The self for Kant is something real, and yet is neither
appearance nor thing in itself, but rather has some third status.
Appearances for Kant arise in space and time where these are
respectively forms of outer and inner attending (intuition).
Melnick explains the "third status" by identifying the self with
intellectual action that does not arise in the progression of
attending (and so is not appearance), but accompanies and unifies
inner attending. As so accompanying, it progresses with that
attending and is therefore temporal--not a thing in itself.
According to Melnick, the distinction between the self or the
subject and its thoughts is a distinction wholly within
intellectual action; only such a non-entitative view of the self is
consistent with Kant's transcendental idealism. As Melnick
demonstrates in this volume, this conception of the self clarifies
all of Kant's main discussions of this issue in the Transcendental
Deduction and the Paralogisms of Pure Reason.
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