The Luftwaffe's defeat of Allied airpower in the Kasserine Pass in
1943 imprinted the principle of mass upon the US Air Force's
organizational psyche. The then Army Air Corps recognized the
necessity of consolidating airpower under the command and control
of a single airman to mass airpower's effects. This belief in
centralized control of airpower became a central reason for the
creation of an independent Air Force in 1947. The linkage between
centralized control and the origin of the Air Force plays a
significant role in Air Force culture. This study examines the Air
Force's ability to apply the centralized control approach to
irregular warfare. The growing focus and literature on the
differences between traditional warfare and irregular warfare
challenge the US Air Force's adherence to centralized control. This
study asks, "Can the Air Force's current, traditional command and
control structure integrate airpower effectively into irregular
warfare (IW) operations?" This research question leads to a review
of the irregular warfare theory, organizational theory, and
application of these theories in the current context to determine
the effectiveness of centralized control in irregular warfare. The
study compares the requirements identified by theory against the
Air Force's command and control structure, the Theater Air Control
System (TACS). Subsequent chapters discuss the TACS performance in
contemporary IW environments. The discussion leads to limitations
of the TACS in irregular warfare and potential improvements.
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