This book explores the effect of the judiciary on the incidence of
post-election violence by political actors across Africa and within
African countries. It examines how variation in judicial
independence can constrain or incentivize election violence among
democratizing states. Using case studies and cross-national
analysis, the book shows that variation in levels of judicial
independence from a non-independent judiciary to a
quasi-independent judiciary or from a fully independent judiciary
to quasi-independent judiciary increases the likelihood of
strategic use of post-election violence by non-state actors.
However, the likelihood of post-election violence is significantly
reduced in non-independent judiciaries or once countries'
judiciaries become fully independent. The author makes the
theoretical argument that, within unconsolidated states, non-state
actors that view the judiciary as semi-independent are more likely
to engage in post-election violence with the purpose of creating
political and professional uncertainty in order to influence
assertive behaviour from judges in disputed elections.
Consequently, the book argues that semi-independent judiciaries or
judiciaries that are neither fully controlled by the incumbent nor
fully independent from the incumbent can help explain post-election
violence among unconsolidated states, all else being equal. This
book will be of interest to scholars of election violence,
democratic politics, law and politics and African politics.
General
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