Democracy has moved to the centre of systemic reflections on political economy, gaining a position which used to be occupied by the debate about socialism and capitalism. Certitudes about democracy have been replaced by an awareness of the elusiveness and fluidity of democratic institutions and of the multiplicity of dimensions involved. This is a book which reflects this intellectual situation. It consists of a collection of essays by well-known economists and political scientists from both North America and Europe on the nature of democracy, on the conditions for democracy to be stable, and on the relationship between democracy and important economic issues such as the functioning of the market economy, economic growth, income distribution and social policies.

At one level of generality, multijuralism is the coexistence of two or more legal systems or sub-systems within a broader normative legal order to which they adhere, such as the existence of civil and common law systems within the EU. However, at a finer level of analysis multijuralism is a more widespread or common phenomenon and a more fluid reality than the civil law/common law distinction suggests. The papers in this study are therefore rooted in the latter frame of reference. They explore various types of multijural manifestations from the harmonizing potential of international treaties to indigenous law and the use of hard and soft pluralism. In addition, the authors consider the external events which are not part of the processes of multijural adjustment but which serve to influence these processes. Included among these important external events are European integration, the growing importance accorded to human rights, the international practice of law, the growth of the Internet, the globalization of markets and the flow of immigrants. This volume represents some of the most current thinking in the area of multijuralism and is essential reading for anyone interested in the coexistence of legal systems or sub-systems.

The purpose of this book is to formulate economic models of the advantages and costs of transparency in various areas of public sector activity and to assess what level of obfuscation in politics is rational. The chapters are arranged in four parts. Part 1 is concerned with the manifestations of transparency and obfuscation in domestic democratic settings whilst Part 2 deals with the same realities but in an international context. Part 3 looks at corruption and Part 4 considers some of the implications of transparency and obfuscation for the working of governments and the formulation of public policies.

The purpose of this book is to formulate economic models of the advantages and costs of transparency in various areas of public sector activity and to assess what level of obfuscation in politics is rational. The chapters are arranged in four parts. Part 1 is concerned with the manifestations of transparency and obfuscation in domestic democratic settings whilst Part 2 deals with the same realities but in an international context. Part 3 looks at corruption and Part 4 considers some of the implications of transparency and obfuscation for the working of governments and the formulation of public policies.

At one level of generality, multijuralism is the coexistence of two or more legal systems or sub-systems within a broader normative legal order to which they adhere, such as the existence of civil and common law systems within the EU. However, at a finer level of analysis multijuralism is a more widespread or common phenomenon and a more fluid reality than the civil law/common law distinction suggests. The papers in this study are therefore rooted in the latter frame of reference. They explore various types of multijural manifestations from the harmonizing potential of international treaties to indigenous law and the use of hard and soft pluralism. In addition, the authors consider the external events which are not part of the processes of multijural adjustment but which serve to influence these processes. Included among these important external events are European integration, the growing importance accorded to human rights, the international practice of law, the growth of the Internet, the globalization of markets and the flow of immigrants. This volume represents some of the most current thinking in the area of multijuralism and is essential reading for anyone interested in the coexistence of legal systems or sub-systems.

Competitive Governments systematically explores the hypothesis that governments are internally competitive, that they are competitive in their relations with each other and in their relations with other institutions in society which, like them, supply consuming households with goods and services. Breton contends that competition not only serves to bring the political system to an equilibrium, but it also leads to a revelation of the households' true demand functions for publicly provided goods and services and to the molding of a link between the quantities and the qualities demanded and supplied and the tax prices paid for these goods and services.

Democracy is widely accepted today, perhaps as never before, as the most suitable form of government. But what is democracy, and does it always produce good government? Democracy is often associated with the existence of competitive elections. But theory and experience suggest that these are not sufficient for democracy to function reasonably well. In this book, which was originally published in 2003, a number of experts from North America and Europe use a rational choice approach to understand the 'foundations' of democracy - what makes democracy successful, and why. In doing so, they consider diverse problems of democratic governance such as the importance of morals or virtue in political life, negative advertising, the role of social capital and civil society in sustaining democracy, the constitutional and cultural prerequisites of democracy, and the interaction of democracy and markets.

Political extremism is widely considered to be the product of irrational behavior. The distinguishing feature of this collection by well-known economists and political scientists from North America, Europe and Australia is to propose a variety of explanations which all insist on the rationality of extremism. Contributors use variants of this approach to shed light on subjects such as the conditions under which democratic parties take extremist positions, the relationship between extremism and conformism, the strategies adopted by revolutionary movements, and the reasons why extremism often leads to violence. The authors identify four core issues in the study of the phenomenon: the nature (definition) of extremism and its origins in both democratic and authoritarian settings, the capacity of democratic political systems to accommodate extremist positions, the strategies (civil disobedience, assassination, lynching) chosen by extremist groups, and the circumstances under which extremism becomes a threat to democracy.

Why is nationalism so widespread? How does the phenomenon arise? How can its negative consequences be controlled? This collection of essays by economists, sociologists, and political scientists from North America and Europe tries to answer these questions at the forefront of political discussion. The work differs from others in that the authors' responses are not based on avowed ideological perspectives, but are rather drawn from rational-choice analysis, the foundation of social science. Although each of the contributors to Nationalism and Rationality takes a distinctive point of view, the collection as a whole focuses on three subjects - the origins of nationalism, whether and why it promotes good or evil, and how to deal with its occasional destructive consequences. Readers will find provocative insights into nationalism through the contributors' diverse diagnoses and prescriptions.

Competitive Governments systematically explores the hypothesis that governments are internally competitive, that they are competitive in their relations with each other and in their relations with other institutions in society which, like them, supply consuming households with goods and services. Breton contends that competition not only serves to bring the political system to an equilibrium, but it also leads to a revelation of the households' true demand functions for publicly provided goods and services and to the molding of a link between the quantities and the qualities demanded and supplied and the tax prices paid for these goods and services.

Why is nationalism so widespread today? How does the phenomenon arise? How can its negative consequences be controlled? This collection of essays by economists, sociologists and political scientists from North America and Europe tries to answer these questions at the forefront of contemporary political discussion. The work differs from others in that the authors' responses are not based on avowed ideological perspectives but are rather drawn from rational-choice analysis, the foundation of social science. Although each of the contributers to Nationalism and Rationality takes a distinctive point of view, the collection, as a whole, focuses on three subjects - the origins of nationalism, whether and why it promotes good or evil, and how to deal with its occasional destructive consequences. Readers should find provocative insights into nationalism through the contributors' diverse diagnoses and prescriptions.

Democracy has moved to the centre of systemic reflections on political economy, gaining a position which used to be occupied by the debate about socialism and capitalism. Certitudes about democracy have been replaced by an awareness of the elusiveness and fluidity of democratic institutions and of the multiplicity of dimensions involved. This is a book which reflects this intellectual situation. It consists of a collection of essays by well-known economists and political scientists from both North America and Europe on the nature of democracy, on the conditions for democracy to be stable, and on the relationship between democracy and important economic issues such as the functioning of the market economy, economic growth, income distribution and social policies.

In this work the authors present a general theory of bureaucracy and use it to explain behaviour in large organizations and to explain what determines efficiency in both governments and business corporations. The theory uses the methods of standard neoclassical economic theory. It relies on two central principles: that members of an organization trade with one another and that they compete with one another. Authority, which is the basis for conventional theories of bureaucracy, is given a role, despite reliance on the idea of trade between bureaucracies. It is argued, however, that bureaucracies cannot operate efficiently on the basis of authority alone. Exchange between bureaucrats is hampered because promises are not enforceable. So trust and loyalty between members of bureaucratic networks play an important part. The authors find that vertical networks promote efficiency while horizontal ones impede it.

The distinguishing feature of this collection by well-known economists and political scientists from North America, Europe, and Australia is to propose a variety of explanations that all insist on the rationality of extremism. The authors identify four core issues in the study of extremism: the nature (definition) of extremism and its origins in both democratic and authoritarian settings, the capacity of democratic political systems to accommodate extremist positions, the strategies (civil disobedience, assassination, lynching) chosen by extremist groups, and the circumstances under which extremism becomes a threat to democracy.