One fundamental premise of democratic theory is that social policy,
group choice, or collective action should be based on the
preferences of the individuals in the society, group, or
collective. Using the tools of formal mathematical analysis, Peter
C. Fishburn explores and defines the conditions for social choice
and methods for synthesizing individuals' preferences. This study
is unique in its emphasis on social choice functions, the general
position that individual indifference may not be transitive, and
the use of certain mathematics such as linear algebra. The text is
divided into three main parts: social choice between two
alternatives, which examines a variety of majority-like functions;
simple majority social choice, which focuses on social choice among
many alternatives when two-element feasible subset choices are
based on simple majority; and a general study of aspects and types
of social choice functions for many alternatives. Originally
published in 1973. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest
print-on-demand technology to again make available previously
out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton
University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of
these important books while presenting them in durable paperback
and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is
to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in
the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press
since its founding in 1905.
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