This book examines the federal judiciary in light of political
science research on the role of interests and interest groups in
the making of public policy. The author finds that efforts of
federal judges to shape court administration are guided, in part,
by self-interest which consequently affects the development and
results of judicial policies. He argues that we must recognize
judges as self-interested political actors whose motivation and
behavior patterns are comparable to other political and
administrative actors. By examining the actions of federal judges
on a series of illustrative issues--civil justice reform, judicial
salaries, habeas corpus reform, and judicial bureaucratization--the
book illuminates the ways in which the judges' self-interested
actions affect the courts and society. Judicial self-interest is
not portrayed here as bad or even unexpected, but as a motivational
factor of significance for government, law, and society that should
be recognized and harnessed appropriately.
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