Can private law assume an ecological meaning? Can property and contract defend nature? Is tort law an adequate tool for paying environmental damages to future generations? This book explores potential resolutions to these questions, analyzing the evolution of legal thinking in relation to the topics of legal personality, property, contract and tort. In this forward thinking book, Mattei and Quarta suggest a list of basic principles upon which a new, ecological legal system could be based. Taking private law to represent an ally in the defence of our future, they offer a clear characterization of the fundamental legal institutions of common law and civil law, considering the challenges of the Anthropogenic era, technological tools of the Internet era, and the global rise of the commons. Summarizing the fundamental institutions of private law: property rights, legal personality, contract, and tort, the authors reveal the limits of these legal institutions in relation to historical international evolution and their regulation in the contexts of catastrophic ecological issues and technological developments. Engaging and thoughtful, this book will be interesting reading for legal scholars and academics of private law and, in particular, those wishing to understand the role of law when facing technological and ecological challenges.

An Approach to Rights contains fifteen previously published but mostly inaccessible papers that together show the development of one of the more important contemporary theories of the nature, grounds and practical implications of rights. In a long retrospective essay, Carl Wellman explains what he was trying to accomplish in each paper, how far he believes that he succeeded and where he failed. Thus the author provides a critical perspective both on his own theory and on alternative theories from which he borrows, or that he rejects. These essays identify the problems any adequate theory of rights must solve, describe the more plausible solutions and weigh the merits of each. They will be of special interest to any reader concerned with legal theory, moral philosophy or any branch of applied ethics or social policy in which appeals to rights are frequently made but seldom rationally satisfactory.

* John Connor describes and evaluates the results of his extensive survey of reports of cartel overcharges.
* Dennis Weisman models the price effects of mergers that not only increase concentration in the relevant market but also increase the merged firms' participation in other, complementary markets.
* Malcolm Coate and Mark Williams develop a superior method for calculating critical loss in markets that are relatively homogenous and competitive premerger.
* Zhiqi Chen surveys recent developments in economic theories of buyer power and creates a general framework for antitrust analysis.
* Thomas J. Miceli and Kathern Segerson, given the difficulty of collecting damages after a long latency period, examine the desirability of granting toxic exposure victims an independent cause of action for medical monitoring at the time of exposure. They shows that such a cause of action incarease incentives for injurer care but only at the cost of greater litigation cost. the reluctance of courts to adopt such a proposed cause of action reflects theri awareness of this trade-off.
*Each chapter examines in depth a topic in law and economics.
*Written by leading experts in the field.

Gans ranks at the head of that important group of Hegelian thinkers that bridged the generations of Hegel and Marx. ! Yet there is a large gap between Gans 's historical importance and the scholarship on him. Despite a renewal of interest in Gans's work on the Continent,2 Gans remains almost completely unknown to English-Ianguage scholars, and almost none ofhis work has been 3 previously translated. His Prefaces to his posthumous editions of Hegel's writings are inaccessib1e to English speakers, despite the fact that they shed important light on the authenticity of the so-called Additions to those texts. His Preface to Hegel's Philosophy ofLaw has never been translated before, while his Preface to the Philosophy of History has been omitted from reprintings 4 for generations. Moreover, the recent scholarship on the Continent has focused on Gans 's political and philosophical rather than his legal writings. There is little dis cussion in any language ofhis system oflaw, which is the focus ofthe present study. Some of the reasons for the neglect of Gans are obvious. Gans cannot be a hero for most readers today. He accepted apostasy as a means to profes sional advancement. And though more liberal than Hegel, Gans nonetheless accommodated himself to the results of the Restoration and evaded political persecution that might have kindled the sympathy of later generations.

In this book the practical dimension of social justice is explained using the analysis and discussion of a variety of well-known topics. These include: the relation between theory and practice in normative political philosophy;the issue of justice under uncertainty; the question of whether we can and should unmask social injustices by means of conspiracy theories; the issues of privacy and the right to privacy; the issue of how certain psychological states may affect our moral obligations, in particular the obligation to treat others fairly; and finally the concepts of morality, fairness, and self-deception. The primary goal of the book is to provide readers with an updated discussion of some important and practical social justice issues. These issues are presentedfrom anew perspective, based on the authors research. It is hoped that bringing these topics together in a single book will promote the emergence of new insights and challenges for future research.

Juha Raikka is a professor at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Turku, Finland. His research focuses on ethics and political philosophy.

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In this book a theory of reasoning with evidence in the context of criminal cases is developed. The main subject of this study is not the law of evidence but rather the rational process of proof, which involves constructing, testing and justifying scenarios about what happened using evidence and commonsense knowledge. A central theme in the book is the analysis of ones reasoning, so that complex patterns are made more explicit and clear. This analysis uses stories about what happened and arguments to anchor these stories in evidence. Thus the argumentative and the narrative approaches from the research in legal philosophy and legal psychology are combined. Because the book describes its subjects in both an informal and a formal style, it is relevant for scholars in legal philosophy, AI, logic and argumentation theory. The book can also appeal to practitioners in the investigative and legal professions, who are interested in the ways in which they can and should reason with evidence.

Transparency is a fundamental principle of justice. A cornerstone of the rule of law, it allows for public engagement and for democratic control of the decisions and actions of both the judiciary and the justice authorities. This book looks at the question of transparency within the framework of transitional justice. Bringing together scholars from across the disciplinary spectrum, the collection analyses the issue from socio-legal, cultural studies and practitioner perspectives. Taking a three-part approach, it firstly discusses basic principles guiding justice globally before exploring courts and how they make justice visible. Finally, the collection reviews the interface between law, transitional justice institutions and the public sphere.

This book explores topical issues in military ethics by according peace a central role within an interdisciplinary framework. Whilst war and peace have traditionally been viewed through the lens of philosophical enquiry, political issues and theological ideas - as well as common sense - have also influenced people's understanding of armed conflicts with regards to both the moral issues they raise and the policies and actions they require. Comprised of fourteen essays on the role and application of peace, the book places emphasis on it's philosophical, moral, theological, technological, and practical implications. Starting with an overview of Kantian perspectives on peace, it moves to discussions of the Just War debates, religious conceptualizations of peace, and the role of peace in modern war technology and cyber-security. Finally concluding with discussions of the psychological and medical impacts of war and peace on both the individual and the larger society, this collection offers a contribution to the field and will be of interest to a wide audience. Chapters 4, 6 and 10 of this book are available open access under a CC BY 4.0 license at link.springer.com.

Plessy v Ferguson (1897) established racial segregation in American constitutional law for over fifty years and its moral and political legacy lives on, despite attempts in the United States to counter its devastating effects during the last half century. Ironically, in the current debate over affirmative action, Justice Harlan's eloquent dissent has been used to justify attacks on government affirmative action programs. In this book, five distinguished philosophers and constitutional theorists, working from very different theoretical positions, take a fresh critical look at the moral and political principles underlying this historic decision and Harlan's dissent. They also explore the nature and extent of law's complicity in perpetuating Plessy's racialist aims. Emerging from their varied but complementary analyses is a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the social injustice of racial segregation in its historic and contemporary forms and of resources of the law to reverse it.

This volume discusses EU criminal justice from three perspectives. The first concerns fundamental rights following the adoption of the directives that have progressively reinforced the cornerstone of procedural rights of suspects and defendants in national criminal proceedings in the EU member states so as to facilitate judicial cooperation. The second perspective relates to transnational criminal investigations and proceedings, which are seen as a cross section of the current state of judicial cooperation in the area of freedom, security and justice, with the related issues of efficiency, coordination, settlement of conflicts of jurisdiction, and guarantees. The third perspective concerns the development of a supranational justice system in the light of the recently established European Public Prosecutor's Office, whose European judicial nature still coexists with strong national components.

This book investigates whether national courts could and should import innovative solutions from abroad in the adjudication of complex legal disputes. Special attention is paid to the concept of "legally relevant damage" and its importance in overcoming the deadlock created by the category of "pure economic loss" in the Portuguese and German tort law systems. These systems are essentially based on the concept of unlawfulness ("Rechtswidrigkeit"), which limits the compensation for pure economic loss to where a protective rule is infringed. These losses have nevertheless been compensated for through the extensive interpretation of rules and the appeal to near-contractual devices, which has been detrimental to legal certainty, the equality before the law, and subjects' freedom of action. This book explains why courts can and should take a proactive role and apply DCFR-based solutions in order to compensate for every loss that is worthy of legal protection.

Ours is an age of growing doubt about constitutional theory and of outright hostility to any theory that defends judicial review. Why should a tiny number of unelected judges be able to validate or invalidate laws on such politically controversial issues as abortion, religion, gender, and sex-or even determine how the president is elected? In this provocative book, a leading constitutional theorist offers an entirely original defense of judicial review. Louis Michael Seidman argues that judicial review is defensible if we set aside common but erroneous assumptions-that constitutional law should be independent from our political commitments and that the role of constitutional law is to settle political disagreement. Seidman develops a theory of "unsettlement." A constitution that unsettles, that destabilizes outcomes produced by the political process, creates no permanent losers nursing deep-seated grievances, he says. An "unsettling" constitution helps to build a community founded on consent by enticing losers into a continuing conversation. The author applies this theory to an array of well-known cases heard by the Supreme Court over the past several decades, including the fall 2000 election decision.

Over recent decades, international humanitarian law has been shaped by the omnipresence of so-called expert manuals. Astute and engaging, this discerning book provides a comprehensive account of these black letter rules and commentaries produced by private expert groups and demonstrates why the general acceptance of these expert manuals is largely unjustified. This theoretically grounded book bridges the divide between theory and practice by linking legal theory to the doctrinal and practical concerns of the laws of war. The author innovatively links interdisciplinary insights to the needs of military lawyers in practice, showing the pitfalls of relying on private manuals as arguable restatements and interpretations of the law 'as it is'. At the same time, he explains why expert processes are so successful and why this should be of concern to all of us. Stimulating and challenging, this book will prove essential reading for students and scholars of public international law, legal theory, and those focussing on the laws of war more specifically. Its practical approach will also greatly benefit legal practitioners working in the field of military law.

"Stewards of Democracy" is a celebration of a moral tradition famously observed by Alexis de Tocqueville through the eyes of Francis Lieber, a Prussian emigre who in antebellum times wrote of political ethics, hermeneutics, and comparative constitutional law as aspects of the moral duties of American lawyers and judges. The duty of the profession unifying this tradition has been to nurture and protect the institutions of self-government on which depend the stability of our complex social order and the protection of all our legal rights. Thomas Cooley, perhaps the lawyer most respected by nineteenth century Americans, is presented as a primary exemplar of the dutiful tradition. Much of the book is an account of his career as judge, scholar, teacher, and founding chair of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Cooley's career was succeeded in the tradition by a trio of Progressives: Louis Brandeis, Ernst Freund, and Learned Hand, whose careers area also examined. Finally noted is the more recent career of Byron White.Carrington contends that the dutiful tradition marked by the careers of the five exemplars is threatened by the mutually reinforcing tendencies of the Supreme Court and other high courts, of highly respected legal scholars, of the most honored of our law schools, and of noted legal journalists, all of whom tend to work from the premise that political and moral judgments can best be made by an elite and imposed on a passive citizenry, a belief tending to fulfill itself. The result is a threatened suffocation of the political institutions commanding the loyalty and enduring support of citizens. The book concludes by suggesting possible causes for a future reversal of this long-term trend and the steps such a reversal might entail.

This book discusses the legal thought of Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942), undoubtedly one of the titans of social sciences who greatly influenced not only the shape of modern cultural anthropology but also the social sciences as a whole. This is the first comprehensive work to focus on his legal conceptions: while much has been written about his views on language, magic, religion, and culture, his views on law have not been fairly reconstructed or recapitulated. A glance at the existing literature illustrates how little has been written about Malinowski's understanding of law, especially in the legal sciences. This becomes even more evident given the fact that Malinowski devoted much of his scholarly work to studying law, especially in the last period of his life, during which he conducted broad research on law and "primitive jurisprudence". The main aim of this book is to address this gap and to present in detail Malinowski's thoughts on law. The book is divided into two parts. Part I focuses largely on the impact that works of two distinguished professors from his alma mater (L. Dargun and S. Estreicher) had on Malinowski's legal thoughts, while Part II reconstructs Malinowski's inclusive, broad and multidimensional understanding of law and provides new readings of his legal conceptions mainly from the perspective of reciprocity. The book offers a fresh look at his views on law, paving the way for further studies on legal issues inspired by his methodological and theoretical achievements. Malinowski's understanding of law provides a wealth of fodder from which to formulate interesting research questions and a solid foundation for developing theories that more accurately describe and explain how law functions, based on new findings in the social and natural sciences.

This work explains the nature of constitutional rights. It does so by means of an analysis of the nature of law in general, the nature of constitutions, and the nature of rights. It looks in detail at several aspects of constitutional law, rights and institutions, as well as aspects related to public officials, private persons and associations. In addition, the book critically examines a considerable number of debates about whether some actual or proposed constitutional rights ought to be established and maintained in the United States constitution. It then identifies the kinds of reasons that justify or fail to justify constitutional rights. The book advances the debate and makes a contribution to the theory and the practice of constitutional rights.

This is the English version of Jerzy Wroblewski's major work in Polish, S dowe Stosowania Prawa (translated in his own preferred terms as 'The Judicial Application of Law'). The present translation arose out of a visit by the author to Scotland in 1989. In that year, the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland made it possible for Jerzy Wroblewski to spend six months as a Carnegie Fellow in the Centre for Criminology and the Social and Philosophical Study of Law at the University of Edinburgh. During that time he took a notably active part in the intellectual life of the Centre and the Faculty of Law. He gave freely of his time in teaching and advising students and also produced a series of original articles on topics connected with legal reasoning and law and computers. His major task while he was here, however, was to prepare a translation of S dowe Stosowania Prawa, and this he accomplished to the extent of completing a preliminary draft. Zenon Bankowski and Neil MacCormick were to help him in improving this linguistically and preparing the final text for publication. Wroblewski warned us, having finished his draft with great labour, that the greater labour would be in the polishing of it. For we would have, as he joked, 'to translate my English into English'. And certainly, we found it extremely time-consuming, so as to defy completion during his stay in Edinburgh.

This book develops the rudiments of a sociological perspective on state law and legal theory. It outlines a distinctive approach to theoretical enquiry that offers an improved understanding of law as a social and institutional phenomenon. The book draws upon Max Weber's sociological and juristic writings as a context in which to explore themes arising or selectively developed from a critical reassessment of key aspects of H.L.A. Hart's theory of law. The discussion initially centres around three problematical areas or 'Gordian Knots': essentially weaknesses in the analytical nucleus of The Concept of Law,matters of misplaced emphasis and other elements that, it is argued, have obscured fundamental aspects of a perceived social reality. Using the critique as a point of departure the book explores key issues that Hart merely touched upon or seemingly passed over: the role of the (sociologically inclined) jurist, the defensibility of an 'institutional insider's' perspective, the institutional behavioural dimension of the legal world, and the relational and social power dynamics of law-affected human behaviour.

This book offers a systematic and comprehensive account of the key cases that have come to shape the jurisprudence on emergency law in the United States from the Civil War to the War on Terror. The legal questions raised in these cases concern fundamental constitutional issues such as the status of fundamental rights, the role of the court in times of war, and the question of how to interpret constitutional limitations to executive power. At stake in these difficult legal questions is the issue of how to conceive of the very status of law in liberal democratic states. The questions with which the Supreme Court justices have to grapple in these cases are therefore as philosophical as they are legal. In this book the Court's arguments are systematized according to categories informed by constitutional law as well as classic philosophical discussions of the problem of emergency. On this basis, the book singles out three legal paradigms for interpreting the problem of emergency: the rights model, the extra-legal model and the procedural model. This systematic approach helps the reader develop a philosophical and legal overview of central issues in the jurisprudence on emergency.

Reason, Democracy, Society deals with basic points of legal theory and philosophy of law. The main contention of the book relates to the insufficiencies of the legal positivistic approach. Some of its claims are that we must sharply separate what the law is from, what the law ought to be, and that we can know what the law is without appealing to meta-legal considerations. These and other claims are criticized. The author shows that with the legal positivistic approach we cannot know, in all cases, what the law is, if that is equated to the rules posited by the legislator. He also challenges H.L.A. Hart's and MacCormick's points of view, amongst others, about the characteristic corner stones of legal positivism. Some other issues relate to human rights, legal rationality and efficiency and ethics. This book will be of interest to philosophers concerned with law or ethics, those concerned with justice in modern society and to jurists and law students.

Volume 37 of "Studies in Law, Politics, and Society" presents a special issue devoted to exploring humanistic perspectives on the subject of punishment. Drawing together a distinguished group of interdisciplinary scholars, it explores the way "deviant" subjects are constructed and made available for punishment, the philosophical context within which decisions about punishment are made, and the inner workings of the penal apparatus. Diverse in their theoretical inspirations and approaches, the articles published here represent a significant advance in our understanding of the complex intersections of punishment, politics, and culture.

Can a discipline that has become intensely specialized tell us anything about the world we live in? Or does it render itself socially irrelevant? These questions are at the heart of Richard A. Cosgrove's history of jurisprudence in England. Cosgrove's account begins with the emergence of the positivist belief that jurisprudence can solve the truly important social issues of the day and leads us through the gradual divorce of legal theory from legal history. Legal theory in the twentieth century, argues Cosgrove, has become narrow and abstract, irrelevant to the daily practice of the law. Contemporary theory, ever anxious to debunk elitism, ironically has become elitist itself. Cosgrove outlines an escape from this trap: jurisprudence must return to its interdisciplinary roots and draw upon economics, politics, and sociology. In short, theory and practice must be recombined. Cosgrove charts the history of English jurisprudence through its key figures: William Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham, John Austin, Henry Maine, Thomas Erskine Holland, and H. L. A. Hart. Through his careful, insightful scholarship and unpretentious prose, Cosgrove distinguishes the contributions of these theorists and clarifies their general move toward specialization.

Americans seem increasingly disenchanted with their legal system. In the wake of several high-profile trials, America's faith in legal authority appears profoundly shaken.

And yet, as David Ray Papke shows in this dramatic and erudite tour of American history, many Americans have challenged and often rejected the rule of law since the earliest days of the country's founding. Papke traces the lineage of such legal heretics from nineteenth-century activists William Lloyd Garrison and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, through Eugene Debs, and up to more recent radicals, such as the Black Panther Party, anti-abortionists, and militia members. A tradition of American legal heresy clearly emerges--linked together by a body of shared references, idols, and commitments--that problematizes the American belief in legal neutrality and highlights the historical conflicts between law and justice. Questioning the legal faith both peculiar and essential to American mythology, this alternative tradition is in itself an overlooked feature of American history and culture.