We must all make choices about how we want to live. We evaluate our possibilities by relying on historical, moral, personal, political, religious, and scientific modes of evaluations, but the values and reasons that follow from them conflict. Philosophical problems are forced on us when we try to cope with such conflicts. There are reasons for and against all proposed ways of coping with the conflicts, but none of them has been generally accepted by reasonable thinkers. The constructive aim of The Nature of Philosophical Problems is to propose a way of understanding the nature of such philosophical problems, explain why they occur, why they are perennial, and propose a pluralist approach as the most reasonable way of coping with them. This approach is practical, context-dependent, and particular. It follows from it that the recurrence of philosophical problems is not a defect, but a welcome consequence of the richness of our modes of understanding that enlarges the range of possibilities by which we might choose to live. The critical aim of the book is to give reasons against both the absolutist attempt to find an overriding value or principle for resolving philosophical problems and of the relativist claim that reasons unavoidably come to an end and how we want to live is ultimately a matter of personal preference, not of reasons.

Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig examine the foundations and applications of Davidson's influential program of truth-theoretic semantics for natural languages. The program uses an axiomatic truth theory for a language, which meets certain constraints, to serve the goals of a compositional meaning theory. Lepore and Ludwig explain and clarify the motivations for the approach, and then consider how to apply the framework to a range of important natural language constructions, including quantifiers, proper names, indexicals, simple and complex demonstratives, quotation, adjectives and adverbs, the simple and perfect tenses, temporal adverbials and temporal quantifiers, tense in sentential complement clauses, attitude and indirect discourse reports, and the problem of interrogative and imperative sentences. They not only discuss Davidson's own contributions to these subjects but consider criticisms, developments, and alternatives as well. They conclude with a discussion of logical form in natural language in light of the approach, the role of the concept of truth in the program, and Davidson's view of it. Anyone working on meaning will find this book invaluable.

Is truth objective or relative? What exists independently of our minds? This book is about these two questions. The essays in its pages variously defend and critique answers to each, grapple over the proper methodology for addressing them, and wonder whether either question is worth pursuing. In so doing, they carry on a long and esteemed tradition - for our two questions are among the oldest of philosophical issues, and have vexed almost every major philosopher, from Plato, to Kant to Wittgenstein. Fifteen eminent contributors bring fresh perspectives, renewed energy and original answers to debates which have been the focus of a tremendous amount of interest in the last three decades both within philosophy and the culture at large.

Susanne Bobzien presents the definitive study of one of the most important intellectual legacies of the ancient Greeks: the Stoic theory of causal determinism. She reconstructs the theory and discusses how the Stoics (third century BC to second century AD) justified it, and how it relates to their views on possibility, action, freedom, moral responsibility, and many other topics. She demonstrates the considerable philosophical richness and power that these ideas retain today.

In this incisive new monograph one of Britain's most eminent philosophers explores the often overlooked tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. He seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied, at its best, in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily believe or what they voluntarily accept? And should statements and assertions be presumed to express what their authors believe or what they accept? Does such a distinction between belief and acceptance help to resolve the paradoxes of self-deception and akrasia? Must people be taken to believe everything entailed by what they believe, or merely to accept everything entailed by what they accept? Through a systematic examination of these problems, the author sheds new light on issues of crucial importance in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science.

Disjunctivism has attracted considerable philosophical attention in recent years: it has been the source of a lively and extended debate spanning the philosophy of perception, epistemology, and the philosophy of action. Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson present seventeen specially written essays, which examine the different forms of disjunctivism and explore the connections between them. This volume will be an essential resource for anyone working in the central areas of philosophy, and the starting point for future research in this fascinating field.

Self-knowledge is the focus of considerable attention from philosophers: Knowing Our Own Minds gives a much-needed overview of current work on the subject, bringing together new essays by leading figures. Knowledge of one's own sensations, desires, intentions, thoughts, beliefs, and other attitudes is characteristically different from other kinds of knowledge, such as knowledge of other people's mental attributes: it has greater immediacy, authority, and salience. The first six chapters examine philosophical questions raised by these features of self-knowledge. The next two look at the role of our knowledge of our own psychological states in our functioning as rational agents. The third group of essays examine the tension between the distinctive characteristics of self-knowledge and arguments that psychological content is externally-socially and environmentally-determined. The final pair of chapters extend the discussion to knowledge of one's own language. Together these original, stimulating, and closely interlinked essays demonstrate the special relevance of self-knowledge to a broad range of issues in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.

In Phenomenology and Lacan on Schizophrenia, Alphonse De Waelhens provides a clear summary of Lacan's theory of schizophrenia, as Lacan derived it from his commentary of Freud's study of the Memoirs of Schreber. De Waelhens also shows how Lacan's understanding of the schizophrenic as having a defective relation to language can also explain four other characteristics of schizophrenic behavior: the fragmented body image; lack of realistic evaluation of the world; so-called bisexuality; and confusion of birth and death. Third, De Waelhens gives a Hegelian interpretation of the pre-Oedipal experience of the child. He makes use of Freud's study on his grand-child using a bobbin and later the words fort-da (away-here), to demonstrate that a transitional object allows the child to take distance from its attachment to the mother so that it can start to separate itself from the mother. Taking distance is, according to De Waelhens, introducing the Hegelian negative, which is the birth of the subject. Fourth, De Waelhens gives a dialectic reading of the history of German and French psychiatry. He shows the epistemological contradictions in the work of some of the great nineteenth century psychiatrists relying too exclusively on a biological model of schizophrenia.In his contribution to this volume, Wilfried Ver Eecke draws several lessons from evaluating the literature on schizophrenia. He argues that epistemologically neither a biological nor a psychological method of reasoning can capture all the factors that can play a role in the creation of schizophrenia. He relies heavily, but not exclusively, on the Finnish studies of Tienari, Myrhman, and Wahlberg and their colleagues to provide statistical evidence that non-biological factors also play an important role in causing schizophrenia. He relies heavily, but again not exclusively, on the study by Karon and VandenBos to demonstrate statistically the efficiency of psychodynamically inspired therapy of schizophrenics.Ver Eecke also addresses an apparent inconsistency in De Waelhens' presentation of Lacan's theory of schizophrenia. Where De Waelhens seemed to argue at one time that the mother figure was the crucial figure to explain schizophrenia (leading to a defective relation to the body) and at another time that it was the role of the father which was crucial (leading to a defective relation to language and the symbolic), there Ver Eecke argues that the defective function of each influences the function of the other. He then draws a conclusion for the therapy of schizophrenics: to be helpful a therapist will have to address both deficiencies. The problem for treating schizophrenics is that correcting an unconscious deficiency to the body-a deficiency in the imaginary-requires a totally different kind of intervention than an attempt to correct a symbolic deficiency-a deficiency in the paternal function. A correction of the imaginary requires a kind of maternal mirroring; a correction of the symbolic requires making a distinction or a prohibition stick. One further difficulty arises. Psychotherapy uses language in its treatment. However, language in schizophrenics is deficient. We can therefore expect that language will be inefficient. This is so unless the therapist uses language, first, to make a repair at the imaginary level and only thereafter makes an attempt to make a correction in the symbolic. In analyzing successful therapeutic techniques reported by several therapists Ver Eecke discovers that all of them first try to repair the imaginary before they attempt to make corrections to the symbolic.

Proclus (412-485 A.D.) was one of the last official 'successors' of Plato at the head of the Academy in Athens at the end of Antiquity, before the school was finally closed down in 529. As a prolific author of systematic works on a wide range of topics and one of the most influential commentators on Plato of all times, the legacy of Proclus in the cultural history of the west can hardly be overestimated. This book introduces the reader to Proclus' life and works, his place in the Platonic tradition of Antiquity and the influence his work exerted in later ages. Various chapters are devoted to Proclus' metaphysical system, including his doctrines about the first principle of all reality, the One, and about the Forms and the soul. The broad range of Proclus' thought is further illustrated by highlighting his contribution to philosophy of nature, scientific theory, theory of knowledge and philosophy of language. Finally, also his most original doctrines on evil and providence, his Neoplatonic virtue ethics, his complex views on theology and religious practice, and his metaphysical aesthetics receive separate treatments. This book is the first to bring together the leading scholars in the field and to present a state of the art of Proclean studies today. In doing so, it provides the most comprehensive introduction to Proclus' thought currently available.

This is the third volume of philosophical writings by Donald Davidson. He presents a selection of his work on knowledge, mind, and language from the 1980s and the 1990s. We all have knowledge of our own minds, knowledge of the contents of other minds, and knowledge of the shared environment. Davidson examines the nature and status of each of these three sorts of knowledge, and the connections and differences among them. Along the way he has illuminating things to say about truth, human rationality, and the relations between language, thought, and the world.

Rae Langton offers a new interpretation and defence of Kant's doctrine of things in themselves. Kant distinguishes things in themselves from phenomena, and in so doing he makes a metaphysical distinction between intrinsic and relational properties of substances. Kant says that phenomena-things as we know them-consist 'entirely of relations', by which he means forces. His claim that we have no knowledge of things in themselves is not idealism, but epistemic humility: we have no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of substances. This humility has its roots in some plausible philosophical beliefs: an empiricist belief in the receptivity of human knowledge and a metaphysical belief in the irreducibility of relational properties. Langton's interpretation vindicates Kant's scientific realism, and shows his primary/secondary quality distinction to be superior even to modern-day competitors. And it answers the famous charge that Kant's tale of things in themselves is one that makes itself untellable.

This book is not aimed at exhuming Kant, but resurrecting him. It is inspired by the Critique of Pure Reason , yet is not about it: perhaps over-ambitiously, it tries to delineate not Kant's metaphysics of experience but the truth of the matter. The author shows rather than says where he agrees and disagrees with the first Critique , in so far as he understood that profound but obscure, over-systematic yet carelessly written, inspiring and infuriating, magnificent but flawed masterpiece. The book attempts a highly systematic presentation, in which the very form of the work reflects the content of the arguments. Kant is often derided for the extent to which he allows his penchant for architectonic structure to distort his insights, but it is argued that he had the right instinct in assuming that there must be some systematic way in which the necessary conditions for experience fit together. The contemporary trend in analytical philosophy seems to be towards ever more specialized, jargon-infested work, and there is a need to draw things together into a wider view that can be more generally appreciated.

Colin Howson offers a solution to one of the central, unsolved problems of Western philosophy, the problem of induction. In the mid-eighteenth century David Hume argued that successful prediction tells us nothing about the truth or probable truth of the predicting theory. Howson claims that Hume's argument is correct, and examines what follows about the relation between science and its empirical base.

In Contradiction advocates and defends the view that there are true contradictions (dialetheism), a view that flies in the face of orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle. The book has been at the center of the controversies surrounding dialetheism ever since its first publication in
1987. This second edition of the book substantially expands upon the original in various ways, and also contains the author's reflections on developments over the last two decades. Further aspects of dialetheism are discussed in the companion volume, Doubt Truth to be a Liar, also published by
Oxford University Press in 2006.

In this short, lucid, rich book Michael Dummett sets out his views about some of the deepest questions in philosophy. The fundamental question of metaphysics is: what does reality consist of? To answer this, Dummett holds, it is necessary to say what kinds of fact obtain, and what constitutes their holding good. Facts correspond with true propositions, or true thoughts: when we know which propositions, or thoughts, in general, are true, we shall know what facts there are in general. Dummett considers the relation between metaphysics, our conception of the constitution of reality, and semantics, the theory that explains how statements are determined as true or as false in terms of their composition out of their constituent expressions. He investigates the two concepts on which the bridge that connects semantics to metaphysics rests, meaning and truth, and the role of justification in a theory of meaning. He then examines the special semantic and metaphysical issues that arise with relation to time and tense. On this basis Dummett puts forward his controversial view of reality as indeterminate: there may be no fact of the matter about whether an object does or does not have a given property. We have to relinquish our deep-held realist understanding of language, the illusion that we know what it is for any proposition that we can frame to be true independently of our having any means of recognizing its truth, and accept that truth depends on our capacity to apprehend it. Dummett concludes with a chapter about God.

Now in a new edition, this volume updates Davidson's exceptional Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984), which set out his enormously influential philosophy of language. The original volume remains a central point of reference, and a focus of controversy, with its impact extending into linguistic theory, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. Addressing a central question--what it is for words to mean what they do--and featuring a previously uncollected, additional essay, this work will appeal to a wide audience of philosophers, linguists, and psychologists.

Frederick F. Schmitt offers a systematic interpretation of David Hume's epistemology, as it is presented in the indispensable A Treatise of Human Nature. Hume's text alternately manifests scepticism, empiricism, and naturalism in epistemology. Interpretations of his epistemology have tended to emphasise one of these apparently conflicting positions over the others. But Schmitt argues that the positions can be reconciled by tracing them to a single underlying epistemology of knowledge and probability quietly at work in the text, an epistemology according to which truth is the chief cognitive merit of a belief, and knowledge and probable belief are species of reliable belief. Hume adopts Locke's dichotomy between knowledge and probability and reassigns causal inference from its traditional place in knowledge to the domain of probability-his most significant departure from earlier accounts of cognition. This shift of causal inference to an associative and imaginative operation raises doubts about the merit of causal inference, suggesting the counterintuitive consequence that causal inference is wholly inferior to knowledge-producing demonstration. To defend his associationist psychology of causal inference from this suggestion, Hume must favourably compare causal inference with demonstration in a manner compatible with associationism. He does this by finding an epistemic status shared by demonstrative knowledge and causally inferred beliefs-the status of justified belief. On the interpretation developed here, he identifies knowledge with infallible belief and justified belief with reliable belief, i.e., belief produced by truth-conducive belief-forming operations. Since infallibility implies reliable belief, knowledge implies justified belief. He then argues that causally inferred beliefs are reliable, so share this status with knowledge. Indeed Hume assumes that causally inferred beliefs enjoy this status in his very argument for associationism. On the reliability interpretation, Hume's accounts of knowledge and justified belief are part of a broader veritistic epistemology making true belief the chief epistemic value and goal of science. The veritistic interpretation advanced here contrasts with interpretations on which the chief epistemic value of belief is its empirical adequacy, stability, or fulfilment of a natural function, as well as with the suggestion that the chief value of belief is its utility for common life. Veritistic interpretations are offered of the natural function of belief, the rules of causal inference, scepticism about body and matter, and the criteria of justification. As Schmitt shows, there is much attention to Hume's sources in Locke and to the complexities of his epistemic vocabulary.

The Wissenschaftslehre or "doctrine of science" was the great achievement of the German idealist philosopher J. G. Fichte. Daniel Breazeale presents accessible new translations of three works in which Fichte developed this philosophical system. The centerpiece of this volume is a new English translation of Fichte's only full-scale presentation of the principles of his philosophy, the Foundation of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre (1794/95). Accompanying this are new translations of the work in which Fichte first publicly introduced his new system, Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre (1794) and the Outline of what is Distinctive of the Wissenschaftslehre with respect to the Theoretical Power (1795), which was intended as a companion to the Foundation. In addition Breazeale includes the transcripts of Fichte's unpublished "Zurich lectures" on his system (1794), translated here for the first time in English. Breazeale supplements his translations with an extensive historical and systematic introduction, detailed outlines of the contents and structure of the Foundation and Outline, and copious scholarly annotation of the translated texts, helping to orient readers who may otherwise find themselves lost in the wilderness of Fichte's complex "derivations."

In Everything Ancient Was Once New, Emalani Case explores Indigenous persistence through the concept of Kahiki, a term that is at once both an ancestral homeland for Kanaka Maoli (Hawaiians) and the knowledge that there is life to be found beyond Hawai'i's shores. It is therefore both a symbol of ancestral connection and the potential that comes with remembering and acting upon that connection. Tracing physical, historical, intellectual, and spiritual journeys to and from Kahiki, Emalani frames it as a place of refuge and sanctuary, a place where ancient knowledge can constantly be made anew. It is in Kahiki, she argues, and in the sanctuary it creates, that today's Kanaka Maoli can find safety and reprieve from the continued onslaught of settler colonial violence, while also confronting some of the often uncomfortable and challenging realities of being Indigenous in Hawai'i, in the Pacific, and in the world. Each chapter of the book engages with Kahiki as a shifting term, employed by Kanaka Maoli to explain their lives and experiences to themselves at different points in history. In doing so, Everything Ancient Was Once New proposes and argues for reactivated and reinvigorated engagements with Kahiki, each supporting ongoing work aimed at decolonizing physical and ideological spaces, and reconnecting Kanaka Maoli to other peoples and places in the Pacific region and beyond in ways that are both purposeful and meaningful. In the book, Kahiki is therefore traced through pivotal moments in history and critical moments in contemporary times, explaining that while not always mentioned by name, the idea of Kahiki was, and is, always full of potential. In writing that is both personal and theoretical, Emalani weaves the past and the present together, reflecting on ancient concepts and their continued relevance in movements to protect lands, waters, and oceans; to fight for social justice; to reexamine our responsibilities and obligations to each other across the Pacific region; and to open space for continued dialogue on what it means to be Indigenous both when at home and when away. Combining personal narrative and reflection with research and critical analysis, Everything Ancient Was Once New journeys to and from Kahiki, the sanctuary for reflection, deep learning, and continued dreaming with the past, in the present, and far into the future.