The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use
econometric tools to study what they call the "missing link"
between constitutional systems and economic policy; the book is an
uncompromisingly empirical sequel to their previous theoretical
analysis of economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a
point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are
supported and which are contradicted by the facts. The results are
based on comparisons of political institutions across countries or
time, in a large sample of contemporary democracies. They find that
presidential/parliamentary and majoritarian/proportional
dichotomies influence several economic variables: presidential
regimes induce smaller public sectors, and proportional elections
lead to greater and less targeted government spending and larger
budget deficits. Moreover, the details of the electoral system
(such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence
corruption and structural policies toward economic growth.Persson
and Tabellini's goal is to draw conclusions about the causal
effects of constitutions on policy outcomes. But since
constitutions are not randomly assigned to countries, how the
constitutional system was selected in the first place must be taken
into account. This raises challenging methodological problems,
which are addressed in the book. The study is therefore important
not only in its findings but also in establishing a methodology for
empirical analysis in the field of comparative politics.
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