Building Better Beings presents a new theory of moral
responsibility. Beginning with a discussion of ordinary convictions
about responsibility and free will and their implications for a
philosophical theory, Manuel Vargas argues that no theory can do
justice to all the things we want from a theory of free will and
moral responsibility. He goes on to show how we can nevertheless
justify our responsibility practices and provide a normatively and
naturalistically adequate account of responsible agency, blame, and
desert.
Three ideas are central to Vargas' account: the agency cultivation
model, circumstantialism about powers, and revisionism about
responsibility and free will. On Vargas' account, responsibility
norms and practices are justified by their effects. In particular,
the agency cultivation model holds that responsibility practices
help mold us into creatures that respond to moral considerations.
Moreover, the abilities that matter for responsibility and free
will are not metaphysically prior features of agents in isolation
from social contexts. Instead, they are functions of both agents
and their normatively structured contexts. This is the idea of
circumstantialism about the powers required for responsibility.
Third, Vargas argues that an adequate theory of responsibility will
be revisionist, or at odds with important strands of ordinary
convictions about free will and moral responsibility. Building
Better Beings provides a compelling and state-of-the-art defense of
moral responsibility in the face of growing philosophical and
scientific skepticism about free will and moral responsibility.
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