsterdam. The first five chapters of the thesis have remained almost completely unchanged but the other chapters have undergone considerable revision and expansion. Most importantly, I have replaced the formal argument-based system of the old Chapters 6, 7 and 8 with a revised and extended system, whieh I have developed during the last three years in collaboration with Giovanni Sartor. Apart from some technical improvements, the main additions to the old system are the enriehment of its language with a nonprovability operator, and the ability to formalise reasoning about preference criteria. Moreover, the new system has a very intuitive dialectieal form, as opposed to the rather unintuitive fixed-point appearance of the old system. Another important revision is the split of the old Chapter 9 into two new chapters. The old Section 9. 1 on related research has been updated and expanded into a whole chapter, while the rest of the old chapter is now in revised form in Chapter 10. This chapter also contains two new contributions, a detailed discussion of Gordon's Pleadings Game, and a general description of a multi-Iayered overall view on the structure of argu mentation, comprising a logieal, dialectical, procedural and strategie layer. Finally, in the revised conclusion I have paid more attention to the relevance of my investigations for legal philosophy and argumentation theory."

Spontaneous Order, Organization and the Law contains contributions by renowned lawyers from all over the World, to honor one of our time's most significant private law scholars, Ernst-Joachim Mestmacker, Director (emeritus) of the Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and International Private Law in Hamburg, on the occasion of his 75th Anniversary. The papers presented at an academic symposium to celebrate the occasion are included in the Annex. The contributions cover a wide spectrum of subjects, ranging from theoretical questions of hybrid governance across national jurisdictions, the changing role of the state, competition as a basic element of the social market economy, and international economic relations in the twenty-first century, to regulatory reform of European telecommunications, the public spirit of the corporation, venture capital funding for biotech pharmaceutical companies, and other questions of corporate law, competition law, civil law and constitutional law, arising in Europe, the US, Japan and Israel.

This book describes the origins of the concept of liberty in the legal and political thought of Rome, Italy, England, France and the United States of America. Professor Sellers traces the development of liberty and republican government over two centuries of European history, in association with liberal ideas. This study reveals republicanism as the parent of liberalism in modern law and politics, and demonstrates the continuing value of republican ideas in securing the liberty of contemporary states and their citizens.

This book offers the first theoretical approach to rules of evidence and the practice of judicial proof in China written in English by a Chinese professor. As Prof. He's first representative work, based on over three decades of studying and researching evidence law, it clarifies concepts relevant to evidence law, highlights the value of studying evidence law, re-examines the domain of presumption, reviews central problems in obtaining evidence, and discusses the reasons for misjudged cases. In brief, the book not only presents all major aspects of Chinese rules of evidence in criminal justice, but also introduces readers to the latest developments from a global perspective.

During the last half of the twentieth century, legal philosophy (or legal theory or jurisprudence) has grown significantly. It is no longer the domain of a few isolated scholars in law and philosophy. Hundreds of scholars from diverse fields attend international meetings on the subject. In some universities, large lecture courses of five hundred students or more study it. The primary aim of the Law and Philosophy Library is to present some of the best original work on legal philosophy from both the Anglo-American and European traditions. Not only does it help make some of the best work available to an international audience, but it also encourages increased aware ness of, and interaction between, the two major traditions. The primary focus is on full-length scholarly monographs, although some edited volumes of original papers are also included. The Library editors are assisted by an Editorial Advisory Board of internationally renowned scholars. Legal philosophy should not be considered a narrowly circumscribed field. Insights into law and legal institutions can come from diverse disciplines on a wide range of topics. Among the relevant disciplines or perspectives contributing to legal philosophy, besides law and philosophy, are anthropol ogy, economics, political science, and sociology. Among the topics included in legal philosophy are theories of law; the concepts of law and legal institu tions; legal reasoning and adjudication; epistemological issues of evidence and procedure; law and justice, economics, politics, or morality; legal ethics; and theories of legal fields such as criminal law, contracts, and property."

"English Version: Anspruch und Rechtfertigung (Appeal and Justification)" develops a phenomenological theory of judgments on legitimacy. It undertakes a first systematic investigation of the structures in consciousness which enable the process of justification to unfold. The overall question is how the claim for legitimacy, inherent in both epistemological and ethical judgments, can be understood as a fundamental character of experience. The thesis that this book offers follows along the lines of a genetic answer to this question. It traces the characteristic of legitimation back to an originary appeal to which consciousness is exposed by experience. Legitimizing structures are thus to be understood as a predicative answer to this prepredicative appeal.This book investigates both the epistemological and the ethical fields, working mainly with Husserl's genetic theory in "Experience and Judgement". It offers a new and comprehensive reading of Husserl's ethics and a critical dialogue with Levinas' ethics of alterity and Apels' discourse ethics."German Version: Anspruch und Rechtfertigung" entwickelt eine phanomenologische Theorie des 'rechtlichen Denkens'.Dabei handelt es sich um eine erste systematische Untersuchung derjenigen Bewusstseinsstrukturen, die ein Begrunden, Ausweisen und Rechtfertigen uberhaupt erst ermoglichen. Die grundlegende Frage ist, wie Rechtsanspruche, die sowohl erkenntnistheoretischen als auch ethischen Urteilen inharent sind, als ein Grundmerkmal des Erfahrens verstanden werden konnen. Die vorliegende These gibt eine genetische Antwort auf diese Frage. Sie fuhrt den Rechtscharakter im Denken auf einen ursprunglichen Anspruch zuruck, dem Bewusstsein im Erfahren immer schon ausgesetzt ist.Rechtliche Strukturen mussen daher als eine pradikative Antwort auf ein vorpradikatives Angesprochen-Sein begriffen werden. Das vorliegende Buch untersucht sowohl den ethischen als auch den erkenntnistheoretischen Bereich, wobei Husserls genetische Phanomenologie in Erfahrung und Urteil den methodischen Hintergrund bildet. Es bietet ausserdem eine neue und umfassende Lekture von Husserls Schriften zur Ethik, sowie einen kritischen Dialog mit der Alteritatsethik von Levinas und der Diskursethik Apels.

The essays in this book treat important aspects of most of the major themes in contemporary philosophy of law and legal theory. All reveal the distinctive authenticity of the author's work, for he is not only a reputable legal theorist but an internationally known scholar of private law, and for many years chair of the Bielefelder Kreis, an international group of legal theorists who have jointly authored major works comparing methodologies of statutory interpretation and precedent.

How should judges and legislators address challenges arising at the frontiers of biomedicine? What if it became possible to edit the DNA of embryos for enhanced traits, gestate a fetus in an artificial womb, self-modify brain implants to provide new skills or bring a frozen human back to life? This book presents an innovative legal theory and applies it to future developments in biomedicine. This legal theory reconceptualises the role of legal officials in terms of moral principle and contextual constraints: 'contextual legal idealism'. It is applied by asking how a political leader or appeal court judge could address technological developments for which the current law of England and Wales would be ill-equipped to respond. The book's central thesis is that the regulation of human conduct requires moral reasoning directed to the context in which it operates. The link between abstract theory and practical application is articulated using future developments within four areas of biomedicine. Developments in heritable genome editing and cybernetic biohacking are addressed using Explanatory Notes to hypothetical UK Parliamentary Bills. Developments in ectogestation and cryonic reanimation are addressed using hypothetical appeal court judgments. The book will be of great interest to scholars and students of medical/health law, criminal law, bioethics, biolaw, legal theory and moral philosophy.

While George Fletcher's book, Rethinking Criminal Law, is justly celebrated as the most widely cited and influential book on criminal law, his articles and essays have been comparatively overlooked. But it is in these essays where Fletcher hones and polishes the themes of Rethinking as well as advances new ground. They are critical in understanding the evolution of his views on criminal law. This volume collects, for the first time, a selection of his most famous previously published shorter works as well as some that are less known but equally important. Each of the twelve essays by Fletcher is paired with one or more new critical commentaries on that essay. These critical commentaries trace the significance of the respective essay in the development of the criminal law and assess its future significance. The commentators include leading criminal law scholars, philosophers, and a judge. Reflecting Fletcher's comparative law focus, the commentators hail from America, England, and Israel. Preceding these paired sets of essays/critical commentaries is an Introduction that broadly assesses Fletcher's body of work and career in criminal scholarship as well as provides an overview of each essay and critical commentary. Concluding the volume is a new, original essay by Fletcher in which he responds to his critics. Fletcher also reflects back on his six-decade spanning career and takes stock. Fletcher's essay concludes with some speculations as to the trend of future developments in the field. In the enterprise of theoretical criminal law, the essays in this book represent the pinnacle of the thinking of one of the fields' most celebrated scholars.

The claim once made by philosophers of unique knowledge of the essence of humanity and society has fallen into disrepute. Neither Platonic forms, divine revelation nor metaphysical truth can serve as the ground for legitimating social and political norms. On the political level many seem to agree that democracy doesn't need foundations. Nor are its citizens expected to discuss the worth of their comprehensive conceptions of the good life. According to Rawls, for example, we have to accept that "politics in a democratic society can never be guided by what we see as the whole truth (...)." (1993: 243) And yet we still call upon truth when we participate in defining the basic structure our society and argue why our opinions, beliefs and preferences need to be taken seriously. We do not think that our views need to be taken into account by others because they are our views, but because we think they are true. If in a democratic society citizens have to deal with the challenge of affirming their claims as true, we need to analyse the precise relationship between truth and democracy. Does truth matter to democracy and if so, what is the place of truth in democratic politics? How can citizens affirm the truth of their claims and accept - at the same time - that their truth is just one amongst many? Our book centers on the role of the public sphere in these pressing questions. It tries to give a comprehensive answer to these questions from the perspective of the main approaches of contemporary democratic theory: deliberative democracy, political pragmatism and liberalism. A confrontation of these approaches, will result in a more encompassing philosophical understanding of our plural democracy, which - in this era of globalization - is more complex than ever before.

Because a good understanding of the function, meaning and shortcomings of the public sphere is essential to answering these questions, a good deal of the book addresses these issues. Historically, after all, the idea that citizens have to engage each other in discussion in order to determine the structure and goals of society, is connected to the rational ideal of a public sphere where conflicting views can be expressed, formed, and transformed. But hasn't the collective decision making in which everyone participates on an equal footing turned out to be a deceptive ideal or a simple illusion? Not every individual in society has equal access to the podium. Furthermore, power, being an inevitable feature of the public sphere, seems to permanently endanger its democratic value. Moreover, the existence of this sphere depends on a specific ethos and particular public spaces where citizens are called upon to present themselves as citizens, as people taking responsibility for their society. It is not clear whether this ethos and these spaces exist at all, and if so, if they preserved their ascribed capacity for constituting 'democratic' truth? By answering these questions we expect to deepen our understanding of the relation between truth and democracy.

'A leading figure in critical legal studies and renowned scholar of comparative constitutionalism, Frankenberg urges us forward, offering a new taxonomy for critical work. He illustrates its potential in terrific chapters on recent transnational legal movements: to regulate the veil, provide access to justice and reinvigorate human rights as a language of justification. A methodological tour de force.' - David Kennedy, Harvard University 'One of the most courageous and intellectually earnest legal scholars of our time, Gunter Frankenberg, has devoted his efforts to reconstructing comparative law's internal strength and potential for critical analysis. This book is a masterpiece that should be read by every serious thinker concerned with the need for legal reforms and the politics of globalization.' - Pier Giuseppe Monateri, University of Turin, Italy Presenting a critique of conventional methods in comparative law, this book argues that, for comparative law to qualify as a discipline, comparatists must reflect on how and why they make comparisons. Gunter Frankenberg discusses not only methods and theories but also the ethical implications and the politics of comparative law in order to bring out the different dimensions of the discipline. Comparative Law as Critique offers various approaches that turn on the academic discourse of comparative law, including analysis of a widespread spirit of innocence in terms of method, and critique of human rights narratives. It also analyses how courts negotiate differences between cases regarding Muslim veiling. Gunter Frankenberg presents varied critical projects that discuss methods and theories, ethics and the politics of comparative law to bring out the different dimensions of the discipline. The incisive critiques and comparisons in this book will make essential reading for comparatists working in legal education and research as well as students of comparative law and scholars in comparative anthropology and social sciences.