Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about
how parliamentary parties form governments, deriving from the
political and social context of such government formation its
generic sequential process. Based on their policy preferences, and
their beliefs about what policies will be forthcoming from
different conceivable governments, parties behave strategically in
the game in which government portfolios are allocated. The authors
construct a mathematical model of allocation of ministerial
portfolios, formulated as a noncooperative game, and derive
equilibria. They also derive a number of empirical hypotheses about
outcomes of this game, which they then test with data drawn from
most of the postwar European parliamentary democracies. The book
concludes with a number of observations about departmentalistic
tendencies and centripetal forces in parliamentary regimes.
General
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