Pinto develops a partisan theory of foreign direct investment (FDI)
arguing that left-wing governments choose policies that allow
easier entry by foreign investors more than right-wing governments,
and that foreign investors prefer to invest in countries governed
by the left. To reach this determination, the book derives the
conditions under which investment flows should be expected to
affect the relative demand for the services supplied by economic
actors in host countries. Based on these expected distributive
consequences, a political economy model of the regulation of FDI
and changes in investment performance within countries and over
time is developed. The theory is tested using both cross-national
statistical analysis and two case studies exploring the development
of the foreign investment regimes and their performance over the
past century in Argentina and South Korea.
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