Law is best interpreted in the context of the traditions and cultures that have shaped its development, implementation, and acceptance. However, these can never be assessed truly objectively: individual interpreters of legal theory need to reflect on how their own experiences create the framework within which they understand legal concepts. Theory is not separate from practice, but one kind of practice. It is rooted in the world, even if it is not grounded by it. In this highly original volume, Allan C. Hutchinson takes up the challenge of self-reflection about how his upbringing, education, and scholarship contributed to his legal insights and analysis. Through this honest examination of key episodes in his own life and work, Hutchinson produces unique interpretations of fundamental legal concepts. This book is required reading for every lawyer or legal scholar who wants to analyse critically where he or she stands when they practice and study law.

This volume brings together the most important writing on torture and the 'war on terror by one of the leading US voices in the torture debate. Philosopher and legal ethicist David Luban reflects on this contentious topic in a powerful sequence of essays including two new and previously unpublished pieces. He analyzes the trade-offs between security and human rights, as well as the connection between torture, humiliation, and human dignity, the fallacy of using ticking bomb scenarios in debates about torture, and the ethics of government lawyers. The book develops an illuminating and novel conception of torture as the use of pain and suffering to communicate absolute dominance over the victim. Factually stimulating and legally informed, this volume provides the clearest analysis to date of the torture debate. It brings the story up to date by discussing the Obama administration's failure to hold torturers accountable.

While legal technology may bring efficiency and economy to business, where are the people in this process and what does it mean for their lives? Brings together leading judges, academics, practitioners, policy makers and educators from countries including India, Canada, Germany, United Kingdom South Africa and Nigeria Includes contributions from Roger Smith, Dory Reiling, Christian Djeffal, George Williams and Odunoluwa Longe Offers a dialogue between theory and practice by presenting practical and reflective essays on the nature of changes in the legal sector Analyses technological changes taking place in the legal sector, situates where these developments have taken place, who has brought it about and what impact has it had on society Around four billion people globally are unable to address their everyday legal problems and do not have the security, opportunity or protection to redress their grievances and injustices. Courts and legal institutions can often be out of reach because of costs, distance, or a lack of knowledge of rights and entitlements and judicial institutions may be under-funded leading to poor judicial infrastructure, inadequate staff, and limited resources to meet the needs of those who require such services. This book sets out to embed access to justice into mainstream discussions on the future of law and to explore how this can be addressed in different parts of the legal industry. It examines what changes in technology mean for the end user, whether an ordinary citizen, a client or a student. It looks at the everyday practice of law through a sector wide analysis of law firms, universities, startups and civil society organizations. In doing so, the book provides a roadmap on how to address sector specific access to justice questions and to draw lessons for the future. The book draws on experiences from judges, academics, practitioners, policy makers and educators and presents perspectives from both the Global South and the Global North.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr, has been called the greatest jurist and legal scholar in the history of the English-speaking world. In this collection of his speeches, opinions and letters, Richard Posner reveals the fullness of Holmes' achievements as judge, historian, philosopher and master of English style. Thematically arranged, the volume covers a variety of subjects from aging and death to themes in politics, personalities, and law. Posner's substantial introduction firmly places this wealth of material in its biographical and historical context.

This book advances a theoretical account of contract law, grounded in value pluralism. Arguing against attempts to delineate branches of legal doctrine by reference to single unifying values, the book suggests that a field such as contract law can only be explained and justified by the interaction of a multiplicity of moral values. In recent times, the philosophy of contract law has been dominated by the 'promise theory', according to which the morality of promise provides a 'blueprint' for the structure, shape, and content that contract law rules and doctrines should take. The promise theory is an example of what this book calls a 'foundationalist' theory, whereby areas of law reflect or are underlain by particular moral principles or sets of such principles. By considering contract law from the point of view of its theory, rules and doctrines, and broader political context, the book argues that the promise theory can only ever offer part of the picture. The book claims that 'top-down' theories of contract law such as the promise theory and its bitter rival the economic analysis of law seriously mishandle legal doctrine by ignoring or underplaying the irreducible plurality of values that shape contract law. The book defends the role of this multiplicity of values in forging contract doctrine by developing from the 'ground-up' a radical and distinctly republican reinterpretation of the field. The book encourages readers to move away from a 'top-down' theory of contract law such as the promise theory and instead embrace a distinctly republican approach to contract law that would justify the legal rules and doctrines we find in particular jurisdictions at particular times.

This book brings the insights of theatre theory to law, legal interpretation and the jurisprudential to reshape law as a practice of response and responsibility. Confronting a Baconian antitheatrical legality embedded in its jurisprudences and interpretative practices, Marett Leiboff turns to theatre theory and practice to ground a theatrical jurisprudence, taking its cues from Han-Thies Lehmann's conception of the post-dramatic theatre and the early work of theatre visionary Jerzy Grotowski. She asks law to move beyond an imagined ideal grounded in Aristotelian drama and tragedy, and turns to the formation of the legal interpreter lawyer, judge, jurisprudent as fundamental to understanding what's "noticed" or not noticed in law. We "notice" most easily through that which is written into the body of the legal interpreter, in a way that can't be replicated through law's standard practices of thinking and reasoning. Without more, thinking and reasoning are the epitome of antitheatricality legality; a set of theatrical antonyms, including transgression and instinct, offer instead a set of possibilities through which to reconceive assumptions and foundational concepts etched into the legal imaginary. And by turning to critical dramaturgy, the book reveals that the liveliness that sits behind theatrical jurisprudence isn't a new concept in law at all, but has a long pedigree and lineage that had been lost and hidden. Theatrical jurisprudence, which demands an awareness of self and beyond self, grounds a responsiveness that can't be found within doctrine, principle, or the technocratic, but also challenges us to notice what it is we think we know as well as what we know of lives in law that aren't our own. The book will be of interest to scholars and students in the field of jurisprudence, legal theory, theatre and performance studies, cultural studies and philosophy.

Since its inception in 2001, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been met with resistance by various African states and their leaders, who see the court as a new iteration of colonial violence and control. In Affective Justice Kamari Maxine Clarke explores the African Union's pushback against the ICC in order to theorize affect's role in shaping forms of justice in the contemporary period. Drawing on fieldwork in The Hague, the African Union in Addis Ababa, sites of postelection violence in Kenya, and Boko Haram's circuits in Northern Nigeria, Clarke formulates the concept of affective justice-an emotional response to competing interpretations of justice-to trace how affect becomes manifest in judicial practices. By detailing the effects of the ICC's all-African indictments, she outlines how affective responses to these call into question the "objectivity" of the ICC's mission to protect those victimized by violence and prosecute perpetrators of those crimes. In analyzing the effects of such cases, Clarke provides a fuller theorization of how people articulate what justice is and the mechanisms through which they do so.

To which institutions or social practices should we grant authority? When should we instead assert our own sense of what is right or good or necessary?
In this book, James Boyd White shows how texts by some of our most important thinkers and writers--including Plato, Shakespeare, Dickinson, Mandela, and Lincoln--answer these questions, not in the abstract, but in the way they wrestle with the claims of the world and self in particular historical and cultural contexts. As they define afresh the institutions or practices for which they claim (or resist) authority, they create authorities of their own, in the very modes of thought and expression they employ. They imagine their world anew and transform the languages that give it meaning.
In so doing, White maintains, these works teach us about how to read and judge claims of authority made by others upon us; how to decide to which institutions and practices we should grant authority; and how to create authorities of our own through our thoughts and arguments. Elegant and accessible, this book will appeal to anyone wanting to better understand one of the primary processes of our social and political lives.

Originally published posthumously, in Latin, in 1695, "The Divine Feudal Law" sets forth Pufendorf's basis for the reunion of the Lutheran and Calvinist confessions. This attempt to seek a "conciliation" between the confessions complements the concept of toleration discussed in "Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion in Reference to Civil Society." In both works Pufendorf examines the proper way to secure the peaceful coexistence of different confessions in a state.Although he argued in "Of the Nature" that maintaining peace and order in the state does not require all subjects to share one belief, Pufendorf also believed that "true" Christianity was beneficial to society. For that reason he advocated a reunion of the confessions on the basis of fundamental truths that he believed were contained in the Bible, saying a conciliation should be enforced not by law but by mutual agreement of the dissenting parties. Therefore, the reunion of the confessions must be accompanied by toleration.Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694) was one of the most important figures in early-modern political thought. An exact contemporary of Locke and Spinoza, he transformed the natural law theories of Grotius and Hobbes, developed striking ideas of toleration and of the relationship between church and state, and wrote extensive political histories and analyses of the constitution of the German empire.Theophilus Dorrington (1654-1715) was an Anglican clergyman and polemicist against Dissent.Simone Zurbuchen is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland.Knud Haakonssen is Professor of Intellectual History at the University of Sussex, England.

Common markets, open borders, air traffic, and the internet have made it faster and less expensive to change places and jurisdictions. As a result, legal forums are increasingly treated as a good that is subject to the market mechanism. Individuals and corporations increasingly have free reign to choose which legal rules to apply to their company, their contract, their marriage, or their insolvency proceedings. States in turn grant these opportunities and respond to demand by competing with other suppliers of legal regimes. 'Regulatory competition' describes a dynamic in which states as producers of legal rules compete for the favour of mobile consumers of their legal products. This book focuses on the philosophical underpinnings, problems, and consequences of such regulatory competition. It argues that there is a mismatch between regulatory competition as a policy approach and the beliefs and commitments that shape our thinking about law and the state. It concludes that 'law markets' are potentially at odds with both our conception of the functions of legal rules and of key political ideals and principles such as democracy, state autonomy, and political authority.

TO VOLUMES 9 AND 10 OF THE TREATISE I am happy to present here the third batch of volumes for the Treatise project: This is the batch consisting of Volumes 9 and 10, namely, A History of the P- losophy of Law in the Civil Law World, 1600-1900, edited by Damiano Canale, Paolo Grossi, and Hasso Hofmann, and The Philosophers' Philosophy of Law from the Seventeenth Century to Our Days, by Patrick Riley. Three v- umes will follow: Two are devoted to the philosophy of law in the 20th c- tury, and the third one will be the index for the entire Treatise, which will 1 therefore ultimately comprise thirteen volumes. This Volume 9 runs parallel to Volume 8, A History of the Philosophy of Law in the Common Law World, 1600-1900, by Michael Lobban, published in 2007. Volume 10, for its part, takes up where Volume 6 left off: which appeared under the title A History of the Philosophy of Law from the Ancient Greeks to the Scholastics (edited by Fred Miller Jr. in association with Carrie-Ann Biondi, likewise published in 2007), and which is mainly a history of the p- losophers' philosophy of law (let us refer to this philosophy as A).

Legality is a profound work in analytical jurisprudence, the branch of legal philosophy which deals with metaphysical questions about the law. In the twentieth century, there have been two major approaches to the nature of law. The first and most prominent is legal positivism, which draws a sharp distinction between law as it is and law as it might be or ought to be. The second are theories that view law as embedded in a moral framework. Scott Shapiro is a positivist, but one who tries to bridge the differences between the two approaches. In Legality, he shows how law can be thought of as a set of plans to achieve complex human goals. His new "planning" theory of law is a way to solve the "possibility problem", which is the problem of how law can be authoritative without referring to higher laws.

National, European and international concepts and strategies concerning the legal and ethical framework of chimera and hybrid research are still largely missing, even though they are absolutely necessary in order to use the potential of chimera and hybrid research effectively and efficiently for the benefit of science and society. The outcome of the CHIMBRIDS-Project successfully sheds light on the chances and risks of this research and provides legal solutions to existing problems in order to help decision-makers fulfil their tasks in an informed and efficient manner.

This comprehensive volume details the complete results, contributed by 40 scholars from 10 member states of the European Union, Canada, China, Israel, Japan, Switzerland and the US, with descriptive reports of the legal situation in specific countries and in-depth analysis of all scientific, medical, ethical and legal implications of chimera and hybrid research.

Thomas Hobbes wrote extensively about law and was strongly influenced by developments and debates among lawyers of his day. And Hobbes is considered by many commentators to be one of the first legal positivists. Yet there is no book in English that focuses on Hobbes's legal philosophy. Indeed, Hobbes's own book length treatment of law, A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England, has also not received much commentary over the centuries. Larry May seeks to fill the gap in the literature by addressing Hobbes's legal philosophy directly, and comparing Leviathan to the Dialogue, as he offers a new interpretation of Hobbes's views about the connections among law, politics, and morality. May argues that Hobbes is much more amenable to moral, and even legal, limits on the law-indeed closer to Lon Fuller than to today's legal positivists-than he is often portrayed. He shows that Hobbes's views can provide a solid grounding for the rules of war and international relations generally, contrary to the near universal belief that Hobbes is the bete noir of international law. To support these views, May holds that Hobbes places greater weight on equity than on justice, and that understanding the role of equity is the key to his legal philosophy. Equity also is the moral concept that provides restrictions on what a sovereign can legitimately do, and if violated is the kind of limitation on sovereignty that could open the door for possible international institutions.

This book fills a major gap in the ever-increasing secondary literature on Hannah Arendt's political thought by providing a dedicated and coherent treatment of the many, various and interesting things which Arendt had to say about law. Often obscured by more pressing or more controversial aspects of her work, Arendt nonetheless had interesting insights into Greek and Roman concepts of law, human rights, constitutional design, legislation, sovereignty, international tribunals, judicial review and much more. This book retrieves these aspects of her legal philosophy for the attention of both Arendt scholars and lawyers alike. The book brings together lawyers as well as Arendt scholars drawn from a range of disciplines (philosophy, political science, international relations), who have engaged in an internal debate the dynamism of which is captured in print. Following the editors' introduction, the book is split into four Parts: Part I explores the concept of law in Arendt's thought; Part II explores legal aspects of Arendt's constitutional thought: first locating Arendt in the wider tradition of republican constitutionalism, before turning attention to the role of courts and the role of parliament in her constitutional design. In Part III Arendt's thought on international law is explored from a variety of perspectives, covering international institutions and international criminal law, as well as the theoretical foundations of international law. Part IV debates the foundations, content and meaning of Arendt's famous and influential claim that the 'right to have rights' is the one true human right.

"The Philosophy of Law" is a broad-reaching text that guides readers through the basic analytical and normative issues in the field, highlighting key historical and contemporary thinkers and offering a unified treatment of the various issues in the philosophy of law.
Enlivened with numerous, everyday examples to illustrate various concepts of law.
Employs the idea of three central commonplaces about law - that law is a social matter, that law is authoritative, and that law is for the common good - to organize seemingly disparate topics and to bring rival views into contention with each other.
The first volume in the "Fundamentals of Philosophy "series, in which leading philosophers explore the fundamental issues and core problems in the major sub-disciplines of philosophy.

What is a crime against humanity and when should it be investigated? What does 'human rights' mean? Is law the new religion and are its high priests, the lawyers, really all bad? What is the role of the law in the regulation of sexual behaviour? Are there limits to what we can reasonably expect from international war crimes tribunals? These and many other crucial questions are explored with wit, panache and consummate even-handedness by Sir Geoffrey Nice, QC, in the series of lectures he delivered as Gresham Professor of Law from 2012 to 2016. Drawing on events from every continent and every period in history, from ancient Babylon to Britain on the brink of Brexit; and referencing icons from Cicero to Socrates, Bertrand Russell to Jean-Paul Sartre, and Joan Baez to Muhammad Ali, Sir Geoffrey applies his own wealth of experience to moral problems which are as pressing in today's anxious world as they ever have been. The book is due to be launched at Gresham College, 18 October 2017.

A SUNDAY TIMES BESTSELLER In the past few decades, legislatures throughout the world have suffered from gridlock. In democracies, laws and policies are just as soon unpicked as made. It seems that Congress and Parliaments cannot forge progress or consensus. Moreover, courts often overturn decisions made by elected representatives. In the absence of effective politicians, many turn to the courts to solve political and moral questions. Rulings from the Supreme Courts in the United States and United Kingdom, or the European court in Strasbourg may seem to end the debate but the division and debate does not subside. In fact, the absence of democratic accountability leads to radicalisation. Judicial overreach cannot make up for the shortcomings of politicians. This is especially acute in the field of human rights. For instance, who should decide on abortion or prisoners' rights to vote, elected politicians or appointed judges? Expanding on arguments first laid out in the 2019 Reith Lectures, Jonathan Sumption argues that the time has come to return some problems to the politicians.

This first English translation of Pierre Manent's profound and strikingly original book La loi naturelle et les droits de l'homme is a reflection on the central question of the Western political tradition. In six chapters, developed from the prestigious Etienne Gilson lectures at the Institut Catholique de Paris, and in a related appendix, Manent contemplates the steady displacement of the natural law by the modern conception of human rights. He aims to restore the grammar of moral and political action, and thus the possibility of an authentically political order that is fully compatible with liberty. Manent boldly confronts the prejudices and dogmas of those who have repudiated the classical and Christian notion of "liberty under law" and in the process shows how groundless many contemporary appeals to human rights turn out to be. Manent denies that we can generate obligations from a condition of what Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau call the "state of nature," where human beings are absolutely free, with no obligations to others. In his view, our ever-more-imperial affirmation of human rights needs to be reintegrated into what he calls an "archic" understanding of human and political existence, where law and obligation are inherent in liberty and meaningful human action. Otherwise we are bound to act thoughtlessly and in an increasingly arbitrary or willful manner. Natural Law and Human Rights will engage students and scholars of politics, philosophy, and religion, and will captivate sophisticated readers who are interested in the question of how we might reconfigure our knowledge of, and talk with one another about, politics.

War remains a grim fixture of the human landscape, and because of its tremendous and ongoing impact on the lives of millions of people, has always attracted the attention of careful, rigorous, and empathetic moral philosophers. And while war is synonymous with death and ruin, very few people are willing to surrender to moral nihilism about war-the view that all really is fair. At the center of debates about war remains the most important question that faces us during battle: whom are we allowed to kill? This volume collects in one place the most influential and groundbreaking philosophical work being done on the question of killing in war, offering a "who's who" of contemporary scholars debating the foundational ethical questions surrounding liability to harm. In ten essays, it expands upon and provides new and updated analyses that have yet to be captured in a single work. Essays explore questions such as: Are some soldiers more deserving of death than others? Should states allow soldiers to conscientiously object (to opt out of war) on a case-by-case basis? Can a theory of rights best explain when it is permissible to kill in war? When are we allowed to violently resist oppression that is itself nonviolent? Is there anything wrong with targeting people with autonomous weapons? As a convenient and authoritative collection of such discussions, this volume is uniquely suited for university-level teaching and as a reference for ethicists, policymakers, stakeholders, and any student of the morality of killing in war.

This book provides a theoretical and practical exploration of the constitutional bar against cruel and unusual punishments, excessive bail, and excessive fines. It explores the history of this prohibition, the current legal doctrine, and future applications of the Eighth Amendment. With contributions from the leading academics and experts on the Eighth Amendment and the wide range of punishments and criminal justice actors it touches, this volume addresses constitutional theory, legal history, federalism, constitutional values, the applicable legal doctrine, punishment theory, prison conditions, bail, fines, the death penalty, juvenile life without parole, execution methods, prosecutorial misconduct, race discrimination, and law & science.

Law and Outsiders is a collection of essays examining cutting edge developments in law. Thirteen essays from leading young scholars cover five important areas of legal scholarship: adjudication, European law and politics, migration, vulnerable minorities, and legal values. The recurring theme in the volume is the way in which rules and processes are contributing to the creation of 21st Century 'others' in areas such as domestic constitutional systems, international security and migration, and global human rights discourses. The essays are drawn from the second International Graduate Legal Research Conference, held at King's College, London in June 2008.

This book sets out to defend the claim that Equity ought to remain a separate body of law; the temptation to iron-out the differences between neighbouring doctrines on the two sides of the Equity/Common Law divide should, in most cases, be resisted. The theoretical part of the book is argues that the characteristics of Equity, namely, appeal to conscience, flexibility, retroactivity and the use of morally-freighted jargon, are essential for the implementation of a legal ideal that has been neglected by the Common Law: aAccountability Correspondencea. According to this fundamental legal ideal, liability imposed by legal rules should correspond to the pattern of moral duty in the circumstances to which the rules apply. Equity promotes this ideal in the fields of property and obligations by disallowing parties to exploit the rule-like nature of Common Law norms in a way that breaches their moral duty to the other party. By reference to various equitable doctrines, it is argued that the faults identified by critics of Equity, especially from the perspective of the Rule of Law, are highly exaggerated, and that the criticism often reflects a political belief in the supremacy of individualism and free market over empathy and social justice. The theoretical part is followed by three chapters, each dedicated to an in-depth analysis of the equitable doctrines of fiduciary duties, proprietary estoppel, and clean hands. For each doctrine, it is shown how their equitable characteristics are indispensable for achieving their social, ethical and economic purpose.

Ranging over a host of issues, Property Rights: A Re-Examination pinpoints and addresses a number of theoretical problems at the heart of property theory. Part 1 reconsiders and rejects, once again, the bundle of rights picture of property and the related nominalist theories of property, showing that ownership reflects a tripartite structure of title: the right to immediate, exclusive, possession, the power to license what would otherwise be a trespass, and the power to transfer ownership. Part 2 explores in detail the Hohfeldian theory of jural relations, in particular liberties and powers and Hohfeld's concept of 'multital' jural relations, and shows that this theory fails to illuminate the nature of property rights, and indeed obscures much that it is vital to understand about them. Part 3 considers the form and justification of property rights, beginning with the relation an owner's liberty to use her property and her 'right to exclude', with particular reference to the tort of nuisance. Next up for consideration is the Kantian theory of property rights, the deficiencies of which lead us to understand that the only natural right to things is a form of use- or usufructory-right. Part 3 concludes by addressing the ever-vexed question of property rights in land.

In this volume, ownership is defined as the simple fact of being able to describe something as 'mine' or 'yours', and property is distinguished as the discursive field which allows the articulation of attendant rights, relationships, and obligations. Property is often articulated through legalism as a way of thinking that appeals to rules and to generalizing concepts as a way of understanding, responding to, and managing the world around one. An Aristotelian perspective suggests that ownership is the natural state of things and a prerequisite of a true sense of self. An alternative perspective from legal theory puts law at the heart of the origins of property. However, both these points of view are problematic in a wider context, the latter because it rests heavily on Roman law. Anthropological and historical studies enable us to interrogate these assumptions. The articles here, ranging from Roman provinces to modern-day piracy in Somalia, address questions such as: How are legal property regimes intertwined with economic, moral-ethical, and political prerogatives? How far do the assumptions of the western philosophical tradition explain property and ownership in other societies? Is the 'bundle of rights' a useful way to think about property? How does legalism negotiate property relationships and interests between communities and individuals? How does the legalism of property respond to the temporalities and materialities of the objects owned? How are property regimes managed by states, and what kinds of conflicts are thus generated? Property and ownership cannot be reduced to natural rights, nor do they straightforwardly reflect power relations: the rules through which property is articulated tend to be conceptually subtle. As the fourth volume in the Legalism series, this collection draws on common themes that run throughout the first three volumes: Legalism: Anthropology and History, Legalism: Community and Justice, and Legalism: Rules and Categories consolidating them in a framework that suggests a new approach to legal concepts.