What is the nature of a conceptual scheme? Are there alternative
conceptual schemes? If so, are some more justifiable or correct
than others? The later Wittgenstein already addresses these
fundamental philosophical questions under the general rubric of
"grammar" and the question of its "arbitrariness"--and does so with
great subtlety. This book explores Wittgenstein's views on these
questions.
Part I interprets his conception of grammar as a generalized
(and otherwise modified) version of Kant's transcendental idealist
solution to a puzzle about necessity. It also seeks to reconcile
Wittgenstein's seemingly inconsistent answers to the question of
whether or not grammar is arbitrary by showing that he believed
grammar to be arbitrary in one sense and non-arbitrary in
another.
Part II focuses on an especially central and contested feature
of Wittgenstein's account: a thesis of the diversity of grammars.
The author discusses this thesis in connection with the nature of
formal logic, the limits of language, and the conditions of
semantic understanding or access.
Strongly argued and cleary written, this book will appeal not
only to philosophers but also to students of the human sciences,
for whom Wittgenstein's work holds great relevance.
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