In countries around the world, politicians distribute patronage
jobs to supporters in exchange for a wide range of political
services - such as helping with campaigns and electoral
mobilization. Patronage employees (clients) engage in these
political activities that support politicians (patrons) because
their fates are tied to the political fate of their patrons.
Although conventional wisdom holds that control of patronage
significantly increases an incumbent's chance of staying in power,
we actually know very little about how patronage works. Drawing on
in-depth interviews, survey data, and survey experiments in
Argentina, Virginia Oliveros details the specific mechanisms that
explain the effect of patronage on political competition. This
fascinating study is the first to provide a systematic analysis of
the political activities of mid and low-level public employees in
Latin America. It provides a novel explanation of the enforcement
of patronage contracts that has wider implications for
understanding the functioning of clientelist exchanges.
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