This research review is a unique resource for those seeking a historical overview of the development of corporate governance. The papers trace the evolution of US corporate governance from the time when the subject became prominent in the 1970s to the present day. Topics canvassed include the board of directors, executive pay, shareholder activism and the regulatory structure that shapes corporate governance in the US. The primary focus is on the governance challenges posed by the separation of ownership and control, a hallmark of larger US public companies.

The separation of the ownership from control of a company is a hallmark of many large UK companies, and has been so for nearly a century. Much contemporary debate over corporate governance assumes that this separation is the norm. However, quoted companies are much less common outside the UK and quoted companies in other jurisdictions often have one dominant shareholder, rather than being widely held.
In this book, Brian Cheffins explores the historical foundations of the separation of ownership and control, asking how the widely held company came to prominence and why it has endured in the UK. He synthesizes existing theories on the evolution of ownership and control in the UK and assesses the extent to which they need to be revised in the light of new historical evidence. He provides the first systematic analysis of why and how the UK stock market came to be dominated by institutional shareholders and illustrates the development of key similarities and differences between the UK and US systems through comparative discussions.
Being a blockholder in a large and successful business can provide the private benefits of control and the power associated with being a business leader, so why did those who traditionally owned large blocks of shares want to exit? Leaving one's savings in the hands of managers over whom one has no control seems foolish. Why were investors willing to buy the shares that the blockholders wanted to sell as ownership separated from control, and why have they continued to buy? As ownership separated from control in UK public companies, those who bought shares (including institutional shareholders, who had sufficient fiscal power to take a hands-on role withpublic companies) rarely sought to exercise control over management. Why was this? Even though the widely held company has been a key part of British capitalism for nearly a century, a series of prominent public-to-private deals carried out by private equity buyers mean that this trend may not necessarily continue. The concluding chapter of this book draws on the analytical framework used throughout to assess the possible future of the widely held company in the UK.

The typical British publicly traded company has widely dispersed share ownership and is run by professionally trained managers who collectively own an insufficiently large percentage of shares to dictate the outcome when shareholders vote. This separation of ownership and control has not only dictated the tenor of corporate governance debate in Britain but serves to distinguish the UK from most other countries. Existing theories fail to account adequately for arrangements in the UK. Corporate Ownership and Control accordingly seeks to explain why ownership became divorced from control in major British companies.
The book is organized by reference to the 'sell side', which encompasses the factors that might prompt those owning large blocks of shares to exit or accept dilution of their stake, and the 'buy side', which involves factors that motivate investors to buy equities and deter the new shareholders from themselves exercising control. The book's approach is strongly historical in orientation, as it examines how matters evolved from the 17th century right through to today. While a modern-style divorce of ownership and control can be traced back at least as far as mid-19th century railways, the 'outsider/arms-length' system of ownership and control that currently characterizes British corporate governance did not crystallize until the middle of the 20th century. The book brings the story right up to date by showing current arrangements are likely to be durable. Correspondingly, the insights the book offers should remain salient for some time to come.

Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation is the first United Kingdom law text to use economic theory to provide insights into corporate law, an approach widely adopted in the United States. In this book, Brian Cheffins discusses the inner workings of companies, examines the impact of the legal system on corporate activities, and evaluates the merits of governmental regulatory strategies. The book covers core areas of the undergraduate company law syllabus in a stimulating and theoretically enlightening fashion and addresses important company law topics such as: * limited liability of shareholders * shareholders' remedies * corporate governance (including the Cadbury Report) * executive pay (including the Greenbury Report) * the role of self-regulation in United Kingdom securities markets * the impact of European Union Directives on company law in the UK Brian Cheffins also examines in detail a number of questions which have not been fully explored elsewhere. These include: * What are the justifications for legal regulation of company affairs? * What are the drawbacks associated with government intervention? * How can one ascertain the optimal format for company law rules?;This