Thomas Reid (1710-96) was a contemporary of both David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and a central figure in the Scottish School of Common Sense. Until recently, his work has been largely neglected, and often misunderstood. Like Kant, Reid cited Hume's Treatise as the main spur to his own philosophical work. In Reid's case, this led him to challenge 'the theory of ideas', which he saw as the cornerstone of Hume's (and many other philosophers') theories. For those familiar with Reid's work, it is clear that its significance extends well beyond his challenging the theory of ideas. The variety of topics which this book covers attests to the richness and variety of Reid's philosophical contributions, and the persisting relevance of his work to contemporary philosophical debates. The work included in this book, by leading figures in Reid scholarship, deals with aspects of Reid's views on topics ranging from perception, to epistemology, to ethics and meta-ethics, through to language, mind, and metaphysics. This book was originally published as a special issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy.

In Sensuous Knowledge, Minna Salami draws on Africa-centric, feminist-first and artistic traditions to help us rediscover inclusive and invigorating ways of experiencing the world afresh. Combining the playfulness of a storyteller with the insight of a social critic, the book pries apart the systems of power and privilege that have dominated ways of thinking for centuries - and which have led to so much division, prejudice and damage. And it puts forward a new, sensuous, approach to knowledge: one grounded in a host of global perspectives - from Black Feminism to personal narrative, pop culture to high art, Western philosophy to African mythology - together comprising a vision of hope for a fragmented world riven by crisis. Through the prism of this new knowledge, Salami offers fresh insights into the key cultural issues that affect women's lives. How are we to view Sisterhood, Motherhood or even Womanhood itself? What is Power and why do we conceive of Beauty? How does one achieve Liberation? She asks women to break free of the prison made by ingrained male-centric biases, and build a house themselves - a home that can nurture us all. Sensuous Knowledge confirms Minna Salami as one the most important spokespeople of today, and the arrival of a blistering new literary voice.

This book offers a systematic framework for thinking about the relationship between language and technology and an argument for interweaving thinking about technology with thinking about language. The main claim of philosophy of technology-that technologies are not mere tools and artefacts not mere things, but crucially and significantly shape what we perceive, do, and are-is re-thought in a way that accounts for the role of language in human technological experiences and practices. Engaging with work by Wittgenstein, Heidegger, McLuhan, Searle, Ihde, Latour, Ricoeur, and many others, the author critically responds to, and constructs a synthesis of, three "extreme", idealtype, untenable positions: (1) only humans speak and neither language nor technologies speak, (2) only language speaks and neither humans nor technologies speak, and (3) only technology speaks and neither humans nor language speak. The construction of this synthesis goes hand in hand with a narrative about subjects and objects that become entangled and constitute one another. Using Words and Things thus draws in central discussions from other subdisciplines in philosophy, such as philosophy of language, epistemology, and metaphysics, to offer an original theory of the relationship between language and (philosophy of) technology centered on use, performance, and narrative, and taking a transcendental turn.

Values are inescapable. They pervade and shape our psychology, our agency, and our lives as reflective and self-knowing subjects. This book explores the crucial ways in which values figure within reflection and thereby shape our theoretical and practical lives, against the backdrop of an expressivist moral psychology that is sensitive to the vicissitudes of valuing. Combining a discussion of the role that values play within reflection with a critique of a range of influential contemporary views in moral psychology and the theory of agency, Dunn shows how such views obscure or distort the nature of that role and that there is a 'natural fit' between an expressivist account of values and the best account of the role of values in the lives of reflective agents. Writers discussed include Simon Blackburn, Michael E. Bratman, Donald Davidson, Harry Frankfurt, Christine Korsgaard, Thomas Nagel and J. David Velleman. The book is also an important addition to the literature on self-knowledge. Dunn argues that, by reasoning about truth and values, we possess a unique, non-observational way of coming to know our own minds and hearts, together with what we are going to make happen in the world. The discussion criticizes recent contributions to the theory of self-knowledge by Richard Moran and J. David Velleman.

This anthology establishes the existence of a distinct and important post-Investigations Wittgenstein, uncovering the overlooked treasures of the final corpus and crystallising key perceptions of what his last thought was achieving. Speaking of a 'third Wittgenstein', this book seeks to correct the traditional bipartite conception of Wittgenstein's thought into his Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations by focusing on his neglected last masterpiece, On Certainty, and works contemporaneous with it: Remarks on Colour, Last Writings in the Philosophy of Psychology, and Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. A Leading international Wittgenstein scholars reveal why On Certainty should be recognised as one of Wittgenstein's three great works. This sustained examination shows that the third Wittgenstein breaks new ground with insights unprecedented in both his own work and philosophy more broadly, giving us keys to the solution and dissolution of problems that have plagued philosophy since Descartes, such as philosophical scepticism and the mind-body problem. Wittgenstein's ultimate and revised positions with regard to epistemology, foundationalism, 'grammar', naturalism, the psychology of language, and psychological indeterminacy are clearly delineated. This book also provides new and illuminating accounts of difficult concepts, such as patterns of life, experiencing meaning, meaning blindness, lying and pretence.

If there has been some modest advance, since Karl Popper's death in 1994, in the general understanding of his critical rationalist theory of knowledge and philosophy of science, there is still widespread resistance both to it and to the recognition of the magnitude of his contribution. Popper long ago diagnosed the logical problems of traditional enlightenment rationalism (as did some irrationalists), but instead of pretending that they are readily solved or embracing irrational defeatism (as do postmodernists), he provided a cogent and liberating rationalist alternative. This book promotes, defends, criticizes, and refines this alternative. David Miller is the foremost exponent of the purist critical rationalist doctrine and here presents his mature views, discussing the role that logic and argument play in the growth of knowledge, criticizing the common understanding of argument as an instrument of justification, persuasion or discovery and instead advocating the critical rationalist view that only criticism matters. Miller patiently and thoroughly undoes the damage done by those writers who attack critical rationalism by invoking the sterile mythology of induction and justification that it seeks to sweep away. In addition his new material on the debate on verisimilitude is essential reading for all working in this field.

The Evolution of the Private Language Argument presents a continuous view of modern analytical philosophy by telling the history of one of its central strands. It is an in-depth history of this well known philosophical argument, the evolution of Wittgenstein's thoughts and its influence on analytical philosophy of mind and language. Nielsen looks at early discussions of the private language argument in the Vienna Circle and the influence of Wittgenstein's ideas and examines the relation between the early and later Wittgenstein on this subject. He discusses which influential versions of the private language argument have been presented in the fifty years since Philosophical Investigations was published and how they relate to Wittgenstein's thoughts, and considers how the role and the interpretation of the argument, and Wittgenstein's philosophy, changed along with changes in the conception of the nature of analytic philosophy.

The notions of mental representation and intentionality are central to contemporary philosophy of mind and it is usually assumed that these notions, if not originated, at least were made essential to the philosophy of mind by Descartes in the seventeenth century. The authors in this book challenge this assumption and show that the history of these ideas can be traced back to the medieval period. In bringing out the contrasts and similarities between early modern and medieval discussions of mental representation the authors conclude that there is no clear dividing line between western late medieval and early modern philosophy; that they in fact represent one continuous tradition in the philosophy of mind.

Addressing the essential question of the relationship between ethics and aesthetics in Deleuze's philosophy this book provides clear indications of the practical implications of Deleuze's approach to the arts through detailed analyses of the ethical dimension of artistic activity in literature, music, and film. Bogue examines Deleuze's "transverse way" of interrelating the ethical and the aesthetic, the transverse way being both a mode of thought and a practice of living. Among the issues examined are those of the relationship of music to literature, the political vocation of the arts, violence in popular music, the ethics and aesthetics of education, the use of music and sound in film, the role of the visual in literary invention, the function of the arts in cross cultural interactions, and the future of Deleuzian analysis as a means of forming an open, reciprocally self-constituting, transcultural global culture.

In the preface to his Philosophical Investigations Ludwig Wittgenstein expresses pessimism about the culture of his time and doubts as to whether his ideas would be understood in such a time: 'I make them public with doubtful feelings. It is not impossible that it should fall to the lot of this work, in its poverty and in the darkness of this time, to bring light into one brain or another - but, of course, it is not likely'. In this book William James DeAngelis develops a deeper understanding of Wittgenstein's remark and argues that it is an expression of a significant cultural component in Wittgenstein's later thought which, while latent, is very much intended. DeAngelis focuses on the fascinating connection between Wittgenstein and Oswald Spengler and in particular the acknowledged influence of Spengler's Decline of the West. His book shows in meticulous detail how Spengler's dark conception of an ongoing cultural decline resonated deeply for Wittgenstein and influenced his later work. In so doing, the work takes into account discussions of these matters by major commentators such as Malcolm, Von Wright, Cavell, Winch, and Clack among others. A noteworthy feature of this book is its attempt to link Wittgenstein's cultural concerns with his views on religion and religious language. DeAngelis offers a fresh and original interpretation of the latter.

David Hume was one of the most important British philosophers of the eighteenth century. The first part of his Treatise on Human Nature is a seminal work in philosophy. Hume on Knowledge introduces and assesses:
* Humes life and the background of the Treatise
* The ideas and text in the Treatise
* Humes continuing importance to philosophy

The problem of moral luck is that there is a contradiction in our common sense ideas about moral responsibility. In one strand of our thinking, we believe that a person can become more blameworthy by luck. For example, two reckless drivers manage their vehicles in the same way, and one but not the other kills a pedestrian. We blame the killer driver more than the merely reckless driver, because we believe that the killer driver is more blameworthy. Nevertheless, this idea contradicts another feature of our thinking captured in this moral principle: A person's blameworthiness cannot be affected by that which is not within her control. Thus, our ordinary thinking about moral responsibility implies that the drivers are and are not equally blameworthy. In Defense of Moral Luck aims to make progress in resolving this contradiction. Hartman defends the claim that certain kinds of luck in results, circumstance, and character can partially determine the degree of a person's blameworthiness. He also explains why there is a puzzle in our thinking about moral responsibility in the first place if luck often affects a person's praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. Furthermore, the book's methodology provides a unique way to advance the moral luck debate with arguments from diverse areas in philosophy that do not bottom out in standard pro-moral luck intuitions.

Powers and Capacities in Philosophy is designed to stake out an emerging, discipline-spanning neo-Aristotelian framework grounded in realism about causal powers. The volume brings together for the first time original essays by leading philosophers working on powers in relation to metaphysics, philosophy of natural and social science, philosophy of mind and action, epistemology, ethics and social and political philosophy. In each area, the concern is to show how a commitment to real causal powers affects discussion at the level in question. In metaphysics, for example, realism about powers is now recognized as providing an alternative to orthodox accounts of causation, modality, properties and laws. Dispositional realist philosophers of science, meanwhile, argue that a powers ontology allows for a proper account of the nature of scientific explanation. In the philosophy of mind there is the suggestion that agency is best understood in terms of the distinctive powers of human beings. Those who take virtue theoretic approaches in epistemology and ethics have long been interested in the powers that allow for knowledge and/or moral excellence. In social and political philosophy, finally, powers theorists are interested in the powers of sociological phenomena such as collectivities, institutions, roles and/or social relations, but also in the conditions of possibility for the cultivation of the powers of individuals. The book will be of interest to philosophers working in any of these areas, as well as to historians of philosophy, political theorists and critical realists.

Think of a number, any number, or properties like fragility and humanity. These and other abstract entities are radically different from concrete entities like electrons and elbows. While concrete entities are located in space and time, have causes and effects, and are known through empirical means, abstract entities like meanings and possibilities are remarkably different. They seem to be immutable and imperceptible and to exist "outside" of space and time. This book provides a comprehensive critical assessment of the problems raised by abstract entities and the debates about existence, truth, and knowledge that surround them. It sets out the key issues that inform the metaphysical disagreement between platonists who accept abstract entities and nominalists who deny abstract entities exist. Beginning with the essentials of the platonist-nominalist debate, it explores the key arguments and issues informing the contemporary debate over abstract reality: arguments for platonism and their connections to semantics, science, and metaphysical explanation the abstract-concrete distinction and views about the nature of abstract reality epistemological puzzles surrounding our knowledge of mathematical entities and other abstract entities. arguments for nominalism premised upon concerns about paradox, parsimony, infinite regresses, underdetermination, and causal isolation nominalist options that seek to dispense with abstract entities. Including chapter summaries, annotated further reading, and a glossary, Abstract Entities is essential reading for anyone seeking a clear and authoritative introduction to the problems raised by abstract entities.

This book reconceives virtue epistemology in light of the conviction that we are essentially social creatures. Virtue is normally thought of as something that allows individuals to accomplish things on their own. Although contemporary ethics is increasingly making room for an inherently social dimension in moral agency, intellectual virtues continue to be seen in terms of the computing potential of a brain taken by itself. Thinking in these terms, however, seriously misconstrues the way in which our individual flourishing hinges on our collective flourishing. Green's account of virtue epistemology is based on the extended credit view, which conceives of knowledge as an achievement and broadens that focus to include team achievements in addition to individual ones. He argues that this view does a better job than alternatives of answering the many conceptual and empirical challenges for virtue epistemology that have been based on cases of testimony. The view also allows for a nuanced interaction with situationist psychology, dual processing models in cognitive science, and the extended mind literature in philosophy of mind. This framework provides a useful conceptual bridge between individual and group epistemology, and it has novel applications to the epistemology of disagreement, prejudice, and authority.

A response to complex problems spanning disciplinary boundaries, Worlds of ScienceCraft offers bold new ways of conceptualizing ideas of science, sociology, and philosophy. Beginning with the historical foundations of civilization and progress, assumptions about the categories we use to talk about minds, identities, and bodies are challenged through case studies from mathematics, social cognition, and medical ethics. Offering innovative approaches to these issues, such as an integrated social brain-mind-body model and a critique of divisions between the natural and technological, this book provides novel conceptions of self, society and an emerging 'cyborg' generation. From the micro level of brains and expanding all the way out to biopolitical civics, disciplinary boundaries are made permeable, emphasizing the increased need for interdisciplinary scholarship. By rejecting outdated and restrictive categories and classifications, new horizons in studies of science, technology, and medicine can be explored through the incorporation of feminist, international, and postmodern perspectives. A truly interdisciplinary examination of science and technology as cultural phenomena, Worlds of ScienceCraft will appeal to scholars and students of science and technology studies, as well as philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science, technology, and medicine.

The acclaimed scholars contributing to this volume place under scrutiny a fascinating alternative proposal for a pathway to religious tolerance - that serious consideration of religious diversity tends to reveal the weakness of support many have for their religious commitments, and the humility produced tends to result in religious tolerance. The authors illuminate the debate within philosophy about the way beliefs are supported, the controversy between internalism and externalism, and disagreement about how humility and tolerance are related. Critical and supportive views are represented so that the main lines of agreement and disagreement rise to the surface and are mapped out for the first time. The collection honours Philip Quinn who advocated the pathway so rigorously that the special attention given to his views focuses and deepens the critical discussion. Original essays by some of the most respected contemporary intellectuals in this field make this collection especially attractive.

In the 1990s great strides were taken in clarifying how the brain is involved in behaviors that, in the past, had seldom been studied by neuroscientists or psychologists. This book explores the progress begun during that momentous decade in understanding why we behave, think and feel the way we do, especially in those areas that interface with religion. What is happening in the brain when we have a religious experience? Is the soul a product of the mind which is, in turn, a product of the brain? If so, what are the implications for the Christian belief in an afterlife? If God created humans for the purpose of having a relationship with him, should we expect to find that our spirituality is a biologically evolved human trait? What effect might a disease such as Alzheimer's have on a person's spirituality and relationship with God? Neuroscience and psychology are providing information relevant to each of these questions, and many Christians are worried that their religious beliefs are being threatened by this research. Kevin Seybold attempts to put their concerns to rest by presenting some of the scientific findings coming from these disciplines in a way that is understandable yet non-threatening to Christian belief.

John Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding begins with a clear statement of an epistemological goal: to explain the limits of human knowledge, opinion, and ignorance. The actual text of the Essay, in stark contrast, takes a long and seemingly meandering path before returning to that goal at the Essay's end-one with many detours through questions in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and philosophy of language. Over time, Locke scholarship has come to focus on Locke's contributions to these parts of philosophy. In Locke's Science of Knowledge, Priselac refocuses on the Essay's epistemological thread, arguing that the Essay is unified from beginning to end around its compositional theory of ideas and the active role Locke gives the mind in constructing its thoughts. To support the plausibility and demonstrate the value of this interpretation, Priselac argues that-contrary to its reputation as being at best sloppy and at worst outright inconsistent-Locke's discussion of skepticism and account of knowledge of the external world fits neatly within the Essay's epistemology.

By the author of the modern classic "The Black Swan," this collection of aphorisms and meditations expresses his major ideas in ways you least expect.
"The Bed of Procrustes" takes its title from Greek mythology: the story of a man who made his visitors fit his bed to perfection by either stretching them or cutting their limbs. It represents Taleb's view of modern civilization's hubristic side effects--modifying humans to satisfy technology, blaming reality for not fitting economic models, inventing diseases to sell drugs, defining intelligence as what can be tested in a classroom, and convincing people that employment is not slavery.
Playful and irreverent, these aphorisms will surprise you by exposing self-delusions you have been living with but never recognized.
With a rare combination of pointed wit and potent wisdom, Taleb plows through human illusions, contrasting the classical values of courage, elegance, and erudition against the modern diseases of nerdiness, philistinism, and phoniness.

The biggest and most comprehensive volume on James's contribution to philosophy published to date James wrote on many philosophical, psychological and religious topics - this will ensure strong interest from these three disciplines Explores James in relation to important interdisciplinary topics, including modernism, sociology and cognitive science William James is a central figure in 20th century philosophy and particularly North American philosophy and pragmatism, the topic he is best known for, studied on many courses Part of an exciting new series that brings fresh perspectives to bear on the work and arguments of the major philosophers

Answering the question 'How is fruitful discussion possible?', this book addresses the central philosophical issue of how reason shall be understood and how it is limited. This study argues that the understanding of discussion according to which it necessarily starts from putative universal norms and rules for argumentation is problematic, among other reasons since such rules are unfruitful in contexts where there are vast disagreements such as religion. Inspired by Wittgensteinian ideas, Strandberg develops instead a new way of understanding discussion, truth and rationality which escapes these problems, and shows how this solution can be used to answer the accusation against Wittgensteinian philosophy for being conservative and resulting in fideism.

Judgment After Arendt is both the first full-length study of Hannah Arendt's The Life of the Mind and, at the same time, a philosophical work on the core concepts of thinking, willing and judging. Comprised of Thinking and Willing, her final and most sustained philosophical project, Arendt's work is framed by the 'thought-less' Adolf Eichmann whose 'banality' of mind in committing evil she observed at his trial in Jerusalem. Arendt's project, cut short by her death, was to have included Judgment. Without judgment, she argued, a life of thought and of will can still collude with evil. In analysing Arendt's work Deutscher develops this theme of judgment and shows how, by drawing upon literature, history, myth and idiom, Arendt contributes significantly to contemporary philosophy.

Religions have always been associated with particular forms of knowledge, often knowledge accorded special significance and sometimes knowledge at odds with prevailing understandings of truth and authority in wider society. New religious movements emerge on the basis of reformulated, often controversial, understandings of how the world works and where ultimate meaning can be found. Governments have risen and fallen on the basis of such differences and global conflict has raged around competing claims about the origins and content of religious truth. Such concerns give rise to recurrent questions, faced by academics, governments and the general public. How do we treat statements made by religious groups and on what basis are they made? What authorities lie behind religious claims to truth? How can competing claims about knowledge be resolved? Are there instances when it is appropriate to police religious knowledge claims or restrict their public expression? This book addresses the relationship between religion and knowledge from a sociological perspective, taking both religion and knowledge as phenomena located within ever changing social contexts. It builds on historical foundations, but offers a distinctive focus on the changing status of religious phenomena at the turn of the twenty-first century. Including critical engagement with live debates about intelligent design and the 'new atheism', this collection of essays brings recent research on religious movements into conversation with debates about socialisation, reflexivity and the changing capacity of social institutions to shape human identities. Contributors examine religion as an institutional context for the production of knowledge, as a form of knowledge to be transmitted or conveyed and as a social field in which controversies about knowledge emerge.

This collection offers a synoptic view of current philosophical debates concerning the relationship between facts and values, bringing together a wide spectrum of contributors committed to testing the validity of this dichotomy, exploring alternatives, and assessing their implications. The assumption that facts and values inhabit distinct, unbridgeable conceptual and experiential domains has long dominated scientific and philosophical discourse, but this separation has been seriously called into question from a number of corners. The original essays here collected offer a diversity of responses to fact-value dichotomy, including contributions from Hilary Putnam and Ruth Anna Putnam who are rightly credited with revitalizing philosophical interest in this alleged opposition. Both they, and many of our contributors, are in agreement that the relationship between epistemic developments and evaluative attitudes cannot be framed as a conflict between descriptive and normative understanding. Each chapter demonstrates how and why contrapositions between science and ethics, between facts and values, and between objective and subjective are false dichotomies. Values cannot simply be separated from reason. Facts and Values will therefore prove essential reading for analytic and continental philosophers alike, for theorists of ethics and meta-ethics, and for philosophers of economics and law.