Exploring how the United States manages its still-powerful nuclear arsenalArms control agreements and the end of the cold war have made the prospect of nuclear war a distant fear for the general public. But the United States and its principle rivals China and Russia still maintain sizable arsenals of nuclear weapons, along with the systems for managing them and using them if that terrible day ever comes. Understanding U.S. Nuclear Operations describes how the United States manages its nuclear forces, focusing on how theories and policies are put into practice. It addresses such questions as: What have been the guiding priorities of U.S. nuclear strategy since the end of the cold war? What nuclear attack options would the President have during a war? How are these war plans developed and reviewed by civilian and military leaders? How would presidential orders be conveyed to the uniformed men and women who are entrusted with U.S. nuclear weapons systems? And are these communications systems and supporting capabilities vulnerable to disruption or attack? The answers to such questions depend on the process by which national strategy for nuclear deterrence, developed by civilian leaders, is converted into nuclear war plans and the entire range of procedures for implementing those plans if necessary. The authors of the book's chapters have extensive experience in government, the armed forces, and the analytic community. Drawing on their firsthand knowledge, as well as the public record, they provide unique, authoritative accounts of how the United States manages it nuclear forces today. This book will be of interest to the national security community, particularly younger experts who did not grow up in the nuclear-centric milieu of the cold war. Any national security analyst, professional or government staffer aiming to learn more about nuclear modernization policy and the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be interested in this book. It should also be of interest to professors and students who want a deep understanding of U.S. nuclear policy.

Radiocarbon After Four Decades: An Interdisciplinary Perspective commemorates the 40th anniversary of radiocarbon dating. The volume presents discussions of every aspect of this dating technique, as well as chronicles of its development and views of future advancements and applications. All of the 64 authors played major roles in establishment, development or application of this revolutionary scientific tool. The 35 chapters provide a solid foundation in the essential topics of radiocarbon dating: Historical Perspectives; The Natural Carbon Cycle; Instrumentation and Sample Preparation; Hydrology; Old World Archaeology; New World Archaeology; Earth Sciences; and Biomedical Applications.

For both the United States and United Kingdom counterinsurgency was a serious component of security policy during the Cold War and, along with counterterrorism, has been the greatest security challenge after September 11, 2001. In The Soul of Armies Austin Long compares and contrasts counterinsurgency operations during the Cold War and in recent years by three organizations: the US Army, the US Marine Corps, and the British Army.Long argues that the formative experiences of these three organizations as they professionalized in the nineteenth century has produced distinctive organizational cultures that shape operations. Combining archival research on counterinsurgency campaigns in Vietnam and Kenya with the author's personal experience as a civilian advisor to the military in Iraq and Afghanistan, The Soul of Armies demonstrates that the US Army has persistently conducted counterinsurgency operations in a very different way from either the US Marine Corps or the British Army. These differences in conduct have serious consequences, affecting the likelihood of success, the potential for civilian casualties and collateral damage, and the ability to effectively support host nation governments. Long concludes counterinsurgency operations are at best only a partial explanation for success or failure.

Multinational corporations can be significant actors in zones of violent conflict. Corporate actions to shape their environment can sometimes mitigate conflict, but as the authors show in their case studies, corporate activities can help generate and sustain violence.

Since its inception six decades ago, the RAND Corporation has been one of the key institutional homes for the study of deterrence. This book examines much of this research for lessons relevant to the current and future strategic environment. It is therefore part intellectual history and part policy recommendation, intended to encourage debate and discussion on how deterrence can best be incorporated into U.S. strategy.This book examines six decades of RAND Corporation research on deterrence for lessons relevant to the current and future strategic environments.

The United States has gained considerable experience in nation-building operations through its participation in at least eight significant operations since World War II - in Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. These eight cases can be split into three distinct periods: the post - World War II cases of Germany and Japan under the administrations of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman; the post - Cold War cases of Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo under the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton; and the post-9/11 cases of Afghanistan and Iraq under the administration of George W. Bush. Exploring both the decision-making style and structure of government in the three periods can lead to a deeper understanding of American decision-making on, and the American capacity for, nation-building.This volume first discusses some general theories of administration, leadership, and authority in order to frame the empirical evidence on nation-building. Then, each period of nation-building is examined, focusing on operations, the distribution of responsibility, how U.S. efforts fit into larger international efforts, and the impact of the decision-making structures on the overall success of the operation. Finally, the authors combine theory and evidence to draw conclusions about the influence of decision-making style and structure on American nation-building.

By comparing modern counterinsurgency doctrine and operations to those of 1960s, this paper tests and ultimately disproves the assumption that doctrine as written and operations as conducted are tightly linked. Ingrained organizational concepts and beliefs have a much greater influence on operations than written doctrine, and altering these beliefs will require the U.S. military to reorient itself mentally as well as physically.

Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom showcased the dazzling technological and professional prowess of the U.S. military in conventional operations. As more recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate, however, significant challenges remain in confronting protracted insurgency and instability. The way insurgents have vexed U.S. troops and civilian agencies may also embolden future opponents to embrace insurgency as the only viable means for combating the Unite States. Thus, both current and future wars demand that the U.S. improve its ability to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Over the course of five decades, RAND has accumulated an impressive body of research on counterinsurgency, from theories of why insurgency takes place to tactical operations. The author provides an intellectual history of COIN theory, summarizes elements of successful COIN campaigns, and makes recommendations on improving it based on RAND's decades-long study of the subject. Covering a wide range of cases, from the British experience in Malaysia to the French in Algeria to the United States in El Salvador, the author points out that while specific details vary greatly, lessons of insurgency and counterinsurgency can and should be applied in Iraq, Afghanistan, and wherever else the U.S. may need to wage low-intensity conflict. On "Other War" provides an invaluable aid to understanding and developing successful responses to modern COIN challenges and should interest policymakers, decisionmakers in the armed forces, and specialists and students of military and political affairs. The term "other war," meaning pacification operations, arose in Vietnam to differentiate those operations from the "real war" of conventional search-and-destroy operations. This focus on high-intensity conflict has, perhaps ironically, resulted in such overwhelming superiority in nuclear and conventional military capability that opponents (with a few possible exceptions) are forced to embrace low intensity conflict as the only viable means of challenging the United States. In Iraq and Afghanistan, rapid and overwhelming conventional success has been countered by terrorism and insurgency. Adaptation and learning about COIN have thus become critical for the military in the 21st century.

For both the United States and United Kingdom counterinsurgency was a serious component of security policy during the Cold War and, along with counterterrorism, has been the greatest security challenge after September 11, 2001. In The Soul of Armies Austin Long compares and contrasts counterinsurgency operations during the Cold War and in recent years by three organizations: the US Army, the US Marine Corps, and the British Army.Long argues that the formative experiences of these three organizations as they professionalized in the nineteenth century has produced distinctive organizational cultures that shape operations. Combining archival research on counterinsurgency campaigns in Vietnam and Kenya with the author's personal experience as a civilian advisor to the military in Iraq and Afghanistan, The Soul of Armies demonstrates that the US Army has persistently conducted counterinsurgency operations in a very different way from either the US Marine Corps or the British Army. These differences in conduct have serious consequences, affecting the likelihood of success, the potential for civilian casualties and collateral damage, and the ability to effectively support host nation governments. Long concludes counterinsurgency operations are at best only a partial explanation for success or failure.