We often have reason to doubt our own ability to form rational
beliefs, or to doubt that some particular belief of ours is
rational. Perhaps we learn that a trusted friend disagrees with us
about what our shared evidence supports. Or perhaps we learn that
our beliefs have been afflicted by motivated reasoning or by other
cognitive biases. These are examples of higher-order evidence.
While it may seem plausible that higher-order evidence should
somehow impact our beliefs, it is less clear how and why. Normally,
when evidence impacts our beliefs, it does so by virtue of speaking
for or against the truth of theirs contents. But higher-order
evidence does not directly concern the contents of the beliefs that
they impact. In recent years, philosophers have become increasingly
aware of the need to understand the nature and normative role of
higher-order evidence. This is partly due to the pervasiveness of
higher-order evidence in human life. But it has also become clear
that higher-order evidence plays a central role in many
epistemological debates, spanning from traditional discussions of
internalism/externalism about epistemic justification to more
recent discussions of peer disagreement and epistemic akrasia. This
volume brings together, for the first time, a distinguished group
of leading and up-and-coming epistemologists to explore a wide
range of interrelated issues about higher-order evidence.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!
Welcome to Loot.co.za!
Sign in / Register |Wishlists & Gift Vouchers |Help | Advanced search
