This book discusses the impact of war on the complex interactions between various actors involved in justice: individuals and social groups on the one hand and 'the justice system' (police, judiciary and professionals working in the prison service) on the other. It also highlights the emergence of new expectations of justice among these actors as a result of war. Furthermore, the book addresses justice practices, strategies for coping with the changing circumstances, new forms of negotiation, interactions, relationships between populations and the formal justice system in this specific context, and the long-term effects of this renegotiation. Ten out of the eleven chapters focus on Belgian issues, covering the two world wars in equal measure. Belgium's diverse war experiences in the twentieth century mean that a study of the country provides fascinating insights into the impact of war on the dynamics of 'doing justice'. The Belgian army fought in both world wars, and the vast majority of the population experienced military occupation. The latter led to various forms of collaboration with the enemy, which required the newly reinstalled Belgian government to implement large-scale judicial processes to repress these 'antipatriotic' behaviours, in order to restore both its authority and legitimacy and to re-establish social peace.

Abraham Lincoln worried that the "walls" of the constitution would ultimately be leveled by the "silent artillery of time." His fears materialized with the 1913 ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, which, by eliminating federalism's structural protection, altered the very nature and meaning of federalism. Ralph A. Rossum's provocative new book considers the forces unleashed by an amendment to install the direct election of U.S. Senators. Far from expecting federalism to be protected by an activist court, the Framers, Rossum argues, expected the constitutional structure, particularly the election of the Senate by state legislatures, to sustain it. In Federalism, the Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment Rossum challenges the fundamental jurisprudential assumptions about federalism. He also provides a powerful indictment of the controversial federalist decisions recently handed down by an activist U.S. Supreme Court seeking to fill the gap created by the Seventeenth Amendment's ratification and protect the original federal design. Rossum's masterful handling of the development of federalism restores the true significance to an amendment previously consigned to the footnotes of history. It demonstrates how the original federal design has been amended out of existence; the interests of states as states abandoned and federalism left unprotected, both structurally and democratically. It highlights the ultimate irony of constitutional democracy: that an amendment intended to promote democracy, even at the expense of federalism, has been undermined by an activist court intent on protecting federalism, at the expense of democracy.

For most Americans, habeas corpus is the cornerstone of our legal system: the principal constitutional check on arbitrary government power, allowing an arrested person to challenge the legality of his detention. In a study that could not be more timely, Justin Wert reexamines this essential individual right and shows that habeas corpus is not necessarily the check that we've assumed. Habeas corpus, it emerges, is as much a tool of politics as it is of law.
In this first study of habeas corpus in an American political context, Wert shifts our collective emphasis from the judicial to the political-toward the changes in the writ influenced by Congress, the president, political parties, state governments, legal academics, and even interest groups. By doing so, he reveals how political regimes have used habeas corpus both to undo the legacies of their predecessors and to establish and enforce their own vision of constitutional governance.

Tracing the history of the writ from the Founding to Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Boumediene v. Bush, Wert illuminates crucial developmental moments in its evolution. He demonstrates that during the antebellum period, Reconstruction, Gilded Age, Great Society, and the ongoing war on terrorism, habeas corpus has waxed and waned in harmony with the interests of majoritarian politics. Along the way, Wert identifies and explains the political context of fine points of law that many political scientists and historians may not be aware of-such as the exhaustion rule requiring that a federal habeas participant must first exhaust all possible claims for relief in state court, a maneuver by which the post-Reconstruction Court abandoned supervision of race relations in the South.

Especially in light of the new scrutiny of habeas corpus prompted by the Guantnamo detainees, Wert's book is essential for broadening our understanding of how law and politics continue to intersect after 9/11. Brimming with fresh insights into constitutional development and regime theory, it shows that the Great Writ of Liberty may not be so great as we have supposed--because while it has the potential to enforce conceptions of rights that are consistent with the best ideals of American politics, it also has the potential to enforce its worst aspects as well.

This book investigates whether treaty interpretation at the ECtHR and WTO, which are sometimes perceived as promoting 'self-contained' regimes, could constitute a means for unifying international law, or, conversely, might exacerbate the fragmentation of international law. In this regard, the practice of the ICJ on treaty interpretation is used for comparison, since the ICJ has made the greatest contribution to the development and clarification of international law rules and principles. Providing a critical analysis of cases at the ICJ, ECtHR and WTO, both prior to and since the adoption of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the book reveals how the ECtHR and WTO apply the general rules of treaty interpretation in patterns which are similar to those used by the ICJ to address difficulties in interpreting the text of treaties. Viewed in the light of the ECtHR's and WTO's interpretative practices, both the VCLT's general rules of interpretation and the ICJ's interpretative practice serve to counteract the fragmentation of international law.

Justice as Right Actions presents an original theory of justice anchored in the analytical philosophical tradition. In contrast to many contemporary approaches, the theory provides normative guidance, rather than focusing solely on political structures and institutions, as the question of justice is seen to comprise both a moral inquiry concerned with questions of good and bad, right and wrong, and a political inquiry, concerned with the nature of the polity and how individuals relate to it. Presenting a relational account of justice, rather than a distributive account - the latter, so much more prevalent in current studies - communications are seen as the key to the theory, both in the substantive sense as a discursive method of resolving disputes, as well as instrumentally, in the transmission of concepts, especially values through time. Rule-oriented in approach, justice as right actions attempts to be value-neutral, acknowledging, however, an underlying thin theory of the good, including concepts of rationality, autonomous moral agency, equal concern and respect for others, as well as plurality of values. Its political context is liberalism, with components of negative liberty and equality of concern and respect, while underscoring as well, the concepts of tolerance and social diversity. In this study, the original theory of Justice as Right Actions is also contrasted with and situated among contemporary accounts of justice, including the most important theoretical works on the topic in the past half-century. Thus, the study also serves as a valuable review and critique of such major contemporary accounts of justice.

Dyzenhaus deals with the urgent question of how governments should respond to emergencies and terrorism by exploring the idea that there is an unwritten constitution of law, exemplified in the common law constitution of Commonwealth countries. He looks mainly to cases decided in the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada to demonstrate that even in the absence of an entrenched bill of rights, the law provides a moral resource that can inform a rule-of-law project capable of responding to situations which place legal and political order under great stress. Those cases are discussed against a backdrop of recent writing and judicial decisions in the United States of America in order to show that the issues are not confined to the Commonwealth. The author argues that the rule-of-law project is one in which judges play an important role, but which also requires the participation of the legislature and the executive.

What is 'intellectual property'? This book examines the way in which this important area of law is constructed by the legal system. It argues that intellectual property is a body of rules, created by the legal system, that regulate the documented forms of abstract objects, which are also defined into existence by the legal system. Intellectual property law thus constructs its own objects of regulation and it does so through the application of a collection of core concepts. By analyzing the metaphysical structure of intellectual property law and the concepts the legal system uses to construct 'intellectual property', the book sheds new light on the nature of this fascinating area of law. It explains anomalies between social and intellectual property uses of concepts such as authorship - here dubbed 'creatorship' - and originality and it helps to explain the role of intellectual property from a structural (rather than the traditional normative) perspective.

This volume is the second part of a project which hosts an interdisciplinary discussion about the relationship among law and language, legal practice and ordinary conversation, legal philosophy and the linguistics sciences. An international group of authors, from cognitive science, philosophy of language and philosophy of law question about how legal theory and pragmatics can enrich each other. In particular, the first part is devoted to the analysis of how pragmatics can solve problems related to legal theory: What can pragmatics teach about the concept of law and its relationship with moral, and, in particular, about the eternal dispute between legal positivism and legal naturalism? What can pragmatics teach about the concept of law and/or legal disagreements? The second part is focused on legal adjudication: it aims to construct a pragmatic apparatus appropriate to legal trial and/or to test the tenure of the traditional pragmatics tools in the field. The authors face questions such as: Which interesting pragmatic features emerge from legal adjudication? What pragmatic theories are better suited to account for the practice of judgment or its particular aspects (such as the testimony or the binding force of legal precedents)? Which pragmatic and socio-linguistic problems are highlighted by this practice?

This book addresses theoretical problems concerning legal evidence. The concept of evidence is expected to fulfill a number of distinct roles in science and philosophy, but also in legal theory and law, some of which are complementary, while others are conflicting. In their profession, lawyers have to deal with evidence and proof. Yet the legal concept of evidence is constantly changing, and the debate concerning the distinction between a legal concept of evidence, the ordinary concept of evidence and the concept of evidence in science is far from being settled. What is more, the problem of evidence is central to both epistemology and the philosophy of science, and by extension to our academic thinking on law. In short, legal theorists' interest in evidence may include such diverse objects as a bloody knife, sensory data, linguistic entities or psychologically recognized beliefs. The book surveys selected theoretical roles that the concept of evidence plays and explores their relations and interconnections. The content is divided into three parts, investigating: (1) evidence in epistemology and the philosophy of science, which focuses on evidence methodologies and the problem of proof in legal scholarship; (2) evidence in legal theory and legal philosophy, where particular attention is paid to the interplay between evidence, legal reasoning and the binding force of such reasoning; and (3) evidence in law, where theoretical problems pertaining to witnesses, expert opinions, explanations of the accused, statistical evidence and neuroscientific evidence are examined.

On Trial is an exegesis on legal reason, moral judgment, political life, and the events that give them meaning. Beginning with the serpent in the Garden of Eden and ending with O. J. Simpson, esteemed thinker George Anastaplo offers students, scholars, and informed readers an exploration of justice and the rule of law through well-known trials ancient and modern, real and fictional. Anastaplo starts with an interrogation of the good common sense on which most of us draw to make successful judgments. He examines the nurturing of this faculty against rationality, moral obligation, and the contingencies of history and culture. Using classic literary sources as well as real trial histories, On Trial puts legal and moral reason squarely beneath the critical lens.

This book intends to contribute to the consolidation of the new approach to lawmaking that has taken place in the last 20 years in legal philosophy and legal theory, spreading to other legal fields, especially criminal law. This new legislation science focusing on criminal problems has triggered a growing interest in the field, a dynamic which has led to a long-needed convergence of disciplines such as administrative law, criminal law, criminology, political science, sociology and, of course, legal philosophy to contribute to a more rational decision-making process for the construct of criminal laws. With the intention to continue on with the building of a solid "Criminal Legislation Science", this work presents scholars, lawmakers and students various emblematic approaches to enrich the discussion about different and promising tools and theoretical frameworks.

On Trial is an exegesis on legal reason, moral judgment, political life, and the events that give them meaning. Beginning with the serpent in the Garden of Eden and ending with O. J. Simpson, esteemed thinker George Anastaplo offers students, scholars, and informed readers an exploration of justice and the rule of law through well-known trials ancient and modern, real and fictional. Anastaplo starts with an interrogation of the good common sense on which most of us draw to make successful judgments. He examines the nurturing of this faculty against rationality, moral obligation, and the contingencies of history and culture. Using classic literary sources as well as real trial histories, On Trial puts legal and moral reason squarely beneath the critical lens.

Abraham Lincoln worried that the 'walls' of the constitution would ultimately be leveled by the 'silent artillery of time.' His fears materialized with the 1913 ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, which, by eliminating federalism's structural protection, altered the very nature and meaning of federalism. Ralph A. Rossum's provocative new book considers the forces unleashed by an amendment to install the direct election of U.S. Senators. Far from expecting federalism to be protected by an activist court, the Framers, Rossum argues, expected the constitutional structure, particularly the election of the Senate by state legislatures, to sustain it. In Federalism, the Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment Rossum challenges the fundamental jurisprudential assumptions about federalism. He also provides a powerful indictment of the controversial federalist decisions recently handed down by an activist U.S. Supreme Court seeking to fill the gap created by the Seventeenth Amendment's ratification and protect the original federal design. Rossum's masterful handling of the development of federalism restores the true significance to an amendment previously consigned to the footnotes of history. It demonstrates how the original federal design has been amended out of existence; the interests of states as states abandoned and federalism left unprotected, both structurally and democratically. It highlights the ultimate irony of constitutional democracy: that an amendment intended to promote democracy, even at the expense of federalism, has been undermined by an activist court intent on protecting federalism, at the expense of democracy.

This book focuses on Jurgen Habermas' theorising on law, rights and democracy in light of the modern critique of law. The latter tradition, which goes back to Hegel and Marx, has addressed the limitations of rights as vocabulary of emancipation and law as language of autonomy. Since Habermas claims that his reconstruction of private and public autonomy has an emancipatory aim, the author has chosen to discuss it in the context of the modern critique of law. More specifically, the study addresses the need to consider the dialectic of law, in which law is both a condition for emancipation and domination, when discussing what law and rights permit. It will appeal to students and scholars across the fields of political theory, law and legal criticism, as well as sociology and sociology of law.

Tackling important philosophical questions on modernity - what it is, where it begins and when it ends - Przemyslaw Tacik challenges the idea that modernity marks a particular epoch, and historicises its conception to offer a radical critique of it. His deconstruction-informed critique collects and assesses reflections on modernity from major philosophers including Hegel, Heidegger, Lacan, Arendt, Agamben, and Zizek. This analysis progresses a new understanding of modernity intrinsically connected to the growth of sovereignty as an organising principle of contemporary life. He argues that it is the idea of 'modernity', as a taken-for-granted era, which is positioned as the essential condition for making linear history possible, when it should instead be history, in and of itself, which dictates the existence of a particular period. Using Hegel's notion of 'spirit' to trace the importance of sovereignty to the conception of the modern epoch within German idealism, Tacik traces Hegel's influence on Heidegger through reference to the 'star' in his late philosophy which represents the hope of overcoming the metaphysical poverty of modernity. This line of thought reveals the necessity of a paradigm shift in our understanding of modernity that speaks to contemporary continental philosophy, theories of modernity, political theory, and critical re-assessments of Marxism.

If Raz and Dworkin disagree over how law should be characterised,how are we, their jurisprudential public, supposed to go about adjudicating between the rival theories which they offer us? To what considerations would those theorists themselves appeal in order to convince us that their accounts of law are accurate and successful? Moreover, what is it that makes an account of law successful? Evaluation and Legal Theory tackles methodological or meta-theoretical issues such as these, and does so via attempting to answer the question: to what extent, and in what sense, must a legal theorist make value judgements about his data in order to construct a successful theory of law? Dispelling the obfuscatory myth that legal positivism seeks a 'value-free' account of law, the author attempts to explain and defend Joseph Raz's position that evaluation is essential to successful legal theory, whilst refuting John Finnis and Ronald Dworkin's contentions that the legal theorist must morally evaluate and morally justify the law in order to properly explain its nature. The book does not claim to solve the many mysteries of meta-legal theory but does seek to contribute to and engender rigorous and focused debate on this topic.

The two sections of this volume present theoretical developments and practical applicative papers respectively. Theoretical papers cover topics such as intercultural pragmatics, evolutionism, argumentation theory, pragmatics and law, the semantics/pragmatics debate, slurs, and more. The applied papers focus on topics such as pragmatic disorders, mapping places of origin, stance-taking, societal pragmatics, and cultural linguistics. This is the second volume of invited papers that were presented at the inaugural Pragmasofia conference in Palermo in 2016, and like its predecessor presents papers by well-known philosophers, linguists, and a semiotician. The papers present a wide variety of perspectives independent from any one school of thought.

In this book I argue for an approach that conceives human rights as both moral and legal rights. The merit of such an approach is its capacity to understand human rights more in terms of the kind of world free and reasonable beings would like to live in rather than simply in terms of what each individual is legally entitled to. While I acknowledge that every human being has the moral entitlement to be granted living conditions that are conducive to a dignified life, I maintain, at the same time, that the moral and legal aspects of human rights are complementary and should be given equal weight. The legal aspect compensates for the limitations of moral human rights the observance of which depends on the conscience of the individual, and the moral aspect tempers the mechanical and inhumane application of the law. Unlike the traditional or orthodox approach, which conceives human rights as rights that individuals have by virtue of their humanity, and the political or practical approach, which understands human rights as legal rights that are meant to limit the sovereignty of the state, the moral-legal approach reconciles law and morality in human rights discourse and underlines the importance of a legal framework that compensates for the deficiencies in the implementation of moral human rights. It not only challenges the exclusively negative approach to fundamental liberties but also emphasizes the necessity of an enforcement mechanism that helps those who are not morally motivated to refrain from violating the rights of others. Without the legal mechanism of enforcement, the understanding of human rights would be reduced to simply framing moral claims against injustices. From the moral-legal approach, the protection of human rights is understood as a common and shared responsibility. Such a responsibility goes beyond the boundaries of nation-states and requires the establishment of a cosmopolitan human rights regime based on the conviction that all human beings are members of a community of fate and that they share common values which transcend the limits of their individual states. In a cosmopolitan human rights regime, people are protected as persons and not as citizens of a particular state.

This book brings together disparate views which attempt to locate India in the contemporary international legal order. The essays endeavour to explore critically India's role and attitude towards international law in various fields and its influence and contribution in the development of the latter. The contributions are also of historical value, as they analyse the present as part of a historical trajectory. Drawing upon the current and historical practices from their respective fields, the authors attempt to highlight some critical aspects involving India and international law. These aspects broadly underline India's drift from its traditional role as an ally and proponent of the third world towards the pragmatism of self-interest, behaviour that is often compelled by internal political and economic conditions, as well as the dictates of external forces.

Comparative Legal Reasoning and European Law deals with the use of comparative law in European legal adjudication. It describes the different forms of the use of comparative law in legal reasoning, argumentation and justification in several national legal orders and in European level legal institutions. The book begins with an inquiry into the nature of comparative law as a legal source. After the description of the empirical study it ends to the general theory of European law and several hard cases of European law are examined. The book is intended for students and researchers in European law but it also contains aspects to be taken into account in the practical work in European legal orders and legal institutions by judges and legal practitioners.

This book offers a new perspective on advance directives through a combined legal, ethical and philosophical inquiry. In addition to making a significant and novel theoretical contribution to the field, the book has an interdisciplinary and international appeal. The book will help academics, healthcare professionals, legal practitioners and the educated reader to understand the challenges of creating and implementing advance directives, anticipate clinical realities, and preparing advance directives that reflect a higher degree of assurance in terms of implementation.

The first attempt to address comparative property law in a common integrative framework, this study discusses German, Italian, French, American, and British property law as mere variations based upon a few fundamental themes through which these nations developed legal systems to provide responses to common economic problems and to set legal foundations for working markets. "Basic Principles of Property LaW" was produced to offer a common framework for the discussion of the law of property within countries in transition, thus it has its basis, not on just one legal system, but on the institutional commonalties that make western property law a working market institution. It offers a major challenge to conventional thinking that in property law the differences between common law and civil law are so important that common core research is impossible.

Mattei hopes to guide the reader to think comparatively about property by shedding many preconceived formalistic abstractions. The substance of property law, he argues, is much more common throughout the Western legal tradition than legal scholars would have us believe. Through a set format and accessible writing, this book looks at national legal traditions as responses to common economic problems. It sets the foundations for further much needed integrative comparative legal research in the domain of property law.

This book defines the characteristics of a new discipline that is both legal and scientific: user-friendly legal science.Focusing on how legal tools and practices can be used to achieve objectives in different contexts, it offers an alternative to doctrinal research, law-and-something disciplines, and the traditional interdisciplinary approach.The book not only defines the new discipline's research approach, point of view, theory-building, and research methods, it also shows how it relates to other scientific disciplines and how existing doctrinal legal disciplines can be upgraded into scientific disciplines.

'The Handbook brings together a unique collection of world renowned experts providing detailed discussion in every chapter. The brilliance of this collective work is found in its broad two dimensional focus - beyond patents to all key IP assets on the one hand, and country specific discussion for key regions around the world on the other. . . Whether read cover-to-cover as a compilation of current best practice or used as a true reference guide, the Research Handbook on Intellectual Property Licensing is a must have for anyone seeking to capture value from intangible assets.' - From the foreword by James E. MalackowskiThe Research Handbook on Intellectual Property Licensing explores the complexities of intellectual property licensing law from a comparative perspective through the opinions of leading experts. This major research tool analyses the features of specific types of licensing agreements and also addresses other practical issues which apply across different types of licensing transactions, such as the treatment of licensing in bankruptcy and the use of arbitration for solving licensing disputes. The Handbook ultimately provides a scholarly contribution to the development of global intellectual property licensing policies. Including transversal and comparative analysis, this Handbook will appeal to intellectual property licensing practitioners, lawyers and intellectual property and contract law academics. Contributors: M. Anderson, P. Beyer, L. Brennan, P. de Miguel Asensio, J. de Werra, F. Dessemontet, J. Dodd, J.C. Ginsburg, H. Goddar, R.W. Gomulkiewicz, R.A. Hillman, J. Hull, N. Krishnamurthy, R.T. Nimmer, M.A. O'Rourke, M. Reutter, A. Strowel, S. Teramoto, B. Vanbrabant, N. Wilkof, H. Xue

This collection is the multifaceted result of an effort to learn from those who have been educated in an American law school and who then returned to their home countries to apply the lessons of that experience in nations experiencing social, economic, governmental, and legal transition. Written by an international group of scholars and practitioners, this work provides a unique insight into the ways in which legal education impacts the legal system in the recipient's home country, addressing such topics as efforts to influence the current style of legal education in a country and the resistance faced from entrenched senior faculty and the use of U.S. legal education methods in government and private legal practice. This book will be of significant interest not only to legal educators in the United States and internationally, and to administrators of legal education policy and reform, but also to scholars seeking a more in-depth understanding of the connections between legal education and socio-political change.