Robert Hanna argues for the importance of Kant's theories of the epistemological, metaphysical, and practical foundations of the 'exact sciences'-- relegated to the dustbin of the history of philosophy for most of the 20th century. Hanna's earlier book Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy (OUP 2001), explores basic conceptual and historical connections between Immanuel Kant's 18th-century Critical Philosophy and the tradition of mainstream analytic philosophy from Frege to Quine. The central topics of the analytic tradition in its early and middle periods were meaning and necessity. But the central theme of mainstream analytic philosophy after 1950 is scientific naturalism, which holds--to use Wilfrid Sellars's apt phrase--that 'science is the measure of all things'. This type of naturalism is explicitly reductive. Kant, Science, and Human Nature has two aims, one negative and one positive. Its negative aim is to develop a Kantian critique of scientific naturalism. But its positive and more fundamental aim is to work out the elements of a humane, realistic, and nonreductive Kantian account of the foundations of the exact sciences. According to this account, the essential properties of the natural world are directly knowable through human sense perception (empirical realism), and practical reason is both explanatorily and ontologically prior to theoretical reason (the primacy of the practical).

Physicalism is a metaphysical thesis easily presented in slogan form - there is nothing over and above the physical - but notoriously difficult to formulate precisely. Understanding physicalism combines insights from contemporary philosophy of mind and metaphysics to present a new account of physical properties and metaphysical dependence and, on this foundation, develop a more rigorous and illuminating formulation of the thesis of physicalism

This volume presents a selection of papers from the Poincare Project of the Center for the Philosophy of Science, University of Lisbon, bringing together an international group of scholars with new assessments of Henri Poincare's philosophy of science-both its historical impact on the foundations of science and mathematics, and its relevance to contemporary philosophical inquiry. The work of Poincare (1854-1912) extends over many fields within mathematics and mathematical physics. But his scientific work was inseparable from his groundbreaking philosophical reflections, and the scientific ferment in which he participated was inseparable from the philosophical controversies in which he played a pre-eminent part. The subsequent history of the mathematical sciences was profoundly influenced by Poincare's philosophical analyses of the relations between and among mathematics, logic, and physics, and, more generally, the relations between formal structures and the world of experience. The papers in this collection illuminate Poincare's place within his own historical context as well as the implications of his work for ours."

Although current debates in epistemology and philosophy of mind show a renewed interest in perceptual illusions, there is no systematic work in the philosophy of perception and in the psychology of perception with respect to the concept of illusion and the relation between illusion and error. This book aims to fill that gap.

This second companion volume on engineering studies considers engineering practice including contextual analyses of engineering identity, epistemologies and values. Key overlapping questions examine such issues as an engineering identity, engineering self-understandings enacted in the professional world, distinctive characters of engineering knowledge and how engineering science and engineering design interact in practice. Authors bring with them perspectives from their institutional homes in Europe, North America, Australia\ and Asia. The volume includes 24 contributions by more than 30 authors from engineering, the social sciences and the humanities. Additional issues the chapters scrutinize include prominent norms of engineering, how they interact with the values of efficiency or environmental sustainability. A concluding set of articles considers the meaning of context more generally by asking if engineers create their own contexts or are they created by contexts. Taken as a whole, this collection of original scholarly work is unique in its broad, multidisciplinary consideration of the changing character of engineering practice.

This volume documents the 17th Munster Lectures in Philosophy with Susan Haack, the prominent contemporary philosopher. It contains an original, programmatic article by Haack on her overall philosophical approach, entitled 'The Fragmentation of Philosophy, the Road to Reintegration'. In addition, the volume includes seven papers on various aspects of Haack's philosophical work as well as her replies to the papers. Susan Haack has deeply influenced many of the debates in contemporary philosophy. In her vivid and accessible way, she has made ground-breaking contributions covering a wide range of topics, from logic, metaphysics and epistemology, to pragmatism and the philosophy of science and law. In her work, Haack has always been very sensitive in detecting subtle differences. The distinctions she has introduced reveal what lies at the core of philosophical controversies, and show the problems that exist with established views. In order to resolve these problems, Haack has developed some 'middle-course approaches'. One example of this is her famous 'Foundherentism', a theory of justification that includes elements from both the rival theories of Foundationalism and Coherentism. Haack herself has offered the best description of her work calling herself a 'passionate moderate'.

When we make claims to each other, we're asserting. But what does it take to assert well? Do we need to know what we're talking about? This book argues that we don't. In fact, it argues that in some special contexts, we can lie.

Information is an important concept that is studied extensively across a range of disciplines, from the physical sciences to genetics to psychology to epistemology. Information continues to increase in importance, and the present age has been referred to as the "Information Age."

One may understand information in a variety of ways. For some, information is found in facts that were previously unknown. For others, a fact must have some economic value to be considered information. Other people emphasize the movement through a communication channel from one location to another when describing information. In all of these instances, information is the set of characteristics of the output of a process. Yet Information has seldom been studied in a consistent way across different disciplines.

"Information from Processes" provides a discipline-independent and precise presentation of both information and computing processes. Information concepts and phenomena are examined in an effort to understand them, given a hierarchy of information processes, where one process uses others. Research about processes and computing is applied to answer the question of what information can and cannot be produced, and to determine the nature of this information (theoretical information science). The book also presents some of the basic processes that are used in specific domains (applied information science), such as those that generate information in areas like reasoning, the evolution of informative systems, cryptography, knowledge, natural language, and the economic value of information.Written for researchers and graduate students in information science and related fields, "Information from Processes "details a unique information model independent from other concepts in computer or archival science, which is thus applicable to a wide range of domains. Combining theoretical and empirical methods as well as psychological, mathematical, philosophical, and economic techniques, Losee's book delivers a solid basis and starting point for future discussions and research about the creation and use of information."

Ignorance and Moral Obligation concerns whether and how our ignorance about ourselves and our circumstances affects what our moral obligations and moral rights are. Michael J. Zimmerman begins by distinguishing three well-established views about the nature of moral obligation: the Objective, Subjective, and Prospective Views. Some philosophers have attempted to reconcile the three views in question, but these attempts are shown to fail. The question thus arises: which of the three views ought to be accepted and which rejected? Zimmerman argues that, in light of the ignorance that besets us, the Objective and Subjective Views should be rejected and the Prospective View accepted. The argument is based on close consideration of a kind of case provided by Frank Jackson, one in which an agent has deficient evidence regarding the outcomes of his options. Many objections to this argument are entertained and rebutted, by means of which the Prospective View is itself elaborated and defended. Among those who accept the Prospective View, the primary motivation for doing so has often been that of finding a useful guide to action, but Zimmerman argues that the Prospective View can be only of strictly limited help in providing such a guide. Finally, he addresses some implications that the Prospective View has regarding the nature of moral rights. Our possession of moral rights is precarious, being dependent on the evidence possessed by others. Once again, several objections are entertained and rebutted. The distinction between rights and desert is stressed, and the relevance of risk to rights is explored.

Truth, Language, and History is the much-anticipated final volume of Donald Davidson's philosophical writings. In four groups of essays, Davidson continues to explore the themes that occupied him for more than fifty years: the relations between language and the world; speaker intention and linguistic meaning; language and mind; mind and body; mind and world; mind and other minds. He asks: what is the role of the concept of truth in these explorations? And, can a scientific world view make room for human thought without reducing it to something material and mechanistic? Including a new introduction by his widow, Marcia Cavell, this volume completes Donald Davidson's colossal intellectual legacy.

Many assume falsely that religious disagreements engage rules of evidence presentation and belief justification radically different than the ordinary disagreements people have every day, whether those religious disagreements are in Sri Lanka between Hindus and Buddhists or in the Middle East among Jews, Christians, and Muslims.

This book offers a metaphysical development of the notion of perspective. By explaining the functional nature of point of view, and by providing a concrete definition of point of view as a window through which to see the world, it offers a scientific realist theory that explains that points of view are real structures that ground properties and objects as well as perspectives. The notion of point of view has been of key importance in the history of philosophy, and different philosophical schools have used this notion to conduct analyses from the external reality to the inner phenomenal status, or even to construct an entire philosophical system. However, there has been a lack of systematic analysis of what a point of view is and what its structure is; this book fills the gap in the literature and makes the transition between semantics and epistemology, and the philosophy of science.

One particular feature of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding - the suggestion that God could add to matter the power of thought - stimulated an extensive debate in Britain between immaterialists (those who defended two substances, mind and matter) and materialists (those who considered matter to be self-active). That debate was also transmitted to the Continent, especially to France, where Locke's suggestion about thinking matter was given prominence by Voltaire. His defence of the suggestion was in turn attacked by a number of writers, thereby implicating Locke in the growth of materialism in France. By the middle of the eighteenth century, Locke's `famous hypothesis' had become the centre of many attacks, mainly by followers of Malebranche. This book tells for the first time the long and complex story of the involvement of Locke's suggestion in the growth of French materialism. There is a discussion of the `affaire de Prades', in which Locke's name was linked with a censored thesis at the Faculty of Theology in Paris. The similarities and differences between English `thinking matter' and the French `matiere pensante' of the philosophes are discussed in the last chapter.

This third out of four volumes by Richard Ned Lebow in this book series includes texts on psychology and international relations, causation, counterfactual analysis. The political psychology contributions draw on richer, ancient Greek understandings of the psyche and offer novel insights into strategies of conflict management, the role of emotions in international relations, and the modern fixation on identity.

One of the most remarkable features of mid-to-late twentieth century analytic philosophy is the revival of interest in the traditional problems of metaphysics. However, given the long period of neglect from which metaphysics in only now emerging, it is perhaps not surprising that philosophers in the analytic tradition are still finding their metaphysical feet, particularly on meta-metaphysical and methodological matters. Thus contemporary metaphysicians find themselves in an exciting but ultimately unstable position: We are convinced that metaphysical questions are worth pursing, but we still lack a convincing story to offer our detractors about how we conduct our business "qua" metaphysicians. This essay is an attempt to provide such a story. The core recommendation is that we need not re-invent the discipline out of whole cloth if we are willing to learn from the past masters, particularly the Scholastics. What ultimately emerges is a defense of Scholastic metaphysical principles based on contemporary evolutionary biology.

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Michael Payne introduces the principal writings of Roland Barthes, Michael Foucault and Louis Althusser by means of a detailed focus on their common interest in the forms and conditions of knowledge. His careful reading reveals their profound commitment to a critical understanding of how truth, meaning, and value are constituted in language and in non-verbal texts.

In his first three chapters, Payne examines in considerable detail brief texts by Barthes, Foucault, and Althusser that seem to be their own strategically designed introductions to their projects. The next three chapters take up the most important books by each of these writers: Foucault's "The Order of Things," Barthes's "S/Z," and Althusser's "Reading Capital." Chapter 7 examines a specific text by each author writing on one of the visual arts, in an effort to investigate the assumption that knowledge - whether as theory, enlightenment, vision, illumination, or insight - is in some sense visual. The last chapter briefly examines the work of Gilles Deleuze.

Payne writes here with the same lucidity and acuity to be found in his highly successful companion to this volume, "Reading Theory: An Introduction to Lacan, Derrida, and Kristeva" (1993).

This book presents the work of leading hermeneutical theorists alongside emerging thinkers, examining the current state of hermeneutics within the Pentecostal tradition. The volume's contributors present constructive ideas about the future of hermeneutics at the intersection of theology of the Spirit, Pentecostal Christianity, and other disciplines. This collection offers cutting-edge scholarship that engages with and pulls from a broad range of fields and points toward the future of Pneumatological hermeneutics. The volume's interdisciplinary essays are broken up into four sections: philosophical hermeneutics, biblical-theological hermeneutics, social and cultural hermeneutics, and hermeneutics in the social and physical sciences.

This book employs a new eco-cognitive model of abduction to underline the distributed and embodied nature of scientific cognition. Its main focus is on the knowledge-enhancing virtues of abduction and on the productive role of scientific models. What are the distinctive features that define the kind of knowledge produced by science? To provide an answer to this question, the book first addresses the ideas of Aristotle, who stressed the essential inferential and distributed role of external cognitive tools and epistemic mediators in abductive cognition. This is analyzed in depth from both a naturalized logic and an ecology of cognition perspective. It is shown how the maximization of cognition, and of abducibility - two typical goals of science - are related to a number of fundamental aspects: the optimization of the eco-cognitive situatedness; the maximization of changeability for both the input and the output of the inferences involved; a high degree of information-sensitiveness; and the need to record the "past life" of abductive inferential practices. Lastly, the book explains how some impoverished epistemological niches - the result of a growing epistemic irresponsibility associated with the commodification and commercialization of science - are now seriously jeopardizing the flourishing development of human creative abduction.

With the world and its structures becoming ever more complex, and the nature of future employment becoming ever more unpredictable, the notion of 'cognitive flexibility' has a high profile in educational and psychological debate. The contributions in this volume analyze the nature of cognitive flexibility, as well as the impact of different types of beliefs on cognitive flexibility.

Making adequate decisions requires considering input from a variety of continuously evolving sources rather than adhering to predetermined procedures. Adopting a position in a debate necessitates the critical evaluation of different alternatives, while solving a problem entails selecting appropriate problem-solving strategies. Meanwhile, studying requires students to integrate a range of interventions, and treating a patient involves making a differential diagnosis. The common factor, cognitive flexibility, lies at the core of effective functioning in complex, domain-specific environments.

Cognitive flexibility can be described as the disposition to consider diverse information elements while deciding on how to solve a problem or to execute a learning-related task in a variety of domains. The concept of 'disposition' implies that individuals will not always demonstrate cognitive flexibility even if they are in principle able to act in a cognitively flexible way. The notion does not require that alternatives are always deliberately considered, which is why this volume's tandem discussion of beliefs is key element of the discussion. Beliefs play a central role in cognitive flexibility and relate to what individuals consider to be important, valid and/or true. Of specific interest is the relationship between epistemological beliefs and cognitive flexibility, especially as a particular subset of epistemological beliefs seems to be a prerequisite to a cognitively flexible disposition."

This collection of John Mackie's papers on topics in epistemology, some of which have not previously been published, deal with such issues as: incorrigible empirical statements; rationalism and empiricism; the philosophy of John Anderson; self-refutation; Plato's theory of idea; ideological explanation; problems of intentionality; Popper's third world;; mind, brain, and causation; Newcomb's Paradox and the direction of causation; induction; causation in concept, knowledge, and reality; absolutism; Locke and representative perception; and anti-realisms.

This book discusses Gadamer's theory of context-dependence. Analytical and partly critical, the book also shows exegetical accuracy in the rendering of Gadamer's position. It explores the following questions that Gadamer's theory of context-dependence tries to answer: in what way is thought influenced by and thus dependent on its historical context? To what extent and in what way is the individual able to become reflectively aware of and emancipate himself from this dependence? The book takes Gadamer's wide interests into account, e.g. issues relating to the history of historiography and the nature of art and aesthetic experience. The problem of the context-dependence of thought is prominent in contemporary philosophy, including the fields of structuralism, post structuralism, deconstruction, certain forms of feminist philosophy and the philosophy of science. In this sense, the book discusses an issue with wide repercussions.

This edited volume brings together 18 state-of-the art essays on pluralism about truth and logic. Parts I and II are dedicated to respectively truth pluralism and logical pluralism, and Part III to their interconnections. Some contributors challenge pluralism, arguing that the nature of truth or logic is uniform. The majority of contributors, however, defend pluralism, articulate novel versions of the view, or contribute to fundamental debates internal to the pluralist camp. The volume will be of interest to truth theorists and philosophers of logic, as well as philosophers interested in relativism, contextualism, metaphysics, philosophy of language, semantics, paradox, epistemology, or normativity.

Keith Lehrer offers an original philosophical view of principal aspects of the human condition, such as reason, knowledge, wisdom, autonomy, love, consensus, and consciousness. Three unifying ideas run through the book. The first is that what is uniquely human is the capacity for metamental ascent, the ability to consider and evaluate first-order mental states (such as beliefs and desires) that arise naturally within us. A primary function of this metamental ascent is the resolution of personal and interpersonal conflict, essential to such central human goods as wisdom, autonomy, and consensus. The second unifying idea is that we have a system for such reflective evaluation which yields acceptance (in relation to beliefs) or preference (in relation to the objects of desires). The third unifying idea is that there are `keystones' of evaluation in this system: loops of trustworthiness that are themselves supported by the structure that they hold together. Self-trust is the basis of our trustworthiness, on which reason, knowledge, and wisdom are grounded.