Airpower for Strategic Effect is intended to contribute to the understanding of airpower-what it is, what it does, why it does it, and what the consequences are. This is the plot: airpower generates strategic effect. Airpower's product is strategic effect on the course of strategic history. Everything about military airpower is instrumental to the purpose of securing strategic effect.

Through the eyes and ears of Jerry L. Thigpen, the story of the Combat Talon sees the light of day. Based on thorough research, with a mind to details, Thigpen tells the story of how the Combat Talon became the weapon of choice in long-range, clandestine operations. Combining the chronological and thematic approaches, this book begins with a historical background that opens with the World War II period and concludes in 2000 after having received many accolades and recording many successful exploits. This is a reprint of this extensive 2001 study.

This book examines the Refah Party in Turkey and addresses the following questions: what does it stand for, who leads it, who belongs to it, where is it going? The book presents some background information about the Turkish secular state, the founding of Refah, the rise of Islamic influence in Turkish politics, and the recent success of the Refah Party. It then discusses the ideology of Refah, specifically as it applies to issues regarding the democratic, secular state, society, economics, and foreign affairs. The paper also presents information regarding the leadership and organization of Refah, and concludes with comments about the future viability of the party. Ultimately, this book concludes that the Refah Party, although not unique from other Islamist movements in its ideological goals, is a unique product of Turkish politics, and must therefore adapt and compromise in order to function and survive within those constraints.

Aerial refueling is key to the nation's global reach in response to operations in all parts of the world. As such, aerial refueling provides the bridge for air, joint, and coalition forces to deploy anywhere, any time around the world. It is important in this era of transformation that the tanker force and doctrine of aerial refueling also meet the challenges of the Air Force's task force concept of operations(CONOPS). The highly demanded tanker has the ability to affect global strike; homeland security; global mobility; space; and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR);global response; and nuclear response. The KC-135 air-craft has been an outstanding platform for aerial refueling, and through some enhancements, it has been able to leverage some of its capabilities in airlift and communication. However, the Air Force has the opportunity with its next class of tankers to field a new tanker with capabilities that can serve all services in more demanding joint and coalition warfare of the future. In Tanker-Force Structure: Recapitalization of the KC-135, Lt Col Juan Narvid challenges air mobility warriors to de-velop a tanker-force structure that overcomes the thinking of old to launch new concepts and capabilities for the future tanker. He argues that the future of warfare will re-quire a tanker that is able to operate as a force enabler across the full spectrum of operations. This research isvery timely with the Boeing 767 being looked at as a re-placement for some of the older KC-135s. In contrast to some of the 767's capabilities, he outlines a conceptual tanker that combines airlift and aerial-refueling capabilities and is able to survive in a combat environment, and he leverages its ability to act as a platform to enhance network-centric warfare. He points out that while the "Cadillac" of all tankers may only be conceived in the minds of Airmen, the tanker of the future cannot resemble the single-role tanker of the past. In this paper, Colonel Narvid examines the chronology of the tanker and the role it has played throughout its his-tory. He argues that the next tanker must break from old capabilities, tied to a Cold War strategy, and embark on new operations and more capabilities that are able to respond to future threats. Joint warfare already capitalizes on getting the right information to the decision makers and the warrior executing the combat mission. Innovative ideas within the mobility Air Force (MAF) are providing the link for information between the two through roll-on beyond line of sight (ROBE) systems. To employ these type capabilities into a combat area, tankers may come up against asymmetric threats from an enemy willing to blunt any advantages the MAF has to offer. Colonel Narvid believes the Boeing767 improves on the capabilities of the KC-135 and that the Air Force currently needs to replace some of the olderKC-135s. However, he argues, it will not fit the bill when It comes to meeting the challenges of the future-instead, a tanker designed from the ground up should recapitalize theKC-135 fleet

The Air Force and the national defense mission are the big losers when talented individuals choose to separate early. Although specific separation figures are not available, analysis of the percentage of men and women by commissioned years of service in the Air Force indicates that women separate prior to retirement more frequently than men. The percentages of men and women remain steady through eh first four years, the typical period of post-commissioning commitment. By the fifth year, the number of women drops two percent, and by the following year, the number of women drops an additional four percent, with corresponding increases in the percentage of men. The percentage of women continues to decrease gradually through year twenty, the point of retirement eligibility. Having determined that women separate from the Air Force prior to retirement eligibility more often than men, Lt. Col. Laura DiSilverio wanted to find out why. The only people with the answers were the women who had separated, so the author developed a survey to elicit the reasons for separating. The results of this survey of 1,000 women appear in this paper. The first chapter demonstrates why the Air Force needs women. It makes the demographic case and presents research results showing the value of diversity in general and the value of women leaders in particular. The second chapter presents the survey results, analyzes why women separate from the Air Force, and lists the types of programs that might retain them. The final chapter looks at the feasibility of implementing some programs that might help the Air Force retain more of its talented members.

Air Force Smart Operations for the Twenty-first Century (AFSO 21) is the Air Force's initiative to recapitalize funds by maximizing value and minimizing waste in operations. This is a fundamental shift by the Air Force toward a desired end state of continuous process improvement. Will AFSO 21 change the culture of the Air Force? A successful change requires a balance between the system components of culture, vision, structure, leadership, and systems. Air Force leadership may avoid failure in its AFSO 21 implementation if it addresses potential failure points before they fester and take root. The first potential failure point is focusing only on culture and thus creating an unbalanced system or organization. The next potential failure point is the inflexibility of the Air Force structure. A third potential failure point is its human resource management systems. When it comes to "quality" programs, Air Force midlevel officers are experiencing deja vu. How will midlevel officers accept it? The failure to win over Generation TQM, the midlevel officers, is a fourth potential failure point for the sustainment of AFSO 21. Does the Air Force have a vision for AFSO 21? The Air Force must rectify this disparity between vision and message and remove a final potential failure point in sustaining AFSO 21. This paper identifies potential failure points associated with the changing Air Force culture. Overall, the Air Force's change plan appears to be proceeding according to schedule. However, it does not appear that the Air Force is adequately planning for a long-term sustainment of AFSO 21. There is still time for Air Force senior leadership to correct the system's alignment and put AFSO 21 on track for long-term sustainment. A culture of continuous process improvement will take root once the Air Force leadership fully commits to AFSO 21.

The development of airpower can be traced to three key elements: thought, organization and technology. The Luftwaffe of World War II is no different. This paper will examine the Luftwaffe's thought, organization and technology as it pertains to maritime operations, or as the modern United States Air Force (USAF) calls it, Countersea Operations. These maritime operations will include direct support of the Kriegsmarine and independent Luftwaffe operations against the Allies. Luftwaffe thought will show that doctrinally the Luftwaffe was not as prepared for the maritime role its leaders thrust upon it, but flexibility and the application of the tenets of airpower provided the basis for adaptation. Also included will be an examination of the fierce rivalry between the Luftwaffe and Kreigsmarine senior leadership and how this interfered with the conduct of countersea operations. Luftwaffe organization during World War II provided a more than adequate basis for conducting the countersea campaign. The adaptability of the operational and support structure allowed the Luftwaffe to accomplish a variety of missions, even as their aircraft and weapons were proving deficient. Finally, the Luftwaffe was at the forefront of innovation in the field of aviation technology, including airframe and weapon development. Once again, interference by senior leadership and equipment teething problems combined with increasing Allied attacks cost the Luftwaffe precious time.

This study focuses on the current global war on terrorism as a conflict against insurgents who attack US power through asymmetric means. Of late, these individuals have selected as a primary target the military and civilian convoy operations in Iraq and, to some extent, Afghanistan. By examining past examples of the use of airpower in counterinsurgent warfare, this study sheds light on the United States' current failings in both equipment and doctrine as it wages this type of war. The French used low-technology aircraft-World War II-vintage A-1 and T-6 fighters-in Algeria to attack insurgent forces and defend ground troops. Well adapted to the environment as well as effectively deployed and employed, these aircraft helped contain and defeat the insurgents. In Vietnam, the United States employed A-1s and T-28s-aircraft with a proven track record in this type of war and ideally suited to training the South Vietnamese air force. The United States should rethink its inventory of aircraft devoted to counterinsurgent war by considering possible replacements for the A-1. It should also reevaluate the manner of employing these assets by locating them with the ground forces they support.

Some readers may wonder at the title of this volume. It was inspired, in a somewhat roundabout way, by Air Force chief of staff T. Michael Moseley, who struggled mightily during his tenure to, in his words, "recapitalize the fleet" of aging USAF aircraft during a period of significant budget constraints. In a world of rapid change and confounding problems that threaten all of mankind, intellectual recapitalization of the Air Force has become critical to survival and success and is at least equal in importance to the recapitalization of the aircraft fleet. One article, "The Essence of Aerospace Power: A New Perspective from a Century of Experience," had been heavily edited to meet the space limitations of the journal in which it was published. The essays and speeches are grouped into four broad subject areas, within which they are arranged chronologically. Part 1, Considering the Past-Contemplating the Future, examines some classical military themes and their relationship to modern military problems and the use of modern airpower. Airpower is a child of technological development, and Airmen are in love with their high-tech gadgetry. Technological fascination is not limited to Airmen, of course, but Airmen have raised that fascination to the status of a fetish, often to the exclusion of fundamental military thinking that could profitably inform them about the employment of airpower above the tactical level. The essays in part 1 address these issues. All were written and published during the 1980s. Part 2, The End of the Cold War, looks at problems that were a consequence of this historical development. Although cause for much joy and relief, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the self-liberation of the former Soviet empire, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union also caused great angst in the US military. It was almost immediately clear to those with any insight that as the new millennium (in one sense of that word) was about to begin, the old millennium (in another sense of that word) had not yet departed. Local and regional politico-military struggles long suppressed by the Cold War superpowers raised their ugly heads as the stability of the Cold War gave way to the near chaos of the post-Cold War. Faced with an enormous amount of uncertainty, the US military had to reevaluate its size, composition, and essential missions, all of which fostered spirited debate within and among the services. The essays and speeches in part 2 illustrate these concerns from an Airman's point of view and are representative of the kinds of jockeying for position (and funding) that went on between the services. These essays and speeches were all written between 1990 and 1993. The demise of our arch adversary, the upheaval of the Cold War regime, and the uncertainty that ensued prompted fierce competition for what all assumed would be drastically reduced military budgets. To make the case for maintaining a strong air arm in the post-Cold War era, it was prudent to begin thinking about the fundamentals of airpower, its impact during the twentieth century, and its potential to make important contributions during the post-Cold War era. Thus the essays in part 3, The Nature and Impact of Airpower, reexamine these issues and attempt to identify what airpower is really all about and what makes it so fundamentally different from land and sea power. These essays, written between 1988 and 2002, examine the impact of airpower and how it influenced national and military strategy since it came of age in the middle of the twentieth century. Finally, the essays and speech selected for part 4, Educating Airmen, reflect the primary focus of the author's career for 30 years and the fundamental reason for writing every essay in this volume as well as every other essay, monograph, and book he's written.

As political and military leaders ponder the future of space operations, the time has come to frame propositions regarding spacepower. Specifically, this study seeks to answer the question, "What is the nature of spacepower?" It also tests the aerospace integration school's hypothesis that space power is simply a continuation or extension of airpower. Two points come immediately to the forefront of this work. First, spacepower is different from airpower even though both share the vertical dimension of warfare. Second, space operations have matured to a point wherein valid and unique propositions regarding spacepower are identifiable. The method used to derive these propositions involved literary research that resulted in a long list. The list evolved over three years during numerous brainstorming sessions with several space experts - most of them space weapons officers with theater and, often, combat experience - until the list was carefully refined into the 10 most salient propositions. The author deferred to Col. Phillip S. Meilinger's approach, in "Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power," of citing each proposition as a thesis statement, with supporting material immediately following. The objective of this work is to stimulate discussions and encourage those who do not yet understand or appreciate the nature of spacepower in modern warfare.

The Air Force global engagement vision and expeditionary air and space force strategy focus on the agile combat support (ACS) core competency as the foundation for the rapid projection of light, lean, and lethal air and space power forces. Lt. Col. J. Reggie Hall's Agile Combat Support Doctrine and Logistics Officer Training: Do We Need an Integrated Logistics School for the Expeditionary Air and Space Force? examines the evolution of USAF logistics doctrine, the linkage between doctrine, strategy, tactics, and training programs, and the corresponding application of logistics employment and sustainment functions in a deployed environment. In doing so, he analyzes the USAF's diverse logistics officer training programs to determine if there is a deficiency in interdisciplinary logistics employment and sustainment training. He ascertains whether or not that training shortfall reveals a gap between USAF logistics doctrine and expeditionary air and space force combat strategy. His study also investigates the USAF transition to the air and space expeditionary force (AEF) operational employment concept as the force projection mechanism for the expeditionary air and space force and the reliance on ACS as the primary enabler to identify specific areas where the absence of integrated logistics training impacts or potentially degrades mission success. After these factors have been adequately analyzed and interpreted, Colonel Hall highlights the Army logistics officer training philosophy as a benchmark to gauge the effectiveness of integrated logistics training on expeditionary strategy and logistics officer professional career development. The origins, course development, and utility of the USAF Weapons School are presented as a historical reference for creating congruency between doctrine, tactics, and training. Red Flag training exercises are offered as a model for operational requirements-driven training and as an example of the opportunity to integrate logistics employment training in existing combat exercises. The weapons school is recommended as a model for the development of an integrated agile logistics course to develop multifunctional tactical logistics expertise. An integrated logistics school is recommended as a means to bridge the gap between logistics officer training and AEF operational employment mechanisms. Colonel Hall's proposed Agile Logistics School provides a venue to strategically align logistics officer training with expeditionary air and space force strategy and ACS doctrine. His recommendation establishes congruency with the USAF's global engagement vision and leverages logistics as a force multiplier enhancing the effective employment and sustainment of air and space forces.

In this compelling study, Lt. Col. Carla D. Bass argues that the American military, underestimating vulnerabilities of the US information infrastructure, has based its strategic policy not on a firm foundation, but rather has built castles on sand. Such documents as "Joint Vision 2010 and United States Air Force Global Engagement" assume the United States will have unimpeded access to information on our own forces and on the enemy's forces as well, due largely to our technological sophistication. They propose application of a downsized US military in a still very deadly world, based on the premise of information superiority. However, the United States will not achieve information superiority until we first attain information assurance by securing our own information systems. Indeed, the defense Science Board cited this point most eloquently in its report delivered to the secretary of defense in November 1996. Lieutenant Colonel Bass believes that the United States simply postulate doctrine and tactics which rely so extensively on information and information technology without comparable attention to information and information systems protection and assurance. As outlined by the Defense Science Board in its "Task Force Information Warfare-Defense," this attention, backed up with sufficient resources, is the only way the Department of Defense can ensure adequate protection of our forces in the face of the inevitable information war. This paper postulates that the information operations (IO) mission should be centralized at the unified command level, specifically Atlantic Command (ACOM), to capture the plethora of uncoordinated, IO-related activities ongoing throughout DOD. Using Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as a model, ACOM would assign teams to combatant commands to help plan and execute information operations missions. ACOM should be allocated a program element (PE) for information operations, paralleling SOCOM's major force program11. This would alleviate a major criticism identified in several national-level studies regarding insufficient, sporadic, and uncoordinated IO expenditures. Establishing an information operations PE would also minimize the conflict with conventionally minded elements of DOD that resist realigning kinetic resources to fund IO initiatives, another problem identified at the national level. Designated as commander in chief for information operations and armed with an information-operation program element, ACOM could lead the way for DO to attain information assurance, thus establishing a firmer foundation for US strategic policy.

Doctrine for joint urban operations, which include aviation urban operations, combined with revised tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint close air support, offers the combined/joint force air component commander a set of best practices for conducting counterland operations on urban terrain. In this study, Lt Col Todd Kemper, USMC, argues that aviation urban operations, particularly urban close air support, are no longer high-risk, low-probability missions left to academic discussions, but are proving to be high-risk, high-probability missions, as witnessed during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Furthermore, the author contends that urban terrain has become the preferred battlespace of US adversaries in the early twenty-first century. This environment poses unique challenges, especially to air and space warfare. The difficulty of sorting friendlies from enemy combatants, the latter intermingled with large numbers of noncombatants in very confined spaces, creates serious dilemmas for maneuver and aviation forces. Colonel Kemper believes that this mission, though well documented, has received neither the priority nor the resources necessary to ensure operational excellence and success on the modern battlefield. Thus, he not only inquires about whether we are training like we fight, but also seeks to determine what makes aviation urban operations so complicated and unique that they require stand-alone doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Colonel Kemper examines aviation urban operations during Operations Allied Force, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom, demonstrating the use of airpower and space power as a force multiplier and enabler in the urban environment. During those operations, tactical jets, bombers, AC-130 gunships, and unmanned aerial vehicles provided precision fires as well as command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) support to the joint fight. Although each conflict is different, recent combat in Iraqi cities such as Fallujah and An Najaf indicates the enemy's willingness to drag US and coalition forces into urban warfare. In view of the possibility of collateral damage and with the world media watching, air and space forces can ill afford to get it wrong in urban fights. Colonel Kemper believes that the US Air Force, Navy, Special Operations Command, and Marine Corps should redouble their efforts from a doctrinal, organizational, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities perspective on the important mission area of aviation urban operations. His study concludes with recommendations for US Joint Forces Command and the military services.

In The Politics of Coercion: Toward a Theory of Coercive Airpower for Post-Cold War Conflict, Lt. Col. Ellwood P. "Skip" Hinman IV confronts an issue of high interest to airmen and policy makers alike: What does coercion theory suggest about the use of airpower in the early twenty-first century? More specifically, Colonel Hinman seeks to determine whether any of the existing theories of coercion can stand alone as a coherent, substantive, and codified approach to airpower employment. Framing his analysis on three key attributes of conflict in the post-Cold War era - limited, nonprotracted war; political re-straint; and the importance of a better state of peace - Hinman examines the contemporary applicability of the four major theories of coercive airpower: punishment, risk, decapitation, and denial. For reasons explained in these pages, Hinman finds limitations in each of the prevailing theories of coercion. In proposing a new construct that more adequately meets the needs of post-Cold War conflict, the author recommends a three-phase "hybrid approach" to coercion that draws on the strengths and minimized the weaknesses of existing theory. Arguing that aspects of this hybrid approach were evident in the employment of airpower in Operations Desert Storm, Deliberate Force, and Allied Force, Hinman contends that his hybrid theory of coercion is uniquely well suited for the unsettled geopolitical landscape of the post-Cold War era.

This study is based on an examination of professional military education (PME) for United States Air Force officers that was conducted in 1988 at the Airpower Research Institutes (ARI), Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (AUCADRE), Maxwell AFT, Alabama. The original study researched the history and evolution of the Air Force's PME systems, assessed the current status of Air Force PME, and compared the PME systems of the other US military services to that of the Air Force. This extract, however, restricts itself to the history of Air Force PME between 1946 and 1987. Originally, seven ARI officers, including the editors of this study, worked on the project. Collectively, they examined more than 345 documents, - letters, regulations, manual, studies, reports, catalogs, and histories - in an effort to fully understand the criticisms made of Air Force PME throughout its history. The capstone of Air Force PME is Air University (AU), located at Maxwell Air Force Base. AU consists of three schools: Squadron Officer School, Air Command Staff College, and Air War College. During the more than 40 years examined here, PME became thoroughly institutionalized. Further, the quality of professional education offered by AU was constantly assessed and reassessed. External observers (those outside the Air Force) and internal observers (both military and civilian, assigned from within the Air Force) regularly examined the qualifications and teaching methods of the schools' faculty, as well as the schools' curricula. Throughout this period, PME's purpose was the subject of ongoing discussion: whether it should provide broad or specialized instruction and whether it should address only military issues or include political and related topics. These questions remain unanswered because the Air Force has never effectively defined what it wanted its officers to know or to be. Although the assessments described in this book are not exhaustive, they are representative of both internal and external commentary over the entire four-decade period. Internal criticism is especially difficult to assess since it is often only implicit in recommendations for changes made by the various groups that conducted studies of PME. In addition, internal Air Force reviews of AU and the schools tended to become less critical as the schools became institutionalized, thus making an objective assessment even more difficult. On the other hand, external criticisms - particularly those from non-Department of Defense observers - were prone to find fault with PME. These evaluations were more likely to be explicitly critical, often bluntly so, and they too were perhaps not wholly objective. This study seeks a balance between the two types of criticisms and attempts to determine how they complement each other.

First published in 2002. From the foreword: "This insightful work by David N. Spires holds many lessons in tactical air-ground operations. Despite peacetime rivalries in the drafting of service doctrine, in World War II the immense pressures of wartime drove army and air commanders to cooperate in the effective prosecution of battlefield operations. In northwest Europe during the war, the combination of the U.S. Third Army commanded by Lt. Gen. George S. Patton and the XIX Tactical Air Command led by Brig. Gen. Otto P. Weyland proved to be the most effective allied air-ground team of World War II. The great success of Patton's drive across France, ultimately crossing the Rhine, and then racing across southern Germany, owed a great deal to Weyland's airmen of the XIX Tactical Air Command. This deft cooperation paved the way for allied victory in Westren Europe and today remains a classic example of air-ground effectiveness. It forever highlighted the importance of air-ground commanders working closely together on the battlefield. The Air Force is indebted to David N. Spires for chronicling this landmark story of air-ground cooperation."

Since the end of the Gulf War, the debate over whether there should be a separate space service, equal with the Air Force, Army, and Navy, has grown in proportion to the indispensable value of space operations to our nation's defense. Increasing dependency on space-systems is a fact of military life. In this we-documented essay, Col. Michael C. Whittington compares the leading arguments for a separate space force to the cogent arguments for an independent air force made by airpower advocates during the interwar years of 1920-1940. The airpower issues in 1920 and the space power issues of today are strikingly similar, revolving around four key issues: leadership, doctrine, technology, and funding. The irony, or course, it that these arguments, which helped created an independent air force in 1947, are challenged by many within today's Air Force leadership, which leads Colonel Whittington to ask, "if there were cogent in 1920, would they not be relevant today?" Interestingly, the author, though a professional Air Force officer, is neither a space operators nor a pilot. Colonel Whittington's purpose is not to propose a separate space force but rather to provide the reader with an unbiased perspective of the arguments for and against. Though all agree that aerospace power is at a critical juncture, senior leaders are divided as to which direction the Air Force should pursue regarding space. Space separatists want space warfare freed from control of "air" commanders, argue that space power doctrine cannot be built upon airpower doctrine, contend that space is a wholly different technological medium, and want to free space funding from competition with Air Force fighter and bomber programs. Whichever road is taken - whether a separate space force or an Air Force with a greater emphasis in space - the shift from an airpower to a space power culture is inevitable. And, when this shift occurs, the author argues, the Air Force "would do well to remember its own history."

"United States Marine Corps Air-Ground Integration in the Pacific Theater" addresses how the United States Marine Corps dealt with the challenge of air support for the infantry in the Second World War. Sources for research included primary documents on doctrine and personal interviews from the United States Air Force Historical Research Agency. Periodicals written before and immediately after the war provided additional information. The research indicated that the Marines developed an effective means for air-ground integration during the Second World War. A great deal of this success was due to the Marine Corps' philosophy of airpower as well as to experience gained during the interwar years, particularly in Nicaragua. In addition, the unique environment in the Pacific influenced many of the procedures that were developed. Finally, the Marines learned a great deal during the course of the Pacific campaign itself. The battles of Guadalcanal, Bougainville, and Luzon illustrate the significant innovations and improvements that were made during the war.

In "Weather Operations in the Transformation Era," Col. John M. Lanicci USAF, takes a compelling look at future weather operations. His hypothesis is that a consolidated battlespace picture integrates both natural and man-made elements, which is totally consistent with USAF transformation efforts. He points out that the way ahead is easier said than done and offers several cogent reasons why the weather operations portion of information-in-warfare has not caught up with current USAF doctrine. One such example is our historical tendency to look at weather as a somewhat isolated, tactical problem. Significant advances in information technology and advent of effects-based operations are propelling the USAF weather community away from traditional, single-inject stand-up briefings towards continuously updated advice to war fighters at every step of campaign/mission planning and execution. This technological momentum will make it necessary to fundamentally change data collection, analysis, prediction, and product tailoring. The author outlines these changes in a concept called weather, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (WISR), a term first used by the Air Staff to describe the total integration of natural and man-made environments for predictive battlespace awareness (PBA). The WISR concept is based on substantially increasing the volume of weather data collected intheater by using the same airborne assets being proposed for PBA, persistent ISR, and time-critical targeting. It proposes the creation of a four-dimensional database that can be used to integrate the natural environment into the common operating picture. The WISR concept also advocates transmitting real-time weather information to the cockpit as a means to optimize the "kill chain" by allowing rapid redirecting of sorties based on continuously updated weather information.

This paper focuses on the unique and vital capabilities of the US Air Force's KC-135 tanker fleet. Specifically, historic and current tanker usage, tanker operational employment, and the capability of today's tanker fleet are analyzed, with emphasis on force structure and force management. Given that the KC-135 is the USAF's primary air refueling asset and that no planned replacements are due on the flightline for some time, how can the current KC-135 method of employment and force structure support future DOD and coalition operations? Since its inception in the mid-1950s, the KC-135 has undergone numerous configuration as well as mission changes. One constant throughout has been the reliance of the nation's airpower on this critical asset, whether it was sitting alert during the cold war, or providing mission essential fuel for F-117s en route to Baghdad during the Gulf War. The success of combat operations in Operation Allied Force was made possible due to the rapid, massive, and professional employment of the KC-135 in the theater of operations. This success, however, can be attributed more to the actions of the tanker community than to any planned, deliberate inclusion of air refueling assets into the operations plan. In light of decreasing budgets, aging airframes, increased downtime for maintenance, and an explosion in the operations tempo, this paper proposes a four-pronged methodology addressing taker vision, organization training and employment, as the correction needed to get the KC-135 weapon system back on centerline. This will allow the tanker to effectively aid the Air Force in successfully deterring conflict and if needed, quickly win the nation's future wars.

This study examines the rise of operations other than war (OOTW) as a new and prominent tasking for the armed services of the United States. The author, Lt Col Charles W. Hasskamp, USAF, is an advocate of the OOTW mission, and he argues that the US Special Forces Command is an excellent instrument for the task. The author bases his position on these points. First, the end of the cold war has provided the United States a respite from the focused geopolitical strategy and challenge of "containment." Unfortunately, without the stability coerced by a bipolar world, the shutters have come off and the shades have gone up on "windows" that reveal a new world disorder. While the world has an increasingly interdependent global economy, the legacies of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drug trafficking, and religious and ethnic extremism generate increasing threats to that free market, democratic ideal the American public espouses for all countries. Second, the US government's current national security strategy emphasizes "engagement and enlargement" as they factor into US preventive diplomacy. The national military strategy emphasizes "flexible and selective engagement" which relates to preventive deterrence. Both of these strategies emphasize the use of US military forces for considerable work other than fighting the nation's wars-that is, for OOTW. As recent experience shows, there is considerable pressure to use the American military as an arbitrator and peacemaker to the world. This study examines the arguments for and against expanding our military's nontraditional roles and missions. It concludes that the US armed forces can do and will continue to be able to perform an excellent job in operations other than war, as they have done in the past. The danger is that this endeavor could jeopardize the readiness of a force structure necessary to maintain the more traditional war-fighting capabilities. The study suggests that an actually smaller force and smaller defense budget can still accomplish the primary mission of fighting the nation's wars while also undertaking the myriad of peacetime engagements and conflict preventions our leaders have ordered. Moreover, the Special Operations Command, which has the skill and will to serve well in the full spectrum of armed conflict, also has the cultural, social, and technical know-how to perform the more complex chores of nation building and humanitarian operations.

We have been at war for four and one half years. The financial burden of executing Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom caused military services to undergo extensive cost cutting efforts. The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) community is not exempt. Recently, the Air Force Nuclear General Officer Steering Group (AFNGOSG) requested an additional study of lower missile readiness rates, presumably to identify any potential cost savings from reduced maintenance and security footprints. This research offers an initial study by analyzing the impact of lowered ICBM alert rates caused by not repairing off alert missiles until a lowered alert rate threshold is reached and any correlation to a potential decrease in daily ICBM maintenance team utilization. The intent of this research is to provide an analysis of the ICBM maintenance team utilization at the current ICBM alert rate and at lowered alert rates. Quantitative research methodologies are used to model historical ICBM maintenance data from the 341st Maintenance Group (MG) and simulate future maintenance team utilization at both the current and decreased ICBM alert rates. The results of this simulation and modeling show negligible savings in overall ICBM maintenance team utilization. One maintenance section under study showed a statistically significant but slight increase in team utilization as the alert rate decreased. Another section under study exhibited a slight decrease in team utilization deemed statistically significant, however, extremely hard to quantify as the increase in team utilization was only .62 percent. The remaining four maintenance sections under study had statistically the same team utilization at all alert rate levels.