Gender and Justice is a unique core textbook that introduces key concepts through case studies. Each chapter opens with a compelling case study that illustrates key concepts, followed by a narrative chapter that builds on the case study to introduce essential elements. Each chapter features pedagogical elements-learning objectives, key terms, review and study questions, and suggestions for further learning and exploration. In addition to the unique case study approach, this book is distinctive in its inclusion of LGBTQ experiences in crime, victimization, processing, and punishment. Gender and Justice also addresses masculinity and the role it plays in defining offenders and victims, as well as challenges posed by the gender gap in offending.

This edited collection of papers comes from the well-established Modern Studies in Property Law biennial conference. It examines a diverse range of topics in property law and uses a wide range of methodological approaches to reflect on a variety of current and emerging themes and important issues that have been overlooked, offering new analysis and insights that will be valuable for property lawyers, academics, and students. It considers new developments in property law, including those connected with digital assets and the issues that have arisen from co-housing. The contributors are leading academics and practitioners from several common law jurisdictions, which expands the book’s focus and enhances its value to the reader.

This book examines the federal judiciary in light of political science research on the role of interests and interest groups in the making of public policy. The author finds that efforts of federal judges to shape court administration are guided, in part, by self-interest which consequently affects the development and results of judicial policies. He argues that we must recognize judges as self-interested political actors whose motivation and behavior patterns are comparable to other political and administrative actors. By examining the actions of federal judges on a series of illustrative issues--civil justice reform, judicial salaries, habeas corpus reform, and judicial bureaucratization--the book illuminates the ways in which the judges' self-interested actions affect the courts and society. Judicial self-interest is not portrayed here as bad or even unexpected, but as a motivational factor of significance for government, law, and society that should be recognized and harnessed appropriately.

Thepresentbookisbasedonthelecturesdeliveredbytheauthorinthepastfew yearsaspartoftheCriminalLawcourseoftheFacultyofLawattheOnoAcademic College. There has been little research on the principle of legality in modern criminallaw,althoughthisisoneofthemostancientlegalprinciplesofhuman society. In recent generations there have been several attempts to de?ne the principleconclusively,butonlywithregardtosomeofitsaspects. Nocompreh- sivede?nitionoftheprincipleoflegalityhasbeenattemptedtodate. Aconclusivede?nitionoftheprincipleoflegalityincriminallawrequiresboth anaccurateinward-lookingde?nitionoftheprincipleitself,andanoutward-lo- ingtreatmentofitsrelationwithcriminallawtheory. Onlyacoherenttheorythat includestheprincipleoflegalityasanintegralpartofcriminallawtheorycando justicetotheprincipleoflegality. Thisviewisconsistentwiththescienti?cconcept oflaw,whichregardsthelawaspartofscience. AModernTreatiseonthePrincipleofLegalityinCriminalLawisthereforea scienti?ctreatiseononeofthefourprinciplesofthecriminallaw. Thepresent treatiseisdividedintosixparts,accordingtothescienti?cunderstandingofthe principleoflegalityincriminallaw. Chapter1explorestherelationbetweenthe principleoflegalityandthegeneraltheoryofcriminallawinthecontextofthe structureandthedevelopmentoftheprincipleoflegalityinhumansociety. This chapter outlines the four secondary principles of the principle of legality, and describesthemingeneralterms. Chapters 2-Thepresentbookisbasedonthelecturesdeliveredbytheauthorinthepastfew yearsaspartoftheCriminalLawcourseoftheFacultyofLawattheOnoAcademic College. There has been little research on the principle of legality in modern criminallaw,althoughthisisoneofthemostancientlegalprinciplesofhuman society. In recent generations there have been several attempts to de?ne the principleconclusively,butonlywithregardtosomeofitsaspects. Nocompreh- sivede?nitionoftheprincipleoflegalityhasbeenattemptedtodate. Aconclusivede?nitionoftheprincipleoflegalityincriminallawrequiresboth anaccurateinward-lookingde?nitionoftheprincipleitself,andanoutward-lo- ingtreatmentofitsrelationwithcriminallawtheory. Onlyacoherenttheorythat includestheprincipleoflegalityasanintegralpartofcriminallawtheorycando justicetotheprincipleoflegality. Thisviewisconsistentwiththescienti?cconcept oflaw,whichregardsthelawaspartofscience. AModernTreatiseonthePrincipleofLegalityinCriminalLawisthereforea scienti?ctreatiseononeofthefourprinciplesofthecriminallaw. Thepresent treatiseisdividedintosixparts,accordingtothescienti?cunderstandingofthe principleoflegalityincriminallaw. Chapter1explorestherelationbetweenthe principleoflegalityandthegeneraltheoryofcriminallawinthecontextofthe structureandthedevelopmentoftheprincipleoflegalityinhumansociety. This chapter outlines the four secondary principles of the principle of legality, and describesthemingeneralterms. Chapters 2-5 discuss in detail each of the four secondary principles of the principleoflegality. Chapter 2discussesthelegitimatesourcesofthecriminal norm,Chap. 3discussestheapplicabilityofthecriminalnormintime,Chap. 4 discussestheapplicabilityofthecriminalnorminplaceandChap. 5discussesthe interpretationofthecriminalnorm. Eachofthefourchaptersconcludeswitha discussionofthecon?ictoflawsissuesrelevanttothesecondaryprincipleunder investigation. Finally,Chap. 6addressestheproblemofthecon?ictoflawswithin thecon?ictsoflawsandroundsoutthediscussion. ix x Preface IwishtothankOnoAcademicCollegeforsupportingthisproject,andespecially DeanofthefacultyoflawandvicechairmanDudiSchwartzforhisstaunchsupport onsomanyimportantoccasions. IthankGabrielLanyiforhiscommentsandAnke SeyfriedofSpringerHeidelbergforguidingthepublicationofthebookfromits inceptiontoitsconclusion. Finally,Iwishtothankmywifeanddaughtersforthe helpfuldiscussionsandsupporttheyofferedalongtheway. KiryatOno,June2010 GabrielHallevy Contents 1 TheMeaningandStructureofthePrincipleofLegality inCriminalLaw ...1 1. 1 TheRoleofthePrincipleofLegalityintheCriminal LawTheory ...1 1. 1. 1 TheBasicStructureofCriminalLawTheory ...1 1. 1. 2 TheBasicStructureofthePrincipleofLegality inCriminalLaw ...5 1. 2 DevelopmentofthePrincipleofLegalityinCriminalLaw andItsModernJusti?cations ...8 2 TheLegitimateSourcesoftheCriminalNorm ...15 2. 1 TheStructureoftheCriminalNormandItsIdenti?cation ...16 2. 1. 1 ValidConditionalClauses ...16 2. 1. 2 CriminalSanction ...17 2. 1. 3 Classi?cationofOffencesBasedonContent ...18 2. 2 TheLegalSourcesoftheCriminalNorm ...20 2. 2. 1 GeneralPrinciples ...20 2. 2. 2 LegalSources ...33 2. 3 Con?ictofLawsBasedonLegitimateSources oftheCriminalNorm ...46 3 ApplicabilityoftheCriminalNorminTime ...49 3. 1 BasicDistinctions ...49 3. 1. 1 DistinctionBetweenProceduralandSubstantive CriminalNorms ...50 3. 1. 2 DistinctionBetweenRelevantPointsinTime ...51 3. 1. 3 DistinctionBetweenContinuous,Temporary, andFragmentedCriminalNorms ...55 3. 1. 4 DistinctionBetweenMitigatingandAggravating CriminalNorms ...56 xi xii Contents 3. 2 ApplicabilityoftheProceduralCriminalNorminTime ...58 3. 2. 1 TheGeneralRule ...58 3. 2. 2 ApplicationoftheRule ...61 3. 3 ApplicabilityinTimeoftheSubstantiveCriminalNorm ...67 3. 3. 1 TheGeneralRule ...67 3. 3. 2 ApplicationoftheRule ...71 3. 4 Con?ictofLawsBasedonApplicabilityoftheCriminal NorminTime ...78 4 TheApplicabilityoftheCriminalNorminPlace ...81 4. 1 TheBasicDistinctions ...81 4. 1. 1 DistinctionBetweenApplicabilityandJurisdiction inCriminalLaw ...

A SUNDAY TIMES BESTSELLER In the past few decades, legislatures throughout the world have suffered from gridlock. In democracies, laws and policies are just as soon unpicked as made. It seems that Congress and Parliaments cannot forge progress or consensus. Moreover, courts often overturn decisions made by elected representatives. In the absence of effective politicians, many turn to the courts to solve political and moral questions. Rulings from the Supreme Courts in the United States and United Kingdom, or the European court in Strasbourg may seem to end the debate but the division and debate does not subside. In fact, the absence of democratic accountability leads to radicalisation. Judicial overreach cannot make up for the shortcomings of politicians. This is especially acute in the field of human rights. For instance, who should decide on abortion or prisoners' rights to vote, elected politicians or appointed judges? Expanding on arguments first laid out in the 2019 Reith Lectures, Jonathan Sumption argues that the time has come to return some problems to the politicians.

Exploring the growing significance of the administration of justice in both democratic and non-democratic countries, often labeled as 'the judicialization of politics', this timely book considers how increased levels of interest in the analysis of judicial institutions have been triggered. It examines the expansion of the role of judges and courts in the political system and the mixed reactions generated by these developments. In this comprehensive book, Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli draw on a wealth of experience in teaching and research in the field, moving beyond traditional legal analysis and providing a clear, concise and all-encompassing introduction to the phenomenon of the administration of justice and all of its traits. Facilitating a deeper understanding of the concrete dynamics characterizing the judicial system and its relationships with the political environment, it also offers a balanced assessment of the process of judicialization. Students and scholars interested in comparative law and politics, and law and society, who wish to broaden their understanding of courts and the operation of the judicial system will find this to be a valuable resource. The wide coverage of cases from both common and civil law traditions will also appeal to practitioners.

This present book examines some of the key features of the interplay between legal history, authoritarian rule and political transitions in Brazil and other countries from the end of 20th Century until today. This book casts light on these aspects of the role of law and legal actors/institutions. In the context of transition from authoritarian rule to democratic state, Brazil has produced a significant literature on the challenges and shortcomings of the transition, but little attention has been given to the role of law and legal actors/institutions. Different approaches focus on the legal mechanisms, discourses and practices used by the military regime and by the players involved in the political transition process in Brazil. A comparative perspective that takes into account different political transitions - and their legal consequences - in Europe and Latin America complements the analysis. Part 1 (4 essays) discusses some of the central issues of political transition and legal history in contemporary Brazil, focusing on the time of the transition (and its effects on transitional justice) with different perspectives, from racial and gender issues to constitutional reform and police repression. Part 2 (3 essays) brings the comparative studies on South American experiences. Part 3 (4 essays) analyses different cases of transition to democracy in Chile, Portugal, Spain and Italy. Part 4 (3 essays) proposes a historiographical and methodological approach, considering the politics of time involved in the interplay between political transitions and legal history.

This book challenges the idea that the Rule of Law is still a universal European value given its relatively rapid deterioration in Hungary and Poland, and the apparent inability of the European institutions to adequately address the illiberalization of these Member States. The book begins from the general presumption that the Rule of Law, since its emergence, has been a universal European value, a political ideal and legal conception. It also acknowledges that the EU has been struggling in the area of value enforcement, even if the necessary mechanisms are available and, given an innovative outlook and more political commitment, could be successfully used. The authors appreciate the different approaches toward the Rule of Law, both as a concept and as a measurable indicator, and while addressing the core question of the volume, widely rely on them. Ultimately, the book provides a snapshot of how the Rule of Law ideal has been dismantled and offers a theory of the Rule of Law in illiberal constitutionalism. It discusses why voters keep illiberal populist leaders in power when they are undeniably acting contrary to the Rule of Law ideal. The book will be of interest to academics and researchers engaged with the foundational questions of constitutionalism. The structure and nature of the subject matter covered ensure that the book will be a useful addition for comparative and national constitutional law classes. It will also appeal to legal practitioners wondering about the boundaries of the Rule of Law.

A theme of growing importance in both the law and philosophy and socio-legal literature is how regulatory dynamics can be identified (that is, conceptualised and operationalised) and normative expectations met in an age when transnational actors operate on a global plane and in increasingly fragmented and transformative contexts. A reconsideration of established theories and axiomatic findings on regulatory phenomena is an essential part of this discourse. There is indeed an urgent need for discontinuity regarding what we (think we) know about, among other things, law, legality, sovereignty and political legitimacy, power relations, institutional design and development, and pluralist dynamics of ordering under processes of globalisation and transnationalism. Making an important contribution to the scholarly debate on the subject, this volume features original and much-needed essays of theoretical and applied legal philosophy as well as socio-legal accounts that reflect on whether legal positivism has anything to offer to this intellectual enterprise. This is done by discussing whether global and transnational cultural, socio-political, economic, and juridical challenges as well as processes of diversification, fragmentation, and transformation (significantly, de-formalisation) reinforce or weaken legal positivists' assumptions, claims, and methods. The themes covered include, but are not limited to, absolute and limited state sovereignty; the 'new international legal positivism'; Hartian legal positivism and the 'normative positivist' account; the relationship between modern secularisation, social conventionalism, and meta-ontological issues of temporality in postnational jurisprudence; the social positivisation of human rights; the formation and content of jus cogens norms; feminist critique; the global and transnational migration of principles of justice and morality; the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties rule of interpretation; and the responsibility of transnational corporations.

Let us endeavor to see things as they are, and then enquire whether we ought to complain. Whether to see life as it is, will give us much consolation, I know not; but the consolation which is drawn from truth if any there be, is solid and durable: that which may be derived from errour, must be, like its original, fallacious and fugitive. Samuel Johnson, Letter to Bennet Langton (1758) Attorneys and clients make hundreds of decisions in every litigation case. From initially deciding which attorney to retain to deciding which witnesses to call at trial, from deciding whether to ?le a complaint to deciding whether to appeal a verdict, attorneys and clients make multiple, critical decisions about strategies, costs, arguments, valuations, evidence and negotiations. Once made, these de- sions are scrutinized by an opponent intent on exploiting the consequences of any mistake. In this intense and adversarial arena, decision-making errors often are transparent, irreversible and dispositive, wielding the power to bankrupt clients and dissolve law ?rms. Although attorneys and clients may regard sound decision making as incidental to effective lawyering, sound decision making actually is the essence of effective lawyering. An attorney's knowledge, intelligence and experience are inert re- urces until the attorney decides how to deploy those skills to serve the client's interests. Those decisions, in turn, largely determine a case's course and outcome.

The intertwinement of EC law and national law may create unforeseeability in situations where EC law invades the national cases. This study contributes to the contemporary discussion, which wrestles with questions such as: What have been the visions and objectives for European integration in the last decades? How to describe European Union as a political entity and a legal system? What is the relationship between legal certainty, rule of law, various general principles and human rights?

Two fish are swimming in a pond. 'Do you know what?' the fish asks his friend. 'No, tell me.' 'I was talking to a frog the other day. And he told me that we are surrounded by water!' His friend looks at him with great scepticism: 'Water? Whats that? Show me some water!' International lawyers often find themselves focused on the practice of the law rather than the underlying theories. This book is an attempt to stir up 'the water' that international lawyers swim in. It analyses a range of theoretical approaches to international law and invites readers to engage with different ways of legal thinking in order to familiarize themselves with the water all around us, of which we hardly have any perception. The main aim of this book is to provide interested scholars, practitioners, and students of international law and other disciplines with an introduction to various international legal theories, their genealogies, and possible critiques. By providing an analytical approach to international legal theory, the book encourages readers to enhance their sensitivity to these different approaches and to consider how the presuppositions behind each theory affect analysis, research, and practice in international law. International Law Theories is intended to assist students, scholars, and practitioners in reflecting more generally about how knowledge is formed in the field.

This work is part of a series focusing on research into law and economics. It discusses a variety of topics in the field.

This book intends to unite studies in different fields related to the development of the relations between logic, law and legal reasoning. Combining historical and philosophical studies on legal reasoning in Civil and Common Law, and on the often neglected Arabic and Talmudic traditions of jurisprudence, this project unites these areas with recent technical developments in computer science. This combination has resulted in renewed interest in deontic logic and logic of norms that stems from the interaction between artificial intelligence and law and their applications to these areas of logic. The book also aims to motivate and launch a more intense interaction between the historical and philosophical work of Arabic, Talmudic and European jurisprudence. The publication discusses new insights in the interaction between logic and law, and more precisely the study of different answers to the question: what role does logic play in legal reasoning? Varying perspectives include that of foundational studies (such as logical principles and frameworks) to applications, and historical perspectives.

To a certain extent, this book is a translation of Recht, verhaal en werke- lijkheid, published by Coutinho (Bussum, 1993). Chapters 1, 5 and 9, however, differ considerably from the original. At the basis of the Dutch book were arguments already submitted in 'Narrative coherence in legal contexts', in C. Faralli and E. Pattaro (eds.), Reason in Law, vol. III., Milano, A. Giuffre Editore, 1988, pp. 159-170; 'Justice, Rights, and Hu- man Dignity', in The Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice, 7, 1987, pp. 46-65; 'Narrative coherence and the guises of legalism', in P. Nerhot (ed.), Law, Interpretation and Reality, Dordrecht - Boston, Kluwer Aca- demic Publishers, 1990, pp. 310-345; 'The Instituting of Brute Facts', in The International Journal for the Semiotics of Law / Revue internationale de semiotique juridique, 4, 1991, pp. 279-308. For chapters 1 and 9 I used the following materials: 'Law is narrative, not literature', in W.l. Witte- veen (ed.), Law, Rhetoric and Literature (Special Issue of the Dutch Jour- nal for Legal Philosophy and Legal Theory), 23, No.3, 1994, Zwolle, Tjeenk Willink, 1994, pp. 221-227 (with a response by R. Weisberg, pp. 228-229); and 'Seeing Places: On Prepositions in Law', The International Journal for the Semiotics of Law / Revue internationale de semiotique juridique, 6, 1993, pp. 249-270. Chapter 5 was rewritten on the basis of 'The Instituting of Brute Facts'.

This anthology illustrates how law and economics is developing in Europe and what opportunities and problems - both in general and specific legal fields - are associated with this approach within the legal traditions of European countries. The first part illuminates the differences in the development and reception of the economic analysis of law in the American Common Law system and in the continental European Civil Law system. The second part focuses on the different ways of thinking of lawyers and economists, which clash in economic analysis of law. The third part is devoted to legal transplants, which often accompany the reception of law and economics from the United States. Finally, the fourth part focuses on the role economic analysis plays in the law of the European Union. This anthology with its 14 essays from young European legal scholars is an important milestone in establishing a European law and economics culture and tradition.

H.L.A. Hart is among the most important philosophers of the twentieth century, with an especially great influence on the philosophy of law. His 1961 book The Concept of Law has become an enduring classic of legal philosophy, and has also left a significant imprint on moral and political philosophy. In this volume, leading contemporary legal and political philosopher Matthew H. Kramer provides a crystal-clear analysis of Hart's contributions to our understanding of the nature of law. He elucidates and scrutinizes every major aspect of Hart's jurisprudential thinking, ranging from his general methodology to his defense of legal positivism. He shows how Hart's achievement in The Concept of Law, despite the evolution of debates in subsequent decades, remains central to contemporary legal philosophy because it lends itself to being reinterpreted in light of new concerns and interests. Kramer therefore pays particular attention to the strength of Hart's insights in the context of present-day disputes among philosophers over the reality of normative entities and properties and over the semantics of normative statements. This book is an invaluable guide to Hart's thought for students and scholars of legal philosophy and jurisprudence, as well as moral and political philosophy.

Methodological and metaphilosophical disputes in the contemporary philosophy of law are very vivid. Basic issues remain controversial. The purpose of the book is to confront approaches of Anglo-Saxon and continental philosophy of law to the following topics: the purpose of legal philosophy, the role of disagreement in legal philosophy, methodology of legal philosophy (conceptual analysis) and normativity of law. We see those areas of legal metaphilosophy as drawing recently more and more attention in the literature. The authors of particular chapters are internationally recognised scholars rooted in various traditions: Anglo-Saxon (Gerald Postema, Dennis Patterson, Kenneth Ehrenberg, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco); Southern-European (Riccardo Guastini, Manuel Atienza); Nordic (Torben Spaak); German (Ralf Poscher); and Central-European (Jan Wolenski, Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki, Adam Dyrda). They represent different approaches and different backgrounds. The purpose of the volume is to contribute to the cross-cultural discussions of fundamental issues of philosophy of law.

Global Perspectives on Subsidiarity is the first book of its kind exclusively devoted to the principle of subsidiarity. It sheds new light on the principle and explores and develops the many applications of the principle of subsidiarity. The book provides a comprehensive overview of the principle in all its facets, from its philosophical origins in the writings of Aristotle and Aquinas, to its development in Catholic social doctrine, and its emergence as a key principle in European Union Law. This book explores the relationship between subsidiarity and concepts such as sphere sovereignty and social pluralism. It analyses subsidiarity in light of globalisation, federalism, democracy, individual rights and welfare, and discusses subsidiarity and the Australian, Brazilian and German Constitutions.

Hans Kelsen is considered by many to be one of the foremost legal thinkers of the twentieth century. He made important contributions to many areas, but especially to legal theory and international law. Over a number of decades, he developed an important legal theory which found its first complete exposition in Reine Rechtslehre, 1934 (presently being translated by Stanley Paulson for OUP) and its fullest expression in the second edition of Reine Rechtslehre, 1960. During the last decade of his life he was working on what he called a general theory of norms. When he died in 1973, he left a lengthy manuscript, which was published in 1979 as Allgemeine Theorie der Normen. This book is the translation - General Theory of Norms. It is thus the last work of one of the most important legal theorists this century. In it, Kelsen develops his `pure theory of law' into a `general theory of norms'. In so doing, he provides a new basis for some of the positions he espoused earlier on, but also revises some of his earlier positions. The most important new topic is that of the applicability of logic to norms: Kelsen develops an original and extreme position some people have called `normative irrationalism'. In the book, Kelsen also examines the views of over 200 philosophers and legal theorists on law, morality and logic, ranging from Plato and Aristotle to contemporary thinkers.

This Handbook discusses representative philosophers in the history of the philosophy of law and social philosophy, giving clear concise expert definitions and explanations of key personalities and their ideas. It provides an essential reference for experts and newcomers alike.

The book provides an in-depth discussion of democratic theory questions in relation to refugee law. The work introduces readers to the evolution of refugee law and its core issues today, as well as central lines in the debate about democracy and migration. Bringing together these fields, the book links theoretical considerations and legal analysis. Based on its specific understanding of the refugee concept, it offers a reconstruction of refugee law as constantly confronted with the question of how to secure rights to those who have no voice in the democratic process. In this reconstruction, the book highlights, on the one hand, the need to look beyond the legal regulations for understanding the challenges and gaps in refugee protection. It is also the structural lack of political voice, the book argues, which shapes the refugee's situation. On the other hand, the book opposes a view of law as mere expression of power and points out the dynamics within the law which reflect endeavors towards mitigating exclusion. The book will be essential reading for academics and researchers working in the areas of migration and refugee law, legal theory and political theory.

Instead of the usual apologetic treatment found in legal doctrine, linked to the determinacy, immutability or predictability of norms, this book treats legal certainty innovatively, holistically and in depth. Using a method at once analytical and functional, Professor Avila examines the structural elements of legal certainty, from its definition and foundations to its various dimensions, normative forces and efficacies, citing a wealth of examples from case law to support each of the theses defended. No subject is more important and topical than legal certainty. Problems relating to lack of understanding, instability and unpredictability of law intensify day by day everywhere, in civil law and common law countries alike. Normative sources are increasingly diverse in origin (national, international, community) and multiple in nature (legal, contractual, jurisprudential). They change constantly, and present increasingly frequent problems of ambiguity and vagueness that significantly hinder their comprehension. This state of affairs, which to a greater or lesser extent is true of any legal order, justifies a return to the subject of legal certainty. In this book, essential questions are answered such as: Legal certainty in what sense? Certainty of what, for whom, in whose vision and by whom? When, to what extent, and to what end? "(...) it is probably the most comprehensive and systematic study ever produced on this subject using the analytical method." (Riccardo Guastini, Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Genoa, Italy)

In law, gains, like losses, don't always lie where they fall. The circumstances in which the law requires defendants to give up their gains are well documented in the work of unjust enrichment lawyers. The same cannot be said, however, of the reasons for ordering restitution of such gains. It is often suggested that unjust enrichment's existence can be demonstrated without inquiry into these reasons, into the principles of justice it represents and invokes. Yet while we can indeed show that there exists a body of claims dealing with the recovery of mistaken payments and the like without going on to inquire into their rationale, this isn't true of unjust enrichment's existence as a distinct ground of such claims. If unjust enrichment exists as a body of like cases and claims, truly independent of contract and tort, it does so by virtue of the distinct reasons it identifies and to which these claims respond. Reason and Restitution examines the reasons which support and shape claims in unjust enrichment and how these reasons bear on the law's resolution of these claims. The identity of these reasons matters. For one thing, unjust enrichment's status as a distinct ground of liability depends on the distinctiveness of these reasons. But, more importantly, it matters to those charged with the practical tasks of deciding cases and making laws, for it is these reasons alone which can direct how judges and legislators ought to respond to these claims.

This Handbook discusses representative philosophers in the history of the philosophy of law and social philosophy, giving clear concise expert definitions and explanations of key personalities and their ideas. It provides an essential reference for experts and newcomers alike.