Justification as Ignorance offers an original account of epistemic
justification as both non-factive and luminous, vindicating core
internalist intuitions without construing justification as an
internal condition knowable by reflection alone. Sven Rosenkranz
conceives of justification, in its doxastic and propositional
varieties, as a kind of epistemic possibility of knowing and of
being in a position to know. His account contrasts with recent
alternative views that characterize justification in terms of the
metaphysical possibility of knowing. Instead, he develops a
suitable non-normal multi-modal epistemic logic for knowledge and
being in a position to know that respects the finding that these
notions create hyperintensional contexts. He also defends his
conception of justification against well-known anti-luminosity
arguments, shows that the account allows for fruitful applications
and principled solutions to the lottery and preface paradoxes, and
provides a metaphysics of justification and its varying degrees of
strength that is compatible with core assumptions of the
knowledge-first approach and disjunctivist conceptions of mental
states.
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