The United States and the international community intervened in
a number of internal conflicts throughout the 1990s, generally
justifying their actions on humanitarian grounds. In most cases,
the external military intervention largely halted the fighting and
allowed humanitarian assistance to be distributed. However, as Hawk
makes clear, simply halting the fighting has not allowed these
countries to create stable governments and harmonious
societies.
This study is based on the premise that if external
actors--foreign governments, international organizations, and
private groups--can not figure out how to lay a foundation for a
stable, longer-term peace, there will be decreasing support for
international intervention and peacekeeping/peacebuilding missions
in the future. Although external actors have undertaken many
activities in the aftermath of a military intervention in an
attempt to consolidate peace, sufficient attention has not been
paid to (re)constructing the state as a capable, effective, and
legitimate entity. While (re)constructing the state is only a
portion of what needs to be done to bring about a stable, long-term
peace, it provides a necessary foundation upon which to structure
the other activities. Through her examination of external actions
in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, Hawk draws 23 lessons, nine of
which are applicable to interventions in general and the remaining
14 specific to statebuilding efforts. This study will be of
particular interest to scholars, students, and policymakers
involved with conflict resolution and international relations.
General
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