Michael Wallerstein was a leader in developing a rigorous comparative political economy approach to understanding substantive issues of inequality, redistribution, and wage-determination. His early death from cancer left both a hole in the profession and a legacy that will surely provide the foundation for research on these topics. This volume collects his most important and influential contributions, organized by topic, with each topic preceded by an editorial introduction that provides overview and context.

Sustainable Democracy is a joint report of twenty-one social scientists, from eleven countries and four academic disciplines, who collaborated over the period of two years under the name of the Group on East-South Systems Transformations (ESST). Their report identifies the principal political and economic choices confronting new democracies in Southern and Eastern Europe and South America, while evaluating their merits and feasibility in the light of current social science knowledge. The scientists explore the social, political and economic conditions under which democracy is likely to generate desirable and politically desired objectives, as well as, whether it is likely to last. It is argued that the state has an essential role in promoting universal citizenship and in creating conditions for a sustained economic growth. Special emphasis is placed on the interdependence between political and economic reforms.

Is democracy in crisis? The current threats to democracy are not just political: they are deeply embedded in the democracies of today, in current economic, social, and cultural conditions. In Crises of Democracy, Adam Przeworski presents a panorama of the political situation throughout the world of established democracies, places it in the context of past misadventures of democratic regimes, and speculates on the prospects. Our present state of knowledge does not support facile conclusions. 'We should not believe the flood of writings that have all the answers'. Avoiding technical aspects, this book is addressed not only to professional social scientists, but to everyone concerned about the prospects of democracy.

An international group of specialists from the fields of law, politics, economics, and philosophy address the question of why governments act or do not act according to laws. The authors interpret the rule of law as a strategic choice of actors with powerful interests, rather than as an exogenous constraint on politicians. The rule of law emerges when no group is strong enough to dominate the others, and political actors seek to resolve their conflicts by recourse to law. Law is thus deeply rooted in politics.

An international group of specialists from the fields of law, politics, economics, and philosophy address the question of why governments act or do not act according to laws. The authors interpret the rule of law as a strategic choice of actors with powerful interests, rather than as an exogenous constraint on politicians. The rule of law emerges when no group is strong enough to dominate the others, and political actors seek to resolve their conflicts by recourse to law. Law is thus deeply rooted in politics.

The political institutions under which we live today evolved from a revolutionary idea that shook the world in the second part of the eighteenth century: that a people should govern itself. Yet if we judge contemporary democracies by the ideals of self-government, equality, and liberty, we find that democracy is not what it was dreamt to be. This book addresses central issues in democratic theory by analyzing the sources of widespread dissatisfaction with democracies around the world. With attention throughout to historical and cross-national variations, the focus is on the generic limits of democracy in promoting equality, effective participation, control of governments by citizens, and liberty. The conclusion is that although some of this dissatisfaction has good reasons, some is based on an erroneous understanding of how democracy functions. Hence, although the analysis identifies the limits of democracy, it also points to directions for feasible reforms.

Is economic development conducive to political democracy? Does democracy foster or hinder material welfare? These two questions are examined by looking at the experiences of 135 countries between 1950 and 1990. Descriptive information, statistical analyses, and historical narratives are interwoven to gain an understanding of the dynamic of political regimes and their impact on economic development. The often surprising findings dispel any notion of a tradeoff between democracy and development. Economic development does not generate democracies, but democracies are much more likely to survive in wealthy societies.

This book examines whether mechanisms of accountability characteristic of democratic systems are sufficient to induce the representatives to act in the best interest of the represented. The first part of the volume focuses on the role of elections, distinguishing different ways in which they may cause representation. The second part is devoted to the role of checks and balances, between the government and the parliament as well as between the government and the bureaucracy. Overall, the essays combine theoretical discussions, game-theoretic models, case studies, and statistical analyses, within a shared analytical approach and a standardized terminology. The empirical material is drawn from the well established democracies as well as from new democracies.

In this book the authors assess the experiences of transition in Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe in order to determine what the conditions for successful transitions are. They argue against the "big bang" approach, espoused by many advisors to reforming countries, on the grounds that this approach bypasses the newly formed institutions of democracy that ultimately may undermine the necessary consensus to support painful economic reforms. The most successful reforms, they argue, have been those agreed upon through a process of democratic negotiation. A new democracy must offer politically important groups incentives to process their demands within the democratic institutional framework; otherwise, their support will be tenuous and the system may collapse under the strains incurred by painful economic reforms.

The quest for freedom from hunger and repression has triggered in recent years a worldwide movement toward political democracy and economic rationality. Never have so many people experimented with democratic institutions. At the same time, traditional strategies of economic development have collapsed in Eastern Europe and Latin America and entire economic systems are being transformed on both continents. What should we expect in the countries that venture on the paths to democracy and markets? Will these transitions result in democracies or in new dictatorships? What economic system, new or old, will emerge? This major book analyzes recent events in Eastern Europe and Latin America, focusing on transitions to democracy and market-oriented economic reforms. The author underscores the interdependence of political and economic transformations and draws on extensive local data as part of his analysis. A distinctive feature of the book is that it employs models derived from politics, economics, and game theory. This book will be of particular interest to scholars and graduate students in political science and sociology.

Three principal choices, confronted by socialist movements as they developed within capitalist societies, are examined to trace the development of socialist strategies since the mid-19th century.

The purpose of this text is to introduce concepts for studying relationships between states and markets. The economy and the state are thus analyzed as networks of relationships between principals and agents, each occupying a particular position in the institutional structure. The book then analyzes systematically the effect of the organization of the state on the functioning of the economy. It isolates the conditions that trigger government's positive or negative responses to the economy.

What can we learn about democracy from the experience of post-Soviet Russia? What can we learn about the prospects for democracy in Russia from the experience of 'really existing democracies'? Must some 'pre-requisites', cultural or material, be fulfilled for democracy to become possible? This book examines the current state of Russia and the prospects for democracy, posing several challenges to our understanding of democracy. Thirteen contributors expand the debate over these questions, offering a variety of insights, interpretations, and conclusions vital to understanding the conditions of emergence and survival of successful democracies.

Michael Wallerstein was a leader in developing a rigorous comparative political economy approach to understanding substantive issues of inequality, redistribution, and wage-determination. His early death from cancer left both a hole in the profession and a legacy that will surely provide the foundation for research on these topics. This volume collects his most important and influential contributions, organized by topic, with each topic preceded by an editorial introduction that provides overview and context.

The political institutions under which we live today evolved from a revolutionary idea that shook the world in the second part of the eighteenth century: that a people should govern itself. Yet if we judge contemporary democracies by the ideals of self-government, equality, and liberty, we find that democracy is not what it was dreamt to be. This book addresses central issues in democratic theory by analyzing the sources of widespread dissatisfaction with democracies around the world. With attention throughout to historical and cross-national variations, the focus is on the generic limits of democracy in promoting equality, effective participation, control of governments by citizens, and liberty. The conclusion is that although some of this dissatisfaction has good reasons, some is based on an erroneous understanding of how democracy functions. Hence, although the analysis identifies the limits of democracy, it also points to directions for feasible reforms.

The purpose of this text is to introduce concepts for studying relationships between states and markets. The economy and the state are thus analyzed as networks of relationships between principals and agents, each occupying a particular position in the institutional structure. The book then analyzes systematically the effect of the organization of the state on the functioning of the economy. It isolates the conditions that trigger government's positive or negative responses to the economy.

Is economic development conducive to political democracy? Does democracy foster or hinder material welfare? These two questions are examined by looking at the experience of 135 countries between 1950 and 1990. Descriptive information, statistical analyses, and historical narratives are interwoven to gain an understanding of the dynamic of political regimes and their impact on economic development and other aspects of material welfare. The findings, several most surprising, dispel any notion of a trade-off between democracy and development. Economic development does not generate democracies but democracies are much more likely to survive in wealthy societies. Political regimes have no impact on the growth of total national incomes, while political instability affects growth only in dictatorships. Per capita incomes grow faster in democracies since population increases faster under dictatorships. In general, political regimes have more of an effect on demography than on economics.

This book examines whether the mechanisms of accountability characteristic of democratic systems are sufficient to induce the representatives to act in the best interest of the represented. The first part of the volume focuses on the role of elections, distinguishing different ways in which they may cause representation. The second part is devoted to the role of checks and balances, between the government and the parliament as well as between the government and the bureaucracy. The contributors of this volume, all leading scholars in the fields of American and comparative politics and political theory, address questions such as, whether elections induce governments to act in the interest of citizens. Are politicians in democracies accountable to voters in future elections? If so, does accountability induce politicians to represent citizens? Does accountability limit or enhance the scope of action of governments? Are governments that violate campaign mandates representative? Overall, the essays combine theoretical discussions, game-theoretic models, case studies, and statistical analyses, within a shared analytical approach and a standardized terminology. The empirical material is drawn from the well established democracies as well as from new democracies.

This 1993 book assesses differing experiences of the transition to democracy in the countries of Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe. The authors try to determine what the conditions for successful transitions are. They argue against the 'big bang' approach, espoused by many advisors to reforming countries, on the grounds that this approach bypasses the newly formed institutions of democracy and, ultimately, may undermine the necessary consensus to support painful economic reforms. The most successful reforms, they argue, have been those agreed upon through a process of democratic negotiation. A new democracy must offer politically important groups incentives to process their demands within the democratic institutional framework; otherwise, their support will be tenuous and the system may collapse under the strains incurred by painful economic reforms.