Lloyd Gerson offers an original new study of Plato's account of persons, a topic of continuing interest to philosophers. His book locates Plato's psychology within his two-world metaphysics, showing that embodied persons are images of a disembodied ideal, and that they reflect many of the conflicting states of the sensible world. For Plato, Gerson argues, philosophy is the means to recognizing one's true identity.

This volume offers a wide range of both reconstructions of Nikolai Vasiliev's original logical ideas and their implementations in the modern logic and philosophy. A collection of works put together through the international workshop "Nikolai Vasiliev's Logical Legacy and the Modern Logic," this book also covers foundations of logic in the light of Vasiliev's contradictory ontology. Chapters range from a look at the Heuristic and Conceptual Background of Vasiliev's Imaginary Logic to Generalized Vasiliev-style Propositions. It includes works which cover Imaginary and Non-Aristotelian Logics, Inconsistent Set Theory and the Expansion of Mathematical Thinking, Plurivalent Logic, and the Impact of Vasiliev's Imaginary Logic on Epistemic Logic. The Russian logician, Vasiliev, was widely recognized as one of the forerunners of modern non-classical logic. His "imaginary logic" developed in some of his work at the beginning of 20th century is often considered to be one of the first systems of paraconsistent and multi-valued logic. The novelty of his logical project has opened up prospects for modern logic as well as for non-classical science in general. This volume contains a selection of papers written by modern specialists in the field and deals with various aspects of Vasiliev's logical ideas. The logical legacy of Nikolai Vasiliev can serve as a promising source for developing an impressive range of philosophical interpretations, as it marries promising technical innovations with challenging philosophical insights.

This book argues that feminist science fiction shares the same concerns as feminist epistemology-challenges to the sex of the knower, the valuation of the abstract over the concrete, the dismissal of the physical, the focus on rationality and reason, the devaluation of embodied knowledge, and the containment of (some) bodies. Ritch Calvin argues that feminist science fiction asks questions of epistemology because those questions are central to making claims of subjectivity and identity. Calvin reveals how women, who have historically been marginal to the deliberations of philosophy and science, have made significant contributions to the reconsideration and reformulation of the epistemological models of the world and the individuals in it.

The book shows how eastern and western perspectives and conceptions can be used to addresses recent topics laying at the crossroad between philosophy and cognitive science. It reports on new points of view and conceptions discussed during the International Conference on Philosophy and Cognitive Science (PCS2013), held at the Sun Yat-sen University, in Guangzhou, China, and the 2013 Workshop on Abductive Visual Cognition, which took place at KAIST, in Deajeon, South Korea. The book emphasizes an ever-growing cultural exchange between academics and intellectuals coming from different fields. It juxtaposes research works investigating new facets on key issues between philosophy and cognitive science, such as the role of models and causal representations in science; the status of theoretical concepts and quantum principles; abductive cognition, vision, and visualization in science from an eco-cognitive perspective. Further topics are: ignorance immunization in reasoning; moral cognition, violence, and epistemology; and models and biomorphism. The book, which presents a unique and timely account of the current state-of-the art on various aspects in philosophy and cognitive science, is expected to inspire philosophers, cognitive scientists and social scientists, and to generate fruitful exchanges and collaboration among them.

This book presents an in-depth perspective of knowledge as a fundamental process of any organization rather than just another resource to be managed. The author presents a process-oriented theory of creating and applying knowledge directed towards bothresearchers and practitioners. In this book the author develops normative knowledge management guidelines which draw from a unique view on knowledge, discussed in the field of philosophy since Plato but neglected by most knowledgemanagement authors - by applying a philosophically grounded 'social epistemology' to organizations. The guidelines in this book call for an open and reflective space of knowledge creation, aligned with goals and structures of the organization. Numerous examples, field studies, and an application to the main case study on Seven-Eleven Japan complement both the descriptive view on knowledge as well as the normative guidelines presented in this book. "

We know that we are fallible creatures, liable to cognitive bias. But we also have a strong and stubborn tendency to overestimate our reasoning capacities. This presents a problem for any attempt to help us reason in more accurate ways: While we might see the point of others heeding intellectual advice and relying on reasoning aids, each and every one of us will tend not to see the point of doing so ourselves. The present book argues that the solution to this problem lies in accepting a form of epistemic paternalism. Accepting such paternalism is to accept that we are sometimes justified in interfering with the inquiry of another without her consent but for her own epistemic good. Because when it comes to our freedom to conduct inquiry in whatever way we see fit, more is not always better. In fact, less is often more.

Truth Through Proof defends an anti-platonist philosophy of mathematics derived from game formalism. Classic formalists claimed implausibly that mathematical utterances are truth-valueless moves in a game. Alan Weir aims to develop a more satisfactory successor to game formalism utilising a widely accepted, broadly neo-Fregean framework, in which the proposition expressed by an utterance is a function of both sense and background circumstance. This framework allows for sentences whose truth-conditions are not representational, which are made true or false by conditions residing in the circumstances of utterances but not transparently in the sense.
Applications to projectivism and fiction pave the way for the claim that mathematical utterances are made true or false by the existence of concrete proofs or refutations, though these truth-making conditions form no part of their sense or informational content.
The position is compared with rivals, an account of the applicability of mathematics developed, and a new account of the nature of idealisation proffered in which it is argued that the finitistic limitations Godel placed on proofs are without rational justification. Finally a non-classical logical system is provided in which excluded middle fails, yet enough logical power remains to recapture the results of standard mathematics.

This book examines epistemic pluralism, a brand new area of research in epistemology with dramatic implications for the discipline. Challenging traditional assumptions about the nature of justification, an expert team of contributors explores pluralism about justification, with compelling first-order results - including analysis of the various requisites one might want to impose on the notion of justification (and therefore of knowledge) and why. It is shown why a long-lasting dispute within epistemology about the nature of justification has reached a stalemate and how embracing a different overarching outlook might lead to progress and aid better appreciation of the relationship between the various epistemic projects scholars have been pursuing. With close connections to the idea of epistemic relativism, and with specific applications to various areas of contemporary epistemology (such as the debate over epistemic norms of action and assertion, epistemic peers' disagreement, self-knowledge and the status of philosophical disputes about ontology) this fascinating new volume is essential reading for scholars, researchers and advanced students in the discipline.

From Plato, through Descartes to W.V. Quine and Edmund Gettier, this concise introduction and reference guide explores the history of thinking about 'knowledge'. Exploring what great philosophers have written about the nature of knowledge and about how we know what we know, this is a concise and accessible introduction to the field of epistemology. "Epistemology: The Key Thinkers" tells the story of how epistemological thinking has developed over the centuries, through the work of the finest thinkers on the topic. Chapters by leading contemporary scholars guide readers through the ideas of key philosophers, beginning with Plato and Aristotle, through Descartes and the British empiricists, to such twentieth-century thinkers such as Wittgenstein, Quine, Goldman, and beyond. The final chapter looks to the future, highlighting some of the very latest debates that energise philosophical writing today about knowledge. Each chapter ends with a guide to further reading, encouraging students to explore the key writings for themselves, making "Epistemology: The Key Thinkers" a perfect guide for study, revision, and reference. "The Key Thinkers" series is aimed at undergraduate students and offers clear, concise and accessible edited guides to the key thinkers in each of the central topics in philosophy. Each book offers a comprehensive overview of the major thinkers who have contributed to the historical development of a key area of philosophy, providing a survey of their major works and the evolution of the central ideas in that area.

Descartes s concern with the proper method of belief formation is evident in the titles of his works e.g., "The Search after Truth," "The Rules for the Direction of the Mind" and "The Discourse on Method of rightly conducting one s reason and seeking the truth in the sciences." It is most apparent, however, in his famous discussions, both in the "Meditations" and in the "Principles," of one particularly noteworthy source of our doxastic errors namely, the misuse of one s will. What is not widely recognized, let alone appreciated and understood, is the relationship between his concern with belief formation and his concern with virtue. In fact, few seem to realize that Descartes regards doxastic errors as "moral" errors and as "sins" both because such errors are intrinsically vicious and because they entail notably deleterious social consequences.

"Reforming the Art of Living" seeks to rectify this rather common oversight in two ways. First, it aims to elucidate the nature of Descartes s account of virtuous belief formation. Second, it aims both (i) to illuminate the social significance of Descartes s philosophical program as it relates to the understanding and practice not of science, but of religion and (ii) to develop a kind of Leibnizian critique of this aspect of his program. More specifically, it aims to show that Descartes s project is dangerous, insofar as it is subversive not only of traditional Christianity but also of other traditional forms of religion, both in theory and in practice."

This book reconstructs the lines of nihilism that Walter Benjamin took from Friedrich Nietzsche that define both his theory of art and the avant-garde, and his approach to political action. It retraces the eccentric route of Benjamin's philosophical discourse in the representation of the modern as a place of "permanent catastrophe", where he attempts to overcome the Nietzschean nihilism through messianic hope. Using conventions from literary criticism this book explores the many sources of Benjamin's thought, demonstrating that behind the materialism which Benjamin incorporates into his Theses on the Concept of History is hidden Nietzsche's nihilism. Mauro Ponzi analyses how Benjamin's Arcades Project uses figures such as Baudelaire, Marx, Aragon, Proust and Blanqui as allegories to explain many aspects of modernity. The author argues that Benjamin uses Baudelaire as a paradigm to emphasize the dark side of the modern era, offering us a key to the interpretation of communicative and cultural trends of today.

ACMES (Algorithms and Complexity in Mathematics, Epistemology, and Science) is a multidisciplinary conference series that focuses on epistemological and mathematical issues relating to computation in modern science. This volume includes a selection of papers presented at the 2015 and 2016 conferences held at Western University that provide an interdisciplinary outlook on modern applied mathematics that draws from theory and practice, and situates it in proper context. These papers come from leading mathematicians, computational scientists, and philosophers of science, and cover a broad collection of mathematical and philosophical topics, including numerical analysis and its underlying philosophy, computer algebra, reliability and uncertainty quantification, computation and complexity theory, combinatorics, error analysis, perturbation theory, experimental mathematics, scientific epistemology, and foundations of mathematics. By bringing together contributions from researchers who approach the mathematical sciences from different perspectives, the volume will further readers' understanding of the multifaceted role of mathematics in modern science, informed by the state of the art in mathematics, scientific computing, and current modeling techniques.

This book investigates the central metaphysics and epistemology of Advaita. Although the vastness of Advaita literature has grown to immense proportions, there has been a glaring lacuna in unraveling its philosophical, theological and religious implications. This volume undertakes a thematic search on the conception of Atman in an all-important Advaitic text, the Vivekacudamani , and other supportive texts of the same genre. Walter Menezes aims to revive Advaita as a sound philosophical system by driving away the cloud of negativity associated with it, thereby opening a new chapter in the history of Advaita philosophy.

This book tackles the difficult task of defending relativism in the age of science. It succeeds where others have failed by combining the rigor of analytic philosophy with the first-hand insights of anthropological experience. Typically, an anthropologist's work on relativism offers rich examples of cultural diversity, but lacks philosophical rigor, while a philosopher's work on relativism offers rigorous argumentation, but lacks rich anthropological examples. Facing Relativism, written by a North American philosopher who lived in the Ecuadorian rainforest, does both. Relativism at a global scale is a view that our claims about the world, both theoretical and practical, are evaluable only relative to a context shaped by factors such as culture, history, language, and environment - or, "a way of life." It can be at once intuitive and disturbing. While we might expect a way of life to exert some influence on our claims, relativism seems to move to the overly strong conclusion that all of our claims about what is true or good must merely be expressions of cultural bias. It easily opens itself to a host of charges, including paradox and self-contradiction. Facing Relativism argues that such problems arise largely from a failure to situate the view within the context that has, throughout its long history, been its inspiration: the experience - whether through literature, the imagination, or direct anthropological contact - of deeply engaging with a very different way of life. By starting with a careful analysis of the experience of deep engagement, this book shows that relativism is neither as incoherent nor as alarming as we tend to think. In fact, it might just offer the tools we need to face these times of global crisis and change. Alyssa Luboff has produced an exceptional defense of a cultural relativism that recognizes how the epistemic and the ethical intertwine in a way of life. Drawing from her deep engagement over many years with the Chachi and traditional Afro-Ecuadorian people, she provides vivid and compelling examples of how one can come to understand another way of life as well-reasoned, coherent, and integrated, as challenging to one's own commitments at the same time that one challenges it. Luboff combines her deep engagement with command of the relevant philosophical and anthropological literature. She presents the major arguments against relativism in a sympathetic and generous way, and carefully responds with a sophisticated relativism that acknowledges how the world resists and responds to different conceptual shapings of it. This book is beautifully written and will engage both the academic specialist and the intelligent general reader. - David Wong, Duke University By the time her brilliant faceoff is over, philosophical relativism will never again be seen as a straw man. - Richard A. Shweder, University of Chicago This book will interest readers who seek an astute account of how the pursuit of "truth" - whether relative or absolute - enters into practices of power. Luboff 's treatment is impressive. - Michael Krausz, Bryn Mawr College and Linacre College, Oxford University

Building from foundations of modern science and cosmic evolution, as well as psychological and philosophical perspectives of value and meaning, this book explores some of humanity's biggest questions: * Is the Universe "about something"? * What might be roles for life and intelligence in cosmic evolution? * How might we think about value, meaning, purpose, and ethics in a cosmic evolutionary context? The author explores how the sciences of relativity and quantum theory, combined with cosmic evolution and philosophical traditions such as process philosophy, contribute to the development of a broad "relationalist framework". That framework helps inform perspectives such as "scientific minimalism" and "cosmological theories of value". Cosmological Reverence, Cosmocultural Evolution, and the Connection-Action Principle are explored as examples of cosmological theories of value, all of which help inform how we might think about ethics, value, and meaning in a cosmic context - including application to the search for extraterrestrial life and the future of intelligence in the universe. This book will benefit a diverse range of practitioners in philosophy, science, and policy, including interdisciplinary fields such as Science and Society and cultural evolution studies. From the Foreword: "This volume ranges from the sciences of cosmic evolution, relativity, and quantum mechanics, to value theory and process philosophy, all with the goal of exploring how they relate to humanity in the sense of worldviews and meaning. With his three cosmological theories of value, Lupisella goes beyond the bounds of most books on naturalism, and into fundamental questions about the nature of the universe and our relation to it. To read Lupisella is to have a mind-boggling experience, to want to race to references, to want to know more." Steven J. Dick Former Baruch S. Blumberg NASA/ Library of Congress Chair in Astrobiology Former NASA Chief Historian

Things is a collection of twelve metaphysical essays by Stephen Yablo. The essays address a range of first-order topics, including identity, coincidence, essence, existence, causation, and properties. Some first-order debates are not worth pursuing, Yablo maintains; there is nothing at issue in them. Several of the papers explore the metaontology of abstract objects, and more generally of objects that are 'preconceived', their principal features being settled already by their job-descriptions. Yablo rejects standard forms of fictionalism, opting ultimately for a view that puts presupposition in the role normally played by pretense. Almost all of Yablo's published work on these topics is collected here, along with the previously unpublished 'Carving Content at the Joints'.

Scientific thinking must be understood as an activity. The acts of interpretation, representation, and explanation are the cognitive processes by which scientific thinking leads to understanding. This book explores the nature of these processes and describes how scientific thinking can only be grasped from a pragmatic perspective.

At least since Locke, philosophers and psychologists have usually held that concepts arise out of sensory perceptions, thoughts are built from concepts, and language enables speakers to convey their thoughts to hearers. Christopher Gauker holds that this tradition is mistaken about both concepts and language. The mind cannot abstract the building blocks of thoughts from perceptual representations. More generally, we have no account of the origin of concepts that grants them the requisite independence from language. Gauker's alternative is to show that much of cognition consists in thinking by means of mental imagery, without the help of concepts, and that language is a tool by which interlocutors coordinate their actions in pursuit of shared goals. Imagistic cognition supports the acquisition and use of this tool, and when the use of this tool is internalized, it becomes the very medium of conceptual thought.

John Foster presents a clear and powerful discussion of a range of topics relating to our understanding of the universe: induction, laws of nature, and the existence of God. He begins by developing a solution to the problem of induction - a solution whose key idea is that the regularities in the workings of nature that have held in our experience hitherto are to be explained by appeal to the controlling influence of laws, as forms of natural necessity. His second line of argument focuses on the issue of what we should take such necessitational laws to be, and whether we can even make sense of them at all. Having considered and rejected various alternatives, Foster puts forward his own proposal: the obtaining of a law consists in the causal imposing of a regularity on the universe as a regularity. With this causal account of laws in place, he is now equipped to offer an argument for theism. His claim is that natural regularities call for explanation, and that, whatever explanatory role we may initially assign to laws, the only plausible ultimate explanation is in terms of the agency of God. Finally, he argues that, once we accept the existence of God, we need to think of him as creating the universe by a method which imposes regularities on it in the relevant law-yielding way. In this new perspective, the original nomological-explanatory solution to the problem of induction becomes a theological-explanatory solution. The Divine Lawmaker is bold and original in its approach, and rich in argument. The issues on which it focuses are among the most important in the whole epistemological and metaphysical spectrum.

Can it be justifiable to commit oneself 'by faith' to a religious claim when its truth lacks adequate support from one's total available evidence? In Believing by Faith, John Bishop defends a version of fideism inspired by William James's 1896 lecture 'The Will to Believe'. By critiquing both 'isolationist' (Wittgensteinian) and Reformed epistemologies of religious belief, Bishop argues that anyone who accepts that our publicly available evidence is equally open to theistic and naturalist/atheistic interpretations will need to defend a modest fideist position. This modest fideism understands theistic commitment as involving 'doxastic venture' - practical commitment to propositions held to be true through 'passional' causes (causes other than the recognition of evidence of or for their truth).
While Bishop argues that concern about the justifiability of religious doxastic venture is ultimately moral concern, he accepts that faith-ventures can be morally justifiable only if they are in accord with the proper exercise of our rational epistemic capacities. Legitimate faith-ventures may thus never be counter-evidential, and, furthermore, may be made supra-evidentially only when the truth of the faith-proposition concerned necessarily cannot be settled on the basis of evidence. Bishop extends this Jamesian account by requiring that justifiable faith-ventures should also be morally acceptable both in motivation and content. Hard-line evidentialists, however, insist that all religious faith-ventures are morally wrong. Bishop thus conducts an extended debate between fideists and hard-line evidentialists, arguing that neither side can succeed in establishing the irrationality of itsopposition. He concludes by suggesting that fideism may nevertheless be morally preferable, as a less dogmatic, more self-accepting, even a more loving, position than its evidentialist rival.

How can we explain our capacity to think about particulars in our external environment? Many philosophers have answered this question in terms of a sophisticated conception of space and time and the movement of objects therein. A more recent reaction against this view sought to explain this capacity solely in terms of perceptual mechanisms of object individuation. Neither explanation remains fully satisfactory. This book argues for a more desirable middle ground in terms of a pragmatist approach to demonstrative thought, where this capacity is explained through graded practical knowledge of objects. This view allows us to do justice to important insights put forward by both positions criticized in the book, while avoiding their potential shortcomings. It also paves the way to a more pragmatist approach to the theory of mental representation, where the notion of practical knowledge is allowed to play a central role in our cognitive life. Finally, it shows how practical knowledge may be firmly rooted in neurobiological processes and mechanisms that conform to what the empirical sciences tell us about the mind.

The concept of truthmaking is attracting much attention in contemporary metaphysics. Helen Beebee and Julian Dodd have assembled a distinguished team to contribute brand new essays on the topic: they ask, among other things, how the truthmaker principle should be formulated, whether it is well motivated, whether it genuinely has the explanatory roles claimed for it, and whether more modest principles might serve just as well. This volume will be the starting point for future discussion and research.