As society struggles to cope with the many repercussions of assisted life and death, the evening news is filled with stories of legal battles over frozen embryos and the possible prosecution of doctors for their patients' suicide. Using an "institutional" approach as an alternative to the prevailing "rights" based analysis of problems in law and medicine, this study explains why society should resist the tendency to look to science and law for a resolution of intimate matters, such as how our children are born and how we die. Palmer's institutional approach demonstrates that legislative analysis is often more important than judicial analysis when it comes to issues raised by new reproductive technologies and physician-assisted suicide. A reliance on individual rights alone for answers to the complex ethical questions that result from society's faith in scientific progress and science's close alliance with medicine will be insufficient and ill-advised. Palmer predicts that the key role of the family as a societal institution will mean that questions of assisted reproduction will be resolved more in response to market forces than through legal intervention. However, he does support a strong role for legislatures in decisions involving the physicians' role in our deaths. These findings are based on the differing views of the Supreme Court justices in these matters: a tendency to protect family formation from state interference (as in abortion decisions), but support of a legislative obligation to control medicine (assisted suicide). According to Palmer, recent Supreme Court decisions on physician assisted suicide usher in a new era in how legal institutions will resolve biomedical dilemmas.

Connected to the jurisprudence surrounding the copyrightability of a factual compilation, this book locates the footprints of the standard envisaged in a US Supreme court decision (Feist) in Europe. In particular, it observes the extent of similarity of such jurisprudence to the standard adopted and deliberated in the European Union. Many a times the reasons behind law making goes unnoticed. The compelling situations and the history existing prior to an enactment helps in understanding the balance that exists in a particular legislation. While looking at the process of enacting the Database Directive (96/9/EC), this book reflects upon the concern that was expressed with the outcome of Feist decision in Europe.

This book analyzes emergency legislations formed in response to terrorism. In recognition that different countries, with different legal traditions, have different solutions, it adopts a comparative point of view. The countries profiled include America, France, Israel, Poland, Germany and United Kingdom. The goal is not to offer judgment on one response or the other. Rather, the contributors offer a comprehensive and thoughtful examination of the entire concept. In the process, they draw attention to the inadaptability of traditional legal and philosophical categories in a new and changing political world. The contributors first criticize the idea of these legislations. They then go on to develop different models to respond to these crises. They build a general analytical framework by answering such questions as: What is an emergency legislation? What kinds of emergencies justify laws of this nature? Why is contemporary terrorism such a specific emergency justifying new laws? Using legal and philosophical reflections, this study looks at how we are changing society. Coverage also provides historical experiences of emergency legislations to further illustrate this point. In the end, readers will gain insight into the long-term consequences of these legislations and how they modify the very work of the rule of law.

This book examines the success of Frederick Schauer's efforts to reclaim force as a core element of a general concept of law by approaching the issue from different legal traditions and distinct perspectives. In discussing Schauer's main arguments, it contributes to answering the question whether force, sanctions and coercion should (or should not) be regarded as necessary elements of the concept of law, and whether legal philosophy should be concerned at all (or exclusively) with necessary or essential properties. While it was long assumed that legal norms are essentially defined by their force, it was H.L.A. Hart who raised doubts about whether law and coercion are necessarily connected, referring to the empowering, or more generally enabling, character exhibited by some legal norms. Prominent scholars following and refining Hart's argument built an influential case for excluding force as a necessary element of the concept of law. Most recently, however, Frederick Schauer has made a strong case to reaffirm the force of law, shedding new light on this essential question. This book collects important commentaries, never before published, by prominent legal philosophers evaluating Schauer's substantive arguments and his claims about jurisprudential methodology.

This book deals with the development of constitutional law in China and Visegrad states by employing a comparative perspective. It is the first time that the researcher compared the constitutional development in the China and the Visegrad states. It offers a few glimpses of development of constitution in the (former) socialist states to readers who are interested in the constitutional law or China-V4 relations. With the increased cooperation between China and V4 countries, this book gives the undergraduates in the university to think about the BRI and 17+1 network from a Chinese perspective. Last, compared to the previous works which mainly focus on North America and/or Western Europe, this book provides a new angle on comparative constitutional law.

This volume features fourteen essays that examine the works of key figures within the phenomenological movement in a clear and accessible way. It presents the fertile, groundbreaking, and unique aspects of phenomenological theorizing against the background of contemporary debate about social ontology and collective intentionality. The expert contributors explore the insights of such thinkers as Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl, Adolf Reinach, and Max Scheler. Readers will also learn about other sources that, although almost wholly neglected by historians of philosophy, testify to the vitality of the phenomenological tradition. In addition, the contributions highlight the systematic relevance of phenomenological research by pinpointing its position on social ontology and collective intentionality within the history of philosophy. By presenting phenomenological contributions in a scholarly yet accessible way, this volume introduces an interesting and important perspective into contemporary debate insofar as it bridges the gap between the analytical and the continental traditions in social philosophy. The volume provides readers with a deep understanding into such questions as: What does it mean to share experiences with others? What does it mean to share emotions with friends or to share intentions with partners in a joint endeavor? What are groups? What are institutional facts like money, universities, and cocktail parties? What are values and what role do values play in social reality?

The book is dedicated to the theoretical problems concerning ratio legis. In the contexts of legal interpretation and legal reasoning, the two most important intellectual tools employed by lawyers, ratio legis would seem to offer an extremely powerful argument. Declaring the ratio legis of a statute can lead to a u-turn argumentation throughout the lifespan of the statute itself - in parliament, or in practice during court sessions, when it is tested against the constitution. Though the ratio legis argument is widely used, much about it warrants further investigation. On the general philosophical map there are many overlapping areas that concern different approaches to human rationality and to the problems of practical reasoning. Particular problems with ratio legis arise in connection with different perspectives on legal philosophy and theory, especially in terms of the methods that lawyers use for legal interpretation and argumentation. These problems can be further subdivided into particular aspects of activities undertaken by lawyers and officials who use the ratio legis in their work, and the underlying theories. In short, this book examines what ratio legis is, what it could be, and its practical implications.

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Culture is the lens through which we make sense of the world. In any conflict, from petty disputes to wars between nation-states, the players invariably view that conflict through the filter of their own cultural experiences. This innovative volume prompts us to pause and think through our most fundamental assumptions about how conflict arises and how it is resolved.

Even as certain culturally based disputes, such as the high-profile cases in which an immigrant engages in conduct considered normal in the homeland but which is explicitly illegal in his/her new country, enter public consciousness, many of the most basic intersections of culture and conflict remain unexamined. How are some processes cultured, gendered, or racialized? In what ways do certain groups and cultures define such concepts as "justice" and "fairness" differently? Do women and men perceive events in similar fashion, use different reasoning, or emphasize disparate values and goals?

Spanning a wide array of disciplines, from anthropology and psychology to law and business, and culling dozens of intriguing essays, The Culture and Conflict Reader is edited for maximum pedagogical usefulness and represents a bedrock text for anyone interested in conflict and dispute resolution.

Contributors include: Kevin Avruch, Peter W. Black, Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Frank E. A. Sander, John Paul Lederach, Heather Forest,"" Sara Cobb, Janet Rifkin, Ryunosuke Akutagawa, Laura Nader, Pat Chew, Stella Ting-Toomey, Harry C. Triandis, Christopher McCusker, C. Harry Hui, Anita Taylor, Judi Beinstein Miller, Carol Gilligan, Trina Grillo, James W. Grosch, Karen G. Duffy, Paul V. Olczak, Michele Hermann, MarthaChamallas, Loraleigh Keashly, Phil Zuckerman, Tracy E. Higgins, Howard Gadlin, Janie Victoria Ward, Kyeyoung Park, Taunya Lovell Banks, Margaret Read MacDonald, Mary Patrice Erdmans, Manu Aluli Meyer, Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Bruce D. Bonta, Paul E. Salem, Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Marc H. Ross, Z.D. Gurevitch, Mari J. Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence III, Hsien Chin Hu, Glenn R. Butterton, Walter Otto Weyrauch, Maureen Anne Bell, Martti Gronfors, Thomas Donaldson, Marjorie Shostak, and Heather Forest.

This book challenges the assumptions of modern criminal law that insanity is a natural, legally and medically defined phenomenon (covering a range of medical disorders). By doing so, it paves the way for a new perspective on insanity and can serve as the basis for a new approach to insanity in modern criminal law. The book covers the following aspects: the structure of the principle of fault in modern criminal law, the development of the insanity defense in criminal law, tangential in personam defenses in criminal law and their implications for insanity and the legal mechanism of reproduction of fault. The focus is on the Anglo-American and European-Continental legal systems. Given the attention consistently drawn by international and domestic events in this context, the book will be of interest to a broad and growing international audience.

This open access book is about the perception of the independence of the judiciary in Europe. Do citizens and judges see its independence in the same way? Do judges feel that their independence is respected by the users of the courts, by the leadership of the courts and by politicians? Does the population trust the judiciary more than other public institutions, or less? How does independence of the judiciary work at the national level and at the level of the European Union? These interrelated questions are particularly relevant in times when the independence of the judiciary is under political pressure in several countries in the European Union, giving way to illiberal democracy. Revealing surveys among judges, lay judges and lawyers - in addition to regular surveys of the European Commission - provide a wealth of information to answer these questions. While the answers will not please everyone, they are of interest to a wide audience, in particular court leaders, judges, lawyers, politicians and civil servants.

This peer-reviewed book features essays on the Armenian massacres of 1915-1916. It aims to cast light upon the various questions of international law raised by the matter. The answers may help improve international relations in the region. In 1915-1916, roughly a million and a half Armenians were murdered in the territory of the Ottoman Empire, which had been home to them for centuries. Ever since, a dispute between Armenians and Turkey has been ongoing over the qualification of the massacres. The contributors to this volume examine the legal nature and consequences of this event. Their investigation strives to be completely neutral and technical. The essays also look at the broader issue of denial. For instance, in Turkey, public speech on the matter can still trigger criminal prosecution whereas in other European States denial of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity is criminalized. However, the European Court of Human Rights views criminal prosecution of denial of the Armenian massacres as unlawful. In addition, one essay considers a state's obligation to remember by looking at lessons learnt from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Another contributor looks at a collective right to remember and some ideas to move forward towards a solution. Moreover, the book explores the way the Armenian massacres have affected the relationship between Turkey and the European Union.

This book uses role theory to analyze the judicial decisions made by state supreme court judges. Grounded in the fields of anthropology, business management, psychology, and sociology, role theory holds that, for each position an individual occupies in society, he or she creates a role orientation, or a belief about the limits of proper behavior. Judicial role orientation is conceptualized as the stimuli that a judge feels can legitimately be allowed to influence his or her decision-making and, in the case of conflict among influences, what priorities to assign to different decisional criteria. This role orientation is generally seen as existing on a spectrum ranging from activist to restraintist. Using multi-faceted data collection and empirical testing, this book discusses the variation in judges' role orientations, the role that personal institutional structure and judges' backgrounds play in determining judicial orientations, and the degree to which judges' orientations affect their decision-making. The first study to provide cross-institutional research on state supreme court judges, this book expands and advances the literature on judicial role orientation. As such, this book will be of interest to graduate students and researchers studying political science, public policy, law, and the courts.

This volume looks at how courts and the police handle racial discrimination in Europe. The chapters show that beyond legal technique, neither the legislators nor the judges escape from their own emotions when responding to racial discrimination. But, as the authors point out, emotions are not always negative. They can also help in a positive way in judicial interpretation. The study profiles five countries: Germany, UK, Estonia, Portugal and Spain. Each of these belong both to the European Union and to the Council of Europe. Coverage examines the responsibility of the public powers, more specifically of the legislative and judicial power, both of the police and of the judiciary, in persecuting racist behavior. In addition, the authors also consider the increase in racism in groups of citizens. The authors argue that racial justice is a proactive reinforcement of policies, practices, attitudes and actions that lead to equal access to opportunities for all. After reading this book, readers will gain a better understanding of the reasoning of legislators, police and judges when dealing with racial discrimination in Europe today.

Clearly, the structure of authority in this country rests on how Americans understand the nature and relationship of law and politics. Law consists of pronouncements from the courts, but also of what we think of these pronouncements: should abortion be a choice or is it murder? Law is formed as much through the dynamic tensions that govern how these laws are received as through their official decree. Legal forms - contracts, property, rights - similarly do not reflect pre-existing or natural categories but themselves constitute social and political life because they dictate how we conceptualize our world. Even activists who seek reform inadvertently reinforce the traditional legal remedies against which they rally, oftentimes relying on legal institutions while claiming to be free of them. John Brigham's book focuses on four particular ideological movements and their strategies, including the emphasis placed by gay men on their rights during the legal struggle over the closing of gay bathhouses in the early years of the AIDS crisis and the radical feminist use of rage and radical consciousness in anti-pornography campaigns. The effect of law in politics, Brigham convincingly reveals, is constitutive precisely when political life finds its meaning in various legal forms.

This book explores the distinction and relationship between two principal branches of international law regulating the use of force: jus ad bellum (international law regulating the resort to force) and jus in bello (international humanitarian law). Two principles traditionally govern the relationship between the two: 1) separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello and 2) equal application of jus in bello to the conflicting parties. These principles emerged in response to the claim that a conflicting party using force illegally under jus ad bellum should not benefit from the protection for victims of armed conflict under jus in bello, which would completely defeat the humanitarian purpose of jus in bello to protect all victims of armed conflict impartially. There is, however, a third principle: concurrent application of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Unlike in the past, jus ad bellum now regulates the use of force during a conflict alongside jus in bello and hence, the two are now considered as one set of rules applying during a conflict. The book explores in detail the interaction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello in the light of these three principles. The relationship between the two has been principally discussed in the context of the use of force in self-defence and international armed conflict. However, this book examines the relationship in other contexts of a very different nature, namely the use of force under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, non-international armed conflict, and armed conflict of a mixed character. The book concludes that the three principles governing the relationship are equally valid, with certain variations, in these different contexts.

The proportionality test, as proposed in Robert Alexy's principles theory, is becoming commonplace in comparative constitutional studies. And yet, the question "are courts justified in borrowing proportionality?" has not been expressly put in many countries where judicial borrowings are a reality. This book sheds light on this question and examines the circumstances under which courts are authorized to borrow from alien legal sources to rule on constitutional cases. Taking the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil - and its enthusiastic recourse to proportionality when interpreting the Federal Constitution - as a case study, the book investigates the normative reasons that could justify the court's attitude and offers a comprehensive overview of its case law on controversial constitutional matters like abortion, same-sex union, racial quotas, and the right to public healthcare. Providing a valuable resource for those interested in comparative constitutional law and legal theory, or curious about Brazilian constitutional law, this book questions the alleged universality of the proportionality test, challenges the premises of Alexy's principles theory, and discloses more than 68 Brazilian Supreme Court decisions delivered from 2003 to 2018 that would otherwise have remained unknown to an English-speaking audience.

This book discusses the relationship between democracy and the financial order from various legal perspectives. Each of the nine contributions adopts a unique perspective on the legal and political challenges brought to the fore by the Global Financial Crisis. This crisis and the ensuing sovereign debt crisis in Europe are only the latest in a long series of financial crises around the globe in recent decades. By their very existence, but also as a result of the political turmoil they have created, these financial crises testify to the well-known tensions between democracy and a market-based economic and financial order. However, what is missing in this debate is an analysis of the role of law for reconciling democracy with a market-based financial order. To fill this lacuna, the book focuses on the controversy surrounding the concept of law, thereby adding another variable to the debate on the relation between democracy and capitalism. Each chapter addresses the concept of law from a particular theoretical angle, be it a full-grown legal theory or an approach in political economy that has a particular view of the law.

The subject of this book is human rights law, focusing on historic achievement of a common standard viewed from a perspective of Pengchun Chang's contributions to the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). This is an original research, integrating different research methods: inter-disciplinary approaches, historical and comparative methods, and documentary research and so on. The research findings can be described briefly as follows: Chinese wisdom has played an important role in achieving a common standard for the establishment of the international human rights system, which can be seen by exploring P. C. Chang's contributions to the drafting of the UDHR. The target readers are global scholars and students in law, politics, philosophy, international relations, human rights law, legal history, religion and culture. This book will enable these potential readers to have a vivid picture of the Chinese contributions to the international human rights regime and to have a better understanding of the significance of the traditional Chinese culture and P. C. Chang's human rights philosophy of pluralism.

How should disability justice be conceptualised, not by orthodox human rights or capabilities approaches, but by a legal philosophy that mirrors an African relational community ideal? This book develops the first comprehensive answer to this question through the contemporary literature on African philosophy, which is relied upon to construct a legal philosophy of disability justice comprising of ethical ideals of community, human relationships and obligations. From these ideals, an African legal philosophy of disability justice is offered as a criterion for critically evaluating existing laws, legal and political institutions, as well as providing an ethical basis for creating new ones to ensure that they are inclusive to people with disabilities. In taking an alternative perspective on the subject, the book outlines and emphasises the need for a new public culture of obligations owed to people with disabilities, highlighting both the prospects and difficulties of achieving the ideal of disability justice that continues to elude the lived experiences of millions of Africans today. Oche Onazi's An African Path to Disability Justice is the first book-length exploration of disability in the light of African ethics, as contrasted with the human rights and capabilities frameworks. Of particular interest are Onazi's thoughtful reflections on how various conceptions of community salient in African moral philosophy--including group-based, reciprocal and relational--bear on what we owe to the disabled. --Thaddeus Metz, Distinguished Professor, University of Johannesburg

This book studies the practical experience and theoretical development of rule of law in China, and provides fundamental theory for the construction of rule of law in contemporary China. The author examines the rule of law by exploring the entire legal system, and highlighting various aspects including the legislation, law enforcement and supervision systems. Readers will also discover the author's strong opinions on scientific legislation, legal government, judicial reform, and the culture of rule of law. This highly readable book will appeal to both general readers and researchers interested in rule of law in China.

This volume highlights important aspects of the complex relationship between common language and legal practice. It hosts an interdisciplinary discussion between cognitive science, philosophy of language and philosophy of law, in which an international group of authors aims to promote, enrich and refine this new debate. Philosophers of law have always shown a keen interest in cognitive science and philosophy of language in order to find tools to solve their problems: recently this interest was reciprocated and scholars from cognitive science and philosophy of language now look to the law as a testing ground for their theses. Using the most sophisticated tools available to pragmatics, sociolinguistics, cognitive sciences and legal theory, an interdisciplinary, international group of authors address questions like: Does legal interpretation differ from ordinary understanding? Is the common pragmatic apparatus appropriate to legal practice? What can pragmatics teach about the concept of law and pervasive legal phenomena such as testimony or legal disagreements?

'A bracing account of abuses of power and corruption in the criminal justice system.' The Guardian From the fearless defense attorney and civil rights lawyer who rose to fame with Netflix's The Staircase comes an essential examination of America's corrupt and abusive criminal justice system. In the past thirty years, more than 2,700 innocent American prisoners-their combined jail sentences adding up to almost 25,000 years-have been exonerated and freed. Terrifyingly, this number represents only a small fraction of the number of persons wrongfully convicted each year. As a result, US jails and prisons are packed with men and women who should not be there, but for crooked police, false testimony, shoddy investigators, vindictive judges, bogus expert witnesses or, far too often, the colour of their skin and their economic condition. Renowned criminal defense attorney and civil rights lawyer David Rudolf has spent his career defending the wrongfully accused. In American Injustice, he draws from his years of experience in the American criminal justice system, including some of his biggest cases, to shed light on the immorality and deceit prevalent at all levels of law enforcement, and the tragic consequences of this misconduct. Rudolf takes the reader to crime scenes to reveal how detectives retrieve evidence that supports their accusations and hide that which doesn't; revisits several unsolved murders to detail how and why the true culprits were never prosecuted; explores how unconscious bias frequently leads prosecutors and police to jump to false conclusions; and exposes how poverty and racism fundamentally deform the system-and why some want to keep it that way.

European integration confronts us with the limits of current constitutional and democratic language. The way out of this impasse will only appear through a refinement of what we consider the European Union to be as a political entity and of our concepts of democracy. In this challenging and thoughtful new book Professor Verhoeven offers a crystal-clear synthesis and analysis of the current state of the European Union as a constitutional project. While she recognizes the continuity of this project with social contract theory and the federal ideal - and uncovers the specific aspects of democracy and constitutionalism the EU has already embraced - she shows how the terms and presuppositions of those persistent conceptual frameworks must be fundamentally revised. At the root of these necessary revisions lies the irreversible onset of multiculturalism and globalisation, twin challenges that force us to reconsider issues of sovereignty and self-governance. Professor Verhoeven does not neglect the much-debated issues at the centre of her topic. Her analysis extends to such critiques as the view of the European constitution as a Court-led process of vertical integration, the meaning of EU citizenship, variability in EU decision-making procedures, the concept of institutional balance, territorial differences in the application of EU law, the whole area of delegated rule-making and the relationship between the European and national legal orders. As a thorough investigation of how democracy and constitutionalism can be reconceptualised in order to meet the challenge of European integration, The European Union in Search of a Democratic and Constitutional Theory will greatly reward the attention oflawyers, policymakers, and scholars in the field.