The Global Force Management Data Initiative was launched to improve aggregation of unclassified force-structure data. Aggregation, though, raised concerns about classification because the system might be attractive to a potential adversary. The authors develop a framework for evaluating classification decisions to determine that, while overall classification is not indicated, the inclusion of some data will require careful consideration.

This volume presents a set of lessons learned from the United Kingdom's Astute submarine program that could help inform future program managers. Designing and building a submarine requires careful management and oversight and a delegation of roles and responsibilities that recognizes which party - the shipbuilder or the government - is best positioned to manage risks.

This volume presents a set of lessons learned from Australia's Collins submarine program that could help inform future program managers. Collins was the first submarine built in Australia. RAND investigated how operational requirements were set for the Collins class; explored the acquisition, contracting, design, and build processes that the program employed; and assessed the activities surrounding integrated logistics support for the class.

The U.S. Navy asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from previous submarine programs that could help inform future program managers. This volume presents lessons from three U.S. submarine programs. The RAND team looked at how the programs were managed, the issues that affected management decisions, and the outcomes of those decisions. An overarching lesson from the three programs is the importance of program stability. One-liner: This volume presents an overview of lessons learned from three U.S. Navy submarine programs that could help inform future program managers.