This book examines the practices of contesting evidence in democratically constituted knowledge societies. It provides a multifaceted view of the processes and conditions of evidence criticism and how they determine the dynamics of de- and re-stabilization of evidence.

This innovative new volume analyses the role of emotions in knowledge acquisition. It focuses on the field of philosophy of emotions at the exciting intersection between epistemology and philosophy of mind and cognitive science to bring us an in-depth analysis of the epistemological value of emotions in reasoning. With twelve chapters by leading and up-and-coming academics, this edited collection shows that emotions do count for our epistemic enterprise. Against scepticism about the possible positive role emotions play in knowledge, the authors highlight the how and the why of this potential, lucidly exploring the key aspects of the functionality of emotions. This is explored in relation to: specific kinds of knowledge such as self-understanding, group-knowledge and wisdom; specific functions played by certain emotions in these cases, such as disorientation in enquiry and contempt in practical reason; the affective experience of the epistemic subjects and communities.

Simon Blackburn presents a selection of his philosophical essays from 1995 to 2010. He offers engaging and illuminating discussions of various problems which arise when such familiar notions as representation, truth, reason, and assertion are applied in the sphere of practical thought. It is puzzling how our thinking gets to grip with such things as values and norms. Blackburn explores how we can try to understand what we say in terms of what we are doing when we say it. He investigates how propositions interact with linguistic expressions whose primary function is identified in terms of actions performed in expressing commitments with them, when those commitments are thought of in practical rather than descriptive terms. He broadens his investigation from semantic questions to wider issues of pluralism, pragmatism, philosophy of mind, and the nature of practical reasoning.

Reading Mill begins with the idea that political theory, as it is understood and practised in Anglophone Universities, is not one practice but a set of four alternative practices marked by divergent ontologies and epistemologies. Three of the conceptions of political theory identified are applied to produce markedly different readings of the works of John Stuart Mill. The work is designed to demonstrate that the alternative conceptions of political theory are coherent and offer different insights into Mill's works.

Slavoj Zizek is one of today's leading theorists, whose polemical works span topics from German idealism to Lacanian psychoanalysis, from Shakespeare to Beckett, and from Hitchcock to Lynch. Critical through and through of both post-modern ideological complacencies-e.g., the death of the subject and the return to ethics-and pre-modern ones-e.g., the re-enchantment of the world, the embrace of postcritique-Zizek doubles down on the virtues of the modern, on what it means to be modern, and to ask modern questions (about the subject, nature, and political economy) in the age of the Anthropocene. This volume takes up the challenges laid out by Zizek's iconoclastic thinking and its reverberations in an array of fields: philosophy, psychoanalysis, political theory, literary studies, and film studies, among others. Zizek's multi-disciplinary appeal attests to the provocation, if not scandal, of his politically incorrect thought. Understanding Zizek, Understanding Modernism makes the force and inventiveness of Zizek's writings accessible to a wide range of students and scholars invested in the open question of modernism and its legacies.

This book collects original essays by top scholars that address questions about the nature, origins, and effects of ambivalence. While the nature of agency has received an enormous amount of attention, relatively little has been written about ambivalence or how it relates to topics such as agency, rationality, justification, knowledge, autonomy, self-governance, well-being, social cognition, and various other topics. Ambivalence presents unique questions related to many major philosophical debates. For example, it relates to debates about virtues, rationality, and decision-making, agency or authenticity, emotions, and social or political metacognition. It is also relevant to a variety of larger debates in philosophy and psychology, including nature vs. nature, objectivity vs. subjectivity, or nomothetic vs. idiographic. The essays in this book offer novel and wide-ranging perspectives on this emerging philosophical topic. They will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and social cognition.

The Problems of Viewing Performance challenges long-held assumptions by considering the ways in which knowledge is received by more than a single audience member, and breaks new ground by, counterintuitively, claiming that viewing performance is not a shared experience. Given that viewers come to each performance with differing amounts and types of knowledge, they each make different assumptions as to how the performance will unfold. Often modified by other viewers and often after the performance event, knowledge of performance is made more accurate by superimposing the experiences and justified beliefs of multiple viewers. These differences in the viewing experience make knowledge surrounding a performance intersubjective. Ultimately, this book explains the how and the why audience members have different viewing experiences. The Problems of Viewing Performance is important reading for theatre and performance students, scholars and practitioners, as it unpacks the dynamics of spectatorship and explores how audiences work.

Contemporary copyright was born in a heroic era of human history when technologies facilitated idea dissemination through the book trade reaching out mass readership. This book provides insights on the copyright evolution and how proprietary individual expression's copyright protection forms an integral part of our knowing in being, driven by the advances of technology through the proliferating trading frameworks. The book captures what is central in the process of copyright evolution which is an "onto-epistemological offset". It goes on to explain that copyright's protection of knowing in originality's delineation of expression and fair use/dealing's legitimization of unauthorized use and being are not isolatable, but rather mutually implicated. While the classic strict determinism has been subject to an onto-epistemological challenge, the book looks at the proliferation of global trade and advent of information technology and how they show us the beauty and possibility of intra-dependence between copyright authorship, entrepreneurship, and readership, which calls for a fresh copyright onto-epistemology. Building on its onto-epistemological critiques on the stakeholder, force, and mechanism of copyright evolution, the book helps readers understand why, not only copyright, but also law in general, and justice too, need to be onto-epistemologically balanced, as this is categorically imperative for being, the fundamental law of nature.

Constructivism dominates over other theories of knowledge in much of western academia, especially the humanities and social sciences. In Exposing the Roots of Constructivism: Nominalism and the Ontology of Knowledge, R. Scott Smith argues that constructivism is linked to the embrace of nominalism, the theory that everything is particular and located in space and time. Indeed, nominalism is sufficient for a view to be constructivist. However, the natural sciences still enjoy great prestige from the "fact-value split." They are often perceived as giving us knowledge of the facts of reality, and not merely our constructs. In contrast, ethics and religion, which also have been greatly influenced by nominalism, usually are perceived as giving us just our constructs and opinions. Yet, even the natural sciences have embraced nominalism, and Smith shows that this will undermine knowledge in those disciplines as well. Indeed, the author demonstrates that, at best, nominalism leaves us with only interpretations, but at worst, it undermines all knowledge whatsoever. However, there are many clear examples of knowledge we do have in the many different disciplines, and therefore those must be due to a different ontology of properties. Thus, nominalism should be rejected. In its place, the author defends a kind of Platonic realism about properties.

In focusing on the systematic deduction of the categories from a principle, Schulting takes up anew the controversial project of the eminent German Kant scholar Klaus Reich, whose monograph "The Completeness of Kant's Table of Judgments" made the case that the logical functions of judgement can all be derived from the objective unity of apperception and can be shown to link up with one another systematically. Common opinion among Kantians today has it that Kant did not mean to derive the functions of judgement, and accordingly the categories, from the principle of apperception. Schulting challenges this standard view and aims to resuscitate the main motivation behind Reich's project. He argues, in agreement with Reich's main thesis about the derivability of the functions of judgement, that Kant indeed does mean to derive, in full a priori fashion, the categories from the principle of apperception. Schulting also shows that, given the general assumptions of the Critical philosophy, Kant's derivation is successful and that absent an account of the derivation of the categories from apperception, the B-Deduction cannot really be understood. New edition. First published 2012 as "Kant's Deduction and Apperception. Explaining the Categories" (Palgrave Macmillan)

Moral certainty refers to those aspects of morality- moral acting, feeling, and thinking-that are beyond doubt, explanation, and justification. The essays in this book explore the concept of moral certainty and its application and usefulness in contemporary moral debates.

Simply stated, this book bridges the gap between statistics and philosophy. It does this by delineating the conceptual cores of various statistical methodologies (Bayesian/frequentist statistics, model selection, machine learning, causal inference, etc.) and drawing out their philosophical implications. Portraying statistical inference as an epistemic endeavor to justify hypotheses about a probabilistic model of a given empirical problem, the book explains the role of ontological, semantic, and epistemological assumptions that make such inductive inference possible. From this perspective, various statistical methodologies are characterized by their epistemological nature: Bayesian statistics by internalist epistemology, classical statistics by externalist epistemology, model selection by pragmatist epistemology, and deep learning by virtue epistemology. Another highlight of the book is its analysis of the ontological assumptions that underpin statistical reasoning, such as the uniformity of nature, natural kinds, real patterns, possible worlds, causal structures, etc. Moreover, recent developments in deep learning indicate that machines are carving out their own "ontology" (representations) from data, and better understanding this-a key objective of the book-is crucial for improving these machines' performance and intelligibility. Key Features Without assuming any prior knowledge of statistics, discusses philosophical aspects of traditional as well as cutting-edge statistical methodologies. Draws parallels between various methods of statistics and philosophical epistemology, revealing previously ignored connections between the two disciplines. Written for students, researchers, and professionals in a wide range of fields, including philosophy, biology, medicine, statistics and other social sciences, and business. Originally published in Japanese with widespread success, has been translated into English by the author.

The question of what defines the human, and of what is human about the humanities, have been shaken up by the radical critiques of humanism and the displacement of anthropomorphism that have gained currency in recent years, propelled in part by rapid advances in our knowledge of living systems and of their genetic and algorithmic codes coupled with the global expansion of a knowledge-intensive capitalism. In Posthuman Knowledge, Rosi Braidotti takes a closer look at the impact of these developments on three major areas: the constitution of our subjectivity, the general production of knowledge and the practice of the academic humanities. Drawing on feminist, postcolonial and anti-racist theory, she argues that the human was never a neutral category but one always linked to power and privilege. Hence we must move beyond the old dualities in which Man defined himself, beyond the sexualized and racialized others that were excluded from humanity. Posthuman knowledge, as Braidotti understands it, is not so much an alternative form of knowledge as a critical call: a call to build a multi-layered and multi-directional project that displaces anthropocentrism while pursuing the analysis of the discriminatory and violent aspects of human activity and interaction wherever they occur. Situated between the exhilaration of scientific and technological advances on the one hand and the threat of climate change devastation on the other, the posthuman convergence encourages us to think hard and creatively about what we are in the process of becoming.

Alan Musgrave has consistently defended two positions that he regards as commonsensical a" critical realism and critical rationalism. In defence of critcal realism he argues for the objective existence of the external world as opposed to idealism, as well as arguing for scientific realism against all anti-realist accounts of science. His critical rationalism is drawn from the work of Karl Popper and stands opposed to inductivist and irrationalist methodologies. In defence of these positions, Musgravea (TM)s writings have covered a wide range of topics in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, history of science, theories of truth, and economic theory. In this volume a group of internationally-renowned authors discuss themes that are relevant in one way or another to Musgravea (TM)s work. This is not intended as a standard celebratory festschrift but rather as a new examination of topics of current interest in philosophy. The contributory essays are followed by responses from Alan Musgrave himself.

The imposing scope and penetrating insights of German philosopher Nicolai Hartmann's work have received renewed interest in recent years. The Neo-Kantian turned ontological realist established a philosophical approach unique among his peers, and it provides a wealth of resources for considering contemporary philosophical problems. The chapters included in this volume examine his ethics, ontology, aesthetics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of nature. They explore his ontology of values, autonomy and human enhancement, and law; his theory of levels of reality, space-time and geometry, the categories of temporality, causality, and "life," the question of realism, and social ontology. Others take inspiration from his aesthetic theory, ideas about education, and his embrace of the Socratic pathos of wonder. They bring his philosophy into conversation with that of his contemporaries, including Roman Ingarden and Konrad Lorenz's appropriation of Hartmann, as well as with the history of philosophy, including Plato's theory of recollection, pre-Socratic philosophy, and that of his Russian teacher Nikolai Lossky. Those familiar with Hartmann's wide-ranging systematic philosophy will benefit from these new engagements with his work, and those new to it will find them relevant to a number of current philosophical debates.

This book argues that traditions in philosophy of language have mistakenly focused on highly idealized linguistic contexts. Instead, it presents a non-idealcfoundational theory of language that contends that the essential function of language is to direct attention for the purpose of achieving diverse social and political goals.

Offers the latest research on the topic.

Intolerance of ideas different from one's own seems to be a common attitude among human beings and, at the same time, something that seems to be more pronounced in recent years. In this volume, political theorists and philosophers consider some of the historical preconditions of modern intolerance and debate the sources of its recent manifestations. From theories of religious intolerance during the Reformation to the contemporary suppression of religious symbols; from homophobia to attempts to ban it; from populism on the right to "cancel culture" on the left-this book covers a variety of forms of intolerance, analysing not only its consequences but its causes and implications. Some of the chapters suggest means by which democracies may, through popular and judicial measures, defend themselves against intolerance, while others probe the philosophical grounding of intolerance in epistemological and metaphysical doctrines such as self-evident truth, divine revelation, inner illumination, naive realism, and the moral relativism attributed to analytic philosophy and postmodernism. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of Critical Review.

In Context and Content Robert Stalnaker develops a philosophical picture of the nature of speech and thought and the relations between them. Two themes in particular run through these collected essays: the role that the context in which speech takes place plays in accounting for the way language is used to express thought, and the role of the external environment in determining the contents of our thoughts. Stalnaker argues against the widespread assumption of the priority of linguistic over mental representation, which he suggests has had a distorting influence on our understanding. The first part of the book develops a framework for representing contexts and the way they interact with the interpretation of what is said in them. This framework is used to help to explain a range of linguistic phenomena concerning presupposition and assertion, conditional statements, the attribution of beliefs, and the use of names, descriptions, and pronouns to refer. Stalnaker then draws out the conception of thought and its content that is implicit in this framework. He defends externalism about thought-the assumption that our thoughts have the contents they have in virtue of the way we are situated in the world-and explores the role of linguistic action and linguistic structure in determining the contents of our thoughts. Context and Content offers philosophers and cognitive scientists a summation of Stalnaker's important and influential work in this area. His new introduction to the volume gives an overview of this work and offers a convenient way in for those who are new to it. The Oxford Cognitive Science series is a new forum for the best contemporary work in this flourishing field, where various disciplines-cognitive psychology, philosophy, linguistics, cognitive neuroscience, and computational theory-join forces in the investigation of thought, awareness, understanding, and associated workings of the mind. Each book constitutes an original contribution to its subject, but will be accessible beyond the ranks of specialists, so as to reach a broad interdisciplinary readership. The series will be carefully shaped and steered with the aim of representing the most important developments in the field and bringing together its constituent disciplines.

The traditional topics of the "philosophy of nature" - space, time, causality, the structure of the universe - are overwhelmingly present in our modern scientific theories. This book traces the complex paths that discussion of these topics has followed, from Plato and Aristotle, through Descartes, Leibniz, Kant and other great thinkers, right up to the relativistic cosmologies and the grand unified theories of contemporary science. In the light of this historical development, it becomes clear that modern science gives us not only a technological power over the world, but also a deeper understanding of physical reality. In this sense, science could be regarded as an heir to the traditional "philosophy of nature". Moreover, the reader will learn why science itself deserves to be the subject of philosophical reflection.

The unconscious raises relevant problems in the theory of knowledge as regards non-conceptual contents and obscure representations. In the philosophy of mind, it bears on the topic of the unity of consciousness and the notion of the transcendental Self. It is a key-topic of logic with respect to the distinction between determinate-indeterminate judgments and prejudices, and in aesthetics it appears in connection with the problems of reflective judgments and of the genius. Finally, it is a relevant issue also in moral philosophy in defining the irrational aspects of the human being. The purpose of the present volume is to fill a substantial gap in Kant research while offering a comprehensive survey of the topic in different areas of research, such as history of philosophy, philosophy of mind, aesthetics, moral philosophy, and anthropology.

This book presents a theory of the self whose core principle is that the consciousness of the self is a process of self-representing that runs throughout our life. This process aims primarily at defending the self-conscious subject against the threat of its metaphysical inconsistence. In other words, the self is essentially a repertoire of psychological manoeuvres whose outcome is self-representation aimed at coping with the fundamental fragility of the human subject. This picture of the self differs from both the idealist and the eliminative approaches widely represented in contemporary discussion. Against the idealist approach, this book contends that rather than the self being primitive and logically prior, it is the result of a process of construction that originates in subpersonal unconscious processes. On the other hand, it also rejects the anti-realistic, eliminative argument that, from the non-primary, derivative nature of the self, infers its status as an illusory by-product of real neurobiological events, devoid of any explanatory role.

A comprehensive collection which contains essays from thirteen international contributors. Provides a fresh engagement with the ideas of two figureheads in philosophy - Kant and Wittgenstein - by putting them in touch with contemporary debates that are shaped by their legacy. The contributors draw upon ideas in phenomenology, dialetheism, and metamathematics to interrogate the ideas of two of the most important thinkers in modern philosophy.

This book applies the general theory of critical rationalism in order to develop a new sociology of the open society, in general, and a new analysis of the transition from a closed society to an open society in particular. It presents a criticism of Karl Popper's analysis of human action for opening up a closed society, followed by a critical study of the mainstream sociology to show how justificational models of knowledge and rational action have prevented sociology from addressing the contribution of human action to social change. This book provides new sociologies of closed and open societies. It argues that in the closed society "a low level" of critical rationality is activated by people to define the meaning of the good life and social institutions of law, polity and economy. Masoud Mohammadi Alamuti proposes five mechanisms of opening up closed society through the model of social change, inspired by the philosophy of critical rationalism. This volume is "the first systematic attempt" to apply the philosophy of critical rationalism in order to present a "normative sociology of the open society". It will be of interest to postgraduate researchers and professional readers in philosophy, sociology, moral science, law, politics and economics. In addition, this book would benefit research centres, policymakers and civil society activists interested in the ideas of critical rationalism and the open society.

This book explains exactly what human knowledge is. The key concepts in this book are structures and algorithms, i.e., what the readers "see" and how they make use of what they see. Thus in comparison with some other books on the philosophy (or methodology) of science, which employ a syntactic approach, the author's approach is model theoretic or structural. Properly understood, it extends the current art and science of mathematical modeling to all fields of knowledge. The link between structure and algorithms is mathematics. But viewing "mathematics" as such a link is not exactly what readers most likely learned in school; thus, the task of this book is to explain what "mathematics" should actually mean. Chapter 1, an introductory essay, presents a general analysis of structures, algorithms and how they are to be linked. Several examples from the natural and social sciences, and from the history of knowledge, are provided in Chapters 2-6. In turn, Chapters 7 and 8 extend the analysis to include language and the mind. Structures are what the readers see. And, as abstract cultural objects, they can almost always be seen in many different ways. But certain structures, such as natural numbers and the basic theory of grammar, seem to have an absolute character. Any theory of knowledge grounded in human culture must explain how this is possible. The author's analysis of this cultural invariance, combining insights from evolutionary theory and neuroscience, is presented in the book's closing chapter. The book will be of interest to researchers, students and those outside academia who seek a deeper understanding of knowledge in our present-day society.