Why did the Soviet Union squander the political leverage
afforded by its trade subsidy to Eastern Europe? Why did Soviet
officials fail to bargain with resolve, to link subsidies to
salient political issues, to make credible commitments, and to
monitor the satellites' policies? Using an unprecedented array of
formerly secret documents housed in archives in Moscow, Warsaw, and
Prague, as well as interviews with former Communist officials
across Eastern Europe, Randall Stone answers these questions and
others that have long vexed Western political scientists.
Stone argues that trade politics revolved around the incentives
created by distorted prices. The East European satellites profited
by trading on the margin between prices on the Western market and
those in the Soviet bloc. The Soviet Union made numerous attempts
to reduce its implicit trade subsidy and increase the efficiency of
the bloc, but the satellites managed consistently to outmaneuver
Soviet negotiators. Stone demonstrates how the East Europeans
artfully resisted Soviet objectives.
Stone draws upon recent developments in bargaining and
principal-agent theory, arguing that the incentives created by
domestic institutions weakened Soviet bargaining strategies. In
effect, he suggests, perverse incentive structures in the Soviet
economy were exported into Soviet foreign policy. Furthermore,
Stone argues, incentives to smother information were so deeply
entrenched that they frustrated numerous attempts to reform Soviet
institutions.
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