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Books > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Epistemology, theory of knowledge
The story of Sosipatra of Pergamum (4th century C.E.) as told by
her biographer, Eunapius of Sardis in his Lives of the Philosophers
and Sophists, is a remarkable tale. It is the story of an elite
young girl from the area of Ephesus, who was educated by traveling
oracles (daemons), and who grew up to lead her own philosophy
school on the west coast of Asia Minor. She was also a prophet of
sorts, channeling divine messages to her students, family, and
friends, and foretelling the future. Sosipatra of Pergamum is the
first sustained, book length attempt to tell the story of this
mysterious woman. It presents a rich contextualization of the brief
and highly fictionalized portrait provided by Eunapius. In doing
so, the book explores the cultural and political landscape of late
ancient Asia Minor, especially the areas around Ephesus, Pergamum,
Sardis, and Smyrna. It also discusses moments in Sosipatra's life
for what they reveal more generally about women's lives in Late
Antiquity in the areas of childhood, education, family, household,
motherhood, widowhood, and professional life. Her career sheds
light on late Roman Platonism, its engagement with religion,
ritual, and "magic," and the role of women in this movement. By
thoroughly examining the ancient evidence, Heidi Marx recovers a
hidden yet important figure from the rich intellectual traditions
of the Roman Near East.
No part of philosophy is as disconnected from its history as is
epistemology. After Certainty offers a reconstruction of that
history, understood as a series of changing expectations about the
cognitive ideal that beings such as us might hope to achieve in a
world such as this. The story begins with Aristotle and then looks
at how his epistemic program was developed through later antiquity
and into the Middle Ages, before being dramatically reformulated in
the seventeenth century. In watching these debates unfold over the
centuries, one sees why epistemology has traditionally been
embedded within a much larger sphere of concerns about human nature
and the reality of the world we live in. It ultimately becomes
clear why epistemology today has become a much narrower and
specialized field, concerned with the conditions under which it is
true to say, that someone knows something. Based on a series of
lectures given at Oxford University, Robert Pasnau's book ranges
widely over the history of philosophy, and examines in some detail
the rise of science as an autonomous discipline. Ultimately Pasnau
argues that we may have no good reasons to suppose ourselves
capable of achieving even the most minimal standards for knowledge,
and the final chapter concludes with a discussion of faith and
hope.
This volume brings together essays - three of them previously
unpublished - on the epistemology, ethics, and politics of memory
by the late feminist philosopher Sue Campbell. The essays in Part I
diagnose contemporary skepticism about personal memory, and develop
an account of good remembering that is better suited to
contemporary (reconstructive) theories of memory. Campbell argues
that being faithful to the past requires both accuracy and
integrity, and is both an epistemic and an ethical achievement. The
essays in Part II focus on the activities and practices through
which we explore and negotiate the shared significance of our
different recollections of the past, and the importance of sharing
memory for constituting our identities. Views about self, identity,
relation, and responsibility (all influenced by traditions in
feminist philosophy) are examined through the lens of Campbell's
relational conception of memory. She argues that remaining faithful
to our past sometimes requires us to re-negotiate the boundaries
between ourselves and the collectives to which we belong. In Part
III, Campbell uses her relational theory of memory to address the
challenges of sharing memory and renewing selves in contexts that
are fractured by moral and political difference, especially those
arising from a history of injustice and oppression. She engages in
detail Canada's Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, where survivor memories have the potential to
illuminate the significance of the past for a shared future. The
study of memory brings together philosophers, psychologists,
historians, anthropologists, legal theorists, and political
theorists and activists. Sue Campbell demonstrates a singular
ability to put these many different areas of scholarship and
activism into fruitful conversation with each other while also
adding an original and powerful voice to the discussion.
Rational Belief provides conceptions of belief and knowledge,
offers a theory of how they are grounded, and connects them with
the will and thereby with action, moral responsibility, and
intellectual virtue. A unifying element is a commitment to
representing epistemology-which is centrally concerned with
belief-as integrated with a plausible philosophy of mind that does
justice both to the nature of belief and to the conditions for its
formation and regulation. Part One centers on belief and its
relation to the will. It explores our control of our beliefs, and
it describes several forms belief may take and shows how beliefs
are connected with the world outside the mind. Part Two concerns
normative aspects of epistemology, explores the nature of
intellectual virtue, and presents a theory of moral perception. The
book also offers a theory of the grounds of both justification and
knowledge and shows how these grounds bear on the self-evident.
Rationality is distinguished from justification; each clarified in
relation to the other; and the epistemological importance of the
phenomenal-for instance, of intuitional experience and other
"private " aspects of mental life-is explored. The final section
addresses social epistemology. It offers a theory of testimony as
essential in human knowledge and a related account of the rational
resolution of disagreements.
Investigation of the Percept is a short (eight verses and a three
page autocommentary) work that focuses on issues of perception and
epistemology. Its author, Dignaga, was one of the most influential
figures in the Indian Buddhist epistemological tradition, and his
ideas had a profound and wide-ranging impact in India, Tibet, and
China. The work inspired more than twenty commentaries throughout
East Asia and three in Tibet, the most recent in 2014. This book is
the first of its kind in Buddhist studies: a comprehensive history
of a text and its commentarial tradition. The volume editors
translate the root text and commentary, along with Indian and
Tibetan commentaries, providing detailed analyses of the
commentarial innovations of each author, as well as critically
edited versions of all texts and extant Sanskrit fragments of
passages. The team-based approach made it possible to study and
translate a corpus of treatises in Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese
and to employ the methods of critical philology and cross-cultural
philosophy to provide readers with a rich collection of studies and
translations, along with detailed philosophical analyses that open
up the intriguing implications of Dignaga's thought and demonstrate
the diversity of commentarial approaches to his text. This rich
text has inspired some of the greatest minds in India and Tibet. It
explores some of the key issues of Buddhist epistemology: the
relationship between minds and their percepts, the problems of
idealism and realism, and error and misperception.
Why should inquiry be possible, only if some knowledge is required
to guide it, as conventionally understood? Contrary to the
conventional wisdom held by many thinkers in all human history
hitherto existing, there are some fundamental dialectic principles
hidden behind any categories of understanding in knowing. And these
principles impose some constraints, at both methodological and
ontological levels, together with other levels in culture, society,
nature, and the mind - on how reality is to be understood.
Furthermore, the specific categories of understanding (as
conventionally understood), even if valid at all (which are often
not the case), are often not that important, when compared with
these more fundamental dialectic principles hidden behind them. The
focus on understanding the nature of knowledge has been much
misplaced, in this sense, in the intellectual history hitherto
existing, and much time and talent have been wasted for something
less important. If true, this thesis will alter the way of how
knowledge is to be understood across the board.
Is written by a highly knowledgeable and well-respected scholarA
new theory called The Holistic Theory of KnowledgeA comprehensive
analysis of knowledge in relation to methodology and ontology, from
the perspectives of nature, the mind, society, and culture
Indian thought is well known for diverse philosophical and
contemplative excursions into the nature of selfhood. Led by
Buddhists and the yoga traditions of Hinduism and Jainism, Indian
thinkers have engaged in a rigorous analysis and
reconceptualization of our common notion of self. Less understood
is the way in which such theories of self intersect with issues
involving agency and free will; yet such intersections are
profoundly important, as all major schools of Indian thought
recognize that moral goodness and religious fulfillment depend on
the proper understanding of personal agency. Moreover, their
individual conceptions of agency and freedom are typically nodes by
which an entire school's epistemological, ethical, and metaphysical
perspectives come together as a systematic whole. Free Will,
Agency, and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy explores the contours of
this issue, from the perspectives of the major schools of Indian
thought. With new essays by leading specialists in each field, this
volume provides rigorous analysis of the network of issues
surrounding agency and freedom as developed within Indian thought.
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception is a survey by
leading philosophical thinkers of contemporary issues and new
thinking in philosophy of perception. It includes sections on the
history of the subject, introductions to contemporary issues in the
epistemology, ontology and aesthetics of perception, treatments of
the individual sense modalities and of the things we perceive by
means of them, and a consideration of how perceptual information is
integrated and consolidated. New analytic tools and applications to
other areas of philosophy are discussed in depth. Each of the
forty-five entries is written by a leading expert, some
collaborating with younger figures; each seeks to introduce the
reader to a broad range of issues. All contain new ideas on the
topics covered; together they demonstrate the vigour and innovative
zeal of a young field. The book is accessible to anybody who has an
intellectual interest in issues concerning perception.
Adrian Bardon's A Brief History of the Philosophy of Time is a
short yet thorough introduction to the history, philosophy, and
science of the study of time-from the pre-Socratic philosophers
through Einstein and beyond. Its treatment is roughly
chronological, starting with the ancient Greek philosophers
Heraclitus and Parmenides and proceeding through the history of
Western philosophy and science up to the present. Using
illustrations and keeping technical language to a minimum, A Brief
History of the Philosophy of Time covers subjects such as time and
change, the experience of time, physical and metaphysical
approaches to the nature of time, the direction of time,
time-travel, time and freedom of the will, and scientific and
philosophical approaches to eternity and the beginning of time.
Bardon brings the resources of over 2500 years of philosophy and
science to bear on some of humanity's most fundamental and enduring
questions.
In Everything Ancient Was Once New, Emalani Case explores
Indigenous persistence through the concept of Kahiki, a term that
is at once both an ancestral homeland for Kanaka Maoli (Hawaiians)
and the knowledge that there is life to be found beyond Hawai'i's
shores. It is therefore both a symbol of ancestral connection and
the potential that comes with remembering and acting upon that
connection. Tracing physical, historical, intellectual, and
spiritual journeys to and from Kahiki, Emalani frames it as a place
of refuge and sanctuary, a place where ancient knowledge can
constantly be made anew. It is in Kahiki, she argues, and in the
sanctuary it creates, that today's Kanaka Maoli can find safety and
reprieve from the continued onslaught of settler colonial violence,
while also confronting some of the often uncomfortable and
challenging realities of being Indigenous in Hawai'i, in the
Pacific, and in the world. Each chapter of the book engages with
Kahiki as a shifting term, employed by Kanaka Maoli to explain
their lives and experiences to themselves at different points in
history. In doing so, Everything Ancient Was Once New proposes and
argues for reactivated and reinvigorated engagements with Kahiki,
each supporting ongoing work aimed at decolonizing physical and
ideological spaces, and reconnecting Kanaka Maoli to other peoples
and places in the Pacific region and beyond in ways that are both
purposeful and meaningful. In the book, Kahiki is therefore traced
through pivotal moments in history and critical moments in
contemporary times, explaining that while not always mentioned by
name, the idea of Kahiki was, and is, always full of potential. In
writing that is both personal and theoretical, Emalani weaves the
past and the present together, reflecting on ancient concepts and
their continued relevance in movements to protect lands, waters,
and oceans; to fight for social justice; to reexamine our
responsibilities and obligations to each other across the Pacific
region; and to open space for continued dialogue on what it means
to be Indigenous both when at home and when away. Combining
personal narrative and reflection with research and critical
analysis, Everything Ancient Was Once New journeys to and from
Kahiki, the sanctuary for reflection, deep learning, and continued
dreaming with the past, in the present, and far into the future.
Included in this volume is an introduction by the translator,
J.M.D. Meiklejohn. Revised edition, originally published by The
Colonial Press in 1899.
Included in this volume is an introduction by the translator,
J.M.D. Meiklejohn. Revised edition, originally published by The
Colonial Press in 1899.
Within the contemporary philosophical debates over the nature of
perception, the question of whether perception has content in the
first place recently has become a focus of discussion. The most
common view is that it does, but a number of philosophers have
questioned this claim. The issue immediately raises a number of
related questions. What does it mean to say that perception has
content? Does perception have more than one kind of content? Does
perceptual content derive from the content of beliefs or judgments?
Should perceptual content be understood in terms of accuracy
conditions? Is naive realism compatible with holding that
perception has content? This volume brings together philosophers
representing many different perspectives to address these and other
central questions in the philosophy of perception.
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