This book is part of a new generation of work on the events of the 1920s and 1930s, one that provides a gestalt view of this period. As such, the many events that have until now been viewed as unrelated, are viewed as parts of a greater whole, namely the introduction of a new power drive technology in the form of electric unit drive and its effects. The Roaring Twenties, the spectacular growth of the 1920s, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, the Stock Market Boom and Crash, the decline in investment expenditure, the ensuing depression and the National Industrial Recovery Act are all shown to be related.

In the aftermath of the stock market crash, Irving Fisher pointed to the electrification of the U.S. industry as one of the underlying causes of the stock market boom. Earlier, in 1927, Brookings Institution economists had lamented the scant attention energy had received from economists. Today, some 60 years later, power remains the forgotten factor input. In this book, the author incorporates energy into the corpus of economic analysis. Unlike previous attempts, which were mostly theoretical, this work generates testable predictions. The result is a model of production based on the two universal factor inputs--broadly defined energy and broadly defined organization.

Once the model of production is developed, the book then tests an empirical model with data from U.S., German, and Japanese manufacturing. The results are used to reexamine the role of energy in productivity slowdown. When the empirically and theoretically correct model of production is used, the Solow residual disappears: growth in manufacturing value added is fully accounted for by growth in energy, capital, and labor.

This is the first book to examine the "nuts and bolts" of production processes. It proposes a truly consilient approach to modeling production processes - one that goes beyond the vague principles found in standard economics - and provides details that are consistent with the applied mechanics and engineering literature. Providing a credible analysis of some of the most pressing questions of our era, such as the productivity slowdown and the information paradox, and bridging the gap between engineering, applied physics, economics, and management science, this book is a fascinating read for anyone interested in industry, the modern economy, and how physical factors constrain productivity growth.

Economists and historians have viewed the events of the 1920s, the stock market boom and crash, the Great Depression and the New Deal, as largely independent events. This work provides an integrated view of this important period arguing that all of these events were the result of the electrification of U.S. industry from 1910 to 1926. The author goes from electrification through the stock market boom to the tariffs of the late 20s to the stock market crash and depression followed by the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933. The conclusion is that the NIRA is an attempt to correct the imbalance between production and consumption caused by industrial electrification.

Provides a network approach to understanding trade and trade policy from Antiquity to the present. Argues that trade has occurred, is occurring, and will continue to occur within well-defined, stable networks (e.g. empires, multinational firms, free-trade areas). Is able to rationalize the many puzzles that currrently plague international economics. Results can be generalized to all trade activity, ranging from economic to social, to political.

First studied by Swiss economist Jean-Charles Leonard Sismonde de Sismondi in 1819, "Making Markets and Making Money: Strategy and Monetary Exchange" examines the strategic aspects of monetary exchange--specifically, of making markets.

Economist Bernard C. Beaudreau, author of "Mass Production, the Stock Market Crash," and "The Great Depression: The Macroeconomics of Electrification," examines the strategic aspects of making markets using basic game theory. Drawing from the archaeological and historical records, Beaudreau documents the prevalence of coordination failures in trade in general, and monetary exchange in particular. He argues, convincingly, that the ability to execute trades (make markets) has been, is, and will continue to be a more important economic problem that scarcity itself.

The First and Second Industrial Revolutions were about energy: steam power revolutionized 19th-century Great Britain and electric power revolutionized 20th-century America. Yet political economy, the science of wealth born of the First Industrial Revolution, is devoid of energy, focusing instead on machinery or capital. According to basic mechanics, tools per se are not productive, as they are not source of energy. This book uses basic mechanics and thermodynamics to reexamine the rise of political economy as the science of wealth in the 19th and 20th centuries. The study shows that the failure of generations of political economists to formally incorporate energy into their models of production and distribution has led to the unfortunate state in which economics currently finds itself. With the inclusion of energy, important insights result. For instance, the Solow Residual in both 19th-century Great Britain and 20th-century America disappears.

Unlike previous critiques of political economy, this analysis is constructive in nature, using past shortcomings and oversights as a springboard to a more consistent model of economic activity, especially production. The book is the first of its kind to use basic physics and thermodynamics as a guide to the First and Second Industrial Revolutions, and more importantly, to show how political economists from Smith to Fisher have attempted to understand these two energy-based Industrial Revolutions.

This is the first book to examine the "nuts and bolts" of production processes. It proposes a truly consilient approach to modeling production processes - one that goes beyond the vague principles found in standard economics - and provides details that are consistent with the applied mechanics and engineering literature. Providing a credible analysis of some of the most pressing questions of our era, such as the productivity slowdown and the information paradox, and bridging the gap between engineering, applied physics, economics, and management science, this book is a fascinating read for anyone interested in industry, the modern economy, and how physical factors constrain productivity growth.

The Oxford Dictionary defines a prophet as..a person who advocates or speaks in a visionary way about a new cause or theory, a definition which describes to a tee, the set of early 20th century authors whose writings on power are presented here. In short, the early 20th century witnessed a power surge, the likes of which the world had never experienced. As power and/or energy is the basis of material civilization, it stands to reason that this surge would surely go on to revolutionize life in general.

In this Volume, the various measures taken by successive Administrations to fully utilize the new-found potential are examined critically. These include the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. The readings in this case consist of my own published work on the topic over the course of the past decade. The articles in question set out to do two things, namely situate the relevant policy measure in the appropriate historical context, namely the presence of output gaps, and second, evaluate the efficacy or wisdom of the proposed policy measures. For example, contrary to popular belief, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was a response to growing excess-capacity-related stagnation in the form of unemployment. Evidence is presented which shows that the output gaps referred to above were clearly on the minds of Ranking Republicans at the Kansas City National Convention in June 1928.

The decade of the 1920s is colloquially known as the Roaring Twenties, when modernity came to the U.S. and the World, ushering in a decade of unbounded growth and new-found optimism. GDP growth was particularly strong, as was employment and investment. However, as counterintuitive as it may sound or appear, the 1920s were also years of stagnation, stagnation that owed to the fact that the new, greater potential was not being fully exploited. In other words, while things were great, they still fell short of the potential that had been created, resulting in a form of "growth stagnation." That is, stagnation in the midst of what was exceptional growth. Bernard C. Beaudreau is Professor of Economics at Universite Laval in Quebec, Canada.

Provides an alternative approach to modeling material processes in economics. Argues that material wealth (GDP) is an increasing function of two universal factor inputs, namely broadly-defined energy and broadly-defined organization. Uses the results to examine the productivity slowdown, the ICT revolution and the phenomenon of outsourcing. The latter is attributed to a desire on the part of firms/shareholders to capture a greater share of the relevant energy rents.

The First and Second Industrial Revolutions were about energy: steam power revolutionized 19th-century Great Britain and electric power revolutionized 20th-century America. Yet political economy, the science of wealth born of the First Industrial Revolution, is devoid of energy, focusing instead on machinery or capital. According to basic mechanics, tools "per se" are not productive, as they are not source of energy. This book uses basic mechanics and thermodynamics to reexamine the rise of political economy as the science of wealth in the 19th and 20th centuries. It is argued that the failure of generations of political economists to formally incorporate energy into their models of production and distribution has led to the unfortunate state in which economics currently finds itself. With the inclusion of energy, important insights result. For instance, the Solow Residual in both 19th-century Great Britain and 20th-century America disappears.

Unlike previous critiques of political economy, the analysis is constructive in nature, using past shortcomings and oversights as a springboard to a more consistent model of economic activity, especially production. The book is the first of its kind to use basic physics and thermodynamics as a guide to the First and Second Industrial Revolutions, and more importantly, to show how political economists from Smith to Fisher have attempted to understand these two energy-based industrial revolutions.

Business history is littered with stories of missed opportunities, of geniuses that never cashed in on their brilliance, of great men who sold themselves short. Apple Computer with its user-friendly operating system, the McDonald brothers of San Bernardino with their fast-food restaurant are two prime examples. This book is about a similar tragedy, but of greater proportion, namely of the failure of a nation to take advantage of a homegrown technology, of a nation that saw its basic research usurped by a competitor. In short, it is the story of the United Kingdom in the latter part of the 19th century and electro-magnetic power. It is the story of a nation that failed to exploit a homegrown technology and consequently sputtered and failed while another (i.e. the United States) prospered. It is the story of the tragedy that was the fall of the British Empire.

Raises doubt about the validity of the impending "Third Industrial Revolution" based on information and communications technology. Shows using basic science that information, unlike energy, is not physically productive, raising serious doubts over the ability of ICT to raise the standard of living.

Money talks, goods and services don't. This fundamental distinction is what sets a monetary economy apart from a barter one. As a result, economic growth requires more than capital, labor and energy. Being able to signal one's willingness to purchase goods and services is also required, a "sine qua non" of an advanced industrial economy. Formally, the ability to generate wealth, it therefore follows, is no longer a sufficient condition for growth, but instead, one of two necessary conditions, the other being the ability to monetize (real or nominal) output-the ability to give a voice to what would otherwise be a mere potential.

Monetarists, notably Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, have chronicled the history of money in the United States, establishing a direct link between the ability to monetize output as defined by the fractional reserve system in the United States, and the ability to create wealth. Recessions are linked to the failure of the Federal Reserve Board in the United States to provide the necessary liquidity, and vice versa. In short, the business cycle is essentially a money-supply driven phenomenon.

This book examines another type of monetary failure, namely the failure on the part of advanced industrial economies to monetize output, a failure rooted in the very nature of the transaction technology (producers and merchants) as opposed to being "supply related" (e.g. central banks, supply of specie). Specifically, in periods of paradigm technological change, money income fails to increase commensurately with society's ability to create wealth, resulting in underincome. As there are no private incentives to increase wage income (real or nominal) in response to greater productivity and profits are a residual income form, overall income fails to increase with productive capacity.

This book presents an alternative view of the Stock Market Boom and Crash of 1929 as having resulted from government intervention, specifically from a case of flawed government policy in the form of the Republican party's 1928 election promise of an upward tariff revision―the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill. As such, the stock market in particular and the market mechanism in general were not to blame, government was. Where the market was to blame, however, was in its reaction to the massive technology shock that was electric power-based extremely-high-throughput, continuous-flow mass production techniques (EHTCFPT) pioneered at the Ford Motor Company's Highland Park plant in Detroit, Michigan. Specifically, aggregate income and expenditure failed to rise commensurately with vastly increased productive capacity, resulting in under income.

Economic complexity, like all other forms of complexity, evolved over time, from early Homo sapiens-sapiens to modern man. The rise of economic civilization was punctuated by a number of technology shocks, including the development of large-scale agriculture, the improvement of the steam engine by James Watt, and the application of electro-magnetic power by Thomas Edison and George Westinghouse. An oft-ignored fact, however, is that the basic knowledge/research underlying all three innovations predated each of the three epochs. There is evidence of rudimentary agriculture at least 4,000 years prior to the first Mesopotamian cities. Likewise, the principles of steam power were known in ancient Rome. Electro-magnetic power had been developed in the mid-1800's in Great Britain. In all three cases, something else was needed, something ultimately tied to the organization of complexity, namely the appropriate communication and coordination strategy. This work is one of the first of its kind to examine the various theoretical aspects of communication and coordination strategies, and use the findings to shed light on important epochs of our history.

In this book, recent advances in the field of game theory, specifically in the area of coordination games (theory and policy) are used to reexamine one of the most far-reaching, yet overlooked pieces of legislation in U.S. economic history, namely the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. While dismissed by most as misconceived, misguided, and mistaken, not to mention unconstitutional and anti-American, recent findings in the field of macroeconomic coordination open the door to a new interpretation, one that is more in keeping with the original objectives of the Roosevelt administration.

In this timely work, Bernard C. Beaudreau provides a new approach to world trade, one that combines the archaeological and historical record with recent developments in the theory of networks, the result of which is a convincing account of trading patterns, past, present, and undoubtedly, into the future.

For the first time, trade theory is no longer at odds with the historical record. Likewise, for the first time, trade policy is no longer at odds with the historical record.In short, this book is the first work of its kind to attempt to integrate over 8,000 years of large-scale international trade.

First studied by Swiss economist Jean-Charles Leonard Sismonde de Sismondi in 1819, "Making Markets and Making Money: Strategy and Monetary Exchange" examines the strategic aspects of monetary exchange--specifically, of making markets.

Economist Bernard C. Beaudreau, author of "Mass Production, the Stock Market Crash," and "The Great Depression: The Macroeconomics of Electrification," examines the strategic aspects of making markets using basic game theory. Drawing from the archaeological and historical records, Beaudreau documents the prevalence of coordination failures in trade in general, and monetary exchange in particular. He argues, convincingly, that the ability to execute trades (make markets) has been, is, and will continue to be a more important economic problem that scarcity itself.

Three-quarters of a century after its enactment, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act remains an enigma. Either U.S. policymakers were grossly mistaken or we have missed something. Could there have been a method to their apparent madness? Could the upward tariff revision have made sense, however little? This book, based on the author's earlier work on Mass Production and the Great Depression, offers an alternative interpretation of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, namely as a response on the part of U.S. policymakers to the problem of underincome, itself the result of the massive technology shock that was electrification and the ensuing extremely-high-throughput, continuous-flow production techniques pioneered at the Ford Motor Company at its Highland Park plant. Productive capacity increased faster than income and expenditure, opening the gap that Reed Smoot, Willis C. Hawley, and the Republican Party set out to close via a generalized upward tariff revision.

Economists and historians view the events of the 1920s, the stock market boom and crash, the Great Depression and the New Deal, as being largely independent. This work presents an integrated, empirically-consistent view of this important period arguing that all of these events can be traced back to a paradigm technology shock, namely the electrification of U.S. industry from 1910 to 1926. The author goes from electrification through the stock market boom to the tariffs of the late 20s to the stock market crash and depression followed by the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933.