Expressivism - the sophisticated contemporary incarnation of the
noncognitivist research program of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare - is
no longer the province of metaethicists alone. Its comprehensive
view about the nature of both normative language and normative
thought has also recently been applied to many topics elsewhere in
philosophy - including logic, probability, mental and linguistic
content, knowledge, epistemic modals, belief, the a priori, and
even quantifiers.
Yet the semantic commitments of expressivism are still poorly
understood and have not been very far developed. As argued within,
expressivists have not yet even managed to solve the "negation
problem" - to explain why atomic normative sentences are
inconsistent with their negations. As a result, it is far from
clear that expressivism even could be true, let alone whether it
is.
Being For seeks to evaluate the semantic commitments of
expressivism, by showing how an expressivist semantics would work,
what it can do, and what kind of assumptions would be required, in
order for it to do it. Building on a highly general understanding
of the basic ideas of expressivism, it argues that expressivists
can solve the negation problem - but only in one kind of way. It
shows how this insight paves the way for an explanatorily powerful,
constructive expressivist semantics, which solves many of what have
been taken to be the deepest problems for expressivism. But it also
argues that no account with these advantages can be generalized to
deal with constructions like tense, modals, or binary quantifiers.
Expressivism, the book argues, is coherent and interesting, but
false.
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