The phenomenon of context dependence is so multifaceted that it is tempting to classify it as hetergenous. It is especially evident in the case of the difference between context dependence as understood in the philosophy of language and context dependence as understood in the philosophy of mind. One of the aims of the present volume is to show that as varied as the phenomenon of context dependence is, the similarities between its different manifestations are profound and undeniable. More importantly, as evidenced in a number of papers presented on the subsequent pages of this volume, a broad perspective on the phenomenon of context dependence helps us to re-apply theories devised for one of the subfields of philosophy to the other subfields. Since the connections and analogies between many uses of contextualism may not be initially obvious, keeping an open perspective and the willingness to learn from the work of others may sometimes be crucial for finding new, satisfactory solutions.

Original papers by leading international authors address the most important problem in the philosophy of language, the question of how to assess the prospects of developing a tenable theory of meaning, given the influential sceptical attacks mounted against the concept of meaning by Willard Van Quine and Saul Kripke and their adherents in particular. Thus the texts attempt to answer the fundamental questions a " of whether there are meanings, and, if there are, of what they are and of the form a serious philosophical theory of meaning should take.

This book analyses how the three books of visions by Hildegard of Bingen use the allegorical vision as a form of knowledge. It describes how the visionary's use of allegory and allegorical exegesis is linked to theories of cognition, interpretation, and prophecy. It argues that the form of the allegorical vision is not just the product of a medieval symbolic mentality, but specific to Hildegard's position and the major transformations taking place in the prescholastic intellectual milieu, such as the changing use of Scripture or the shift from traditional hermeneutics to cognitive language philosophy. The book shows that Hildegard uses traditional forms of knowledge - prophecy, the vision, monastic theology, allegorical hermeneutics - in startlingly innovative ways by combining them and by revising them for her own time.

This book examines the textual, social, cultural, practical and institutional environments to which the expression "teaching and learning contexts" refers. It reflects on the extent to which studying such environments helps us to better understand ancient or modern sources, and how notions of "teaching" and "learning" are to be understood.
Tackling two problems: the first, is that of certain sources of scientific knowledge being studied without taking into account the various "contexts" of transmission that gave this knowledge a long-lasting meaning.

The second is that other sources are related to teaching and learning activities, but without being too precise and demonstrative about the existence and nature of this "teaching context." In other words, this book makes clear what is meant by "context" and highlights the complexity of the practice hidden by the words "teaching" and "learning." Divided into three parts, the book makes accessible teaching and learning situations, presents comparatist approaches, and emphasizes the notion of teaching as projects embedded in coherent treatises or productions.

The self for Kant is something real, and yet is neither appearance nor thing in itself, but rather has some third status. Appearances for Kant arise in space and time where these are respectively forms of outer and inner attending (intuition). Melnick explains the "third status" by identifying the self with intellectual action that does not arise in the progression of attending (and so is not appearance), but accompanies and unifies inner attending. As so accompanying, it progresses with that attending and is therefore temporal--not a thing in itself. According to Melnick, the distinction between the self or the subject and its thoughts is a distinction wholly within intellectual action; only such a non-entitative view of the self is consistent with Kant's transcendental idealism. As Melnick demonstrates in this volume, this conception of the self clarifies all of Kant's main discussions of this issue in the Transcendental Deduction and the Paralogisms of Pure Reason.

This volume distinguishes between two main traditions in the philosophy of science - the aristotelian, with its stress on explanation in terms of purpose and intentionality, and the galilean, which takes causal explanation as primary. It then traces the complex history of these competing traditions as they are manifested in such movements as positivism, idealism, Marxism and contemporary linguistic analysis. Hempels's theory of scientific explanation, the claims of cybernetics the rise of an analytic philosophy of action and the revival of hermenuetics are all discussed. The volume also deals with causal explanation, intentionality and teleological explanation, and explanation in history and the social sciences. The author concludes that explanation of human actions cannot be reduced to simple causality, and discusses the implications of this conclusion for the disciplines of history and sociology.

The idea that knowledge about the world, personal identity and reality is imparted through narrative is widely accepted. However, the textual and semiotic techniques that writers use to construct this knowledge have received much less attention. Bridging the gap between linguistic and literary analysis and philosophical investigation, this book uses a semiotic methodology to analyze major works by Merleau-Ponty, Kierkegaard and Austin, and to explore the ways in which conceptualizations of reality are formed through narrative strategy.

Amongst Digital Humanists brings an ethnographic account of the changing landscape of humanities scholarship as it affects individual scholars, academic fields and institutions, and argues for a pluralistic vision of digital knowledge production in the humanities.

This is an outline of a coherence theory of law. Its basic ideas are: reasonable support and weighing of reasons. All the rest is commentary.

These words at the beginning of the preface of this book perfectly indicate what On Law and Reason is about. It is a theory about the nature of the law which emphasises the role of reason in the law and which refuses to limit the role of reason to the application of deductive logic.

In 1989, when the first edition of On Law and Reason appeared, this book was ground breaking for several reasons. It provided a rationalistic theory of the law in the language of analytic philosophy and based on a thorough understanding of the results, including technical ones, of analytic philosophy. That was not an obvious combination at the time of the book s first appearance and still is not. The result is an analytical rigor that is usually associated with positivist theories of the law, combined with a philosophical position that is not natural law in a strict sense, but which shares with it the emphasis on the role of reason in determining what the law is. If only for this rare combination, On Law and Reason still deserves careful study.

On Law and Reason also foreshadowed and influenced a development in the field of Legal Logic that would take place in the nineties of the 20th century, namely the development of non-monotonic ( defeasible ) logics for the analysis of legal reasoning. In the new Introduction to this second edition, this aspect is explored in some more detail."

This book has two objectives: to be a contribution to the understanding of Frege's theory of truth - especially a defence of his notorious critique of the correspondence theory - and to be an introduction to the practice of interpreting philosophical texts.

This book explores the enduring appeal of child pornography and its ramifications for criminal justice systems around the world. It is based on an extensive review of academic literature and newspaper coverage, a trawl of websites frequented by those with a sexual interest in children, a survey of how police investigate these offences, examination of prosecutors' decisions, and interviews with judges. It provides a framework for understanding the contemporary nature of this problem, especially the harms it causes, its intimate relationship with new technologies and the challenges it poses to law enforcement authorities. The internet plays a pivotal role. Its sheer size, the anarchic way it grows, the lack of any boundaries to its expansion and its disregard for national borders make it a legal environment without parallel. An unwavering focus on the threat of sexual abuse has contributed to the emergence of a context where routine dealings with children are viewed through a 'paedophilic' lens. This can have the unfortunate consequence of distracting attention from more urgent concerns (such as poverty and neglect), which make children vulnerable to sexual exploitation. In this way an emphasis on the sexualisation of children could be said to aggravate the problem that it sets out to address. The book: provides a comprehensive analysis of child pornography issues in all of their complexity, including legal, psychological, criminal justice and social perspectives. presents significant volume of original empirical data gathered from police, prosecutors and judges. includes new qualitative and quantitative information set against a background of shifting international developments. The analysis is explicitly comparative. draws on a variety of sources including support groups for paedophiles, newspaper coverage of court cases involving child pornography, victim testimony and police operations.

This book is a unique and note-worthy enquiry into the implications of algorithmic knowledge for human subjectivity Eran Fisher provides timely insight on a relevant field of research, i.e., how algorithms impact our society This book will make a timely contribution to the social study of algorithms and will prove especially valuable for scholars working at the intersections of media and communication studies, internet studies, information studies, the sociology of technology, the philosophy of technology, and science and technology studies

This book examines the role that human subjective experience plays in the creation of reality and introduces a new concept, the Bubble Universe, to describe the universe as it looks from the subjective viewpoint of an individual. Drawing on a range of research, the author questions the extent to which the scientific study of the origins of life, consciousness and subjective experience is itself influenced by scientists' subjective worlds. The author argues that in many respects the Bubble Universe differs from the universe as described by science and religion, and analyzes these differences. The fabric and structure of subjective reality is described, and various aspects of the Bubble Universe are examined, including science, religion, life, morality and history. The differences between the views from inside the subjective universe and from scientific, religious and sociocultural versions of the universe are outlined, and their significance for practical and theoretical problems are highlighted and illustrated with psychological experiments. This book will be of value to all scholars interested in how subjectivity influences research and appeal in particular to those working in developmental and theoretical psychology, consciousness, epistemology, phenomenology, and the philosophy of science and of the mind.

This book defines a logical system called the Protocol-theoretic Logic of Epistemic Norms (PLEN), it develops PLEN into a formal framework for representing and reasoning about epistemic norms, and it shows that PLEN is theoretically interesting and useful with regard to the aims of such a framework. In order to motivate the project, the author defends an account of epistemic norms called epistemic proceduralism. The core of this view is the idea that, in virtue of their indispensable, regulative role in cognitive life, epistemic norms are closely intertwined with procedural rules that restrict epistemic actions, procedures, and processes. The resulting organizing principle of the book is that epistemic norms are protocols for epistemic planning and control. The core of the book is developing PLEN, which is essentially a novel variant of propositional dynamic logic (PDL) distinguished by more or less elaborate revisions of PDL's syntax and semantics. The syntax encodes the procedural content of epistemic norms by means of the well-known protocol or program constructions of dynamic and epistemic logics. It then provides a novel language of operators on protocols, including a range of unique protocol equivalence relations, syntactic operations on protocols, and various procedural relations among protocols in addition to the standard dynamic (modal) operators of PDL. The semantics of the system then interprets protocol expressions and expressions embedding protocols over a class of directed multigraph-like structures rather than the standard labeled transition systems or modal frames. The intent of the system is to better represent epistemic dynamics, build a logic of protocols atop it, and then show that the resulting logic of protocols is useful as a logical framework for epistemic norms. The resulting theory of epistemic norms centers on notions of norm equivalence derived from theories of process equivalence familiar from the study of dynamic and modal logics. The canonical account of protocol equivalence in PLEN turns out to possess a number of interesting formal features, including satisfaction of important conditions on hyperintensional equivalence, a matter of recently recognized importance in the logic of norms, generally. To show that the system is interesting and useful as a framework for representing and reasoning about epistemic norms, the author applies the logical system to the analysis of epistemic deontic operators, and, partly on the basis of this, establishes representation theorems linking protocols to the action-guiding content of epistemic norms. The protocol-theoretic logic of epistemic norms is then shown to almost immediately validate the main principles of epistemic proceduralism.

Recent findings about the capabilities of smart animals such as corvids or octopi and novel types of artificial intelligence (AI), from social robots to cognitive assistants, are provoking the demand for new answers for meaningful comparison with other kinds of intelligence. This book fills this need by proposing a universal theory of intelligence which is based on causal learning as the central theme of intelligence. The goal is not just to describe, but mainly to explain queries like why one kind of intelligence is more intelligent than another, whatsoever the intelligence. Shiny terms like "strong AI," "superintelligence," "singularity" or "artificial general intelligence" that have been coined by a Babylonian confusion of tongues are clarified on the way.

The present book is a natural outgrowth of Rescher s longstanding preoccupation with the rational systematization of our knowledge as manifested in such earlier works as Cognitive Systematization (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), and Complexity (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998). Accordingly, the role of principles in human affairs is crucial and ubiquitous. Principology, the theory of principles underdeveloped through it may be is accordingly bound to find a significant place in the sphere of philosophical inquiry regarding matters of thought and action."

Never before, in any anthology, have contemporary epistemologists and philosophers of language come together to address the single most neglected important issue at the confluence of these two branches of philosophy, namely: Can we know facts from reliable reports? Besides Hume's subversive discussion of miracles and the literature thereon, testimony has been bypassed by most Western philosophers; whereas in classical Indian (Pramana) theories of evidence and knowledge philosophical debates have raged for centuries about the status of word-generated knowledge. Is the response "I was told by an expert on the subject" as respectable as "I saw" or "I inferred" in answer to "How do you know?"' is a question answered in diverse and subtle ways by Buddhists, Vaisesikas and Naiyayikas. For the first time this book makes available the riches of those debates, translating from Sanskrit some contemporary Indian Pandits' reactions to Western analytic accounts of meaning and knowledge. For advanced undergraduates in philosophy, for researchers - in Australia, Asia, Europe or America - on epistemology, theory of meaning, Indian or comparative philosophy, as well as for specialists interested in this relatively fresh topic of knowledge transmission and epistemic dependence this book will be a feast. After its publication analytic philosophy and Indian philosophy will have no excuse for shunning each other.

"The Knowledge Book" is a unique interdisciplinary reference work for students and researchers concerned with the nature of knowledge. It is the first work of its kind to be organized on the assumption that whatever else knowledge might be, it is intrinsically social. The book consists of 42 alphabetically arranged entries on key concepts at the intersection of philosophy and sociology - what used to be called "sociology of knowledge" but is now increasingly called "social epistemology". The entries include concepts common to disciplines that in recent years have devoted more of their attention to knowledge: cultural studies, communication studies, information science, education, policy studies and business studies. Special attention is given to concepts from the emerging field of science and technology studies. Each entry presents a short, self-contained essay providing an overview of a concept and concludes with suggestions for further reading. All the entries are fully cross-referenced, allowing readers to both make connections and follow their own interests.

This book focuses on the role of intuition in querying Socratic problems, the very nature of intuition itself, and whether it can be legitimately used to support or reject philosophical theses. The reader is introduced to questions connected to the use of intuition in philosophy through an analysis of two methods where the appeal to intuition is explicit: thought experiments and reflective equilibrium. In addition, the debate on the legitimacy of such an appeal is presented as connected to the discussion on the nature of the aims and results of philosophical inquiries. Finally, the main tenets and results of experimental philosophers are discussed, highlighting the methodological limits of such studies. Readers interested in the nature of intuition in philosophy will find this an invaluable and revealing resource.

What do philosophy and computer science have in common? It turns out, quite a lot! In providing an introduction to computer science (using Python), Daniel Lim presents in this book key philosophical issues, ranging from external world skepticism to the existence of God to the problem of induction. These issues, and others, are introduced through the use of critical computational concepts, ranging from image manipulation to recursive programming to elementary machine learning techniques. In illuminating some of the overlapping conceptual spaces of computer science and philosophy, Lim teaches the reader fundamental programming skills and also allows her to develop the critical thinking skills essential for examining some of the enduring questions of philosophy. Key Features Teaches readers actual computer programming, not merely ideas about computers Includes fun programming projects (like digital image manipulation and Game of Life simulation), allowing the reader to develop the ability to write larger computer programs that require decomposition, abstraction, and algorithmic thinking Uses computational concepts to introduce, clarify, and develop a variety of philosophical issues Covers various aspects of machine learning and relates them to philosophical issues involving science and induction as well as to ethical issues Provides a framework to critically analyze arguments in classic and contemporary philosophical debates

The purpose of the book is twofold: to give a theory of reference for the indexical I' and to explain what is involved in thinking about oneself. The first part constitutes a critique of different solutions to the problem of how I' refers, while the second part advances a positive account of I' and I-thoughts. It is argued that I' refers indirectly through a de re sense that is based on non-conceptual content. I' expresses an individual concept with two components: a de re sense and a context-independent self-concept. Other issues that are discussed concern self-knowledge, e.g. whether there is something in specific that we have to know about ourselves to be able to self-refer, and the kind of self-consciousness that is required for self-reference. Furthermore, the notions of unity of consciousness and personal identity, as they both are presupposed by a competent use of I', are examined. Audience: The book is intended for philosophers of mind and language with a general interest in theories of reference and meaning, and more specifically in the first person, the self, and self-knowledge.

(1) Beliefs are involuntary, and not nonnally subject to direct voluntary control. For instance I cannot believe at will that my trousers are on fire, or that the Dalai Lama is a living God, even if you pay me a large amount of money for believing such things. (2) Beliefs are nonnally shaped by evidence for what is believed, unless they are, in some sense, irrational. In general a belief is rational if it is proportioned to the degree of evidence that one has for its truth. In this sense, one often says that "beliefs aim at truth" . This is why it is, on the face of it, irrational to believe against the evidence that one has. A subject whose beliefs are not shaped by a concern for their truth, but by what she wants to be the case, is more or less a wishful thinker or a self-deceiver. (3) Beliefs are context independent, in the sense that at one time a subject believes something or does not believe it; she does not believe it relative to one context and not relative to another. For instance if I believe that Paris is a polluted city, I cannot believe that on Monday and not on Tuesday; that would be a change of belief, or a change of mind, but not a case of believing one thing in one context and another thing in another context. If I believe something, the belief is more or 4 less pennanent across various contexts.

Gabriel Marcel reminds me that I asked him to write for this book. This is quite true, but not the whole story. During the visit with Ernest Hocking which he describes so eloquently in his essay, "Solips ism Surmounted," he learned from Hocking's hostess, Elizabeth Hazard, that I was planning hopefully for a Hocking F estschri/t. On his return to Harvard, where he was preparing his James Lectures, he wrote me offering an essay should these plans develop. Encouraged, I kept his letter while I moved my family to India and settled into a new job. When it was possible to begin work on the book in earnest I then made my request, reminding him of his original offer. I mention this because I discovered that his enthusiasm was to be typical of those who came to know about the project. Charles Moore commented that such a book was "long overdue," and Walter Stace spoke for us all when he said: "I am sure that there is no one in our profession who would not wish to be associated with any project in his honor. " Given the wide range of Hocking's interests and influence, it was difficult to know just how the volume should be organized."

"Robert Brandom" is one of the most significant philosophers writing today, yet paradoxically philosophers have found it difficult to get to grips with the details and implications of his work. This book aims to facilitate critical engagement with Brandom's ideas by providing an accessible overview of Brandom's project and the context for an initial assessment. Jeremy Wanderer's examination focuses on Brandom's inferentialist conception of rationality, and the core part of this conception that aims to specify the structure that a set of performances within a social practice must have for the participants to count as sapient beings by virtue of their participation in the practice, and for the performances within the practice to have objective semantic content by virtue of their featuring within the practice. Wanderer's exploration of these two goals forms the structure to the book. It Includes: Part I that provides a structural model of linguistic practice and considers various groups of potential participants in terms of their relationships to this practice; and, Part II that examines the meaning of the performances that are caught up in this gameplaying practice. Brandom's approach to semantics is outlined and the challenge such an approach has in allowing for a representational dimension of language and thought is explored. Wanderer offers readers a valuable framework for understanding the Brandomian system and helps situate Brandom's systematic theorizing within contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. This book will be a sought after aid to reading Brandom for advanced students and philosophers engaging with his challenging body of work.