Kierkegaard's Concepts is a comprehensive, multi-volume survey of the key concepts and categories that inform Kierkegaard's writings. Each article is a substantial, original piece of scholarship, which discusses the etymology and lexical meaning of the relevant Danish term, traces the development of the concept over the course of the authorship, and explains how it functions in the wider context of Kierkegaard's thought. Concepts have been selected on the basis of their importance for Kierkegaard's contributions to philosophy, theology, the social sciences, literature and aesthetics, thereby making this volume an ideal reference work for students and scholars in a wide range of disciplines.

The subtitle of this book should be read as a qualification as much as an elaboration of the title. If the goal were completeness, then this book would have included essays on the work of other philosophers such as Wilfrid Sellars, Nicholas Rescher, Donald Davidson, Gilbert Harman and Michael Williams. Although it would be incorrect to say that each of these writers has set forth a version of the coherence theory of justification and knowledge, it is clear that their work is directly relevant, and reaction to it could easily fill a companion volume. This book concentrates, however, on the theories of Keith Lehrer and Laurence BonJour, and I doubt that any epistemologist would deny that they are presently the two leading proponents of coherentism. A sure indication of this was the ease with which the papers in this volume were solicited and delivered. The many authors represented here were willing, prepared, and excited to join in the discussion of BonJour's and Lehrer's recent writings. I thank each one personally for agreeing so freely to contribute. All of the essays but two are published for the first time here. Marshall Swain's and Alvin Goldman's papers were originally presented at a symposium on BonJour's The Structure of Empirical Knowledge at the annual meeting of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, Chicago, Illinois, in April, 1987.

Pethick investigates a much neglected philosophical connection between two of the most controversial figures in the history of philosophy: Spinoza and Nietzsche. By examining the crucial role that affectivity plays in their philosophies, this book claims that the two philosophers share the common goal of making knowledge the most powerful affect.

This book is the first volume featuring the work of American women philosophers in the first half of the twentieth century. It provides selected papers authored by Mary Whiton Calkins, Grace Andrus de Laguna, Grace Neal Dolson, Marjorie Glicksman Grene, Marjorie Silliman Harris, Thelma Zemo Lavine, Marie Collins Swabey, Ellen Bliss Talbot, Dorothy Walsh and Margaret Floy Washburn. The book also provides the historical and philosophical background to their work. The papers focus on the nature of philosophy, knowledge, the philosophy of science, the mind-matter nexus, the nature of time, and the question of freedom and the individual. The material is suitable for scholars, researchers and advanced philosophy students interested in (history of) philosophy; theories of knowledge; philosophy of science; mind, and reality.

In each of Plato's "dialogues of definition" (Euthyphro, Laches, Meno, Charmides, Lysis, Republic I, Hippias Major), Socrates motivates philosophical discussion by posing a question of the form "What is F-ness?" Yet these dialogues are notorious for coming up empty. Socrates' interlocutors repeatedly fail to deliver satisfactory answers. Thus, the dialogues of definition are often considered negative- empty of any positive philosophical content. Justin C. Clark resists the negative reading, arguing that the dialogues of definition contain positive "Socratic" answers. In order to see the positive theory, however, one must recognize what Clark calls the "dual function" of the "What is F-ness?" question. Socrates is not looking for a single type of answer. Rather, Socrates is looking for two distinct types of answers. The "What is F-ness?" question serves as a springboard for two types of investigation- conceptual and causal. The key to understanding any of the dialogues of definition, therefore, is to decipher between them. Clark offers a way to do just that, at once resolving interpretive issues in Socratic philosophy, providing systematic interpretations of the negative endings, and generating important new readings of the Charmides and Lysis, whilst casting further doubt on the authenticity of the Hippias Major.

This book demonstrates how a radical version of physicalism ('No-Self Physicalism') can offer an internally coherent and comprehensive philosophical worldview. It first argues that a coherent physicalist should explicitly treat a cognitive subject merely as a physical thing and should not vaguely assume an amorphous or even soul-like subject or self. This approach forces the physicalist to re-examine traditional core philosophical notions such as truth, analyticity, modality, apriority because our traditional understandings of them appear to be predicated on a cognitive subject that is not literally just a physical thing. In turn, working on the assumption that a cognitive subject is itself completely physical, namely a neural network-based robot programmed by evolution (hence the term 'No-Self'), the book proposes physicalistic theories on conceptual representation, truth, analyticity, modality, the nature of mathematics, epistemic justification, knowledge, apriority and intuition, as well as a physicalistic ontology. These are meant to show that this No-Self Physicalism, perhaps the most minimalistic and radical version of physicalism proposed to date, can accommodate many aspects that have traditionally interested philosophers. Given its refreshingly radical approach and painstakingly developed content, the book is of interest to anyone who is seeking a coherent philosophical worldview in this age of science.

This book investigates the methodological issues raised by the encounter between Islamic thought and contemporary philosophical hermeneutics. It features essays that examine why and how current Muslim thinkers refer to Continental philosophy. The contributors put the universality of the hermeneutic order to the test with three different approaches. The first looks at exegetical aspects. It addresses contemporary thinkers from the Islamicate world who have engaged critically or not with main representatives or key concepts of philosophical hermeneutics. The second presents an interpretative analysis. The essays here present attempts at using philosophical hermeneutics in order to develop new interpretations of canonical or traditional ensembles of texts such as the Qur'an and the Hadith as well as legal, spiritual, and philosophical corpuses from the Islamicate world. The third looks at different political and critical issues. The clear and sound reference to religion of Islamic thought makes its entanglement with philosophical hermeneutics a burning challenge for all parties involved. Is it true, as some contend, that philosophical hermeneutics can help interpret Islamic thought anew? This book reveals how the two philosophies are likely to expand each other's horizons and influence each other's conceptual frameworks. It features revised papers from an International Conference.

Cognition is a paradoxical process, from the moment of the formation of human subjectivity, through its relationship with the Other (or more precisely: l'autre) and with the world, to the ontological status of the world as such. This is what this book has at stake. The book deals with selected aspects of poststructural thought which are introduced into the language of contemporary science, prose, and poetry. Such an enterprise is possible by treating philosophy, science, and poetry as languages which can try to enter into a dialogue through metaphors. This is the ground on which the project is implemented.

Political protests, debates on college campuses, and social media tirades make it seem like everyone is speaking their minds today. Surveys, however, reveal that many people increasingly feel like they're walking on eggshells when communicating in public. Speaking your mind can risk relationships and professional opportunities. It can alienate friends and anger colleagues. Isn't it smarter to just put your head down and keep quiet about controversial topics? In this book, Hrishikesh Joshi offers a novel defense of speaking your mind. He explains that because we are social creatures, we never truly think alone. What we know depends on what our community knows. And by bringing our unique perspectives to bear upon public discourse, we enhance our collective ability to reach the truth on a variety of important matters. Speaking your mind is also important for your own sake. It is essential for developing your own thinking. And it's a core aspect of being intellectually courageous and independent. Joshi argues that such independence is a crucial part of a well-lived life. The book draws from Aristotle, John Stuart Mill, Friedrich Nietzsche, Bertrand Russell, and a range of contemporary thinkers to argue that it's OK to speak your mind. Key Features Shows that we have not just a right but a moral duty to publicly share what we know. Argues that discussing your unique ideas with others is essential for developing as a critical thinker. Explores the value of intellectual honesty and independence in the writings of John Stuart Mill and Friedrich Nietzsche and connects their thinking to contemporary problems. Argues that avoiding cultural blind spots today is important for the fate of future generations.

Wisdom, considered the highest level of enlightenment, has not had a foothold in our education since Plato's Academy and Aristotle's Lyceum. Yet it is wisdom that ultimately promotes human flourishing and equips individuals with the sophistication to live life well. Wisdom is especially urgent if leaders and followers are to lead and follow well. Wisdom is more critical and urgent than ever in today's world. Stories of lack of discernment and sound judgment abound in the news. Comments such as "what were they thinking?" and "why did they do that?" reveal that wisdom is often painfully lacking when it comes to making decisions. The world needs people who judiciously discern and courageously implement innovative decisions at the right time and in the right way. But before wisdom can be adequately taught, it needs to be properly understood. Historically, the study and acquisition of wisdom has been reserved to the philosophical and theological fields of study, often making wisdom appear esoteric, elusive, and mysterious. While relatively recent empirical attempts have led to certain quantifications and qualifications of wisdom, a comprehensive and cohesive model for understanding, teaching, and implementing general wisdom has yet to emerge. Unfortunately, philosophical and theological treatises on wisdom have been overly convoluted or mystical, making wisdom appear elusive for the lay person. The empirical traditions have overanalyzed the concept to make it almost formulaic and uninspiring. This primer merges insights from the philosophical, theological, and empirical traditions to provide a simple model for understanding, acquiring, practicing, and teaching wisdom. This primer is unique is that it uses clear language to walk the readers through representative classical philosophical and religious works and empirical studies in lieu of jargon-filled meditations. As a result, the primer orients readers to think like philosophers, theologians, and social scientists by shepherding them through to the logic of previous works on wisdom. What also sets this work apart is its brevity without compromise to substance. This primer demonstrates that the complicated can be made relatively simple, and that brevity and profound meaning often walk hand in hand. Ideal for emerging and established leaders, this book demonstrates that wisdom inspires confidence, establishes credibility, and helps us successfully navigate complex problems and promote human progress. This primer makes wisdom accessible and provides all soon-to-be, novice, and seasoned leaders with the understanding, dispositions, and skills to be discerning and virtuous people others will want to emulate and follow.

Philosopher and art historian Georges Didi-Huberman is one of the most innovative and influential critical thinkers writing today. This book is the first English-language study of his writing on images. An image is a form of representation, but what are the philosophical frameworks supporting it? The book considers how Didi-Huberman takes up this question repeatedly over the course of his career. Placing his project in relation to major historical and intellectual contexts, it shows not only how he modifies dominant disciplinary traditions, but also how the study of images is central to a new way of thinking about poststructuralist-inspired art history. -- .

This book deals with the development of thinking under different cultural conditions, focusing on the evolution of mathematical thinking in the history of science and education. Starting from Piaget's genetic epistemology, it provides a conceptual framework for describing and explaining the development of cognition by reflective abstractions from systems of actions.

In Centering Epistemic Injustice: Epistemic Labor, Willful Ignorance, and Knowing Across Hermeneutical Divides, Kamili Posey asks what it means for accounts of epistemic injustice to take seriously the lives and perspectives of socially marginalized knowers. The first part of this book takes up the predominant account of testimonial injustice offered by Miranda Fricker, arguing that testimonial injustice is not merely about the epistemic harms perpetrated by dominant knowers against marginalized knowers, but also about the strategies that marginalized knowers use to circumvent those harms. Such strategies expand current conceptions of epistemic injustice by centering how marginalized knowers engage and resist in hostile epistemic environments. The second part of the book examines Fricker's concept of hermeneutical injustice, rooted in hermeneutical marginalization. Thinking alongside critics of hermeneutical injustice, Centering Epistemic Injustice explores the relationship between dominant knowing and marginalized knowing and asks if social power-including the power to shape collective resources and ways of meaning-making-makes it impossible for dominant knowers to know and "hear well" across hermeneutical divides. Finally, the book asks whether hermeneutical divides are real divides in understanding and how dominant knowers might come to be better knowers in the pursuit of a more thoroughgoing epistemic justice.

Wisdom, considered the highest level of enlightenment, has not had a foothold in our education since Plato's Academy and Aristotle's Lyceum. Yet it is wisdom that ultimately promotes human flourishing and equips individuals with the sophistication to live life well. Wisdom is especially urgent if leaders and followers are to lead and follow well. Wisdom is more critical and urgent than ever in today's world. Stories of lack of discernment and sound judgment abound in the news. Comments such as "what were they thinking?" and "why did they do that?" reveal that wisdom is often painfully lacking when it comes to making decisions. The world needs people who judiciously discern and courageously implement innovative decisions at the right time and in the right way. But before wisdom can be adequately taught, it needs to be properly understood. Historically, the study and acquisition of wisdom has been reserved to the philosophical and theological fields of study, often making wisdom appear esoteric, elusive, and mysterious. While relatively recent empirical attempts have led to certain quantifications and qualifications of wisdom, a comprehensive and cohesive model for understanding, teaching, and implementing general wisdom has yet to emerge. Unfortunately, philosophical and theological treatises on wisdom have been overly convoluted or mystical, making wisdom appear elusive for the lay person. The empirical traditions have overanalyzed the concept to make it almost formulaic and uninspiring. This primer merges insights from the philosophical, theological, and empirical traditions to provide a simple model for understanding, acquiring, practicing, and teaching wisdom. This primer is unique is that it uses clear language to walk the readers through representative classical philosophical and religious works and empirical studies in lieu of jargon-filled meditations. As a result, the primer orients readers to think like philosophers, theologians, and social scientists by shepherding them through to the logic of previous works on wisdom. What also sets this work apart is its brevity without compromise to substance. This primer demonstrates that the complicated can be made relatively simple, and that brevity and profound meaning often walk hand in hand. Ideal for emerging and established leaders, this book demonstrates that wisdom inspires confidence, establishes credibility, and helps us successfully navigate complex problems and promote human progress. This primer makes wisdom accessible and provides all soon-to-be, novice, and seasoned leaders with the understanding, dispositions, and skills to be discerning and virtuous people others will want to emulate and follow.

The question of meaning in life is as relevant and central as ever - in spite of all attempts at declaring it senseless. It does not disappear. But how should we deal with this question today? The collection presents a wide range of approaches, discussing subjectivist and objectivist answers, confronting concepts of meaning with notions of happiness and morality, and considering the idea of human life's meaning both sub specie aeternitatis and in view of the world's finitude and contingency. The volume assembles contributions from leading scholars in the field, including John Cottingham, John Kekes, Iddo Landau, Dag T. Andersson, Robert B. Louden, Christoph Horn, and Bernard Reginster.

This Festschrift celebrates Teddy Seidenfeld and his seminal contributions to philosophy, statistics, probability, game theory and related areas. The 13 contributions in this volume, written by leading researchers in these fields, are supplemented by an interview with Teddy Seidenfeld that offers an abbreviated intellectual autobiography, touching on topics of timeless interest concerning truth and uncertainty. Indeed, as the eminent philosopher Isaac Levi writes in this volume: "In a world dominated by Alternative Facts and Fake News, it is hard to believe that many of us have spent our life's work, as has Teddy Seidenfeld, in discussing truth and uncertainty." The reader is invited to share this celebration of Teddy Seidenfeld's work uncovering truths about uncertainty and the penetrating insights they offer to our common pursuit of truth in the face of uncertainty.

Michael Hanchett Hanson weaves together the history of the development of the psychological concepts of creativity with social constructivist views of power dynamics and pragmatic insights. He provides an engaging, thought-provoking analysis to interest anyone involved with creativity, from psychologists and educators to artists and philosophers.

The book contains a collection of chapters written by experts from the fields of philosophy, law, logic, computer science and artificial intelligence who pay tribute to Professor Risto Hilpinen's impressive work on the logic of induction, on deontic logic and epistemology, and on philosophy of science. In addition to an introduction by the editors, a section on Professor Hilpinen's positions, professional services and honors, as well as a complete bibliography of his writings, the editors, McNamara, Jones and Brown, have compiled a multidisciplinary global cross-section of academic contemporaries that provides insights and perspectives on Hilpinen's influence and legacy. The essays reflect central aspects of Risto Hilpinen's research interests, and offer further contributions to some of the philosophical fields for which he is best known: applied modal logic, including deontic logic (from the ancient Greek deon, pertaining to the concepts of duty and obligation), the semantics of normative language, the logic of action, and the theory of practical reasoning; the analysis of the concept of artifact; and the theory of semiotics in the tradition of Charles Peirce. The presence in the collection of several papers relating to deontic logic underlines Hilpinen's importance in that area, in which his publications have long been recognized as standard works. The book is an essential collection of ideas for all those who feel at home in a variety of formal disciplines, from propositional logic to the logic of artificial intelligence.

For the Parmenidean monist, there are no distinctions whatsoever-indeed, distinctions are unintelligible. In The Parmenidean Ascent, Michael Della Rocca aims to revive this controversial approach on rationalist grounds. He not only defends the attribution of such an extreme monism to the pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides, but also embraces this extreme monism in its own right and expands these monistic results to many of the most crucial areas of philosophy, including being, action, knowledge, meaning, truth, and metaphysical explanation. On Della Rocca's account, there is no differentiated being, no differentiated action, knowledge, or meaning; rather all is being, just as all is action, all is knowledge, all is meaning. Motivating this argument is a detailed survey of the failure of leading positions (both historical and contemporary) to meet a demand for the explanation of a given phenomenon, together with a powerful, original version of a Bradleyan argument against the reality of relations. The result is a rationalist rejection of all distinctions and a skeptical denial of the intelligibility of ordinary, relational notions of being, action, knowledge, and meaning. Della Rocca then turns this analysis on the practice of philosophy itself. Followed to its conclusion, Parmenidean monism rejects any distinction between philosophy and the study of its history. Such a conclusion challenges methods popular in the practice of philosophy today, including especially the method of relying on intuitions and common sense as the basis of philosophical inquiry. The historically-minded and rationalist approach used throughout the book aims to demonstrate the ultimate bankruptcy of the prevailing methodology. It promises-on rationalist grounds-to inspire much soul-searching on the part of philosophers and to challenge the content and the methods of so much philosophy both now and in the past.

In Technology and Anarchy: A Reading of Our Era, Simona Chiodo argues that the technological era can be read as the most radical form of anarchism ever experienced. People are not only removing the role of the expert as a mediator, but also trying, for the first time in history, to replace the role of a transcendent god itself by creating, especially through computer engineering, a totally immanent technological entity characterized by the typical ontological prerogatives of the divine: omnipresence (by being everywhere), omniscience (by knowing everything, especially about us) and omnipotence (by having power, especially over us), as well as inscrutability. Chiodo proposes a novel view of our technological era by reading it as the last step of a precise trajectory of Western thought, i.e. as the most radical form of anarchism we have ever experienced, due to the crisis of the founding epistemological relationship between ideality and reality. By doing this, Chiodo helps fill the gap between technological innovation and the humanities, which is becoming an emerging research goal that is more and more urgent in order to face the greatest challenges of our present and future.

The development of phenomenological philosophy in Japan is a well-established tradition that reaches back to the early 20th-century. The past decades have witnessed significant contributions and advances in different areas of phenomenological thought in Japan that remain unknown, or only partially known, to an international philosophical public. This volume offers a selection of original phenomenological research in Japan to an international audience in the form of an English language publication. The contributions in this volume range over classical figures in the phenomenological movement (Husserl, Heidegger, Levinas, Merleau-Monty), recent trends in French phenomenology, and contemporary inter-disciplinary approaches. In addition to this diverse engagement with European thinkers, many of the contributions in this volume establish critical and complimentary discussions with 20th-century Japanese philosophers.

This volume explores the various 'labyrinths' of Leibniz's philosophy, that is, hard-to-solve problems in which the human mind becomes entangled. Although the Hanoverian explicitly distinguished two such labyrinths (freedom and continuum), one may notice that in his theory there are more intricate issues the thinker can resolve with the help of the 'Ariadne's thread' - a certain principle to be followed by the reflecting mind. In the perspective of the mazes of theodicy, consciousness and absolute and relative differences, the authors try to unravel issues such as: the etymology of 'theodicee', the concepts of freedom and metaphysical evil, the reception of monadology by Olivier Sacks, the understanding of 'panpsychism', the similarity between jurisprudence and theology, and many others.

David Hume's argument against believing in miracles has attracted nearly continuous attention from philosophers and theologians since it was first published in 1748. Hume's many commentators, however, both pro and con, have often misunderstood key aspects of Hume's account of evidential probability and as a result have misrepresented Hume's argument and conclusions regarding miracles in fundamental ways. This book argues that Hume's account of probability descends from a long and laudable tradition that goes back to ancient Roman and medieval law. That account is entirely and deliberately non-mathematical. As a result, any analysis of Hume's argument in terms of the mathematical theory of probability is doomed to failure. Recovering the knowledge of this ancient tradition of probable reasoning leads us to a correct interpretation of Hume's argument against miracles, enables a more accurate understanding of many other episodes in the history of science and of philosophy, and may be also useful in contemporary attempts to weigh evidence in epistemically complex situations where confirmation theory and mathematical probability theory have proven to be less helpful than we would have hoped.

This volume represents the first exploration of caste in the field of curriculum studies, challenging the ongoing silence around the issue of caste in education and curriculum theory. Presenting comprehensive critical examination of caste as a category of domination and oppression in the colonial power matrix, chapters confront Eurocentric educational epistemologies which deny the existence and influence of caste. The book examines the impact of such silence in educational policy, praxis, and curriculum, and draws from leading scholars to illustrate the fluidity of power and oppression in the caste system. By challenging historical, cultural, and institutional origins of caste and foregrounding perspectives from outside Western epistemological frameworks, the book pioneers a critical approach to integrating caste in educational debate to interrupt social and cognitive injustices. In so doing so, the volume advocates for an alternative, non-derivative curriculum reason, through an itinerant curriculum theory as a path toward the emergence of a critical Dalit educational theory. As such, it makes a vital contribution for scholars and researchers looking to refine and enhance their knowledge of curriculum studies by highlighting the importance of theorizing caste in the role of education.

Disagreement is common: even informed, intelligent, and generally reasonable people often come to different conclusions when confronted with what seems to be the same evidence. Can the competing conclusions be reasonable? If not, what can we reasonably think about the situation? This volume examines the epistemology of disagreement. Philosophical questions about disagreement arise in various areas, notably politics, ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion: but this will be the first book focusing on the general epistemic issues arising from informed disagreement. Ten leading philosophers offer specially written essays which together will offer a starting-point for future work on this topic.