Part I of this book presents a theory of modal metaphysics in the
possible-worlds tradition. `Worlds' themselves are understood as
structured sets of properties; this `Ersatzist' view is defended
against its most vigorous competitors, Meinongianism and David
Lewis' theory of existent concrete worlds. Related issues of
essentialism and linguistic reference are explored. Part II takes
up the question of lexical meaning in the context of possible-world
semantics. There are skeptical analyses of analyticity and the
notion of a logical constant; and an `infinite polysemy' thesis is
defended. The book will be of particular interest to
metaphysicians, possible-world semanticists, philosophers of
language, and linguists concerned with lexical semantics.
General
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