The purpose of this study, commissioned by the Army, was to document the process by which the Congressional Medal of Honor was awarded from December 7, 1941, through September 1, 1948; to identify units in which African Americans served; to identify by name all black soldiers whose names were submitted for the medal and to document any errors in the processing of their nominations; and to compile a list of all black soldiers who received the Distinguished Service Cross, the second highest award. Based on this work, in January 1997 President Clinton awarded seven African Americans the Medal of Honor. The authors were selected by Shaw University of Raleigh, North Carolina, to conduct this study under a U.S. Army contract.

This work focuses on the all black 92nd Infantry Division in the Italian Campaign in World War II and the poor combat performance of the division in Italy. An introduction provides an overall view of the Italian Campaign and the role of the 92nd Infantry Division. The author then examines the reasons for the division's troubles on and off the battlefield, such as the low morale among the soldiers because of racial segregation, the limited facilities provided for them, and their lack of trust in their leadership. All of these issues are explored at length. Information on the early life and military training and experience of General Ned Almond is provided, along with the stories of Vernon Baker and John Fox, who emerged as leaders but endured a long struggle for recognition. The author concludes this work on a personal note by telling of his involvement as principal investigator of Acting Secretary of the Army John Shannon's study of why no African American received the Medal of Honor in World War II (a situation that was rectified in the late 1990s: See Elliott V. Converse, Daniel K. Gibran et al., The Exclusion of Black Soldiers from the Medal of Honor in World War II, McFarland 1997).

The Falklands War is an ideal showcase for how British policy evolved in the 1970s and 1980s. The background of the dispute over the island group in the remote south Atlantic (called Las Malvinas by the Argentines) is given first and then the events that precipitated the 1982 conflict and extensive examination of the military aspects of the war is then provided. An overview follows of the many hypotheses offered for the British motivation to recapture the Falklands, showing that only those theories pertaining to the British perception of their national honor and the defense of democratic principles are significant. The Falklands War did not result in a dramatic shift in British defense policy, but did show the importance of external developments and political realism in policy formation, and these considerations are fully detailed here.