Chinese government officials have played a crucial role in China's
economic development, but they are also responsible for severe
problems, including environmental pollution, violation of citizens'
rights, failure in governance, and corruption. How does the Chinese
Party-state respond when a government official commits a
duty-related malfeasance or criminal activity? And how does it
balance the potential political costs of disciplining its own
agents versus the loss of legitimacy in tolerating their misdeeds?
"State and Agents in China" explores how the party-state addresses
this dilemma, uncovering the rationale behind the selective
disciplining of government officials and its implications for
governance in China.
By examining the discipline of state agents, Cai shows how
selective punishment becomes the means of balancing the need for
and difficulties of disciplining agents, and explains why some
erring agents are tolerated while others are punished. Cai finds
that the effectiveness of punishing erring officials in China does
not depend so much on the Party-state's capacity to detect and
punish each erring official but on the threat it creates when the
Party-state decides to mete out punishment. Importantly, the book
also shows how relaxed discipline allows reform-minded officials to
use rule-violating reform measures to address local problems, and
how such reform measures have significant implications for the
regime's resilience.
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