A comprehensive collection containing twenty original chapters from a group of international contributors. New Philosophical Perspectives on Scientific Progress examines a wide range of scientific disciplines to comparatively analyse traditional and contemporary debates concerning scientific progress. An invaluable resource for researchers and advanced students working on the history and philosophy of science.

Caught between the history of exclusion and the reality of the world philosophies approach, this is an introduction to African philosophy unlike any other. With distinctive insight Pascah Mungwini brings together African philosophy and the emancipative mission, introducing African thought as a practice defined by its own history and priority questions while always in dialogue with the world. He charts the controversies and contestations around the contemporary practice of philosophy as an academic enterprise in Africa, examining some of philosophy's most serious mistakes, omissions, and failures. Covering the history of African philosophy's development and trajectory, Mungwini's introduction focuses on the struggle for intellectual liberation. His compelling portrayal reveals that true liberation begins by understanding one's own world, an essential point for anyone beginning to explore another philosophical tradition on its own terms.

Testimony is a crucial source of knowledge: we are to a large extent reliant upon what others tell us. It has been the subject of much recent interest in epistemology, and this volume collects twelve original essays on the topic by some of the world's leading philosophers. It will be the
starting point for future research in this fertile field.
Contributors include Robert Audi, C. A. J. Coady, Elizabeth Fricker, Richard Fumerton, Sanford C. Goldberg, Peter Graham, Jennifer Lackey, Keith Lehrer, Richard Moran, Frederick F. Schmitt, Ernest Sosa, and James Van Cleve.

We ordinarily take it as obvious that we acquire knowledge of our world on the basis of sensory perception, and that such knowledge plays a central cognitive and practical role in our lives. Upon reflection, however, it is far from obvious what perception involves and how exactly it contributes to our knowledge. Indeed, skeptical arguments have led some to question whether we have any knowledge, or even rational or justified belief, regarding the world outside our minds. Investigating the nature and scope of our perceptual knowledge and perceptually justified belief, A Critical Introduction to the Epistemology of Perception provides an accessible and engaging introduction to a flourishing area of philosophy. Before introducing and evaluating the main theories in the epistemology of perception, Ali Hasan sets the stage with a discussion of skepticism, realism, and idealism in early modern philosophy, theories of perceptual experience (sense-datum theory, adverbialism, intentionalism, and metaphysical disjunctivism), and central controversies in general epistemology. Hasan then surveys the main theories in the contemporary debate, including coherentism, abductivism, phenomenal conservatism or dogmatism, reliabilism, and epistemological disjunctivism, presenting the motivations and primary objections to each. Hasan also shows how to avoid confusing metaphysical issues with epistemological ones, and identifies interesting connections between the epistemology and metaphysics of perception. For students in epistemology or the philosophy of perception looking to better understand the central questions, concepts, and debates shaping contemporary epistemology, A Critical Introduction to the Epistemology of Perception is essential reading.

Hans-Georg Gadamer is depicted as a paradoxical figure in the literature. When Gadamer's work is approached by itself, outside the history of hermeneutics, he is generally presented as the disciple of Martin Heidegger, whose main theoretical contribution lies in having transposed his ontological hermeneutics into the sphere of the human sciences. Usually the master-student relation ends with a break between the two brought about by the student's desire to become herself a master. In Gadamer and Heidegger's case, scholarship has always excluded the possibility of such a symbolic parricide. However, when Gadamer's work is approached from the history of hermeneutics, he, not Heidegger, is revered as the central figure of hermeneutic theory in the twentieth century, and scholars perceive the works of the latter-together with those of his immediate forerunners Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey-as mere preambles to the great hermeneutic theory proposed by Truth and Method, and the works of those following him as footnotes to it. Gadamer and the Question of Understanding: Between Heidegger and Derrida dismantles this paradox by showing, on the one hand, that Gadamer's translation of Heidegger involved, as he himself says, a series of "essential alterations" to the original which make philosophical hermeneutics a more coherent and better articulated hermeneutic theory, one offering a more faithful description of the phenomenon of understanding than Heidegger's. And, on the other hand, by taking the dossier of the famous encounter between Gadamer and Derrida as its cue, Adrian Costache demonstrates that in light of Derrida's deconstruction, every step Gadamer takes forward from Heidegger as well as from Schleiermacher and Dilthey-however necessary--is problematic in itself. The insights in this book will be valuable to students and scholars interested in modern and contemporary European philosophy, especially those focusing on philosophical hermeneutics and deconstruction, as well as those working in social sciences that have incorporated a hermeneutic approach to their investigations, such as pedagogy, sociology, psychotherapy, law, and nursing.

This book presents a multidisciplinary perspective on chance, with contributions from distinguished researchers in the areas of biology, cognitive neuroscience, economics, genetics, general history, law, linguistics, logic, mathematical physics, statistics, theology and philosophy. The individual chapters are bound together by a general introduction followed by an opening chapter that surveys 2500 years of linguistic, philosophical, and scientific reflections on chance, coincidence, fortune, randomness, luck and related concepts. A main conclusion that can be drawn is that, even after all this time, we still cannot be sure whether chance is a truly fundamental and irreducible phenomenon, in that certain events are simply uncaused and could have been otherwise, or whether it is always simply a reflection of our ignorance. Other challenges that emerge from this book include a better understanding of the contextuality and perspectival character of chance (including its scale-dependence), and the curious fact that, throughout history (including contemporary science), chance has been used both as an explanation and as a hallmark of the absence of explanation. As such, this book challenges the reader to think about chance in a new way and to come to grips with this endlessly fascinating phenomenon.

When we talk about delusions we may refer to symptoms of mental health problems, such as clinical delusions in schizophrenia, or simply the beliefs that people cling to which are implausible and resistant to counterevidence; these can include anything from beliefs about the benefits of homeopathy to concerns about the threat of alien abduction. Why do people adopt delusional beliefs and why are they so reluctant to part with them? In Why Delusions Matter, Lisa Bortolotti explains what delusions really are and argues that, despite their negative reputation, they can also play a positive role in people's lives, imposing some meaning on adverse experiences and strengthening personal or social identities. In a clear and accessible style, Bortolotti contributes to the growing research on the philosophy of the cognitive sciences, offering a novel and nuanced view of delusions.

The past two decades have witnessed an intensifying rise of populist movements globally, and their impact has been felt in both more and less developed countries. Engaging Populism: Democracy and the Intellectual Virtues approaches populism from the perspective of work on the intellectual virtues, including contributions from philosophy, history, religious studies, political psychology, and law. Although recent decades have seen a significant advance in philosophical reflection on intellectual virtues and vices, less effort has been made to date to apply this work to the political realm. While every political movement suffers from various biases, contemporary populism's association with anti-science attitudes and conspiracy theories makes it a potentially rich subject of reflection concerning the role of intellectual virtues in public life. Interdisciplinary in approach, Engaging Populism will be of interest to scholars and students in philosophy, political theory, psychology, and related fields in the humanities and social sciences.

Radical Skepticism and the Shadow of Doubt brings something new to epistemology both in content and style. At the outset we are asked to imagine a person named Vatol who grows up in a world containing numerous people who are brains-in-vats and who hallucinate their entire lives. Would Vatol have reason to doubt whether he himself is in contact with reality? If he does have reason to doubt, would he doubt, or is it impossible for a person to have such doubts? And how do we ourselves compare to Vatol? After reflection, can we plausibly claim that Vatol has reason to doubt, but we don't? These are the questions that provide the novel framework for the debates in this book. Topics that are treated here in significantly new ways include: the view that we ought to doubt only when we philosophize; epistemological "dogmatism"; and connections between radical doubt and "having a self." The book adopts the innovative form of a "dialogue/play." The three characters, who are Talmud students as well as philosophers, hardly limit themselves to pure philosophy, but regale each other with Talmudic allusions, reminiscences, jokes, and insults. For them the possibility of doubt emerges as an existential problem with potentially deep emotional significance. Setting complex arguments about radical skepticism within entertaining dialogue, this book can be recommended for both beginners and specialists.

This book offers a rigorous analysis of why commitment matters and the challenges it presents to a range of believers. Peter Forrest treats commitment as a response to lost innocence. He considers the intellectual consequences of this by demonstrating why, for example, we should not believe in angels. He then explores why humans are attached to reason and to humanism, recognising the different commitments made by theist and non-theist humanists. Finally, he analyses religious faith, specifically fideism, defining it by way of contrast to Descartes, Pascal and William James, as well as contemporary philosophers including John Schellenberg and Lara Buchak. Of particular interest to scholars working on the philosophy of religion, the book makes the case both for and against committing to God, recognising that God's divine character sets up an emotional rather than an intellectual barrier to commitment to worship.

In the last forty years, action theory has revitalized moral philosophy. Philosophers have explored the nature of agency, what is involved in acting for a reason, how we know what we are doing, the role of intention, desire, and belief in motivating action, and more. At their most ambitious, philosophers have claimed that action theory is the foundation of ethics. For rationalists or constitutivists, the standards of practical reason derive from the nature of agency as a functional or teleological kind. They are no more mysterious than the standards for being a good clock or a good heart, given the function of clocks and hearts. In this collection of new and previously published essays, Kieran Setiya defends a causal theory of intentional action on which it is explained by knowledge in intention, a form of practical knowledge that transcends prior evidence. Such knowledge rests on knowing how to do the things we do. The theory is otherwise minimalist: agents need not regard their reasons as good, put means to ends, or adopt particular aims. It follows that we must reject the rationalist or constitutivist approach: the nature of agency is too thin to support the standards of practical reason. But the upshot is not nihilism. Instead, the requirement of means-end coherence is explained by the cognitive aspect of intention; and the standards of practical reason are those of ethical virtue, applied to practical thought.